Mark Corey Taylor v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                       FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                               Jul 16 2019, 9:28 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing                                CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    APPELLANT PRO SE                                          ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Mark Corey Taylor                                         Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Carlisle, Indiana                                         Attorney General of Indiana
    Chandra K. Hein
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Mark Corey Taylor,                                        July 16, 2019
    Appellant-Defendant,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
    18A-CR-2365
    v.                                                Appeal from the Marion Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                         The Honorable Sheila A. Carlisle,
    Appellee-Plaintiff                                        Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    49G03-1311-FA-71200
    Altice, Judge.
    Case Summary
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2365 | July 16, 2019                   Page 1 of 5
    [1]   Mark Corey Taylor, pro se, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his request to
    file a belated notice of appeal from the trial court’s denial of his motion to
    correct erroneous sentence.
    [2]   We affirm.
    Facts & Procedural History
    [3]   On July 21, 2014, Taylor pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to one count
    of child molesting as a Class A felony and one count of sexual misconduct with
    a minor as a Class B felony and admitted to being a habitual offender. In
    exchange for his plea, the State dismissed nine other charges relating to sex
    offenses against children and all charges under a separate cause. The plea
    agreement also provided that the “[t]otal sentence shall be fifty (50) years
    executed in the Department of Corrections [sic].” Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 2 at
    17.
    [4]   The trial court found that Taylor “understands his rights and knowingly and
    voluntarily waives his rights” and thereafter accepted the plea agreement and
    entered a judgment of conviction in accordance with the terms of the plea
    agreement. Id. at 9. The trial court held a sentencing hearing on August 13,
    2014, and sentenced Taylor to concurrent terms of twenty years executed on the
    Class A felony conviction and ten years on the Class B felony conviction. The
    court enhanced the Class A felony sentence by thirty years based on Taylor’s
    status as a habitual offender, for an aggregate sentence of fifty years executed.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2365 | July 16, 2019   Page 2 of 5
    [5]   On July 2, 2018, Taylor, pro se, filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence
    claiming that his habitual offender enhancement was improper because it was
    based on two Class D felonies. On July 5, 2018, the trial court denied Taylor’s
    motion. Taylor filed a request to file a belated notice of appeal on September 5,
    2018, which motion the trial court denied. Taylor appealed this denial with this
    court on September 25, 2018. See Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 2(1)(e) (“An order
    granting or denying permission to file a belated notice of appeal is a Final
    Judgment for purposes of Ind. Appellate Rule 5”). This court denied the State’s
    motion to dismiss the appeal and the State timely filed its appellee’s brief. 1
    Discussion & Decision
    [6]   For purposes of this appeal, we will assume, without deciding, that Taylor
    should have been permitted to file a belated notice of appeal from the denial of
    his motion to correct erroneous sentence. We therefore turn to the merits of
    Taylor’s claim.
    1
    The State filed its appellee’s brief on February 25, 2019. On March 25, 2019, Taylor filed a “Motion for
    Order of Default – Waiver of Opportunity to File Reply Brief” asserting that the State had not timely filed its
    appellee’s brief. A review of this court’s docket showed that the appellee’s brief was timely filed, and thus,
    this court denied Taylor’s motion on April 1, 2019. This matter was deemed fully briefed and transmitted to
    this court on April 3, 2019, after Taylor did not file a reply brief within the allotted timeframe for doing so.
    On April 8, 2019, Taylor sent a letter requesting that he be provided with a copy of the State’s brief. The
    Clerk of the Courts notified Taylor that such request must be made through a motion. Taylor has since filed
    two motions to compel with this court claiming he never received the appellee’s brief filed herein and
    requesting that this court compel the State to serve him with such. Taylor asserts that he was denied his
    opportunity to file a reply brief. We have denied both of Taylor’s motions to compel as our court docket
    shows that the State certified that it served Taylor with a copy of its appellee’s brief “by United States mail
    postage prepaid” to Taylor’s provided address. This court, however, did provide Taylor with a copy of the
    chronological case summary for the instant appeal as requested in his first motion to compel.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2365 | July 16, 2019                        Page 3 of 5
    [7]   Taylor challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct erroneous
    sentence. Our Supreme Court has held that
    a motion to correct sentence may only be used to correct
    sentencing errors that are clear from the face of the judgment
    imposing the sentence in light of the statutory authority. Claims
    that require consideration of the proceedings before, during, or
    after a trial may not be presented by way of a motion to correct
    sentence.
    Robinson v. State, 
    805 N.E.2d 783
    , 787 (Ind. 2004). Indeed, the Court has
    “repeatedly cautioned” that a motion to correct erroneous sentence is an
    available remedy only when a sentence is erroneous on its face, and such
    motion must be “narrowly confined” and “strictly applied” to claims apparent
    from the face of the sentencing judgment. 
    Id. at 787-88
    . “As to sentencing
    claims not facially apparent, the motion to correct sentence is an improper
    remedy. Such claims may be raised only on direct appeal and, where
    appropriate, by post-conviction proceedings.” 
    Id.
    [8]   Here, in his motion to correct erroneous sentence, Taylor argued that his
    habitual offender enhancement was erroneous because the predicate felonies
    did not support his status as a habitual offender. Such a claim is clearly beyond
    the purview of a motion to correct erroneous sentence as it requires
    consideration of matters outside the face of the sentencing judgment. In short,
    a habitual offender determination does not meet the “erroneous on its face”
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2365 | July 16, 2019   Page 4 of 5
    standard. See 
    id.
     Because Taylor’s claim was improperly raised by a motion to
    correct erroneous sentence, the trial court did not err in denying his motion. 2
    [9]   Judgment affirmed.
    Kirsch, J. and Vaidik, C.J., concur.
    2
    We further note that as part of his plea agreement with the State, Taylor agreed to a fifty-year sentence and
    waived his right to challenge the sentence imposed if it fell within the terms of the plea agreement. The trial
    court sentenced him within such parameters. Taylor has waived his right to challenge the propriety of his
    sentence. See Hole v. State, 
    851 N.E.2d 302
    , 304 (Ind. 2006).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2365 | July 16, 2019                       Page 5 of 5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18A-CR-2365

Filed Date: 7/16/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021