Saveraid v. State Farm Insurance , 597 F. App'x 492 ( 2015 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
TENTH CIRCUIT January 8, 2015
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
SHIRLEY SAVERAID,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 14-2019
(D.C. No. 1:13-CV-00818-JAP-ACT)
(D.N.M.)
STATE FARM INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before PHILLIPS, SEYMOUR, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
Shirley Saveraid appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of State Farm on her claims to recover for injuries from a car accident.
Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we AFFIRM.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however,
for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R.
32.1.
BACKGROUND
Saveraid sustained injuries as a passenger in a single-vehicle accident in New
Mexico. Her friend Robin Hall was driving Saveraid’s motor home. At the time
of the accident, Saveraid, an Iowa resident, had two insurance policies with State
Farm: a policy for her Holiday Motor Home (“Motor Home policy”) and a policy
for her Ford Edge (“Towed Vehicle policy”). Her policies with State Farm were
executed in Iowa and, by their terms, are governed by Iowa law. Each of the
policies includes liability coverage limits of up to $500,000 per person 1 and
underinsured motorist (“UIM”) coverage limits of $100,000 per person. 2
Each policy also contains several identical provisions that form the basis of
this lawsuit. First, both policies include an “other insurance” clause, which is
intended to prevent the stacking of UIM coverage from two separate policies. 3
The language states:
1
Liability coverage protects the insured in an event that she is sued for claims that
come within the coverage of her policy (i.e., third-party insurance claims).
2
UIM coverage pays for the damages of the insured person who is legally entitled to
collect from the at-fault driver, but that driver has inadequate insurance to cover the
insured’s damages.
3
The “stacking” of policy limits takes place where the same claimant and the same
loss are covered under multiple policies (inter-policy stacking), or under multiple
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If Underinsured Motor Vehicle Coverage provided by this policy and
one or more other policies issued to you . . . by the State Farm
Companies apply to the same bodily injury, then . . . the
Underinsured Motor Vehicle Coverage limits of such policies will
not be added together to determine the most that may be paid . . . .
Appellant’s Br. at 67, 105. Second, both policies contain an “owned vehicle
exclusion,” which excludes vehicles from the definition of an underinsured motor
vehicle if they are either provided liability coverage under the policy or are
owned by the insured. Id. at 65, 103.
Following the accident, Hall’s insurance provider (also State Farm) paid
Saveraid $25,000 under his policy’s liability coverage. State Farm also paid
Saveraid $500,000 in liability benefits under her own Motor Home policy because
it treated Hall as a permissive driver. 4 Even so, Saveraid sued State Farm in New
Mexico state court to recover the UIM benefits under her two policies. State Farm
then removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of New
coverages contained within a single policy (intra-policy stacking), and the amount
available under one policy is inadequate to satisfy the damages alleged or awarded. In
other words, the claimant adds all available coverages together to satisfy her actual loss.
See Steven Plitt et al., 12 Couch on Insurance § 169:4 (3d ed. 2014) for more information
on stacking.
4
State Farm paid Saveraid the benefits under her liability coverage even though the
policy had the “owned vehicle” exclusion. If enforceable, the exclusion would have
precluded Saveraid from receiving liability coverage under her own policy. However,
State Farm did not invoke the exclusion because it understood that Saveraid intended to
bring her case in New Mexico and it did not think that the New Mexico courts would
have enforced the provision because doing so would have violated a fundamental
principle of justice in New Mexico.
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Mexico. However, State Farm continued to evaluate her claims and paid Saveraid
an additional $100,000 in UIM benefits under her Towed Vehicle policy.
In her complaint, Saveraid claimed a right to stack her UIM coverages from
her two policies despite their explicit anti-stacking provisions. Additionally, she
claimed that she was entitled to increase her UIM coverage limits to match her
liability limits. According to Saveraid, New Mexico’s laws governing the
selection and rejection of UIM coverage should trump Iowa law, and New Mexico
law allows such policy reformation. Accordingly, she sought a total of
$1,000,000 in UIM benefits under her two policies, acknowledging that State
Farm had already paid her $100,000 of that amount. State Farm moved for
summary judgment, and Saveraid filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.
The district court granted State Farm’s motion for summary judgment and
denied Saveraid’s cross-motion. First, it denied her request to apply New Mexico
law to the anti-stacking provisions, explaining that the Iowa provision was fully
enforceable in New Mexico under Shope v. State Farm Ins. Co., 925 P.2d 515
(N.M. 1996). Second, the court declined to reform her Towed Vehicle policy’s
UIM coverage limits because, based on the payments Saveraid had received under
her policies, it concluded that applying Iowa law did not conflict with
fundamental principles of justice in New Mexico.
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On appeal, Saveraid argues that the district court erred in concluding that the
“other insurance” clause prohibiting inter-policy stacking did not violate New
Mexico’s fundamental principles of justice. She next asserts that the district
court’s decision regarding the reformation of her UIM coverage was based on the
erroneous conclusion that “other insurance” clauses are enforceable in New
Mexico. Finally, she requests that this court reverse the grant of summary
judgment for State Farm and certify these matters to the New Mexico Supreme
Court for determination.
DISCUSSION
Because we sit in diversity jurisdiction, we apply substantive state law to
Saveraid’s claims, but we apply federal law to “the propriety of the district
court’s grant of summary judgment.” Hill v. Allstate Ins. Co., 479 F.3d 735, 739
(10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Eck v. Parke, Davis & Co., 256 F.3d 1013, 1016 (10th
Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, we review de novo the
district court’s grant of summary judgment. Eugene S. v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue
Shield of N.J., 663 F.3d 1124, 1130 (10th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is
appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a).
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At its core, this case presents the question of whether New Mexico or Iowa
law applies to the disputed insurance policy provisions. New Mexico follows the
choice-of-law doctrine of lex loci contractus—the law of the place of
contracting—to issues involving contract interpretation, including insurance
policies. Shope, 925 P.2d at 517. However, there is a narrow exception: a New
Mexico court will apply its own law when the foreign law would violate a
fundamental principle of justice under New Mexico law. Id. “It is said that courts
should invoke this public policy exception only in ‘extremely limited’
circumstances.” Reagan v. McGee Drilling Corp., 933 P.2d 867, 869 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1997) (quoting Tucker v. R.A. Hanson Co., 956 F.2d 215, 218 (10th Cir.
1992)). “Mere differences among state laws should not be enough to invoke the
public policy exception.” Id. (citing Shope, 925 P.2d at 518). Otherwise, “the
forum law would always apply unless the foreign law were identical, and the
exception would swallow the rule.” Id.
A. Anti-Stacking Provisions
New Mexico courts generally interpret stacking provisions favorably for the
insured. See Rodriguez v. Windsor Ins. Co., 879 P.2d 759, 759 (N.M. 1994)
(noting that the New Mexico Supreme Court’s cases have “evolved a strong
judicial policy . . . favoring stacking”). In contrast, Iowa law does not. See Farm
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Iowa v. Ries, 551 N.W.2d 316, 319 (Iowa 1996)
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(emphasizing that anti-stacking provisions are valid and enforceable even when
the various policies involved are issued by different insurers). Here, the district
court applied Iowa law to the “other insurance” clause in Saveraid’s policies,
enforcing the anti-stacking provision based on the New Mexico Supreme Court’s
holding in Shope. In Shope, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that “our
rationale in establishing this policy [of favoring stacking] did not concern
fundamental principles of justice . . . .” 925 P.2d at 517.
Saveraid argues that the district court erroneously relied on Shope to conclude
that the anti-stacking provisions in her insurance policies do not violate a
fundamental principle of justice in New Mexico. But her argument centers on the
mistaken idea that there is a distinction between inter- and intra-policy stacking
under New Mexico law for the purposes of fundamental justice. As mentioned
earlier, inter-policy stacking refers to one claimant being covered under multiple
policies for a single loss, and intra-policy stacking refers to one claimant being
covered under multiple coverages within the same policy for a single loss.
Saveraid attacks this difference in an attempt to distinguish her case from Shope.
She fails to do so.
1. Inter-Policy versus Intra-Policy Stacking
Saveraid attempts to distinguish Shope from her own case by arguing that New
Mexico law on stacking policies distinguishes between inter-policy and intra-
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policy stacking. Shope concerned intra-policy stacking, while Saveraid’s case
involves inter-policy stacking. Accordingly, she argues that Shope’s holding
applies only to intra-policy stacking cases.
In Shope, the New Mexico Supreme Court confronted a choice-of-law dispute
over whether to enforce an anti-stacking provision from a Virginia insurance
contract. 925 P.2d at 515–16. Virginia law enforces anti-stacking provisions. Id.
at 516. While the court noted that New Mexico public policy favors stacking in
UIM cases when separate premiums have been paid, “this rule is one of contract
interpretation that does not rise to the level of a fundamental principle of justice.”
Id. at 517. Saveraid argues that New Mexico treats inter- and intra-policy
stacking provisions differently, and so Shope only applies to intra-policy
stacking. She argues to us that inter-policy stacking rises to the level of a
fundamental principle of justice. We are not persuaded. As we show below, the
New Mexico Supreme Court does not meaningfully distinguish between inter-
and intra-policy stacking and so Saveraid cannot successfully distinguish her
facts from Shope.
A brief review of New Mexico law on stacking establishes that it does not
distinguish between inter- and intra-policy stacking when evaluating whether
such provisions violate a New Mexico fundamental principle of justice. Two of
the foundational cases are Sloan v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 519 P.2d 301 (N.M.
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1974), and Lopez v. Found. Reserve Ins. Co., 646 P.2d 1230 (N.M. 1982). In Sloan, the
New Mexico Supreme Court permitted inter-policy stacking when the insured had
paid separate premiums for each of the policies. 519 P.2d at 302–03. In Lopez,
the court permitted intra-policy stacking on the same public policy grounds. 646
P.2d at 1235. It explained that “[t]he crucial question, therefore, is not whether
multiple vehicles are insured under one policy or several, but whether the insured
has paid one premium or several for the particular uninsured motorist coverage
sought to be stacked.” Id. The critical issue is not the number of policies but the
number of premiums paid.
The district court relied on Lopez for the proposition that New Mexico does
not make “a firm distinction between intra-policy stacking and inter-policy
stacking.” Appellant App. at 217. Saveraid criticizes the court for this reliance,
claiming that Lopez does in fact distinguish between the two types of stacking.
We agree with the district court. In fact, the Lopez court explained that “[t]he
reasoning adopted in the Sloan case is applicable to the issue in the present case.”
Lopez, 646 P.2d at 1233. The cited cases have all treated inter- and intra-policy
stacking cases the same.
Saveraid also criticizes the district court for relying on Konnick v. Farmers
Ins. Co. of Ariz., 703 P.2d 889 (N.M. 1985). But she misses the point yet again—
the district court relied on Konnick, a case in which the New Mexico Supreme
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Court allowed inter-policy stacking, because it cites both Lopez (intra) and Sloan
(inter) for support, again demonstrating that New Mexico courts treat inter- and
intra-policy cases the same. 5 Thus, we agree with the district court that New
Mexico courts do not distinguish between inter- and intra-policy stacking.
2. Fundamental Principle of Justice
Because New Mexico law equally enforces both inter- and intra-policy
stacking prohibitions in choice-of-law analysis, Saveraid’s argument that this
issue rises to the level of a fundamental principle of justice fails under Shope. See
Shope, 925 P.2d at 517. The Shope court held that “[w]hile we interpret New
Mexico insurance contracts to avoid repugnancy in clauses that prohibit stacking
of coverages for which separate premiums have been paid, this rule is one of
contract interpretation that does not rise to the level of a fundamental principle of
justice.” Id. (emphasis added).
And if Shope is not enough, the New Mexico Court of Appeals has recently
reaffirmed Shope’s view in Wilkeson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 329 P.3d
749 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 328 P.3d 1188 (N.M. 2014). The facts of
5
Saveraid admonishes the district court for relying on Rehders v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
135 P.3d 237 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006), for the idea that New Mexico does not distinguish
between inter- and intra-policy stacking. But just as she was wrong about the roles of
Lopez and Konnick, she also misses the point with Rehders. In Rehders, the court drew
from both inter- and intra-policy stacking cases to assess whether stacking was
appropriate in the intra-policy stacking context. Rehders, 135 P.3d at 244–45. The district
court pointed to Rehders for this exact reason. It shows that New Mexico does not
distinguish between the two types of stacking.
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Wilkeson are similar to Saveraid’s. Wilkeson was insured under two separate
California policies, both of which contained inter-policy anti-stacking provisions
for UIM coverage. Id. at 750. After a car accident, Wilkeson’s insurer paid her
the UIM coverage under one policy, but it denied coverage under the second. Id.
After reviewing the history of stacking jurisprudence in New Mexico, including
the inter- and intra-policy stacking cases, the New Mexico Court of Appeals
agreed with Wilkeson that New Mexico generally favors stacking. Id. at 751.
However, it explained that choice-of-law issues require a different sort of
analysis, as laid out in Shope. Id. at 752. To overcome New Mexico’s policy of
applying the substantive law from where the contract was executed, a party must
show “a countervailing interest that is fundamental and separate from general
policies of contract interpretation.” Id. (quoting Shope, 925 P.2d at 517) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Because Shope concluded that the stacking of
insurance coverages is purely a question of contract interpretation that did not
violate a fundamental interest of justice in New Mexico, the Wilkeson court
declined to apply New Mexico law. See id. at 753 (“Although there is an
important public policy favoring stacking that . . . may outweigh conflicting
concerns within the same or related insurance policies, it does not alter the New
Mexico policy to interpret insurance contracts according to the law of the place
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where the contract is executed.”). It consequently upheld the anti-stacking
provision in the California policies. Id at 754.
Saveraid also depends heavily on Sloan to support her claim that New Mexico
public policy should control the enforceability of the anti-stacking provision. In
doing so, she misunderstands the fundamental question at stake. In Sloan, an
inter-policy case, the New Mexico Supreme Court refused to apply an anti-
stacking provision in a New Mexico insurance policy because it conflicted with
New Mexico public policy. 519 P.2d at 303. These are two distinct questions.
Under Sloan, the court was applying the standard for whether the contract—
which was created in New Mexico—contained a provision that violated New
Mexico public policy. Id. at 301–03. Conversely, in Shope, the court was tasked
with determining whether a contract provision from Virginia violated a New
Mexico fundamental principle of justice, a choice-of-law question. 925 P.2d at
515–16. What Saveraid fails to acknowledge is that Sloan had no choice-of-law
question, and its holding is inapplicable to the issue she raises in her case. 6 Thus,
6
Saveraid argues that State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ballard, 54 P.3d 537 (N.M.
2002), provides an example of how the district court should have analyzed this case. In
Ballard, a choice-of-law case, the court cited Estep v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
703 P.2d 882 (N.M. 1985), which was not a choice-of-law case, to establish New Mexico
law and public policy for the purpose of lex loci contractus analysis. 54 P.3d at 540. She
argues we should apply Sloan instead of Shope for the same reasons. But New Mexico
precedent disfavors this argument. In Wilkeson, the court rejected a request to apply
Ballard instead of Shope in deciding whether to enforce an inter-policy anti-stacking
provision. 329 P.3d at 754 (“Ballard . . . [is] not [a] stacking case[], and we consider the
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we pivot away from whether New Mexico courts enforce stacking as part of New
Mexico’s general public policy, and instead, we ask whether the anti-stacking
provision rises to the level of a violation of a fundamental principle of justice in
New Mexico. To this, Shope already has answered no. 925 P.2d at 517.
Shope and Wilkeson are dispositive of this case. Inter- and intra-policy
stacking cases are interchangeable when interpreting the validity of anti-stacking
provisions in New Mexico. Both types of provisions are preferred for the same
reason: “to ensure that the insured gets what he or she pays for, and to fulfill the
reasonable expectations of the insured.” Rehders, 135 P.3d at 245 (citing
Montano v. Allstate Indem. Co., 92 P.3d 1255 (N.M. 2004)).
For the first time on appeal, Saveraid asserts that Jordan v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
245 P.3d 1214 (N.M. 2010), and Progressive Nw. Ins. Co. v. Weed Warrior
Servs., 245 P.3d 1209 (N.M. 2010), support her position that anti-stacking
provisions are not enforceable in New Mexico. We see no reason to deviate from
our general rule that we do not address arguments that are presented for the first
time on appeal. 7 See United States v. Mora, 293 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir. 2002).
Thus, we do not address it fully here.
public policies involved in [that] case[] to carry greater weight when balanced against the
policy to interpret insurance contracts according to the law of the contracting state.”).
Therefore, this argument fails.
7
Moreover, Saveraid’s new argument lacks merit. This court stated that “it is
important to recognize that . . . the Jordan court did not comment on the question of
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In sum, Saveraid’s Iowa UIM policy contained an anti-stacking provision, and
there is not a fundamental principle of justice under New Mexico law that
precludes its application here. 8 Both parties agree that under Iowa law, anti-
stacking provisions are enforceable. State Farm has already paid Saveraid the
UIM benefits under her Towed Vehicle policy. Therefore, she has no basis to
recover UIM benefits under her Motor Home policy.
B. Reformation Under Jordan
Saveraid next argues that she is entitled to reformation of her UIM coverage
limits under Jordan. We disagree. Under the facts of this case, denying Saveraid
the ability to reform her UIM coverages does not violate a New Mexico
fundamental principle of justice.
For insurance policies originating in its state, New Mexico requires that an
insured’s UIM coverage limits must equal her liability limits unless the insured
waives this requirement in writing as part of the insurance policy delivered to her.
Jordan, 245 P.3d at 1217. If an insurer fails to obtain a valid rejection, New
stacking, and it did not explicitly forge a nexus between the new standard that it
announced and the concept of stacking.” Jaramillo v. Gov’t Emp. Ins. Co., 573 F. App’x
733, 743 (10th Cir. 2014) (unpublished). We conclude that these cases do not change the
landscape of anti-stacking policy in the context of choice-of-law analysis in New Mexico.
8
Saveraid asks that we certify this question to the New Mexico Supreme Court. This
is unnecessary because New Mexico has already answered this question, as we explained
above.
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Mexico courts will reform the policy to provide UIM coverage that equals the
limits of the liability coverage. Id. But Iowa has no such requirement. See Iowa
Code §§ 516A.1, 321A.1 (2014). Saveraid’s UIM coverage is less than her
liability coverage. Because her policies originated in Iowa, we will apply Iowa
law unless reformation under Jordan is a fundamental principle of justice in New
Mexico.
Saveraid argues that the policy behind Jordan—to protect insureds by
requiring the insurer to get an explicit rejection—rises to the level of a
fundamental principle of justice in New Mexico. She supports this assertion by
noting that Jordan says nothing about “other insurance” clauses or their effect on
inter-policy stacking, so Sloan remains good law. But, she claims, Jordan
completely changed inter-policy stacking because, according to her interpretation
of the case, no matter how unambiguous an anti-stacking provision is, Jordan
mandates that UIM coverages on a multi-vehicle policy must be stacked unless
the Jordan requirements are met. The district court declined to determine whether
the Jordan requirements rise to the level of a fundamental principle of justice in
New Mexico. It found that, based on the facts in this particular case, applying
Iowa law would not conflict with fundamental New Mexico principles of justice
and thus no reformation should occur. We agree.
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If Iowa law applies, Saveraid would not be entitled to additional UIM
coverage. Iowa does not require its insurers to offer policy holders UIM coverage
equal to their liability coverage. See Iowa Code §§ 516A.1, 321A.1 (2014).
Instead, Iowa merely requires that an insurer provide UIM coverage equal to the
statutory minimum of $20,000 for one person, absent a written rejection. See
Iowa Code §§ 516A.1, 321A.1 (2014). Saveraid’s UIM coverage already exceeds
that statutory minimum under Iowa law. Consequently, she would not be eligible
for reformation of her UIM coverage and would not receive additional
compensation beyond the $100,000 in UIM benefits State Farm already paid her.
If New Mexico law applies, Saveraid also would not be eligible for additional
UIM benefits. As previously stated, in New Mexico, an insured is entitled to have
her UIM coverage reformed (increased) to equal her liability coverage, absent a
legally sufficient rejection pursuant to Jordan. 245 P.3d at 1217. Saveraid’s UIM
coverage is less than her liability coverage, so she falls into the category of
insureds that Jordan addresses.
However, New Mexico’s law governing UIM coverage has a limitation that
Iowa law does not, thus prohibiting Saveraid from recovering additional UIM
benefits. Under Iowa law, an insured is permitted to recover her UIM benefits
until she is fully compensated for her injuries or until her policy limits are
exhausted. Am. States Ins. Co. v. Estate of Tollari, 362 N.W.2d 519, 522 (Iowa
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1985) (holding that UIM benefits are not decreased by the amount of the
underinsured’s liability coverage if the insured’s injuries exceed the limit). In
contrast, under New Mexico law, an insured is entitled to UIM benefits only to
the extent that her UIM coverage exceeds the underinsured’s liability coverage.
Schmick v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 704 P.2d 1092, 1098 (N.M. 1985). In
Schmick, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that an insured’s UIM coverage
may be offset by the tortfeasor’s liability coverage. Id. at 1099. For example,
imagine the insured has $30,000 in UIM coverage. She gets into a car accident
with an underinsured driver, who has $25,000 in liability coverage. The insurer
owes her $30,000 (her UIM coverage) minus $25,000 (the tortfeasor’s liability
coverage) for a total of $5,000.
In this case, even if Saveraid’s UIM benefits were reformed under Jordan to
$500,000 (the amount of her liability coverage), that amount would not exceed
the liability coverage she received from Hall’s insurance coverage, also
$500,000. That liability coverage from Hall would offset Saveraid’s own UIM
coverage. 9 Thus, even if New Mexico law governed the policy and the policy was
9
Technically, the $500,000 that Saveraid received from Hall’s liability coverage
actually came from her own insurance policy because Hall was covered under her policy
as a permissive driver. To explain, insurance policies often include an omnibus clause
stating that the word “insured” includes not only the named insured but also any person
using the car with the named insured’s permission. When this permissive driver has an
accident, the omnibus clause extends liability coverage under the owner’s policy to the
driver. See George A. Locke, 18 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts § 1 (3d. ed. 2014). In this case,
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reformed, Saveraid would not receive additional UIM benefits because they
would be offset by the liability coverage she received from Hall’s insurance.
Because Saveraid would remain in the same financial position whether or not
Jordan applies, we do not have to reach the question of whether Jordan
constitutes a fundamental principle of justice in New Mexico. Moreover, Saveraid
is attempting to pick and choose the laws from each state that benefit her the
most. She would like us to reform her UIM coverage limits under Jordan while
asking us to ignore New Mexico’s settled law of deducting liability benefits from
her UIM coverage. Such an approach contravenes the intentions behind each
state’s laws, and we refuse to engage in such arbitrary lawmaking.
In sum, we agree with the district court that Saveraid is not entitled to a
reformation of her UIM benefits. Under both Iowa and New Mexico law, she
could not recover more money than she already has recovered. Therefore, we
decline to decide whether the rule from Jordan constitutes a fundamental
principle of justice in New Mexico and reject Saveraid’s contention that she is
entitled to reformation of her UIM benefit limits.
C. Certification to the New Mexico Supreme Court
Saveraid argues that all of the issues in this case are questions of first
impression for New Mexico. Thus, she asks us to reverse the district court’s order
the liability coverage from Saveraid’s policy counts as Hall’s liability coverage (with
Hall as the tortfeasor) and would offset her UIM benefits.
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granting summary judgment to State Farm and certify this case in its entirety to
the New Mexico Supreme Court. We decline.
Tenth Circuit Rule 27.1(A) governs the certification of state-law questions. It
provides that “[w]hen state law permits, this court may: (1) certify a question
arising under state law to that state’s highest court according to that court’s rules;
and (2) abate the case in this court to await the state court’s decision of the
certified question.” 10th Cir. R. 27.1(A). New Mexico permits its Supreme Court
to “answer a question of law certified to it by a court of the United States . . . if
the answer may be determinative of an issue in pending litigation in the certifying
court and there is no controlling appellate decision, constitutional provision or
statute of this state.” N.M. Stat. Ann. § 39-7-4 (2014).
This case does not raise any novel issues of state law that the New Mexico
Supreme Court has not already addressed. “[W]e will not trouble our sister state
courts every time an arguably unsettled question of state law comes across our
desks. When we see a reasonably clear and principled course, we will seek to
follow it ourselves.” Pino v. United States, 507 F.3d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 2007).
Both of the issues on appeal have reasonably clear courses that we can follow.
The first issue, dealing with the anti-stacking provisions, has already been
resolved by Shope and confirmed by Wilkeson. The second issue, involving the
reformation of UIM benefits under Jordan, similarly does not involve any novel
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issues of state law. We can avoid the question of whether the rule set forth in
Jordan amounts to a fundamental principle of justice by looking at the specific
facts of this case. Based on these facts, we can apply settled New Mexico state
law to decide the case on the merits.
Therefore, we deny Saveraid’s request to certify any of these issues to the
New Mexico Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION
In sum, we reject Saveraid’s arguments. First, the anti-stacking provisions
from insurance policies issued in Iowa do not violate a fundamental principle of
justice in New Mexico, and they are thus enforceable. Second, Saveraid’s UIM
benefits are ineligible for reformation under Jordan because she would not
receive any additional compensation for her injuries. Therefore, both issues can
be decided under settled New Mexico state law; we decline to certify them to the
New Mexico Supreme Court. We AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary
judgment.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Gregory A. Phillips
Circuit Judge
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