MacKenzie v. Flagstar Bank, FSB , 738 F.3d 486 ( 2013 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 13-1236
LYNNE MACKENZIE and JAMES MACKENZIE,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
FLAGSTAR BANK, FSB,
Defendant, Appellee,
HARMON LAW OFFICES, P.C.,
Defendant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Marianne B. Bowler, U.S. Magistrate Judge]
Before
Howard, Selya, and Stahl,
Circuit Judges.
Christopher R. Whittingham for appellants.
Carol E. Kamm, with whom Jamie L. Kessler and Donn A. Randall
were on brief, for appellee.
December 30, 2013
STAHL, Circuit Judge. Appellants Lynne and James
MacKenzie ("MacKenzies") filed an amended complaint alleging eleven
counts of state law violations related to the decisions of Flagstar
Bank, FSB ("Flagstar") to deny them a loan modification under the
Home Affordable Modification Program ("HAMP") and to foreclose on
their home.1 The district court dismissed the complaint. For the
following reasons, we affirm.
I. Background
The MacKenzies own property located at 277 Williams
Street in North Dighton, Massachusetts ("Property"). On May 24,
2007, they gave a promissory note ("2007 Note") in the amount of
$275,877.00 at the interest rate of 6.5% to Bankstreet Mortgage,
LLC ("Bankstreet") secured by a mortgage on the Property ("2007
Mortgage"). The MacKenzies executed the 2007 Mortgage with
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS") as the
nominee for the lender. The 2007 Mortgage granted the right of
assignment and allowed for the severability of the mortgage and the
note.
Bankstreet assigned the 2007 Note to Flagstar. Flagstar
signed a Servicer Participation Agreement ("SPA") with Fannie Mae
(acting as the agent of the United States Department of Treasury),
agreeing to participate in HAMP. SPAs require loan servicers to
1
Harmon Law Offices, P.C. ("Harmon") was a defendant in the
case below, but it is not a party to this appeal.
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offer loan modifications and foreclosure prevention services
pursuant to HAMP guidelines.
On July 21, 2009, the MacKenzies and Flagstar executed a
loan modification agreement ("2009 Agreement") reducing the
interest rate to 5.75%, extending the maturity date, and
capitalizing unpaid interest to arrive at a principal balance of
$279,575.23. The 2009 Agreement identifies the 2007 Mortgage as
the contract that it "amends and supplements." On October 31,
2010, the MacKenzies submitted an application to Flagstar for a new
modification. Flagstar denied that application on April 14, 2011.
On April 19, 2011, the MacKenzies filed another application with
Flagstar, this time for a loan modification pursuant to HAMP.
On May 3, 2011, MERS assigned to Flagstar the 2007
Mortgage as modified by the 2009 Agreement. The MacKenzies allege
on the basis of a loan investigation that the 2007 Mortgage had
been securitized into a Lehman Brothers trust prior to the
assignment. On May 11, 2011, Harmon filed a notice with the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts Land Court on behalf of Flagstar
claiming authority to foreclose on the Property.
Thereafter, Flagstar inexplicably began pursuing two
contradictory courses of action. Despite the May 11 notice, on
August 31, 2011, Flagstar evaluated the MacKenzies for a loan
modification under the HAMP guidelines and determined that they
were eligible. Nevertheless, Harmon sent the MacKenzies a notice
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of foreclosure sale on October 4, 2011, stating that Flagstar would
conduct the sale on or after November 3, 2011. On October 19,
2011, the MacKenzies filed a complaint in the Massachusetts
Superior Court seeking injunctive relief to prevent the
foreclosure. On November 2, 2011, Flagstar sent the MacKenzies a
HAMP modification offer, but still scheduled a foreclosure sale for
November 16. On November 8, 2011, Flagstar "closed" the HAMP
modification offer.2 It then removed the pending state court case
to federal court on November 14, 2011, on the basis of diversity
jurisdiction. To date, as far as the record before us shows, a
foreclosure sale has not taken place.
On February 10, 2012, the MacKenzies served Flagstar with
a notice to rescind the 2009 Agreement. Flagstar did not accept
the notice as a valid recission. The MacKenzies filed an Amended
Complaint on February 14, 2012, raising eleven state law claims.
Flagstar filed a motion to dismiss and a request for declaratory
judgment, and the MacKenzies filed a motion for partial summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and
2
It is not clear from the record if Flagstar "closed" the
offer because the MacKenzies rejected it or for some other reason.
In the Amended Complaint, the MacKenzies alleged that the written
modification offer required them to make a previously undisclosed
initial payment of $8,634.58. According to the MacKenzies,
"Flagstar maliciously intended that [they] be unable to afford or
fulfill the terms of the modification offer with the lump sum
payment requirement." These allegations raise the inference that
the MacKenzies rejected the November 2 offer because they could not
afford the initial payment.
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denied the request for declaratory judgment and the motion for
partial summary judgment. The MacKenzies appeal the dismissal.
II. Analysis
The MacKenzies state on appeal that they "do not press
Counts I, II, III, VI, VIII, and XI." The remaining counts are
breach of contract, based on violations of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing (Count IV); violation of the
Massachusetts Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure Act ("MCCCDA"),
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140D, § 10 (Count V); rescission (Count VII);
negligence (Count IX); and promissory estoppel (Count X).
A. Implied Covenant of Good Faith (Count IV)
In Count IV, the MacKenzies allege that Flagstar
"breached the implied obligation of good faith under the
agreements," and "breached the implied covenant that neither party
shall do anything which will destroy or injure the other party's
right to receive the fruits of the contract." It is not clear on
the face of the complaint whether the MacKenzies intended to raise
these allegations pursuant to their mortgage with Flagstar or as
third-party beneficiaries of the SPA between Flagstar and the
federal government. The MacKenzies do not entirely clarify their
position on appeal. On one hand, they state that they "were third-
party beneficiaries of the SPA agreement [between the government]
and the servicer, Flagstar." They rely almost exclusively on In re
Cruz, however, in which the court denied injunctive relief as to a
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third-party beneficiary claim but granted it with respect to a
claim for breach of good faith, on the basis of the duty mortgagees
owe to mortgagors. 446 B.R. 1, 4–5 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2011).
The district court rejected both possibilities. It held
that the MacKenzies are not third-party beneficiaries of the
agreements between Flagstar and the government. With respect to
the mortgage, it found that "Plaintiffs fail to allege any specific
duty or right that was violated by Flagstar in the 2009 agreement
between [the MacKenzies] and Flagstar." It observed further that
"under Massachusetts case law, absent an explicit provision in the
mortgage contract, there is no duty to negotiate for loan
modification once a mortgagor defaults" (internal quotation marks
omitted). Instead, a mortgagee's duty of good faith when acting
under a "power of sale" generally only extends to "reasonable
efforts to sell the property for the highest value possible"
(internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, it concluded that
the MacKenzies had not stated a claim for breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.
1. Third-Party Beneficiary Claim
The district court was correct in deciding that the
MacKenzies are not third-party beneficiaries of the SPA between
Flagstar and the government. It is a well-established principle
that "[g]overnment contracts often benefit the public, but
individual members of the public are treated as incidental
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beneficiaries [who may not enforce a contract] unless a different
intention is manifested." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 313
cmt. a (1981); see also Interface Kanner, LLC v. JPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A., 704 F.3d 927, 933 (11th Cir. 2013); Klamath Water Users
Protective Ass'n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 1999)
("Parties that benefit from a government contract are generally
assumed to be incidental beneficiaries, and may not enforce the
contract absent a clear intent to the contrary."); Price v. Pierce,
823 F.2d 1114, 1121 (7th Cir. 1987).
District courts in this circuit, relying on Klamath, have
applied this general principle in the specific context of disputes
over HAMP modifications and have concluded that borrowers are not
third-party beneficiaries of agreements between mortgage lenders
and the government. See Dill v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc.,
935 F. Supp. 2d 299, 302 (D. Mass. 2013); Teixeira v. Fed. Nat'l
Mortg. Ass'n, No. 10-cv-11649, 2011 WL 3101811, at *2 (D. Mass.
July 18, 2011) ("Although HAMP was generally designed to benefit
homeowners, it does not follow necessarily that homeowners like the
plaintiffs are intended third-party beneficiaries of the contracts
between servicers and the government."); Markle v. HSBC Mortg.
Corp. (USA), 844 F. Supp. 2d 172, 179-82 (D. Mass. 2011); Blackwood
v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 10-cv-10483, 2011 WL 1561024, at *6
(D. Mass. Apr. 22, 2011) ("Massachusetts courts have consistently
rejected the argument that there is a private right of action under
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HAMP by intended third party beneficiaries."); Speleos v. BAC Home
Loans Servicing, L.P., 755 F. Supp. 2d 304, 310 (D. Mass. 2010).
The reasoning of these district courts is persuasive. In
Teixeira, the court observed that the SPA in that case "does not
give any indication that the parties [to it] intended to grant
qualified borrowers the right to enforce the contract." 2011 WL
3101811, at *2. Instead, the SPA "appears to limit who can enforce
the contract's terms: 'The Agreement shall inure to the benefit of
and be binding upon the parties to the Agreement and their
permitted successors-in-interest.'" Id. The SPA in this case
contains identical language. While it is true that intended
beneficiaries "need not be specifically named in the contract,"
they must "fall[] within a class clearly intended by the parties to
benefit from the contract." Markle, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 181
(internal quotation marks omitted). The decision of the
contracting parties here specifically to identify themselves and
their successors as the contract's beneficiaries evinces their
intention to exclude third-party beneficiaries. Moreover, as the
court in Markle noted:
If plaintiffs were third-party beneficiaries, every
homeowner-borrower in the United States who has defaulted
on mortgage payments or is at risk of default could
become a potential plaintiff. Finding such a broad and
indefinite . . . class of third-party beneficiaries would
be inconsistent with the clear intent standard for
government contracts set by the Restatement.
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Id. at 182. Thus, the broadly accepted principle set forth in the
Restatement, from which we see no reason to deviate, applies
squarely to the circumstances of this case and forecloses the
MacKenzies' argument that they are third-party beneficiaries of the
SPA.3
2. Flagstar's Duty of Good Faith as Mortgagee
Despite their explicit claim to be third-party
beneficiaries of the SPA, the MacKenzies rely almost entirely on
Cruz, in which the court found that borrowers are not third-party
beneficiaries of SPAs, but nevertheless found a substantial
likelihood that the plaintiff would prevail on his claim for breach
of good faith. 446 B.R. at 3–5. Oddly, the court in that case
relied on Speleos, which rejected the good faith claim but allowed
a negligence claim to proceed. 755 F. Supp. 2d at 310–12. The
court in Cruz held that the "plaintiff's allegation . . . that
Wells Fargo breached its duty of good faith and reasonable
diligence is comparable to the negligence claim in Speleos." 446
3
The MacKenzies point to Parker v. Bank of Am., NA, a
Massachusetts state court case that found a borrower to be a third-
party beneficiary of an SPA between a mortgagee and the government.
No. 11-cv-1838, 2011 WL 6413615, at *7 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 16,
2011). The court in Parker relied on Marques v. Wells Fargo Home
Mortgage, Inc., a district court case from California that reached
the same conclusion. No. 09-cv-1985, 2010 WL 3212131, at *3 (S.D.
Cal. Aug. 12, 2010). The court in Parker recognized, however, that
"every court in the District of Massachusetts (and as far as I
know, elsewhere) to consider the issue has rejected the Marques
holding." 2011 WL 6413615, at *7. Given the persuasiveness of the
authority to the contrary, the holding in Parker does not change
our analysis.
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B.R. at 4. The court did not explain, however, how the two
claims were comparable.
A more clearly reasoned case that reaches the same
conclusion as Cruz is Blackwood. 2011 WL 1561024, at *5. In that
case, the court pointed out that "[i]t is familiar law that a
mortgagee in exercising a power of sale in a mortgage must act in
good faith and must use reasonable diligence to protect the
interests of the mortgagor." Id. (quoting W. Roxbury Co-op. Bank
v. Bowser, 87 N.E.2d 113, 115 (Mass. 1949)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). It decided not to dismiss the breach of good faith
claim, because if "the defendants foreclosed when they lacked the
legal authority to do so, they acted in violation of their
obligation to protect the mortgagor." Id.
The problem with the decision in Blackwood is that "[t]he
concept of good faith 'is shaped by the nature of the contractual
relationship from which the implied covenant derives,' and the
'scope of the covenant is only as broad as the contract that
governs the particular relationship.'" Young v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., 717 F.3d 224, 238 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Ayash v.
Dana–Farber Cancer Inst., 822 N.E.2d 667, 684 (Mass. 2005)). Here,
the 2007 Mortgage as modified by the 2009 Agreement is the only
contract between the MacKenzies and Flagstar. And as the district
court correctly pointed out, nothing in the mortgage imposes a duty
on Flagstar to consider a loan modification prior to foreclosure in
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the event of a default. See Peterson v. GMAC Mortg., LLC, No. 11-
cv-11115, 2011 WL 5075613, at *6 (D. Mass. Oct. 25, 2011) ("Under
Massachusetts case law, absent an explicit provision in the
mortgage contract, there is no duty to negotiate for loan
modification once a mortgagor defaults." (citing Carney v. Shawmut
Bank, N.A., No. 07-P-858, 2008 WL 4266248, at *3 (Mass. App. Ct.
2008))).
It is true that mortgagees have "an independent duty at
common law to protect the interests of the mortgagor in exercising
a power of sale in a mortgage." Teixeira, 2011 WL 3101811, at *2.
"Typically, this entails mak[ing] reasonable efforts to sell the
property for the highest value possible." Armand v. Homecomings
Fin. Network, No. 12-cv-10457, 2012 WL 2244859, at *5 (D. Mass.
June 15, 2012) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Thus, in the event of a foreclosure, the existence of a
duty of good faith is tied directly to the mortgagee's contractual
right to exercise a power of sale. But the implied covenant of
good faith "cannot 'create rights and duties not otherwise provided
for in the existing contractual relationship.'" Young, 717 F.3d at
238 (quoting Ayash, 822 N.E.2d at 684). It would therefore be an
error to extend the implied covenant to encompass a duty to modify
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(or consider modifying) the loan prior to foreclosure, where no
such obligation exists in the mortgage.4
Because the MacKenzies are not third-party beneficiaries
of the SPA, and because Flagstar had no duty to modify the
MacKenzies' loan prior to foreclosure, the district court correctly
dismissed Count IV.
B. MCCCDA (Count V) and Rescission (Count VII)
The MCCCDA provides borrowers in certain consumer credit
transactions, including the refinancing of a mortgage, with a
right of rescission and requires lenders to make certain mandatory
disclosures related to the terms of the loan. Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
140D, § 10. Section 10(f) of the statute extends the borrower's
right of rescission to a period of four years in the event that the
lender fails to make the required disclosures. Id. The MacKenzies
4
The Plaintiff's argument on appeal appears to conflate the
implied convenant of good faith and fair dealing, which attaches to
every contract, with the particular duty of a mortgagee to act in
good faith and use reasonable diligence in exercising its power of
sale. The two doctrines are distinct and have separate
underpinnings. Compare Sandler v. Silk, 198 N.E. 749, 751 (Mass.
1935) (explaining that the duty of good faith and reasonable
diligence "extends . . . not only [to] the mortgagor" but also to
"those holding junior encumbrances or liens") with Ayash v. Dana-
Farber Cancer Inst., 822 N.E.2d 667, 684 (Mass. 2005) (noting that
the "scope of the covenant [of good faith and fair dealing] is only
as broad as the contract that governs the particular
relationship"). Although we appreciate this distinction, we
nevertheless analyze the issues together because that is how they
arose in the context of this case. In the future, however, we wish
to make clear that the better practice is for litigants to
acknowledge the distinct nature of each doctrine and present their
arguments accordingly.
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allege that the 2009 Agreement is a refinancing subject to the
terms of the MCCCDA and that Flagstar failed to make the required
disclosures. Accordingly, they seek to exercise their right of
rescission within the four-year period under section 10(f).
The district court held that "the 2009 [A]greement . . .
does not fall within the provisions of the MCCCDA." It pointed to
section 32.20 of title 209 of the Code of Massachusetts
Regulations, which provides that:
A refinancing occurs when an existing obligation that was
subject to 209 CMR 32.00 is satisfied and replaced by a
new obligation undertaken by the same consumer. A
refinancing is a new transaction requiring new
disclosures to the consumer. The new finance charge
shall include any unearned portion of the old finance
charge that is not credited to the existing obligation.
The following shall not be treated as a refinancing:
. . .
(b) A reduction in the annual percentage rate with a
corresponding change in the payment schedule.
. . .
(d) A change in the payment schedule or a change in
collateral requirements as a result of the consumer's
default or delinquency . . . .
209 Mass. Code Regs. 32.20; see also In re Washington, 455 B.R.
344, 350 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2011) (applying this section of the
regulations to the MCCCDA). The district court found that the 2009
Agreement was not a refinancing because it did no more than lower
the interest rate and change the payment schedule.
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In their initial brief, the MacKenzies sidestep section
32.20. They argue instead that the 2009 Agreement is not exempt
from disclosure requirements under section 10(e)(1)(B) of chapter
140D of the Massachusetts General Laws, which excludes refinancings
from the purview of the MCCCDA under certain circumstances. That
argument is beside the point. As the district court held, the
modification was not a refinancing and, thus, section 10(e)(1)(B)
does not apply. In their reply brief, however, the MacKenzies
contend that the 2009 Agreement was a refinancing because in
addition to lowering the interest rate and extending the payment
schedule, it involved a new lender and a new amount of principal.
But these points do not undermine the district court's decision.
First, Flagstar is not a "new lender"; it is the assignee
of Bankstreet, the original lender. It is axiomatic that an
"assignee 'stands in the shoes' of the assignor." R.I. Hosp. Trust
Nat'l Bank v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 789 F.2d 74, 81 (1st Cir. 1986)
(quoting 10 W. Jaeger, Williston on Contracts § 432, at 182 (3d ed.
1967)). Through the assignment, Flagstar obtained Bankstreet's
rights and obligations under the existing mortgage, including the
right to reach an agreement with the MacKenzies to modify the terms
of the loan. See Bank of Am., N.A. v. WRT Realty, L.P., 769 F.
Supp. 2d 36, 39 (D. Mass. 2011) (holding that the assignee of a
note and mortgage "enjoys all rights the assignor possessed"). The
fact that Flagstar exercised that right does not mean that the
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"existing obligation . . . [was] satisfied and replaced by a new
obligation." 209 Mass. Code Regs. 32.20
Second, the change in the amount of principal was the
result of the capitalization of unpaid interest. In other words,
the entire principal balance under the 2009 Agreement was debt owed
under the original mortgage; it was not a new obligation replacing
the original obligation. See Sheppard v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 299
B.R. 753, 762–64 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2003) (holding that the
capitalization of unpaid debt does not constitute a refinancing
under the Truth In Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667f, on which
the MCCCDA is modeled, because the new obligation did not
completely replace the old one).
Thus, under the terms of section 32.20, the 2009
Agreement is not a refinancing. It is not subject to the
disclosure requirements of the MCCCDA, and the MacKenzies have no
right to rescind it under the statute. Therefore the district
court properly dismissed Counts V and VII.
C. Negligence (Count IX)
In Count IX, the MacKenzies claim that Flagstar "owed
[them] a duty . . . as third-party beneficiaries of the [SPA]
between a loan servicer and the federal government," and that
Flagstar "breached their obligations under the HAMP and other
related government programs which the SPA incorporates." To state
a claim for negligence under Massachusetts law, a plaintiff must
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allege: "(1) a legal duty owed by defendant to plaintiff; (2) a
breach of that duty; (3) proximate or legal cause; and (4) actual
damage or injury." Primus v. Galgano, 329 F.3d 236, 241 (1st Cir.
2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court
correctly concluded that the MacKenzies' allegations fall short
because as a matter of law Flagstar does not owe the MacKenzies any
legal duty under the circumstances of this case.
As we have said above, the MacKenzies are not third-party
beneficiaries of the SPA between Flagstar and the government.
Therefore, they cannot base their negligence claim on that
argument. The MacKenzies appear to argue in the alternative that
violations of HAMP give rise to a claim for negligence per se.
That argument fails as well.
"Generally, a duty of care arises from the relationship
of parties to one another: landlord and tenant, doctor and patient,
driver and passenger, etc." Brown v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 10-cv-
11085, 2011 WL 1311278, at *4 (D. Mass. Mar. 31, 2011). The
relationship between a borrower and lender does not give rise to a
duty of care under Massachusetts law. See Corcoran v. Saxon Mortg.
Servs., Inc., No. 09-cv-11468, 2010 WL 2106179, at *4 (D. Mass. May
24, 2010) ("[A] lender owes no general duty of care to a
borrower."); Murray v. Am.'s Servicing Co., No. 200701716, 2009 WL
323375, at *5 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 12, 2009). "[T]he existence
of a positive regulation imposing a duty on one actor does not by
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itself create a similar duty as a matter of state tort common law."
Brown, 2011 WL 1311278, at *4.
The MacKenzies correctly point out that "violations of a
statute may constitute evidence of negligence," and that "[a] claim
for negligence based on a statutory or regulatory violation can
survive even where there is no private cause of action under that
statute or regulation." Both of those propositions are true, but
neither directly addresses the dispositive issue here: statutory or
regulatory violations cannot give rise to a negligence claim when
there is no independent duty of care between the parties. See
Seidel v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 12-cv-10766, 2012 WL 2571200,
at *4 (D. Mass. July 3, 2012) ("HAMP . . . does not create an
independent duty for mortgag[ee]s where no other basis for that
duty exists. Thus, plaintiff's claim for negligence fails
. . . .") (internal citations omitted); Brown, 2011 WL 1311278, at
*4 ("[W]hile violation of a regulation such as HAMP may provide
evidence of a breach of a duty otherwise owed, it does not create
such a duty in the first place."); Markle, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 185.
Where an independent duty of care exists, the violation of a
statute or regulation can provide evidence of a breach of that
duty, even if the statute or regulation itself does not create a
private right of action. But in the absence of an independent
duty, a plaintiff cannot proceed with a negligence claim based
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solely on a statutory or regulatory violation. Thus, the district
court properly dismissed Count IX.
D. Promissory Estoppel (Count X)
In Count X, the MacKenzies allege that "Borrowers and
Flagstar entered into an agreement that a foreclosure sale could be
conducted according to the terms of the Power of Sale in the 2009
Mortgage Loan and/or the 2007 Deed of Trust." According to the
MacKenzies, "[i]mplicit in these contracts is an agreement by
Flagstar that all documents recorded by Flagstar relative to the
2007 Deed of Trust or the 2009 Mortgage Loan shall be free from
fraud and shall be reliable." The MacKenzies claim that they
"relied on this promise of Flagstar to their detriment, and have
been damaged as a result of the failure of the [sic] Flagstar to
keep its promise."
Under Massachusetts law, to state a claim for promissory
estoppel "a plaintiff must allege that (1) a promisor makes a
promise which he should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of
the promisee, (2) the promise does induce such action or
forbearance, and (3) injustice can be avoided only by enforcement
of the promise." Dill, 935 F. Supp. 2d at 304 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The district court dismissed Count X, finding that
the MacKenzies had recited the elements of a promissory estoppel
claim, but had "fail[ed] to articulate the facts to support th[ose]
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elements." Specifically, "Plaintiffs fail[ed] to identify the
particular promise that they relied upon and the manner in which
such reliance was to their detriment."
Looking solely at the Amended Complaint, the district
court's decision is plainly correct. These allegations are a
textbook illustration of the type of "formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action" that falls below the standard of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). On appeal, however, the MacKenzies try to
recharacterize their claim. Rather than focusing on implicit
contractual promises not to engage in fraud, they now argue that
Flagstar "engag[ed] in a course of conduct them [sic] for over two
years leading them to believe that the result would be a HAMP
modification." According to the MacKenzies, they "detrimentally
relied upon Flagstar's promises by, in part, awaiting determination
of HAMP eligibility and loan modification" instead of "seek[ing]
alternatives to foreclosure."
"[I]t is a virtually ironclad rule that a party may not
advance for the first time on appeal either a new argument or an
old argument that depends on a new factual predicate." Cochran v.
Quest Software, Inc., 328 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2003). But even
considering these new arguments on their own terms, they fare no
better than the allegations below.
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The MacKenzies claim that "Flagstar strung [them] along
. . . from October 2009 through the fall of 2011 only to present
them with an offer just days before the foreclosure sale," thereby
creating a "reasonable expectation" that Flagstar would modify the
loan instead of pursuing foreclosure. These circumstances, the
MacKenzies argue, are similar to those in Dixon v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., where the district court allowed a promissory estoppel
claim to survive a motion to dismiss. 798 F. Supp. 2d 336, 340–52
(D. Mass. 2011). Dixon is distinguishable from the present case,
however.
In Dixon, "Wells Fargo convinced the Dixons that to be
eligible for a loan modification they had to default on their
[mortgage] payments." Id. at 346. But once the Dixons defaulted,
instead of modifying the loan, the bank initiated foreclosure
without any warning. Id. at 339. "[I]t was only because they
relied on this representation and stopped making their payments
that Wells Fargo was able to initiate foreclosure proceedings."
Id. at 346. Thus, in that case, the plaintiffs alleged both a
"specific promise" and a "legal detriment that . . . was a direct
consequence of their reliance on [that] promise." Id. at 343.
Here, the MacKenzies have done neither. The fact that
Flagstar considered the MacKenzies for a loan modification multiple
times over a two-year period is not a promise, implicit or
otherwise, to consider them for further loan modifications prior to
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initiating foreclosure. Moreover, the MacKenzies' argument ignores
that Flagstar did in fact offer them a loan modification under HAMP
on November 2, 2011, which they apparently rejected because they
could not afford the initial payment. Thus, even if Flagstar had
made an implicit promise to offer them a loan modification, it
appears to have fulfilled that promise.
Additionally, the MacKenzies have not alleged any facts
that would allow us to infer that their decision not to seek
"alternatives to foreclosure" was detrimental to them. In other
words, there is no reason for us to believe the MacKenzies would
have successfully avoided foreclosure, or been better off in any
way, but for their reliance on Flagstar's supposed promise to
consider them for a loan modification. Therefore, the MacKenzies
have failed to adequately plead the elements of a promissory
estoppel claim, and the district court correctly dismissed Count X.
E. Validity of the Mortgage Assignment to Flagstar
The MacKenzies' final argument asserts that they "have
standing to challenge Flagstar's authority to foreclose on their
home" under Culhane v. Aurora Loan Services of Nebraska, 708 F.3d
282 (1st Cir. 2013). They claim that "the trust into which the
2007 Mortgage Loan was sold and securitized has since been
[d]issolved. Consequently, . . . MERS had nothing to assign to
Flagstar on [the] date of the assignment." The MacKenzies conclude
that "[b]ecause Flagstar received nothing from the assignment it
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has no authority to commence foreclosure proceeding[s] on the
MacKenzies' home."
The MacKenzies are correct that Culhane supports their
standing to challenge the assignment of the mortgage. The
plaintiff in Culhane, however, challenged the assignment under
Massachusetts General Laws chapter 183, section 54B. Id. at
293–94. Here, the factual allegations related to purported defects
in the assignment are not tethered to any legal claim before us on
appeal. In the amended complaint, these allegations appeared in
the context of the MacKenzies' claim for fraud (Count I) and
perhaps (it is not entirely clear) the claim for violations of
Massachusetts General Laws chapter 93A (Count III). The MacKenzies
chose not to pursue those claims on appeal. It is not apparent
that these allegations are relevant to any of the remaining counts.
At oral argument, counsel for the MacKenzies attempted to
find a home for these orphaned allegations by suggesting that they
are related to the negligence claim. But the MacKenzies premise
their negligence claim on Flagstar's alleged failure to follow HAMP
guidelines, not on any defects in the assignment. Furthermore, for
the reasons discussed above, the negligence claim fails because
Flagstar does not owe a duty of care to the MacKenzies. Thus, even
accepting as true the MacKenzies' allegations regarding the
defective assignment, we would not be able to grant any relief,
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because the MacKenzies have not preserved on appeal any legal
theory on which they might recover.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's
dismissal of the amended complaint.
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