Drexler v. Spahn ( 2022 )

Appellate Case: 21-1368 Document: 010110775509 Date Filed: 11/30/2022 Page: 1
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
November 30, 2022
_______________________________________
Christopher M. Wolpert
REGINA T. DREXLER, Clerk of Court
Plaintiff - Appellant.
v. No. 21-1368
(D.C. No. 1:21-CV-00805-LTB-GPG)
HONORABLE THERESA SPAHN, (D. Colo.)
in her official capacity;
HONORABLE CHELSEA
MALONE, in her official capacity;
DENVER COUNTY COURT, CITY
AND COUNTY OF DENVER;
PHILLIP WEISER, Attorney
General, in his official capacity for
the State of Colorado,
Defendants - Appellees.
__________________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
__________________________________________
Before BACHARACH, McHUGH, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
___________________________________________
*
We set this case for oral argument, but Ms. Drexler then moved for
submission on the briefs. We granted that motion, so we’re deciding the
appeal based on the briefs.
This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except
under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value if
otherwise appropriate. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
Appellate Case: 21-1368 Document: 010110775509 Date Filed: 11/30/2022 Page: 2
This appeal grew out of a feud between Regina Drexler and Rachel
Brown. The two women had an intimate relationship, which ended bitterly.
In the fallout, Ms. Drexler wrote literary essays about abuse. Ms. Brown
characterized the essays as harassment and complained that she was being
stalked by Ms. Drexler. The feud led to the entry of a protection order in
state court, 1 restricting Ms. Drexler’s proximity to Ms. Brown, her
children, and her houses.
The protection order spurred Ms. Drexler to bring an action in
federal court, where she alleged constitutional violations in the protection
order as well as the statutes authorizing that order. In this action,
Ms. Drexler
 sought habeas relief against two state-court judges and the state
court itself and
 sued the state attorney general under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
prospective relief and damages.
The district court dismissed the entire action, and Ms. Drexler appeals. The
appeal involves two main issues:
1. Jurisdiction for the habeas action against the two state-
court judges and the state court. Habeas corpus is a remedy
entitling an individual to release. So habeas jurisdiction exists
only when the claimant is in custody. Because the typical form
of custody is incarceration, most habeas claims are brought by
inmates. But even when the claimant is not incarcerated, the
1
The state court issued two protection orders. In 2015, Judge Theresa
Spahn issued an oral protection order. Three years later, Judge Chelsea
Malone modified the order. Though Ms. Drexler refers to both protection
orders, the second order served only to modify the first one.
2
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imposition of extraordinary restrictions on freedom can be
considered custody.
Ms. Drexler complains that the protection order was so
restrictive that it effectively constituted custody, triggering
habeas jurisdiction. The district court disagreed. Ms. Drexler
can appeal that determination only if a reasonable jurist could
characterize the protection order as the imposition of custody.
But the protection order simply kept Ms. Drexler away from
Ms. Brown, her children, and her houses. No jurist could
reasonably regard that restriction as severe enough to constitute
custody.
2. Applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in the suit
against the state attorney general. Many times, litigants
might feel victimized by a state court’s rulings. These litigants
sometimes go to federal court to challenge the state-court
rulings. But federal courts are not appellate tribunals for state
courts because federal and state courts are separate sovereign
actors. Because of this dual sovereignty, federal courts have
recognized a doctrine—called the Rooker-Feldman doctrine—
that prevents federal jurisdiction when a litigant challenges a
state-court ruling.
In this case, the district court invoked the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, treating the entire § 1983 suit as an attack on the
protection order. The district court was correct for much of
Ms. Drexler’s claim. But Ms. Drexler complained about not
only the protection order, but also the underlying state statutes
authorizing protection orders. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine
covered Ms. Drexler’s challenge to the protection order but not
to the underlying statutes. So the district court shouldn’t have
dismissed the challenges involving the underlying state
statutes.
1. No reasonable jurist could regard the restrictions on Ms. Drexler
as custody.
Ms. Drexler wants to appeal the dismissal of her habeas action. But a
habeas claimant can appeal only upon the issuance of a certificate of
appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A).
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The district court denied a certificate of appealability, so
Ms. Drexler asks us for one. We can grant her a certificate only if she’s
presented a reasonably debatable argument. Dulworth v. Evans, 442 F.3d
1265, 1266 (10th Cir. 2006). Here that argument turns on whether
Ms. Drexler was in custody when she sought habeas relief.
Custodial status was required because habeas jurisdiction exists only
if the petitioner was “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.”
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 2 Custody can exist when a state court imposes
significant restraints on freedom that are not generally shared by the
public. Mays v. Dinwiddie, 580 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 2009).
According to Ms. Drexler, the restraints inhibited her speech and
movement.
2
Given the need for custodial status, habeas petitioners like
Ms. Drexler must name their custodians as the respondents. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2242. The custodian is the individual who’s able to bring the petitioner
to the federal district court. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004).
When a petitioner isn’t incarcerated, the proper respondent is the
state attorney general. Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United
States District Courts, 1976 advisory comm. note, Rule 2(b)(3). Though
Ms. Drexler sued the state attorney general under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he
wasn’t named as a respondent in the habeas action. The only named
respondents were two state-court judges and the state court, but they were
not proper respondents for the habeas action. See id. The failure to name
the proper custodian may have deprived the court of personal jurisdiction.
See Stanley v. Cal. Sup. Ct., 21 F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Failure to
name the petitioner’s custodian as a respondent deprives federal courts of
personal jurisdiction.”).
4
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In invoking her right to speech, Ms. Drexler conflates the terms of
the protection order with the state court’s reasoning. The protection order
itself didn’t say anything that would restrict Ms. Drexler’s right to speech.
Rather than rely on the terms of the protection order, Ms. Drexler relies on
the state court’s reasoning. For example, Ms. Drexler zooms in on the state
court’s comments about her fixation with Ms. Brown—not only following
Ms. Brown but also writing about her. These comments allegedly inhibit
Ms. Drexler from writing more essays out of fear that a state court might
view them as harassment.
But a court must consider the effect of the protection order based on
its terms, and the terms themselves didn’t restrict Ms. Drexler’s future
writings. In fact, the state district court clarified to Ms. Drexler that
“[n]othing in the [protection order] . . . prohibits Ms. Drexler from
publishing written materials” or “otherwise intrude[s] on her protected
First Amendment [a]ctivities” and the protection order “merely forbids
Ms. Drexler from contact with Ms. Brown.” Appellant’s App’x vol. 2, at
364. That clarification eliminates any conceivable characterization of the
protection order as a restriction on Ms. Drexler’s speech.
Ms. Drexler also complains about the restrictions on her freedom of
movement. The protection order requires Ms. Drexler to stay at least
 100 yards away from Ms. Brown, her children, and her houses;
and
5
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 10 feet away from Ms. Brown when going to or from work.
We must determine whether a reasonable jurist could regard these
restrictions as significant constraints on Ms. Drexler’s freedom beyond
those generally shared by the public. See Mays v. Dinwiddie, 580 F.3d
1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 2009); see also p. 4, above.
Every year, state courts issue thousands of orders requiring parties to
stay away from other individuals. To our knowledge, no court has ever
regarded these restrictions on movement as severe enough to constitute
custody. See Vega v. Schneiderman, 861 F.3d 72, 75 (2d Cir. 2017)
(concluding that a protection order didn’t impose custody by requiring the
habeas petitioner to stay away from another individual); Austin v.
California, No. 20-cv-900-CRB, 2020 WL 4039203, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal.
July 17, 2020) (unpublished) (holding that a protection order didn’t create
custody by prohibiting the petitioner from returning to his prior residence
or being within 100 yards of his son and ex-wife).
State law also sometimes authorizes restrictions on movement. For
example, Oklahoma law prohibits convicted sex offenders from living
within 2000 feet of a school or childcare center. Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 590(2014). We’ve held that this restriction doesn’t constitute custody for the
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purposes of habeas jurisdiction. Dickey v. Allbaugh, 664 F. App’x 690,
692–94 (10th Cir. 2016) (unpublished). 3
Ms. Drexler complains that her restrictions went even further by
preventing attendance at a local university or even her own office. These
complaints aren’t accurate.
First, she says that she couldn’t attend the University of Colorado
Denver because Ms. Brown worked there. This statement isn’t correct. In
fact, the state court told Ms. Drexler that she could freely enroll as a
student at the University of Colorado Denver, adding that she just had to
avoid Ms. Brown’s lectures and keep at least 10 feet away from her. Given
this clarification, no reasonable jurist could interpret the protection order
as a ban on attending the university.
Second, Ms. Drexler states that the protection order prevented her
from going to her own law office. This statement mischaracterizes the
protection order. The state court explained to Ms. Drexler that she could
go to and from her office, but just had to keep at least 10 feet away from
Ms. Brown. Ms. Drexler has not shown that her office was within 10 feet
of Ms. Brown.
3
This opinion is persuasive but not precedential. See p. 1 n.*, above.
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Without support in the case law, no reasonable jurist would treat the
protection order as the imposition of custody. 4 Given the inability of a
court to find custody, Ms. Drexler hasn’t presented a reasonably debatable
challenge to the district court’s jurisdictional determination. We thus deny
a certificate of appealability.
2. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine doesn’t cover the § 1983 challenge
to the constitutionality of the state statutes.
Ms. Drexler not only sought habeas relief but also sued the state
attorney general under § 1983, claiming that the protection order and
underlying state statutes were unconstitutional. The district court
concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over these claims.
On appeal, Ms. Drexler doesn’t question the ruling as to the
protection order itself. She instead argues that the district court should not
have dismissed her constitutional challenge to the state statutes. In
considering this argument, we conduct de novo review. Miller v. Deutsche
Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 666 F.3d 1255, 1260 (10th Cir. 2012).
4
Ms. Drexler also alleged that she’s been put on the state criminal
registry and the national criminal database. But the protection order
doesn’t address a listing on the state criminal registry or the national
criminal database. Granted, deliberate disobedience of the protection order
could constitute criminal contempt. People v. Allen, 787 P.2d 174, 176
(Colo. App. 1989). But we’re not aware of any court that has found
custody because of the possibility of contempt for violating a protection
order. Cf. Calhoun v. Att’y Gen. of Colo., 745 F.3d 1070, 1074 (10th Cir.
2014) (holding that a threat of future incarceration for failing to register
on the sex offender registry does not constitute custody for habeas
purposes).
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In conducting this review, we conclude that the district court erred in
applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Under this doctrine, federal district
courts generally lack jurisdiction to review the correctness of a state-court
order. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283–
84 (2005). But this doctrine doesn’t prevent federal jurisdiction over a
challenge to the validity of state statutes. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521,
531–33 (2011). “[A] state-court decision is not reviewable by lower federal
courts, but a statute . . . governing the decision may be challenged in a
federal action.” Id. at 532.
In the complaint, Ms. Drexler challenged the constitutionality of the
state statutes underlying the protection order: “The Colorado protection
order statutes are substantially overbroad and vague, including C.R.S. §13-
14-101 and C.R.S. §13-14-106.” Appellant’s App’x vol. 1, at 59.
Consideration of this challenge could incidentally affect the validity of the
protection order itself. But this part of the claim addressed only the
constitutionality of the state statutes—not the protection order itself. So
this part of the claim falls outside of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Skinner, 562 U.S. at 532.
Because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine doesn’t apply to this part of
the claim, a court must address the merits. The district court didn’t
consider the merits, and the defendants don’t address them. So we remand
for the district court to consider the merits of Ms. Drexler’s challenge to
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the state statutes. See Apartment Inv. & Mgmt. Co. v. Nutmeg Ins. Co., 593
F.3d 1188, 1198 (10th Cir. 2010) (stating that the preferred practice is to
let the district court decide the issue when it was raised in district court
but not yet decided there).
3. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Ms. Drexler’s request to file a reply brief.
Ms. Drexler objected to the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation, and the defendants responded. With the benefit of both
sides’ submissions, the district court ruled on the objections. Before the
clerk entered the order on the docket, Ms. Drexler asked for a chance to
file a reply brief. The district court declined, and Ms. Drexler challenges
that ruling. We reject this challenge.
In considering this challenge, we apply the abuse-of-discretion
standard. Beaird v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 145 F.3d 1159, 1164 (10th Cir.
1998). Under this standard, we reverse only if we’re definitely and fairly
convinced that the district court clearly erred in its judgment or made an
impermissible choice. Id.The federal and local rules were silent on reply briefs for objections
to a magistrate judge’s report. 5 See Bistryski v. Allbert, 848 F. App’x 804,
5
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2) addresses only a party’s
right to object and the adverse party’s right to respond. The rule says
nothing about replies.
10
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805 (9th Cir. 2021) (unpublished) (“The district court did not abuse its
discretion by considering the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation without giving Bistryski an opportunity to reply to
defendants’ response to his objections because the local rules did not allow
for a reply.”). 6 And the right to due process didn’t entitle Ms. Drexler to
file a reply brief. See NLRB v. Eclipse Lumber Co., 199 F.2d 684, 686 (9th
Cir. 1952) (statement by the Ninth Circuit that it knew of no due process
right to file a reply brief). So the district court had discretion to rule
before the filing of a reply brief.
Ms. Drexler relies on Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-6-311. This statute
governs appeals from a county court, not proceedings in federal court.
And, as Ms. Drexler acknowledges, the cited statute does not authorize
reply briefs. Appellant’s App’x vol. 1, at 18–19 (“The statute fails to
provide for reply briefs.”). The federal district court thus didn’t abuse its
discretion by declining to allow a reply brief under this Colorado statute.
6
For motions, rather than objections to a magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation, the district court’s local rules generally allow the filing
of reply briefs. D. Colo. L. Civ. R. 7.1(d). But these rules also expressly
allow judges to decide a motion before the filing of a reply brief. See id.(“Nothing in this rule precludes a judicial officer from ruling on a motion
at any time after it is filed.”).
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4. The magistrate judge didn’t select the district judge assigned to
the case.
Ms. Drexler also alleges that the magistrate judge chose which
district judge would handle this case. Ms. Drexler is mistaken.
In the District of Colorado, the clerk’s office randomly assigns each
civil case to a district judge. So when the complaint was filed, the clerk’s
office randomly assigned U.S. District Judge Babcock to the case.
District courts vary in how they communicate the assignment of the
district judge. In this case, the district court communicated the assignment
through an order issued by the magistrate judge. His order stated:
“Pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR 8.1, the Clerk of Court is directed to assign
this matter to Senior Judge Lewis T. Babcock.” Appellant’s App’x vol. 3,
at 585. The cited local rule (Rule 8.1) states that the assignment of judges
is governed by Local Rule 40.1, and that local rule requires random
assignment of judges under a computerized program maintained in the
clerk’s office. D.C. Colo. L. Civ. R. 8.1(c), 40.1(b).
The clerk’s office used this computerized program to assign Judge
Babcock to the case. Like many courts, the District of Colorado opted to
communicate that assignment through an order issued by the magistrate
judge. But the magistrate judge didn’t pick Judge Babcock; the computer in
the clerk’s office did that. The magistrate judge simply communicated that
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assignment to the parties. No impropriety existed in the appointment of
Judge Babcock.
5. The district court couldn’t void the state-court orders.
Finally, Ms. Drexler argues that the district court should have voided
the state-court orders. But Ms. Drexler suggests no plausible basis for
concluding that the state courts lacked jurisdiction to enter the protection
orders. We thus have no reason to question the district court’s refusal to
void the state-court orders. See Nixon v. City & Cnty of Denver, 784 F.3d
1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 2015) (“The first task of an appellant is to explain to
us why the district court’s decision was wrong.”).
6. Disposition
We deny a certificate of appealability for the habeas appeal. For the
§ 1983 claim, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further
proceedings.
Entered for the Court
Robert E. Bacharach
Circuit Judge
13