United States v. Candelaria-Silva , 714 F.3d 651 ( 2013 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 11-1064
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
MOISÉS CANDELARIA-SILVA,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. José Antonio Fusté, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Selya and Lipez,
Circuit Judges.
Judith H. Mizner, Assistant Federal Public Defender, District
of Massachusetts, for appellant.
Justin Reid Martin, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, Nelson
Pérez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate
Division, and Julia M. Meconiates, Assistant United States
Attorney, were on brief for appellee.
May 13, 2013
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. This is a second appeal from
the denial of Defendant-Appellant Moisés Candelaria-Silva's
("Moisés") motion for reduction of sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and the retroactively amended crack-cocaine guidelines. The
first time around, the district court found defendant ineligible
for a reduction, stating, without further explanation, that "[a]ny
of the other narcotics [underlying this offense] standing alone
substantiate[s] the [Offense Level] of 42 for which the defendant
was convicted." United States v. Candelaria-Silva, 357 F. App'x
306 (1st Cir. 2009) (per curiam). Because the court's conclusion
was not self-evident on the face of the record, we vacated that
order on appeal and remanded for further proceedings. In so doing,
we made plain that, under the applicable law, Moisés "may only be
held responsible for those drugs he personally handled as well as
those that were reasonably foreseeable to him." Id. at 307.
The district court reaffirmed its ruling on remand. It
found that the quantity of heroin distributed by the conspiracy, of
which Moisés was a member, was reasonably foreseeable to him and in
itself sufficient to support the sentence imposed. Moisés contends
that the district court's foreseeability finding and the drug
quantity determinations underlying it were clearly erroneous. We
agree.
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I. Background
Moisés was arrested in February 1995, along with more
than 30 co-conspirators, for his part in a massive drug conspiracy,
which had controlled a substantial share of the Puerto Rican drug
market since at least 1988. At the height of its power, the
conspiracy headed by Israel Santiago-Lugo ("Santiago-Lugo")
controlled the drug trade in the northern half of Puerto Rico,
generating millions of dollars in profits and waves of violent
reprisals against their competitors.
Though he was more than a street-level dealer, Moisés was
a comparatively young, minor player in the conspiracy. Evidence
presented at trial supported a conclusion that for at least some
period of time, Moisés controlled the conspiracy's drug point at
Villa Evangelina, a public housing project in Manatí, Puerto Rico.
Exactly when and for how long Moisés controlled Villa Evangelina is
not clear. One former co-conspirator testified that he thought
Moisés was working at Villa Evangelina in 1992 or 1993, but could
not be sure.1
Beyond his involvement at Villa Evangelina, however, no
evidence presented at trial explicitly tied Moisés to the
conspiracy before 1992 or 1993. Testimony of co-operating co-
conspirators at trial indicated that Moisés' mother and his older
1
Moisés apparently became the head of the Villa Evangelina point
after the incarceration of his older brother in 1993.
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brother Eulalio had been stashing and packaging drugs in the
Candelaria-Silva's family home for several years, but no evidence
of record directly linked Moisés to those activities.
As relevant here, at trial, the government presented two
ledgers that the police had seized from a co-conspirator during a
search of an apartment in Virgilio-Dávila. An FBI cryptanalysis
expert testified that the ledgers spanned from October 1990 to
October 1991, and detailed, in units, the quantity of drugs
supplied over that time-span by the Santiago-Lugo organization to
several drug points. No mention of Moisés, his family members, or
Villa Evangelina was made in the ledgers.
Co-operating co-conspirator Marcos Hidalgo-Meléndez
("Hidalgo"), who had been in charge of cocaine distribution in Los
Murales, testified to the use of the ledgers by the Santiago-Lugo
organization as well as to the quantities of drugs reflected
therein. Another co-operating co-conspirator, Carlos Otero-Colón
("Otero"), testified that he delivered cocaine to the Candelaria-
Silvas to be packaged before it was sold at Hidalgo's point in Los
Murales. He also testified that, "at some point," after one of his
deliveries to the Candelaria-Silvas, he attempted to open his own
drug point in Vega Baja, Puerto Rico, and that his transactions in
relation to those efforts were recorded in the ledgers.
The jury found Moisés guilty of conspiracy to possess
with the intent to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base,
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five kilograms or more of cocaine, one or more kilograms of heroin,
and an undetermined quantity of marijuana, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846.2 Moisés was also found guilty of possession
with intent to distribute cocaine base, cocaine, heroin, and
marijuana. At the sentencing hearing, the district court found a
base offense level of 38, and added two two-level enhancements due
to Moisés' use of a firearm and his role as a supervisor, resulting
in a total offense level of 42. He received a 30-year incarcerative
sentence.
Following the 2007 Amendments to the Sentencing
Guidelines, which reduced the crack/powder disparity, Moisés
petitioned for re-hearing and was denied without explanation. He
appealed to this court, and in a per curiam opinion, we remanded to
the district court, with instructions to provide an explanation for
its conclusions.
On remand, the district court concluded that Moisés was
not entitled to a sentencing reduction because of evidence on the
record supporting a conclusion that he had possessed enough heroin
to warrant a base offense level of 38, regardless of any change in
the crack-related guidelines. The district court reached this
finding through combining two pieces of evidence in the record -–
2
All co-conspirators who opted to go to trial were also found
guilty. Some, including Moisés, appealed their convictions, which
we affirmed. See United States v. Candelaria-Silva, 166 F.3d 19(1st Cir. 1999).
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the ledgers recovered by the police and trial testimony explaining
the contents of the ledgers.
According to the testimony of the FBI's cryptanalysis
expert, the ledgers recorded the sale of 28,208 units of 'c', 7,802
units of 'r', 753 units of 'a', and 9,535 unidentified units. Co-
conspirator Hidalgo testified that the 'c' was heroin and 'r' was
cocaine and that the units were packets. He further testified that
there were 50 packets in 1/8 of a kilogram of cocaine (or 400
packets in a kilogram).
Hidalgo's critical testimony relating to the quantity of
heroin in a packet, however, was less clear and possibly marred by
prosecutorial error. Hidalgo testified that 100 packets of heroin
were sold at a certain drug point every week. The prosecutor then
asked him, without foundation:
Q: Did you nevertheless find out how much he
would pay for that eighth of a kilogram that
you previously stated was sold every week at
the Los Murales housing project?
A: I was aware, I had knowledge, that at that
point in time the eighth of a kilo of heroin
was being sold in the market for $28,000.
Even though Hidalgo's answer assumed a fact not otherwise
in evidence, the district court decided to credit this response as
an affirmation of the prosecutor's statement that 1/8 of a kilogram
of heroin was being sold at Los Murales every week. Combining this
with Hidalgo's previous testimony that 100 packets had been sold
every week, the district court concluded that 100 packets of heroin
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equaled 1/8 of a kilogram. The court reached this conclusion
despite noting that Hidalgo had earlier testified that each packet
sold for $75, which, assuming a $28,000 market price for 1/8 of a
kilogram of heroin, would suggest that there were closer to 400
packets in 1/8 of a kilogram. Indeed, the district court explained
in a footnote that it believed that Hidalgo had made a mistake in
his testimony and that he had meant to say that one kilogram of
heroin sold for $28,000.
Using the 100 packets as an equivalency for 1/8 of a
kilogram of heroin, the district court divided the 28,208 units of
'c' by 100 to get the number of kilograms sold, and then divided
again by eight to conclude that for the period October 1990 -
October 1991, the conspiracy-wide total quantity of heroin was
35.26 kilograms.
From the testimony of co-conspirator Otero that he had
delivered drugs to the Candelaria-Silva's family home at some
point, which may have been during the period reflected in the
ledgers, the district court concluded that Moisés had been involved
in the conspiracy at this time and the entire quantity of drugs was
"reasonably foreseeable" to him.
Reasoning that 30 kilograms of heroin alone is enough to
trigger a base offense level of 38 "and because it was obvious to
all involved that the immense quantities of drugs distributed over
this seven-year conspiracy justified a base offense level of
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thirty-eight," the court concluded that Moisés was not eligible for
a sentence reduction. This appeal promptly ensued.
II. Discussion
The two-step analysis a district court uses to determine
whether to grant a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2) is
straightforward. See, e.g., Dillon v. United States, ___ U.S. ___,
130 S. Ct. 2683, 2691 (2010). The court begins by determining "the
prisoner's eligibility for a sentence modification and the extent
of the reduction authorized." Id. At this first stage, the court
considers whether it has the legal authority to grant the reduction
requested; thus, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and
its factual findings, for clear error. See United States v.
Fanfan, 558 F.3d 105, 107 (1st Cir. 2009); see also United States
v. Davis, 587 F.3d 1300, 1303 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Johnson, 569 F.3d 619, 623 (6th Cir. 2009). Next, at the second
step, the court determines "whether the authorized reduction is
warranted, either in whole or in part, according to the factors set
forth in [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)." Dillon, 130 S. Ct. at 2691.
Decisions at this stage are reviewed for abuse of discretion, as
the question whether to reduce a final sentence pursuant to § 3582
(c)(2) "is a matter [Congress] committed to the sentencing court's
sound discretion." United States v. Aponte-Guzmán, 696 F.3d 157,
159-61 (1st Cir. 2012).
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Moisés' appeal revolves around the factual findings
underlying the district court's eligibility determination. The
clearly erroneous standard is therefore the compass that guides our
review. The scope of our task is well settled: a reversal on
clearly erroneous grounds is in order "when . . . the reviewing
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v.
United Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). Such is the case, for
example, when the district court fails "to synthesize the evidence
in a manner that accounts for . . . gaps in a party's evidentiary
presentation." Doe v. Menefee, 391 F.3d 147, 164 (2d Cir. 2004).
Likewise, reversal for clear error is warranted "where the trial
court incorrectly assessed the probative value of various pieces of
evidence, leading it to rely on speculation . . . ." Id. (citing
United States v. Rizzo, 349 F.3d 94, 100-02 (2d Cir. 2003)); see
also United States v. Marrero-Ortiz, 160 F.3d 768, 779-80 (1st Cir.
1998) ("While we may agree with the government that the
[conspiracy] did a substantial amount of narcotics business, and
that the totals necessary for a [drug quantity finding] seem
attainable given the appellant's role in the conspiracy, we cannot
uphold a drug quantity calculation on the basis of hunch or
intuition.").
Applying this standard to the record before us, we find
clear error in the district court's factual finding that the
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quantity of heroin reflected in the ledgers was reasonably
foreseeable to Moisés. The district court reached that conclusion
without addressing troublesome evidentiary gaps, all of which
Moisés underscores.
For example, among other things, the ledgers nowhere
mention (either explicitly or in code) Moisés, his family, or the
drug points attributed to them. In fact, trial testimony from a
government's expert established that not a single ledger entry
could be attributed to Moisés. Similarly, no evidence of record
shows that Moisés participated in any way in the preparation of the
ledgers. Nor is there any evidence directly linking Moisés, his
family, or the Villa Evangelina project to the co-conspirators from
whom the ledgers were seized. And the housing project where the
seizure occurred was a long distance away from the Candelaria-
Silvas' home base in Manatí. Last but not least, the ledgers
covered transactions occurring between 1990 and 1991, a period
during which Moisés' brother was the leader of the Candelaria-
Silvas' drug operation. Although Moisés apparently took over
business at Villa Evangelina after his brother's arrest in 1993, no
evidence of record shows what Moisés' role in the conspiracy was
when the transactions recorded in the ledgers took place. We thus
agree with Moisés that "there is nothing in the contents of the
ledgers or the circumstances of their seizure to suggest that [he]
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was aware of them or to support attributing the quantities they
referenced to him."
The government interprets the record differently. From
its vantage point, "the record establishes that Moisés was a high
member of the Santiago-Lugo organization [who] fully participated
in the drug trade . . . [and enjoyed] a position of trust and
cooperation with other members of the . . . drug conspiracy." The
government offers four factual assertions in support: (1) that
Moisés became the leader of the Villa Evangelina drug point after
his brother's arrest in 1993; (2) that the Candelaria-Silvas
packaged drugs received from Virgilio-Dávila for sale in Los
Murales; (3) that Santiago-Lugo himself offered protection to
Moisés in connection with a personal feud with people from another
residential project;3 and (4) that Santiago-Lugo's brother, who was
married to Moisés' sister, would help from time to time at the
Villa Evangelina drug point. The government's factual proffer,
however, falls far short of satisfying the applicable burden.
For sentencing purposes in a drug-distribution conspiracy
conviction, aside from his or her own acts, a defendant is
accountable only for "all reasonably foreseeable quantities of
contraband that were within the scope of the criminal activity that
3
At some point during the drug conspiracy, Moisés was kidnaped
and robbed while visiting a drug point at a neighboring residential
project. Santiago-Lugo thereafter told Moisés that he would be
nearby if needed.
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he jointly undertook." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, cmt. (n.2). This means
that the sentencing court must "ascertain on an individual basis
the scope of the criminal activity that the particular defendant
agreed jointly to undertake." United States v. Carrozza, 4 F.3d
70, 76 (1st Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Cruz-Rodríguez,
541 F.3d 19, 32 (1st Cir. 2008) ("When making the individualized
finding of drug quantity responsibility, the court must not
automatically shift the quantity attributable to the conspiracy as
a whole to the defendant."). Specifically, the record must show
the defendant's "level of involvement so as to explain why the
nature of the conspiracy or his relationship with the leaders of
the conspiracy showed he could foresee a given quantity of drugs."
United States v. Correy, 570 F.3d 373, 388 (1st Cir. 2009)
(emphasis in original).
The immense size of Santiago-Lugo's organization was a
matter thoroughly discussed during the trial against Moisés and its
other members. At Moisés' sentencing hearing, the size of the
conspiracy played a major role in the court's analysis: "[a]fter
considering the immense size of this drug-trafficking conspiracy,
comprising so many members and various kinds of drugs distributed
throughout the northern half of the island, it was not difficult
for the experienced eye of the trial judge to arrive at a [base
offense] level of thirty-eight." The record shows that, within
Santiago-Lugo's vast drug-trafficking network, the Candelaria-
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Silvas played a discrete role through their activities at Villa
Evangelina and Los Murales. The record also shows that in 1993
Moisés may have succeeded his brother as the leader of the Villa
Evangelina drug point. But other than these facts, the record is
devoid of any evidence from which we could explain why Moisés'
seemingly discrete role within Santiago-Lugo's "immense"
organization put him in a position to foresee the quantities of
drugs handled by it. See United States v. Willis, 49 F.3d 1271,
1274 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[I]t is highly questionable to leap from one
person's knowledge that the organization is big to knowledge of its
full scope. The district judge must take a closer look at this
subject."). Nor does the record show that Moisés was privy to any
information from which he could foresee the drug quantities that
Santiago-Lugo's organization handled. While Moisés and Santiago-
Lugo appear to have had some personal ties, more is necessary to
show that the drug quantities involved in the conspiracy were
foreseeable to Moisés. See Correy, 570 F.3d at 388 (noting that a
drug-conspiracy sentence premised solely upon the defendant's
familiarity with the leaders of the conspiracy "goes against our
instruction to base individualized drug finding on a review of the
record"). The government's proffer does little to address these
types of concerns. We thus discard its contentions on this front
as insufficient.
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Similar problems afflict the district court's factual
conclusions about the quantity of drugs recorded in the ledgers.
We have stated on previous occasions that where, as here, a drug
quantity determination relies on multiples of averages or
extrapolations, the sentencing court must be mindful of "the
potential for error where one conclusory estimate serves as the
multiplier for another (i.e., average number of transactions per
hour and average operating hours per day) [, which] may undermine
the reasonable reliability essential to a fair sentencing system."
United States v. Rivera-Maldonado, 194 F.3d 224, 233 (1st Cir.
1999); see also United States v. Sepúlveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1198 (1st
Cir. 1993) ("[T]he two flawed findings feed on each other; by using
not one, but two, unsupported averages to arrive at both the number
of trips undertaken and the amounts of cocaine handled in the
course of each trip, the court compounded the error of its ways.").
Accordingly, in sentencing a defendant convicted of participation
in a poly-drug conspiracy, "care must be taken to ensure that
particularized drug-type quantity findings are predicated on
reliable information and, where significant uncertainty exists,
that those findings err on the side of caution." Rivera-Maldonado,
194 F.3d at 233-34 (concluding that drug quantity determination was
clearly erroneous where "the risk of error was compounded by
pyramiding unreliable inferences"). In other words, sentencing
judges may rely "on reasonable estimates and averages, "id. at 228,
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but not on drug quantity calculations based on "hunches and
intuition," Marrero-Ortiz, 160 F.3d at 779-80.
Here, the district court based its determination that
there were 100 "packets" in 1/8 of a kilogram of heroin on
testimony that assumed a fact not in evidence, that the district
court acknowledged was inconsistent with prior testimony, and that
the district court concluded was probably actually mistaken. These
numbers are not the sort of "reasonable estimates and averages"
that can or should be used as the foundational multiplier when
making a drug-quantity determination. The risk of error inherent
in these loose calculations is simply too high. As such, we
conclude that the district court's drug quantity calculation was
also clearly erroneous.
The government argues in the alternative that, even if
Moisés was eligible for a sentence reduction, the district court
would have found the § 3553(a) factors to preclude the relief
sought. The district court, however, explicitly declined to
consider § 3553(a) given its ineligibility finding; therefore, we
are not in a position to make any determinations in this regard.
See Aponte-Guzmán, 696 F.3d at 159-61 (stating that the balancing
of § 3553(a)'s factors is "committed to the sentencing court's
sound discretion"); see also United States v. Cardosa, 606 F.3d 16,
22 (1st Cir. 2010) ("Cardosa is eligible for resentencing; whether
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to do so is within the discretion of the district judge on
remand.").
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we vacate the court's
judgment and remand for further proceedings. In so doing, we note
that despite the considerable amount of resources and time spent in
addressing Moisés' motion, the record twice presented to us
contains scant evidence from which to conclude that Moisés is
ineligible for the relief requested. On remand, therefore, the
parties as well as the court would be well advised to move beyond
the eligibility question and squarely address the second step of
the applicable analysis -- that is, determining whether the
"reduction is warranted, either in whole or in part, according to
the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)." Dillon, 130 S.
Ct. at 2691.
We have the utmost confidence in the district court
judge's ability to adjudicate Moisés' motion fairly and
objectively. We understand that district court judges retain
considerable discretion in fashioning an explanation of their
sentencing decisions. However, given the unusual circumstances of
this case (a second remand because of errors in the district
court's handling of the resentencing decision), we cannot emphasize
more strongly the importance of the district court's duty to
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provide detailed support for both its factual and legal
conclusions.
So Ordered.
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