Casiano-Montanez v. State Insurance Fund Corp. , 707 F.3d 124 ( 2013 )


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  •           United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 12-1453
    NANCY CASIANO-MONTAÑEZ; MIGUEL A. REYES-VARGAS;
    JAVIER TORRES-GONZÁLEZ; RAQUEL VILLEGAS-ROSA;
    WILMA J. ROSA-MÉNDEZ; LETICIA SANTIAGO-REYES;
    GLORIA D. SOTO-MALDONADO; NEXAIDA CUSTODIO;
    JUANA TORRES-ESCRIBANO; ROSAURA REYES-RAMOS;
    MIGDALIA ESPINO-PITRE; FELICITA OTERO-BARBOSA,
    Plaintiffs, Appellants,
    v.
    STATE INSURANCE FUND CORPORATION ("SIFC"); ZOIME ÁLVAREZ-RUBIO;
    SAÚL RIVERA-RIVERA; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP RIVERA-DOE;
    JORGE GARCÍA-ORTIZ; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP GARCÍA-DOE; ERNESTO
    SANTIAGO-SAYAS; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP SANTIAGO-DOE,
    Defendants, Appellees.
    JOSÉ IGNACIO COBIÁN;
    CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP COBIÁN-ÁLVAREZ,
    Defendants.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
    [Hon. Daniel R. Domínguez, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Lynch, Chief Judge,
    Selya and Howard, Circuit Judges.
    Celina Romany, with whom Celina Romany Law Offices was on
    brief, for appellants.
    Susana I. Peñagarícano-Brown, Assistant Solicitor General,
    with whom Luis R. Román-Negrón, Solicitor General of Puerto Rico,
    was on brief, for personal capacity appellees.
    Pedro A. Delgado Hernández, Yadhira M. Rodríguez Quiñones and
    O'Neill & Borges LLC on brief for appellee SIFC and for official
    capacity appellees.
    February 7, 2013
    HOWARD, Circuit Judge.          Plaintiffs-appellants are twelve
    dismissed     or    demoted       employees       of   the    State    Insurance    Fund
    Corporation ("Corporation"), a public corporation in Puerto Rico
    that administers the Commonwealth's workers' compensation program.
    They sued the Corporation and several of its officers in the United
    States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, alleging
    political discrimination and due process violations stemming from
    adverse employment actions.               The district court dismissed the
    claims based on Younger abstention.                     We reverse the order of
    dismissal and remand to the district court with instructions to
    stay further proceedings pending the resolution of a related case
    awaiting decision before the Puerto Rico Supreme Court.
    I.
    Shortly after the 2008 Puerto Rico elections, Zoimé
    Álvarez-Rubio,         the        newly-appointed           administrator      of    the
    Corporation, initiated an audit of personnel appointments made at
    the Corporation between 2001 and 2008. The audit revealed that 232
    positions had been filled through internal hiring calls rather than
    through   a    competitive         process    open     to    the   public.     Álvarez
    concluded that the appointments were void because the procedure
    contravened personnel regulations promulgated to implement the
    "merit    principle"         of     the   Public       Service        Human   Resources
    Administration Act of Puerto Pico, see 
    P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, §§ 1462
    -1462h.        In January 2010, Álvarez informed the plaintiffs and
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    other     affected    employees      of     her   intent    to     nullify     their
    appointments, resulting in dismissals or demotions from their
    career positions at the Corporation.
    Before the adverse employment actions took effect, the
    plaintiffs requested informal administrative hearings before the
    Corporation.     The Corporation affirmed Álvarez's decision, and the
    dismissals and demotions became final.             The plaintiffs then filed
    administrative appeals before the Corporation's Board of Appeals
    ("Board").     The Board has yet to act on the appeals.
    Meanwhile, the plaintiffs filed suit in federal court,
    alleging that they were dismissed or demoted because of their
    political affiliation, in violation of their rights under the First
    Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause, and without due process
    of law.      Because the plaintiffs "voluntarily engage[d] the wheels
    of an administrative procedure before filing an action in federal
    court," the district court abstained under Younger v. Harris, 
    401 U.S. 37
         (1971),     and     dismissed      the   plaintiffs'          claims.
    Casiano-Montañez v. State Ins. Fund Corp., 
    852 F. Supp. 2d 177
    , 182
    (D.P.R. 2012).
    The Corporation's decision to nullify the appointments
    made pursuant to internal hiring calls has spawned numerous other
    lawsuits in both Puerto Rico and federal courts.                    One case has
    progressed     far   in   the    Commonwealth     courts.        After   the   Board
    affirmed the Corporation's decision to void the appointments of
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    twenty employees, that group sought judicial review before the
    Puerto Rico Court of Appeals.     See González Segarra v. State Ins.
    Fund Corp., No. KLRA201100611, slip op. (P.R. Cir. Sept. 30, 2011)
    (certified translation).    Like the plaintiffs in the instant case,
    the González Segarra plaintiffs argued that internal hiring calls
    were legal, that their due process rights were violated, and that
    political discrimination motivated their dismissals or demotions.
    The Court of Appeals held that the appointments were valid but
    affirmed the Board's conclusions that the petitioners failed to
    establish either a due process violation or a prima facie case of
    political discrimination.      
    Id.
          The Puerto Rico Supreme Court
    subsequently   granted   the   Corporation's   petition   for   writ    of
    certiorari.    The case (No. CC-2011-01051) has been briefed and is
    awaiting decision.
    II.
    The plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in
    dismissing their federal claims based on Younger abstention.            We
    review de novo the district court's decision to abstain under
    Younger.   Rio Grande Cmty. Health Ctr., Inc. v. Rullan, 
    397 F.3d 56
    , 68 (1st Cir. 2005).
    Younger   abstention   is     appropriate   only   "when    the
    requested relief would interfere (1) with an ongoing state judicial
    proceeding; (2) that implicates an important state interest; and
    (3) that provides an adequate opportunity for the federal plaintiff
    -5-
    to advance his federal constitutional challenge."      Rossi v. Gemma,
    
    489 F.3d 26
    , 34-35 (1st Cir. 2007).      To satisfy the first prong in
    the context of a state administrative proceeding, the proceeding
    "must be coercive, and in most-cases, state-initiated, in order to
    warrant abstention."       Guillemard-Ginorio v. Contreras-Gómez, 
    585 F.3d 508
    ,   522   (1st    Cir.   2009);   see   Kercado-Melendez   v.
    Aponte-Roque, 
    829 F.2d 255
    , 259-61 (1st Cir. 1987). The plaintiffs
    voluntarily initiated the administrative proceedings before the
    Board to challenge the legality of a personnel decision.      Plainly,
    those proceedings are remedial in nature and "not of the type to
    which deference under Younger applies."       Guillemard-Ginorio, 
    585 F.3d at 522
    ; see Mass. Delivery Ass'n v. Coakley, 
    671 F.3d 33
    , 41
    (1st Cir. 2012) (delineating the types of proceedings that warrant
    Younger abstention).       Accordingly, the district court erred in
    abstaining based on Younger, and dismissal was not the remedy in
    any event.    See Rossi, 
    489 F.3d at 38
     ("When a court orders
    abstention on a damages claim, it ordinarily may only stay the
    action, rather than dismiss the action in its entirety.").
    That, alas, is the easy part of the case.           At oral
    argument, the defendants asked us to stay further proceedings in
    the district court pending the Puerto Rico Supreme Court's decision
    in the González Segarra case.       The exceptional circumstances of
    this case convince us to grant that request.
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    To begin, it is well settled that the pendency of an
    action in state court is not a per se bar to related federal court
    proceedings.     Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 
    544 U.S. 280
    , 292 (2005).          Indeed, federal courts have a "virtually
    unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given
    them."   Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 
    424 U.S. 800
    , 817 (1976).       This duty, however, is not absolute, and it
    yields in certain "exceptional circumstances, where denying a
    federal forum would clearly serve an important countervailing
    interest."     Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
    517 U.S. 706
    , 716
    (1996) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    The    Supreme   Court   has    delineated   several abstention
    doctrines,   see    
    id. at 716-17
    ,    which   "reflect    a   complex   of
    considerations designed to soften the tensions inherent in a system
    that contemplates parallel judicial processes."               Pennzoil Co. v.
    Texaco, Inc., 
    481 U.S. 1
    , 11 n.9 (1987).           Although "the categories
    do matter," Rio Grande Cmty. Health Ctr., Inc., 
    397 F.3d at 68
    ,
    "[t]he various types of abstention are not rigid pigeonholes into
    which federal courts must try to fit cases."             Pennzoil Co., 
    481 U.S. at
    11 n.9.    Here, both the Pullman abstention doctrine and the
    principles of federalism, comity, and sound judicial administration
    that ground the various abstention doctrines counsel a stay of the
    federal court proceedings pending the Puerto Rico Supreme Court's
    decision in the related Commonwealth court litigation.
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    Pullman abstention serves to "avoid federal-court error
    in   deciding      state-law   questions   antecedent    to    federal
    constitutional issues." Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona,
    
    520 U.S. 43
    , 76 (1997); see R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 
    312 U.S. 496
    , 501 (1941). Under Pullman, federal courts should abstain
    when "(1) substantial uncertainty exists over the meaning of the
    state law in question, and (2) settling the question of state law
    will or may well obviate the need to resolve a significant federal
    constitutional question."      Batterman v. Leahy, 
    544 F.3d 370
    , 373
    (1st Cir. 2008).    "[T]he fact that a state proceeding is actually
    pending strengthens the case for [Pullman] abstention."        Rivera-
    Feliciano v. Acevedo-Vilá, 
    438 F.3d 50
    , 61 (1st Cir. 2006); see
    Harris Cnty. Comm'rs Court v. Moore, 
    420 U.S. 77
    , 83 (1975) ("Where
    there is an action pending in state court that will likely resolve
    the state-law questions underlying the federal claim, [the Supreme
    court has] regularly ordered abstention.").
    Applying these principles to the plaintiffs' Fourteenth
    Amendment due process claim, we conclude that a stay of the federal
    proceedings is appropriate.      The Constitution affords procedural
    due process protections to government employees who possess a
    property interest in continued public employment.       See Cleveland
    Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 
    470 U.S. 532
    , 541 (1985).         Property
    interests are creatures of state law, and under the laws of Puerto
    Rico, public employees who lawfully hold career positions have a
    -8-
    protected     property   interest    in   continued           employment   in   those
    positions.      Costa-Urena v. Segarra, 
    590 F.3d 18
    , 27 (1st Cir.
    2009).      Employees whose hiring contravened Commonwealth laws and
    regulations, however, are not vested with a property interest in
    their career positions.       Id.; González-de-Blasini v. Family Dep't,
    
    377 F.3d 81
    , 86 (1st Cir. 2004); Kauffman v. P.R. Tel. Co., 
    841 F.2d 1169
    , 1173-74 (1st Cir. 1988).           "[T]heir career appointments
    are null and void ab initio" and no due process protections attach.
    Kauffman, 
    841 F.2d at 1173
    .
    Hence, whether the plaintiffs have a property interest in
    their career positions at the Corporation hinges on the legality of
    their appointments, the very issue that the Commonwealth's highest
    court is poised to decide in González Segarra.                  As is evident from
    the   divergent      legal   interpretations        of    the     agency   and    the
    intermediate appellate court in that case, substantial uncertainty
    surrounds the issue.         Determining whether internal hiring calls
    violated the merit principle incorporated into public personnel
    laws of Puerto Rico involves complex questions of statutory and
    regulatory interpretation.         The questions concern the requirements
    of    the    merit    principle,    the     power        of     the   Corporation's
    administrator to limit competition for certain positions, the
    ability of a subsequent administrator to countermand the decisions
    of the predecessor, and the role of Commonwealth-wide fiscal
    measures aimed at reducing public payroll costs.                      See González
    -9-
    Segarra, No. KLRA201100611, slip op. at 29-53. Resolution of these
    unsettled issues of Puerto Rico administrative and statutory law
    may obviate the need to decide whether the plaintiffs received
    constitutionally adequate process prior to losing their positions.
    At the very least, once the Puerto Rico Supreme Court "has spoken,
    adjudication of any remaining constitutional questions may indeed
    become greatly simplified."               Arizonans for Official English, 
    520 U.S. at 80
    .        The circumstances of this case suggest that it might
    well fit within the Pullman rubric.
    Considerations of federalism, comity, and sound judicial
    administration also sway us to direct a stay of the federal court
    proceedings.        See Cruz v. Melecio, 
    204 F.3d 14
    , 22-25 (1st Cir.
    2000)      (considering      the    same    in    ordering       a       stay    of     federal
    proceedings        pending    the    outcome       of   a    related            state    court
    litigation).       The Commonwealth case is pending before the highest
    court of the jurisdiction.           "From the standpoint of federalism and
    comity, there is something particularly offensive about hijacking
    a   case    that    is   pending     on    the    docket    of       a    state's       highest
    tribunal."     
    Id. at 24
    .      Yet another concern is that, absent a stay,
    the district court could be forced to decide the complex state law
    issue intertwined with the due process claim before the Puerto Rico
    Supreme Court issues its decision.                  A contrary ruling from the
    Commonwealth court would render the federal court's opinion "merely
    advisory -- an outcome we seek to avoid in any case."                             Currie v.
    -10-
    Grp. Ins. Comm'n, 
    290 F.3d 1
    , 11 (1st Cir. 2002); accord Rivera-
    Feliciano, 
    438 F.3d at 62
    ; see Pennzoil Co., 
    481 U.S. at
    11 n.9
    ("In some cases, the probability that any federal adjudication
    would be effectively advisory is so great that this concern alone
    is   sufficient     to    justify   abstention[.]").       It   is    therefore
    preferable     to   allow    the    Commonwealth   court   to     resolve     the
    controlling issue of Puerto Rico law first.
    We recognize, of course, that the plaintiffs' political
    discrimination claim is not synonymous with their due process claim
    and, thus, will not necessarily be resolved by answering the
    unsettled state law question.         If that claim is not rendered moot
    by the Puerto Rico Supreme Court's decision, the parties will have
    their chance to argue it in federal court at a later date.                  We are
    not surrendering federal court jurisdiction over either federal
    claim,   but   simply     staying   the   proceedings   until     the      related
    Commonwealth proceedings have run their course.
    III.
    For      the   foregoing    reasons,    we   reverse      the    order
    dismissing the plaintiffs' action and remand the case to the
    district court with instructions to stay proceedings pending the
    Puerto Rico Supreme Court's decision in the González Segarra case.
    So ordered.
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