Clapp v. Tobin ( 2023 )


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  •                 Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 22-1350
    KEVIN S. CLAPP,
    Plaintiff, Appellant,
    v.
    TROOPER BRUCE TOBIN, ETC., ET AL.,
    Defendants, Appellees.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
    [Hon. Allison D. Burroughs, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Gelpí, Selya, and Montecalvo,
    Circuit Judges.
    Robert C. Johnson, Jr., with whom Johnson & Associates was on
    brief, for appellant.
    Brian Rogal, with whom Rogal & Donnellan, P.C. was on brief,
    for appellee Tobin.
    Joseph G. Donnellan, with whom Rogal & Donnellan, P.C. was on
    brief, for appellee Kearns.
    Lorena Galvez, with whom Joseph P. Kittredge and Rafanelli
    Kittredge, P.C. were on brief, for appellee Brooks.
    Joseph P. Kittredge, with whom Lorena Galvez and Rafanelli
    Kittredge, P.C. were on brief, for appellee Tully.
    August 4, 2023
    SELYA, Circuit Judge.      Not every appeal produces a need
    for a full-dress opinion.      Some appeals present only issues that
    are either factbound or context-specific and involve nothing more
    than the application of settled principles of law to particular
    circumstances.     This is such a case.
    In the district court, plaintiff-appellant Kevin S.
    Clapp    brought   suit   against   seventy-nine         defendants.    After
    compendious   pretrial    proceedings,      the   herd    of   defendants   was
    thinned out substantially to four.1          The district court presided
    over the ensuing trial with care and circumspection, and the case
    went to the jury against        the remaining       four defendants (all
    Massachusetts state troopers).        The gravamen of the plaintiff's
    amended complaint was the allegation that the troopers, jointly
    and severally, had acted under color of state law so as to violate
    the plaintiff's civil rights through, inter alia, the use of
    excessive force.     See 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    .
    The jury found in favor of all of the defendants,
    returning take-nothing verdicts.         The plaintiff did not move for
    1 The plaintiff has not appealed from any of the district
    court's rulings regarding any of the other seventy-five
    defendants.
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    a new trial but, rather, filed this notice of appeal advancing
    what he describes as seven separate claims of error.2
    We have reviewed the entire record and the parties'
    briefs.   In addition, we have heard oral argument.    After careful
    consideration, we conclude that the appeal presents no substantial
    issue of law and that, therefore, summary disposition is in order.
    We explain briefly.
    All of the plaintiff's claims of error implicate the
    same standard of review:     abuse of discretion.     See, e.g., Ira
    Green, Inc. v. Mil. Sales & Serv. Co., 
    775 F.3d 12
    , 18 (1st Cir.
    2014) (rulings admitting or excluding evidence are reviewed for
    abuse of discretion); Aponte-Torres v. Univ. of P.R., 
    445 F.3d 50
    ,
    58 (1st Cir. 2006) (ruling on motion to file amended complaint is
    reviewed for abuse of discretion).     Abuse of discretion is by any
    measure a deferential standard of review.      See United States v.
    Padilla-Galarza, 
    990 F.3d 60
    , 80 (1st Cir. 2021).       As we noted
    many years ago, "'[a]buse of discretion' is a phrase which sounds
    worse than it really is."     Aggarwal v. Ponce Sch. of Med., 
    745 F.2d 723
    , 727 (1st Cir. 1984) (quoting In re Josephson, 
    218 F.2d 174
    , 182 (1st Cir. 1954)).
    2 Refined to bare essence, some of the plaintiff's claims of
    error overlap, that is, they hinge on the same evidentiary
    predicate.
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    Here, the challenged rulings, without exception, rest on
    well-established precedent.        See, e.g., Palmer v. Champion Mortg.,
    
    465 F.3d 24
    , 30-31 (1st Cir. 2006) (motion to amend may be denied
    on grounds of undue delay); United States v. Marrero-Ortiz, 
    160 F.3d 768
    , 775 (1st Cir. 1998) ("[A] district court has discretion
    to exclude from evidence acquittals or other favorable outcomes of
    prior    state     court   proceedings       involving   the   same    subject
    matter.").        Moreover, the district court's interpretation and
    application of these authorities were both sound and within the
    compass of its discretion.         Given the unexceptional nature of the
    district court's rulings, it would serve no useful purpose to
    recite book and verse.
    We need go no further.           For aught that appears, the
    plaintiff had a fair trial before an impartial jury, presided over
    even-handedly by a conscientious judge.           And he has had a full and
    fair opportunity to air his claims of error before this court.              We
    have found those claims wanting:         they are context-specific, they
    implicate    no    new   legal   principles,    and   the   district   court's
    challenged rulings must be viewed, on appeal, through a deferential
    glass.   Thus, we readily conclude that the plaintiff has failed to
    identify any abuse of the district court's wide discretion, and we
    summarily affirm the judgment below.
    Affirmed.     See 1st Cir. R. 27.0(c).
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