United States Ex Rel. Heineman-Guta v. Guidant Corp. , 718 F.3d 28 ( 2013 )


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  •           United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 12-1867
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    ex rel. HEIDI HEINEMAN-GUTA, Relator,
    Plaintiff, Appellant,
    v.
    GUIDANT CORPORATION; BOSTON SCIENTIFIC CORPORATION,
    individually and as Successor-in-Interest to Guidant Corporation,
    Defendants, Appellees.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
    [Hon. Richard G. Stearns, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Torruella, Stahl, and Thompson,
    Circuit Judges.
    Loren Jacobson, with whom Charles S. Siegel and Waters &
    Kraus, LLP, were on brief for appellant.
    Jonathan S. Franklin, with whom Frederick Robinson, Mark
    Emery, and Fulbright & Jaworski LLP, were on brief for appellees.
    May 31, 2013
    THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. Appellant Heidi Heineman-Guta
    ("Heineman-Guta"), on behalf of the United States, brought a qui
    tam action under the False Claims Act ("FCA"), 
    31 U.S.C. § 3729
     et
    seq., against Guidant Corporation ("Guidant") and Boston Scientific
    Corporation ("BSC") alleging they engaged in a kickback scheme to
    promote the       sale   and use      of    their     cardiac   rhythm   management
    devices.    The district court dismissed Heineman-Guta's complaint
    for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 12(b)(1) on the basis that an earlier-filed complaint
    barred consideration of Heineman-Guta's complaint under the first-
    to-file    rule    of    the   FCA,    
    id.
           §   3730(b)(5).    Heineman-Guta
    challenges the dismissal, arguing on appeal, as she did below, that
    the earlier-filed complaint cannot adequately serve as a preclusive
    first-filed complaint to trigger the first-to-file bar because it
    does not meet the heightened pleading standard under Rule 9(b).1
    Heineman-Guta raises an issue of first impression in this
    circuit; that is, whether § 3730(b)(5) requires the first-filed
    complaint to meet the heightened pleading standards of Rule 9(b) to
    bar a later-filed complaint.               We hold it does not and affirm the
    district court.
    1
    Rule 9(b) provides in relevant part that "[i]n alleging fraud
    or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances
    constituting fraud or mistake." Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
    -2-
    BACKGROUND
    A.   The FCA
    To set the stage, we start with a brief overview of the
    FCA and the provisions that are relevant to this case.             The FCA
    prohibits the knowing submission of false or fraudulent claims for
    payment, or causing the submission of such claims, to the federal
    government and prescribes fines and treble damages to penalize
    offenders. 
    31 U.S.C. § 3729
    (a).2            The FCA's qui tam provisions
    "supplement     federal   law   enforcement    resources   by   encouraging
    private citizens to uncover fraud on the government."               United
    States ex rel. Rost v. Pfizer, Inc., 
    507 F.3d 720
    , 727 (1st Cir.
    2007).     Such provisions permit private persons (known as relators)
    to bring certain fraud claims on behalf of the United States
    Government.     
    31 U.S.C. § 3730
    (b).3      Qui tam actions are filed under
    2
    The FCA provides, in pertinent part:
    "[A]ny person who--(A) knowingly presents, or causes to
    be presented [to an officer or employee of the United
    States Government] a false or fraudulent claim for
    payment or approval; . . . [or] (G) knowingly makes,
    uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or
    statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit
    money or property to the Government; . . . is liable to
    the United States Government for a civil penalty of not
    less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000, as adjusted
    . . . plus 3 times the amount of damages which the
    Government sustains because of the act of that person."
    
    31 U.S.C. § 3729
    .
    3
    "'Qui tam' comes from the phrase 'qui tam pro domino rege
    quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur,' which translates as 'who
    pursues this action on our Lord the King's behalf as well as his
    -3-
    seal and remain that way for at least 60 days.        
    Id.
     § 3730(b)(2).
    This procedure gives the government an opportunity to assess the
    relator's complaint and decide whether to intervene and assume
    primary responsibility for prosecuting the case. Id. § 3730(b)(2),
    (b)(4), (c)(1).       A relator is entitled to recover a share of the
    proceeds from the action, subject to the requirements of the
    statute, regardless of whether the government decides to intervene.
    Id. § 3730(d).
    The FCA also, however, includes certain jurisdictional
    bars, limiting a district court's subject matter jurisdiction over
    qui tam actions.       United States ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech
    Prods., 
    579 F.3d 13
    , 16 (1st Cir. 2009).     As relevant to this case,
    the "first-to-file" rule bars a "person other than the Government"
    from "bring[ing] a related action based on the facts underlying the
    pending action."       
    31 U.S.C. § 3730
    (b)(5).       With this statutory
    scheme in mind, we turn to the two complaints against Guidant and
    BSC and detail the allegations made in each below.4
    B.    The FCA Allegations Against BSC
    1.   The Bennett Complaint
    On October 16, 2008, Elaine Bennett filed a qui tam
    action against BSC in the United States District Court for the
    own.'" Rost, 
    507 F.3d at
    727 n.4 (quoting Rockwell Int'l Corp. v.
    United States, 
    549 U.S. 457
    , 463 n.2 (2007)).
    4
    BSC acquired Guidant in 2006. For simplicity, we refer to
    Guidant and BSC as "BSC" throughout this opinion.
    -4-
    District of Maryland.5        In that action, Bennett, a former employee
    of BSC, claimed that between 2003 and early October 2008, BSC
    engaged in an unlawful kickback scheme within its Cardiac Rhythm
    Management ("CRM") division to induce physicians and hospitals to
    use BSC's pacemakers, internal cardiac defibrillators, and cardiac
    resynchronization therapy ("CRT"), thereby increasing the company's
    market share of these devices.         BSC has allegedly offered various
    types of renumeration to hospitals and physicians in exchange for
    their use of BSC's devices in violation of the Anti-Kickback
    Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b, and has caused physicians who
    received kickbacks to make false claims for reimbursement under
    Medicare in violation of the FCA.
    BSC furthers its alleged kickback scheme in a number of
    ways:    first, by "provid[ing] doctors and hospitals with kickbacks
    in the form of follow-up medical services in exchange for the
    providers'    use   of   BSC's   cardiac     rhythm   devices";   second,   by
    "induc[ing] doctors and hospitals to bill for medical services and
    procedures they d[id] not perform"; third, by "requir[ing] BSC
    sales personnel to provide medical care in the absence of a
    licensed    physician    or    staff   member";   fourth,   by    "improperly
    conduct[ing] Medicare billing for physicians and hospitals through
    non-licensed, non-medical staff"; fifth, by "provid[ing] monetary
    5
    Donald Boone, a Virginia resident and Guidant employee from
    1986 to 1996, joined the Bennett Complaint as a relator.
    -5-
    'grants' to foundations set up by physicians and physician groups
    in return for favored status by such physicians," and; sixth, by
    "sponsor[ing] dinner meetings for implanting physicians to invite
    potential 'referring physicians' to, in order for the implanting
    physician to increase the number of patients he receives for
    implants from those referring physicians." In most instances, "the
    benefitting implanting physician also receives an 'honorarium' for
    speaking about his or her expertise at the program."
    BSC   provides     physicians      access    to    an   internet-based
    monitoring system called "The Latitude Patient Management System"
    ("Latitude"), which allows patients to receive post-implant care
    from their residences without having to meet with a physician in-
    person. Latitude transmits information obtained from the implanted
    device through       the   internet      to     the   physician's     office.      The
    physician can then use the information to determine whether the
    device   is    working     properly,     and     whether   any    adjustments      are
    necessary.      Part of BSC's representatives' follow-up care for a
    patient's     device   includes        office    visits,   "phone       checks,"   and
    driving to rural areas to conduct follow-up site visits.                       Because
    phone checks cost less than office visits, BSC representatives
    often conduct more phone consultations so that physicians can
    increase their billing to Medicare.                   BSC representatives advise
    physicians'     offices     on   how    to    bill    Medicare    for    the   maximum
    reimbursement for Latitude services.
    -6-
    In    addition,     BSC   organizes    networking    events      where
    surgeons can meet physicians who might provide referrals.                     The
    "host" surgeon is allegedly paid "as if the event were a speaking
    engagement when in fact it is simply a marketing ploy to increase
    the surgeon's" and BSC's business.            BSC "incentivizes the use of
    [its] devices by planning and funding dinner programs held by
    implanting physicians."         BSC identifies implanting physicians and
    "organizes   and    pays   for    lavish     dinner   programs   so   that    the
    physician    in    question     can   network     with   potential    referring
    physicians."        In   many    instances,     BSC   "improperly     pays    the
    benefitting physician 'honoraria' for 'speaking' at these dinner
    programs."
    On September 28, 2011, the United States declined to
    intervene in Bennett's case.          One month later, the government and
    Bennett agreed to voluntarily dismiss the matter.                The district
    court dismissed the case and the seal was lifted.6
    6
    Before Bennett filed her October 16, 2008 complaint, she
    filed a complaint (under her previous name, Elaine George) against
    BSC in November 2006.     United States ex rel. Bennett v. Bos.
    Scientific Corp., No. 07-2467, 
    2011 WL 1231577
    , at *1 (S.D. Tex.
    Mar. 31, 2011).    The complaint, originally filed in the United
    States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, was
    transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern
    District of Texas in July 2007. On July 10, 2009, Bennett filed an
    amended complaint ("the George Complaint"). The George Complaint
    alleged inter alia that BSC and Guidant violated the FCA through an
    "off-label marketing campaign and the use of illegal kickbacks"
    that caused physicians to perform an increased number of inpatient
    surgical ablation procedures when less invasive and less expensive
    procedures could have been performed. The George Complaint was
    dismissed without prejudice for failure to satisfy Rule 9(b). 
    Id.
    -7-
    2.   The Heineman-Guta Complaint
    On November 10, 2009, while the Bennett complaint was
    still pending   and   under   seal,   Heineman-Guta   filed a   qui   tam
    complaint under seal alleging BSC violated the FCA.      Heineman-Guta
    amended her complaint on January 30, 2012.
    Like Bennett, Heineman-Guta made numerous allegations
    concerning BSC's kickback scheme.       Heineman-Guta, a former account
    manager in BSC's heart failure management group from April 2003
    until November 2007, claimed that over her four-year employment
    with BSC, it defrauded the Government by engaging in a scheme to
    provide kickbacks in various forms to physicians to encourage them
    to both implant its cardiac rhythm management devices and refer
    patients that would be implanted with such devices.
    Specifically, Heineman-Guta says that BSC instructed her
    to provide "lavish trips and entertainment to physicians in order
    to encourage them to refer patients for implantation of Guidant
    cardiac rhythm management devices."        BSC offered physicians all-
    expense paid trips and used expensive meals to induce them to
    at *28, *35. In the present case, BSC argued in its motion to
    dismiss that the previously dismissed George Complaint, in addition
    to the Bennett Complaint, served as a preclusive first-filed
    complaint.    Agreeing with Heineman-Guta, the district court
    rejected the notion that the George Complaint could serve as a
    preclusive first-filed complaint because it did not allege a
    kickback scheme to promote the sale of cardiac rhythm management
    devices. United States ex rel. Heineman-Guta v. Guidant Corp. et
    al., 
    874 F. Supp. 2d 35
    , 38 (D. Mass. 2012). Since BSC does not
    challenge that conclusion, the George Complaint is not at issue in
    this appeal.
    -8-
    insist on the implantation of BSC devices or refer patients for
    implantation.    BSC   required   sales   representatives   to   prepare
    customer management plans on how to retain customers, grow their
    business or win back their support and gain market share from them.
    BSC paid physicians as speakers to gain their loyalty,
    repeatedly paying one high-volume implanting physician between
    $1200 and $2500 per engagement over the course of two years.          A
    July 2005 company power point presentation on sales-representative
    training allegedly instructed that "best practices" at the company
    included compensating physicians by providing them with speaking
    opportunities.
    BSC used "case reviews" to funnel money to referring
    physicians and to provide a steady stream of patient referrals for
    implanting physicians who were loyal to BSC.         Under the "case
    review" program, BSC invited an implanting physician along with
    several referring physicians to an expensive dinner.             At the
    dinner, the implanting physician "reviewed" cases for possible
    referral. In addition to paying for the dinner, BSC allegedly paid
    each referring physician a $250 fee for each patient chart they
    brought to the dinner.   BSC used the case review program as a means
    to not only funnel money to referring physicians, but also to
    ensure the commitment of participating implanting physicians to
    implant BSC cardiac rhythm management devices.
    -9-
    In    addition,   BSC    conducted       "sham   clinical   trial"
    programs.    Heineman-Guta pointed to one specific "sham program"
    called ADVANCENT, which was an "observational registry" of patients
    with certain symptoms of cardiac failure.              Through this program,
    BSC allegedly targeted physicians who were loyal to BSC and paid
    them for each patient they entered into the database who had those
    symptoms.
    BSC   also   assisted    fellows    in   finding   employment   in
    practices that primarily implanted BSC devices.              BSC helped place
    fellows in certain practices and hospitals in exchange for promises
    from those practices and hospitals that they would mainly use BSC
    devices.
    According    to the     amended    complaint,    these   kickbacks
    caused certain physicians to implant or recommend the use of BSC
    devices.    In addition to providing the initials of the specific
    referring and implanting physicians, the initials of the patients
    who received implantations due to the purported scheme and the
    dates and places of implantation, the amended complaint detailed
    the trips, meals and hotel reimbursements for physicians who
    implanted BSC devices.        BSC, knowing that Medicare would pay for
    the vast majority of these implants, allegedly promoted the highly
    lucrative nature of implanting its devices by pointing out to
    implanting physicians the extent to which Medicare would provide
    reimbursement for implantations and the profit margins physicians
    -10-
    could make from such reimbursement.             Lastly, Heineman-Guta claimed
    that    BSC   caused     physicians     and    hospitals,     who    must     certify
    compliance with the federal Anti-Kickback Statute, to make false
    certifications that were material to the government's decision to
    pay for the implantation of the companies' cardiac devices.
    3.   The Dismissal of the Amended Complaint
    On July 5, 2012, about nine months after the government
    and    Bennett   voluntarily     dismissed      the    Bennett      Complaint,    the
    district court      in    this   case   granted BSC's         motion    to    dismiss
    Heineman-Guta's      amended     complaint      for   lack    of    subject    matter
    jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).              Guidant Corp., 874 F. Supp. 2d
    at 41.    The court held that the first-to-file rule under 
    31 U.S.C. § 3730
    (b)(5) barred consideration of the amended complaint because
    it alleged the same "essential facts" of the kickback scheme as the
    Bennett Complaint.        
    Id. at 38-39, 41
    .           The court found that the
    essential facts contained in the Bennett Complaint provided the
    government sufficient notice that it was the potential victim of
    fraud worthy of investigation and, that as a result, it served as
    the    preclusive    first-filed      complaint       for    the    purposes    of   §
    3730(b)(5).      Id. at 40-41.
    Despite the fact that the Bennett Complaint had been
    voluntarily dismissed in another court which had not been called
    upon to examine its Rule 9(b) sufficiency, Heineman-Guta's main
    argument below was that the Bennett Complaint did not satisfy that
    -11-
    rule's particularity requirements.      She contended that the Bennett
    Complaint lacked specific details about the alleged kickback scheme
    such as dates, places and names of physicians involved.     According
    to Heineman-Guta, the Bennett Complaint's failure to satisfy Rule
    9(b) pleading requirements meant it could not serve as a preclusive
    first-filed complaint under § 3730(b)(5) to bar her qui tam action.
    The district court, recognizing we had yet to rule on whether
    preclusive first-filed complaints must comply with Rule 9(b),
    rejected her argument.    Id. at 40 n.10.     In doing so, it adopted
    the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit in United States ex rel. Batiste
    v. SLM Corp., 
    659 F.3d 1204
    , 1210 (D.C. Cir. 2011), which held that
    a complaint need not satisfy Rule 9(b) requirements to serve as a
    preclusive first-filed complaint under § 3730(b)(5).      Id. at 40.
    Heineman-Guta timely appealed.
    DISCUSSION
    Heineman-Guta argues that the district court erred in
    dismissing her amended complaint based on its conclusion that the
    FCA's first-to-file rule does not require the first-filed complaint
    to meet the particularity requirements for pleading fraud under
    Rule 9(b).    We review de novo the dismissal of an action under the
    FCA for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.        United States ex.
    rel. Estate of Cunningham v. Millennium Labs. of Cal., Inc., No.
    12-1258, 
    2013 WL 1490435
    , at *6 (1st Cir. Apr. 12, 2013).
    -12-
    The question in this case is narrow.               It is whether a
    first-filed        complaint   under    the     FCA's     first-to-file    rule,   §
    3730(b)(5), must comply with Rule 9(b) particularity requirements
    in order to give sufficient notice to the government of an alleged
    fraudulent scheme.       To that narrow question, for reasons explained
    below, we hold it does not.
    The first-to-file rule bars a plaintiff from bringing "a
    related action based on the facts underlying the pending action."
    
    31 U.S.C. § 3730
    (b)(5).7       The    rule   is    intended   to   "provide
    incentives to relators to 'promptly alert[ ] the government to the
    essential facts of a fraudulent scheme.'"                 Duxbury, 
    579 F.3d at 32
    (alteration in original) (quoting United States ex rel. Lujan v.
    Hughes Aircraft Co., 
    243 F.3d 1181
    , 1188 (9th Cir. 2009)).                         To
    further that purpose, we have said that the first-to-file rule bars
    a later-filed complaint if it "'states all the essential facts of
    a previously-filed [complaint]' or 'the same elements of a fraud
    described in an earlier suit.'"              Duxbury, 
    579 F.3d at 32
     (emphasis
    omitted) (quoting United States ex rel. LaCorte v. SmithKline
    Beecham Clinical        Labs.,     Inc.,     
    149 F.3d 227
    , 232-33      (3d Cir.
    1998)).8   Under this essential facts test, the first-to-file rule
    7
    It is undisputed that the Bennett Complaint was pending when
    Heineman-Guta filed her complaint.
    8
    The district court noted that Heineman-Guta did not deny the
    Bennett Complaint disclosed a fraudulent scheme nearly identical to
    the one alleged in the amended complaint. Guidant Corp., 874 F.
    Supp. 2d at 39. Heineman-Guta does not expressly challenge that
    -13-
    bars   a   later    complaint    even     if    that    complaint    "incorporates
    somewhat different details."             Duxbury, 
    579 F.3d at 32
     (quoting
    LaCorte, 149 F.3d at 232-33) (internal quotation mark omitted).
    Heineman-Guta says the appropriate standard under which first-filed
    complaints should be assessed is not an essential facts standard,
    but rather the pleading standard set forth in Rule 9(b).
    Under Rule 9(b), a party alleging fraud or mistake "must
    state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or
    mistake."     Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).             To satisfy Rule 9(b) pleading
    requirements, the "complaint must specify 'the time, place, and
    content of an alleged false representation.'"                    Rost, 
    507 F.3d at 731
     (quoting Doyle v. Hasbro, Inc., 
    103 F.3d 186
    , 194 (1st Cir.
    1996)).     To discern whether § 3730(b)(5) imposes Rule 9(b)'s
    pleading    standard     on     earlier-filed          complaints    alleging    FCA
    violations,    we    start,    as   we   must,    with     the   language   of   the
    statutory provision.          United States v. Armstrong, 
    706 F.3d 1
    , 5
    (1st Cir. 2013).      "Where the language of the statute is plain and
    the meaning unambiguous, we will do no more than enforce the
    statute in accordance with those plain terms."                    United States v.
    Booker, 
    644 F.3d 12
    , 17 (1st Cir. 2011).                 Section 3730(b)(5) says
    "no person other than the Government" can "bring a related action
    based on the facts underlying the pending action."                    
    31 U.S.C. § 3730
    (b)(5).     Nothing in the language of § 3730(b)(5) references
    finding on appeal.
    -14-
    Rule 9(b)'s particularity requirements.                 We will not ordinarily
    read requirements into a statute that "do not appear on its face."
    See Dean v. United States, 
    556 U.S. 568
    , 572 (2009) (quoting Bates
    v. United States, 
    522 U.S. 23
    , 29 (1997)) (internal quotation mark
    omitted).    The language is plain and simple:                 an action is barred
    if it is a "related action" that is "based on the facts underlying
    the pending action."       
    31 U.S.C. § 3730
    (b)(5) (emphasis added).
    Section 3730(b)(5) contains no exceptions, and certainly not one
    requiring that the "pending" earlier-filed action comply with Rule
    9(b)'s heightened pleading standard.                   Duxbury, 
    579 F.3d at 33
    (noting § 3730(b)(5) is "'exception-free'" (quoting Lujan, 243 F.3d
    at 1187)).
    Had     Congress     wanted        to      incorporate      Rule     9(b)
    particularity requirements into § 3730(b)(5), it could have done
    so.    Congress referenced the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
    various   FCA     provisions.        See,     e.g.,     
    31 U.S.C. §§ 3732
    (a),
    3733(b)(1)(B),     3733(c)(2), 3733(h)(1),             3733(j)(6).          Indeed,   §
    3730(b) twice refers to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.                     See
    id. §§ 3730(b)(2), 3730(b)(3) (referring to Rule 4's service
    requirements).       As   is   the     case    here,    when    Congress     includes
    language in one section of a statute but omits it in another, "it
    is    generally    presumed     that    Congress       acts     intentionally     and
    purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion." Keene Corp. v.
    United States, 
    508 U.S. 200
    , 208 (1993) (quoting Russello v. United
    -15-
    States, 
    464 U.S. 16
    , 23 (1983)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
    Congress's reference to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
    some of the FCA's provisions, particularly the subsections under §
    3730(b), and the omission of any Rule 9(b) requirement from §
    3730(b)(5), tells us that Congress did not intend the first-to-file
    rule to incorporate Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard.
    Contrary to Heineman-Guta's contention otherwise, the
    allegations      of   a    preclusive        first-filed    complaint   under   §
    3730(b)(5) need not comport with Rule 9(b)'s pleading requirements
    to provide the government with sufficient notice of potential
    fraud.   In amending the FCA in 1986 to add § 3730(b)(5), Congress
    sought   to    strike      the   appropriate      balance    "between   adequate
    incentives for whistle-blowing insiders with genuinely valuable
    information and discouragement of opportunistic plaintiffs who have
    no significant information to contribute of their own."                 LaCorte,
    149 F.3d at 234 (quoting United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal
    Ry v. Quinn, 
    14 F.3d 645
    , 650 (D.C. Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation
    mark omitted); see False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
    99-562, § 3, 
    100 Stat. 3153
    , 3154-55 (1986).                   To achieve that
    balance, § 3730(b)(5) "allow[s] recovery when a qui tam relator
    puts the government on notice of potential fraud," and "bar[s]
    copycat actions that provide no additional material information"
    about the fraud.          Batiste, 
    659 F.3d at 1210
     (underline omitted);
    see also LaCorte,          149   F.3d   at    233-34   (Section   3730(b)(5) is
    -16-
    intended to prevent parasitic suits and duplicative awards covering
    the same behavior).   This means that if the first-filed complaint
    contains enough material information (the essential facts) about
    the potential fraud, the government has sufficient notice to launch
    its investigation.    At that point, the purpose of the qui tam
    action under § 3730(b) is satisfied.     If a later-filed action,
    filed while the first one is pending, offers merely additional
    facts and details about the same scheme, the later-filed action
    will be barred because it is duplicative of the first suit.    The
    reason for allowing private persons to bring qui tam actions is to
    reduce fraud against the government.   A later-filed complaint that
    mirrors the essential facts as the pending earlier-filed complaint
    does nothing to help reduce fraud of which the government is
    already aware.   LaCorte, 149 F.3d at 234.9
    9
    In arguing that only the particularity required by Rule 9(b)
    suffices to provide the government with sufficient notice of
    alleged fraud, Heineman-Guta challenges the district court's use of
    the essential facts test in deciding whether the government had
    such notice. At base, she argues that the essential facts test is
    not used to decide whether the first-filed complaint provides
    adequate notice to the government to justify barring subsequently
    filed complaints under the first-to-file rule.     Heineman-Guta's
    argument ignores this court's precedent. As we noted in Duxbury,
    and reiterate here, the purpose of the first-to-file rule is to
    promptly notify the government about the essential facts of a
    fraudulent scheme. Duxbury, 
    579 F.3d at 25, 32
    . In Duxbury, this
    circuit adopted the essential facts standard and applied that
    standard in determining whether the later-filed complaint was
    barred under § 3730(b)(5).    Id. at 32-33.    The essential facts
    standard is therefore applied to determine whether the government
    has been adequately alerted of the essential facts of the
    fraudulent scheme in the first-filed complaint such that the
    later-filed complaint (filed while the first one is pending)
    -17-
    Unlike the purpose served by § 3730(b)(5), Rule 9(b) is
    not concerned with providing the government notice sufficient to
    enable it to launch an investigation into alleged fraudulent
    practices.     Rule 9(b) is intended "to protect defendants in fraud
    cases from frivolous accusations and allow them to prepare an
    appropriate" defense.     Batiste, 
    659 F.3d at 1210
    ; see also United
    States v. Williams Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 
    389 F.3d 1251
    , 1256
    (D.C.   Cir.   2004)   (Rule   9(b)'s    requirements   "discourage   the
    initiation of suits brought solely for their nuisance value, and
    safeguard potential defendants from frivolous accusations of moral
    turpitude" (citation and alteration omitted)); Fidelity Nat'l Title
    Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Intercounty Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 
    412 F.3d 745
    ,
    748 (7th Cir. 2005) (Rule 9(b)'s purpose is to "minimize the
    extortionate impact that a baseless claim of fraud can have on a
    firm or an individual").        Undoubtedly, as a general matter a
    complaint alleging a fraudulent scheme under the FCA must comply
    with Rule 9(b) pleading requirements or face dismissal.         Duxbury,
    
    579 F.3d at 29-30
     (a relator must allege "the who, what, where, and
    when of the allegedly false or fraudulent representation" (internal
    quotation marks and citation omitted)); see United States ex rel.
    Gagne v. City of Worcester, 
    565 F.3d 40
    , 45 (1st Cir. 2009).          But
    the question of whether allegations in a complaint have been plead
    with sufficient particularity under Rule 9(b) to withstand a
    alleging the same essential facts is barred.
    -18-
    defendant's       motion   to   dismiss    is    distinct     from   whether   the
    allegations give the government adequate notice of potential fraud
    to   begin   an    investigation       under    the   first-to-file    rule.     A
    complaint that does not comply with Rule 9(b)'s particularity
    requirements to protect the defendant's interests may nonetheless
    provide the government sufficient notice to begin an investigation
    of an alleged fraudulent scheme.           See Batiste, 
    659 F.3d at 1210
    .
    We    therefore    hold    that,     for   the   purposes   of    the
    first-to-file rule, the earlier-filed complaint need not meet the
    heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b) to provide sufficient
    notice to the government of the alleged fraud and bar a later-filed
    complaint under § 3730(b)(5); earlier-filed complaints must provide
    only the essential facts to give the government sufficient notice
    to initiate an investigation into allegedly fraudulent practices.10
    10
    We thus reject Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 
    431 F.3d 966
    , 972 (6th Cir. 2005), which imposed Rule 9(b)'s heightened
    pleading standard on first-filed complaints under § 3730(b)(5). In
    grafting   Rule   9(b)   particularity   requirements    onto   the
    first-to-file rule, the Sixth Circuit did not address in-depth the
    plain language of § 3730(b)(5), or the different purposes behind
    Rule 9(b) and § 3730(b)(5). See id. We, like the district court,
    agree instead with the D.C. Circuit's holding in Batiste, that
    first-filed complaints under § 3730(b)(5) need not satisfy Rule
    9(b) particularity requirements.     In holding that first-filed
    complaints need not meet Rule 9(b)'s standards under the
    first-to-file rule, the D.C. Circuit noted, as we do here, that
    nothing in the plain language of § 3730(b)(5) incorporates Rule
    9(b) particularity requirements "which militates against reading
    such a requirement into the statute."     Id. at 1210.    The D.C.
    Circuit pointed out that the language of § 3730(b)(5) bars
    complaints related to earlier-filed "pending" actions which plainly
    means that "as long as a first-filed complaint remains pending, no
    related complaint may be filed." Id. The D.C. Circuit further
    -19-
    Applying that standard to this case, there is no question
    that the Bennett Complaint provided the essential facts of BSC's
    alleged fraud to give the government notice sufficient to initiate
    its investigation and consequently bar Heineman-Guta's amended
    complaint.     We disagree with Heineman-Guta's characterization of
    the Bennett Complaint's allegations as "barebones," cursory and
    speculative.       Like Heineman-Guta's amended complaint, the heart of
    the Bennett complaint is that BSC and Guidant used kick-backs to
    induce physicians and hospitals to submit false or fraudulent
    claims to the government, specifically Medicare, as part of BSC's
    scheme to induce implantation of BSC devices and thereby increase
    its own market share.         The Bennett Complaint alleged that BSC used
    various forms of kickbacks to promote the same cardiac rhythm
    management    devices     such   as     pacemakers,        defibrillators,   among
    others, and encourage the use of the "Latitude" patient management
    system.      The    Bennett    Complaint       described     the   same   types   of
    kickbacks as disclosed in Heineman-Guta's amended complaint, such
    as payment of honoraria to physicians, lavish meals and dinner
    programs designed to generate referrals, payment of grants to
    educational    foundations       used    as    a   guide    to   funnel   money   to
    physicians, and BSC's "coach[ing]" of physicians on the profits to
    be made by charging Medicare for care related to cardiac rhythm
    observed the different goals served by Rule 9(b) and § 3730(b)(5),
    noting that Rule 9(b) is about deterrence, not preclusion. See id.
    -20-
    devices.11     The complaint further alleged, like Heineman-Guta's
    amended complaint, that as a result of BSC's kickback scheme, BSC
    caused physicians and hospitals to make and use false statements to
    obtain     reimbursement       for    health    care    services   provided      under
    Medicare.
    Heineman-Guta       says    the     Bennett   Complaint   cannot      be
    preclusive because it fails to allege particular incidents, dates,
    times or names of physicians as alleged in her amended complaint.
    But   the    statute    does    not    require    the    facts   alleged    in   both
    complaints be identical; they need only overlap in their material
    facts. See LaCorte, 149 F.3d at 233 ("[S]ection 3730(b)(5)'s plain
    language is conclusive; the statute speaks of a 'related action,'
    not an identical one.").             If the earlier-filed complaint contains
    enough material facts to alert the government to potential fraud,
    a later-filed complaint, like Heineman-Guta's, containing the same
    essential facts but incorporating additional or "somewhat different
    details," is nonetheless barred. Duxbury, 
    579 F.3d at 32
     (internal
    quotation mark and citation omitted).                  The fact that the Bennett
    complaint     does     not   allege,    for     example,   where   lavish     dinner
    11
    Although the Bennett Complaint, unlike Heineman-Guta's
    amended complaint, does not explicitly mention the placement of
    residents in practices in exchange for a commitment to use BSC
    devices, this is an additional detail about the alleged fraudulent
    scheme in inducing physicians and hospitals to implant BSC devices.
    Because the Bennett Complaint's allegations provided the government
    with notice sufficient to initiate its investigation, this
    additional detail is one the government would have been able to
    uncover in its investigation.
    -21-
    programs were held does not change the essential fact that BSC used
    gifts such as expensive meals as kickbacks to induce physicians to
    use its devices.      And, the Bennett Complaint alleges the essential
    facts of BSC's fraudulent scheme:               that it used various forms of
    kickbacks including lavish dinner programs, honoraria and grants,
    to induce physicians and hospitals to use its products and, in
    doing     so,   caused     false     claims     to    be    submitted     to   obtain
    reimbursement       from   the     government    under      Medicare.12        Because
    Heineman-Guta's amended complaint alleges the same essential facts,
    it merely echos the alarm sounded by Bennett's complaint and is
    barred under § 3730(b)(5).
    We further reject Heineman-Guta's argument, pulled from
    the Sixth's Circuit's reasoning in Walburn, that failing to impose
    Rule 9(b)'s particularity requirements on earlier-filed complaints
    under § 3730(b)(5) would encourage would-be qui tam relators to
    file overly broad, vague and speculative complaints simply to
    prevent     other    potential       relators        from   filing   more-detailed
    complaints.      We do not see how an overly broad and speculative
    12
    Heineman-Guta claims that the Bennett Complaint fails the
    essential facts test because it lacks allegations that the scheme
    actually caused physicians to implant BSC devices or that those
    devices were covered by Medicare. As explained above, the Bennett
    Complaint need not contain a detailed play-by-play narration of how
    the scheme led to the submission of false claims under Medicare.
    The Bennett Complaint alleges inter alia that through multiple
    forms of kickbacks designed to induce physicians and hospitals to
    use BSC devices, BSC caused false statements and claims to be made
    to the government for reimbursement under Medicare. We find those
    allegations sufficient.
    -22-
    complaint lacking essential facts would be sufficient in the first
    instance to notify the government of a fraudulent scheme under the
    FCA.        A first-filed complaint that failed to do so would not
    preclude a later-filed complaint that does allege the essential
    facts of the alleged fraud.         The purpose of the first-filed
    complaint under § 3730(b)(5) is to provide notice of potential
    fraud to the government so it may initiate its investigation into
    the alleged fraudulent scheme, nothing more.        So "[o]nce the
    government is put on notice of its potential fraud claim, the
    purpose behind allowing qui tam litigation is satisfied." Grynberg
    v. Koch Gateway Pipeline Co., 
    390 F.3d 1276
    , 1279 (10th Cir.
    2004).13
    CONCLUSION
    For the aforementioned reasons, the district court's
    dismissal of Heineman-Guta's amended complaint due to the first-to-
    file rule under § 3730(b)(5) is affirmed.    The parties shall bear
    their own costs.
    13
    Heineman-Guta's reliance on Campbell v. Redding Med. Ctr.,
    
    421 F.3d 817
     (9th Cir. 2005), is misplaced. Campbell's holding was
    limited to situations where a complaint fails to satisfy the public
    disclosure rule under § 3730(e)(4)(A).        Id. at 825.     Since
    Heineman-Guta does not contend on appeal that the Bennett Complaint
    would be barred by the public disclosure rule, Campbell does not
    support her contention that construing § 3730(b)(5) to bar later-
    filed complaints would permit opportunistic plaintiffs with no
    inside information to displace actual insiders with knowledge of
    fraud.
    -23-