United States v. Ramirez-Vega ( 1998 )


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  •                      [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    No. 96-2081
    UNITED STATES,
    Appellee,
    v.
    CARMELO RAMIREZ-VEGA, A/K/A TITO MORGAN,
    Defendant, Appellant.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
    [Hon. Daniel R. Dominguez, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Boudin, Circuit Judge,
    Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
    and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
    Edward E. Parson on brief for appellant.
    Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Nelson Perez-Sosa, Assistant
    United States Attorney, and Jose A. Quiles-Espinosa, Senior Litigation
    Counsel, on brief for appellee.
    March 17, 1998
    Per Curiam.  Defendant-appellant Carmelo Ramirez-Vega
    appeals from his sentence imposed following a guilty plea to
    possession with intent to distribute (with two co-defendants)
    of two kilograms of cocaine.  Appellant's sole issue on appeal
    is that the court erred in imposing a two-level enhancement for
    his supervisory role in the offense under Section 3B1.1(c) of
    the United States Sentencing Guidelines.  He seeks to have his
    sentence vacated and remanded for a hearing on his role in the
    offense.
    The guilty plea was entered pursuant to a plea
    agreement under Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(1)(B).  Appellant
    specifically agreed that he "had an aggravating role as a
    supervisor within the meaning of the Guidelines Section
    3B1.1(c) and that, therefore, the base offense level shall be
    increased by an additional TWO (2) levels."  At his sentencing
    hearing, appellant clearly stated that he did not wish to
    withdraw his plea.  Nor does he attack the validity of the plea
    on appeal.  Our careful review of the record reveals that there
    is ample support for the district court's finding that Ramirez
    had a supervisory role within the meaning of U.S.S.G.
    3B1.1(c).
    Under these circumstances, the district court did not
    err in imposing a two-level enhancement for appellant's role in
    the offense.  Contrary to appellant's contentions, the district
    court clearly set forth the reasons for imposing the
    enhancement:  1) the plea agreement under which the sentence
    was imposed specifically provided for the enhancement and 2)
    there was factual support for the finding that appellant's role
    was supervisory.
    The information contained in the Presentence Report
    ("PSR") supported a finding that Ramirez "exercised control
    over, or was otherwise responsible for organizing the
    activities of, at least one other individual in committing the
    crime."  United States v. Akitoye, 
    923 F.2d 221
    , 227 (1st Cir.
    1991).  The PSR provided that Ramirez "was accompanied by
    [Acevedo] on more than one of the former's drug negotiations."
    PSR, p. 6.  It further reported that
    [a]ccording to the Assistant U.S. Attorney, [co-
    defendant Acevedo] was the one who either helped
    carry the cocaine, gave same to the buyer, and on
    other occasions, delivered or accepted payments for
    [Ramirez].  He had no decision making authority, nor
    was he knowledgeable as to the details of the
    negotiations or transactions.
    PSR, p. 7.  The PSR noted that Ramirez was "described as a
    leader."  Ramirez was often accompanied by Acevedo, but the
    latter "exercised no role other than that of helper." PSR, p.
    7.  "[F]actual averments contained in the PSI Report usually
    are deemed reliable enough to be used for sentencing purposes."
    United States v. Brewster, 
    127 F.3d 22
    , 28 (1st Cir. 1997).
    The district court did not err in relying -- in part --
    upon information from a co-defendant's guilty plea and
    sentencing hearings, where appellant had the opportunity to
    respond to that information before his sentence was imposed.
    Compare United States v. Berzon, 
    941 F.2d 8
    , 21 (1st Cir.
    1991).  Nor, under these circumstances, did the court abuse its
    wide discretion in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing to
    consider statements that appellant indicated would be provided
    by his co-defendants regarding his role in the offense.  "[T]he
    decision to hold an evidentiary hearing at the time of
    sentencing or, alternatively, to eschew such a hearing, lies
    within the sound discretion of the sentencing court."  United
    States v. Robles-Torres, 
    109 F.3d 83
    , 85 (1st Cir. 1997).
    Appellant's conviction and sentence are summarily
    affirmed. See Loc. R. 27.1.