Salado v. Moham , 639 F. App'x 562 ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                        FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS March 31, 2016
    TENTH CIRCUIT                   Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    EXONDIA SALADO,
    Petitioner - Appellant,
    No. 15-6171
    v.
    (D.C. No. 5:14-CV-00831-HE)
    (W.D. Okla.)
    DEBBIE ALDRIDGE, Warden, *
    Respondent - Appellee.
    ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE
    OF APPEALABILITY
    Before MATHESON, MURPHY, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
    Proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, Exondia Salado seeks a
    certificate of appealability (“COA”) from this court so she can appeal the district
    court’s denial of her 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
     habeas petition. 1 See 
    28 U.S.C. § 2253
    (c)(1)(A) (providing that no appeal may be taken from a final order
    disposing of a § 2254 petition unless the petitioner first obtains a COA). Salado
    was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole after an Oklahoma jury
    *
    Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Debbie Aldridge is substituted for
    Ricky Moham as the Warden of Mabel Bassett Correctional Center.
    1
    Salado’s notice of appeal was timely filed under the prison mailbox rule.
    See Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(1).
    convicted her of first degree murder. Her conviction and sentence were affirmed
    by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”) on direct appeal. Salado
    sought, and was denied, state post-conviction relief. She filed a § 2254 petition
    in federal district court on August 6, 2014.
    In her § 2254 petition, Salado presented the following claims for relief: (1)
    the “October 17, 2007 warrant [was a] constitutionally impermissible general
    warrant,” (2) the “[w]arrantless seizure of Gateway and Hewlett Packard
    computers and storage media was unlawful and unjustified,” (3) “[p]rosecutorial
    misconduct violated [her] rights to due process, speedy trial, fair trial, freedom
    from unreasonable search and seizure, and failed to comply with trial court’s
    discovery order,” (4) “[her] right to speedy trial [was] violated,” and (5) she
    received ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel. Salado’s
    petition was referred to a federal magistrate judge who examined each of her
    claims and recommended that the petition be denied.
    Salado received notice in the report and recommendation that she was
    required to file any objections she might have to the recommended disposition of
    her habeas petition no later than the date set out therein. The report and
    recommendation specifically informed her that the failure to file timely objections
    “would waive appellate review of the recommended ruling.” Salado sought to
    extend the time for filing her written objections after the deadline had already
    passed.
    -2-
    This court has “adopted a firm waiver rule when a party fails to object to
    the findings and recommendations of the magistrate.” Moore v. United States,
    
    950 F.2d 656
    , 659 (10th Cir. 1991). “Our waiver rule provides that the failure to
    make timely objection to the magistrate’s findings or recommendations waives
    appellate review of both factual and legal questions.” 
    Id.
     The district court
    recognized the potential applicability of this court’s firm waiver rule, and
    permitted Salado to file her objections. Her objections, however, only addressed
    the proposed disposition of the two Fourth Amendment claims and a related
    ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim. The court discussed the
    objections in depth, ruling that Salado was not entitled to relief on her two Fourth
    Amendment claims because she had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
    claims in state court. See Stone v. Powell, 
    428 U.S. 465
    , 494 (1976). As to the
    related ineffective assistance claim, the district court concluded Salado’s
    appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to present the Fourth Amendment
    claim on direct appeal because the claim was, in fact, presented. The court
    adopted the proposed findings and recommended disposition of the magistrate
    judge as to all issues raised in Salado’s habeas petition and denied relief.
    For Salado to proceed on appeal, she must first obtain a COA. 
    28 U.S.C. § 2253
    (c)(1)(A). This court may issue a COA “only if the applicant has made a
    substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 
    Id.
     § 2253(c)(2).
    Salado must therefore show that “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for
    -3-
    that matter, agree that)” the district court erred in concluding that the Stone bar
    precludes review of her Fourth Amendment claims. 2 Slack v. McDaniel, 
    529 U.S. 473
    , 484 (2000) (quotation omitted). “[W]here the State has provided an
    opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state
    prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that
    evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his
    trial.” Stone, 
    428 U.S. at 494
    . “An opportunity for full and fair consideration
    requires at least the procedural opportunity to raise or otherwise present a Fourth
    Amendment claim, a full and fair evidentiary hearing, and recognition and at least
    colorable application of the correct Fourth Amendment constitutional standards.”
    United States v. Lee Vang Lor, 
    706 F.3d 1252
    , 1258 (10th Cir. 2013) (quotations
    omitted). Salado does not appear to dispute that the state trial court provided her
    with a procedural opportunity to present her Fourth Amendment claim and that
    2
    In her application for a COA, Salado has attempted to challenge the
    district court’s disposition of all claims raised in her § 2254 petition. She does
    not, however, address the firm waiver rule or argue that either of the two
    exceptions to the rule apply in this case. See Talley v. Hesse, 
    91 F.3d 1411
    ,
    1412-13 (10th Cir. 1996) (“This rule does not apply . . . when the ends of justice
    dictate otherwise or when the magistrate’s order does not clearly apprise a pro se
    litigant of the consequences of a failure to object.”). Because Salado did not
    object to the recommended disposition of any claim other than the three
    specifically mentioned in the written objections filed on July 8, 2015, she has
    waived appellate review of all claims except those three. See United States v.
    One Parcel of Real Property, 
    73 F.3d 1057
    , 1060 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[A] party’s
    objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation must be both
    timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the district court or
    for appellate review.”).
    -4-
    the OCCA reviewed the claim. She argues, instead, that the state courts could not
    have “possibly” applied the correct legal standards because it is “manifestly
    evident” that the October 17, 2007 warrant is overbroad on its face and, yet, the
    state courts reached the opposite conclusion. She further asserts the OCCA’s
    resolution of the claim was “brief and conclusory.”
    Having reviewed the record in its entirety we conclude Salado is not
    entitled to a COA on her Fourth Amendment claims. On direct appeal, the OCCA
    applied the Leon good-faith exception and concluded the trial court properly
    refused to exclude the evidence seized pursuant to the October 17, 2007 warrant.
    See United States v. Leon, 
    468 U.S. 897
    , 920 (1984) (adopting a good-faith
    exception to the application of the exclusionary rule and specifically applying that
    exception where “an officer acting with objective good faith has obtained a search
    warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope,” even though the
    search warrant was later deemed to be invalid). In its ruling on Salado’s post-
    conviction application, the OCCA concluded review of the claim was barred from
    judicial review under the doctrine of res judicata.
    Even if we accept Salado’s insistence that her two Fourth Amendment
    claims are separate and distinct, the OCCA’s application of the Leon good-faith
    exception to the application of the exclusionary rule resolved both claims
    -5-
    regardless of how Salado attempts to categorize them. 3 After review of the
    district court order and the state court record, we agree that Salado presented her
    Fourth Amendment claims to the state courts and had a full and fair opportunity
    to litigate them. Accordingly, Salado is also not entitled to a COA on her claim
    that her appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise a
    fourth amendment challenge to the validity of the search and the seizure of
    computers and storage media.
    This court denies Salado’s request for a COA and dismisses this appeal.
    ENTERED FOR THE COURT
    Michael R. Murphy
    Circuit Judge
    3
    Under both iterations of her claim, Salado seeks suppression of the
    computers and electronic media seized pursuant to the October 17, 2007 warrant
    and subsequently searched pursuant to an additional warrant.
    -6-