United States v. Harmon , 742 F.3d 451 ( 2014 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
PUBLISH Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS January 27, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
__________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 12-2099
MICHAEL HARMON,
Defendant – Appellant,
__________________________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
(D.C. NO. 1-10-cr-01760-JB-1)
__________________________________
Jerry A. Walz of Walz and Associates, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Appellant.
Jennifer M. Rozzoni, Assistant United States Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico
(Kenneth J. Gonzales, United States Attorney, on the brief) for Appellee.
__________________________________
Before GORSUCH and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and JACKSON, District Judge.
__________________________________
JACKSON, District Judge.
__________________________________

The Honorable R. Brooke Jackson, United States District Judge for the District of
Colorado, sitting by designation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Probably most of us have, at some time in our lives, weaved within our lane while
driving on the highway. Probably most of us have, at one time or another, crossed the
“fog line” separating our lane from the shoulder of the road. This case asks us to decide
at what point otherwise ordinary driving errors cross the line into driving that gives law
enforcement reasonable suspicion to stop a car for a traffic violation.
Mr. Harmon, the appellant in this case, was driving a car across New Mexico with
drugs in his spare tire. After weaving within his lane and crossing the fog line, a police
officer decided to stop the car on suspicion of violating a New Mexico statute that
requires a driver to stay in his or her lane whenever practical or, alternatively, on
suspicion that the driver might have been intoxicated or fatigued. During the traffic stop,
the officer discovered the drugs, and Mr. Harmon was arrested and charged with
possession with intent to distribute. He moved to suppress the evidence before trial, but
the district court denied that motion. On appeal, we are asked to decide, among other
things, whether the stop was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. This court has
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
II. FACTS
On a clear, calm morning in May of 2010, Officer Hermilo Lucero of the New
Mexico Motor Transportation Police Department was patrolling Interstate 40 in eastern
New Mexico when he noticed a silver Dodge Intrepid driven by Michael Harmon.
According to Officer Lucero, Mr. Harmon was “weaving within [his] lane,” and at one
point his front and rear passenger tires “crossed over the outer white line” before coming
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back into the lane. Vol. III, DNM 9-10. Officer Lucero did not regard this movement as
unsafe. He did, however, think touching the fog line violated N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-7-317
(“lane statute”). He also wondered whether the driver was intoxicated or fatigued. Vol.
III, DNM 8-9.
Officer Lucero did not pull over the Intrepid at that moment because, as he
explained, the two cars were entering a construction zone, and it would not have been
safe to stop the vehicle. Instead, he followed Mr. Harmon through the construction zone,
two and a half miles, at which point he turned on his lights and initiated a traffic stop.
Turning on the emergency lights activated the in-dash video recording system. The
resulting video captured the one minute preceding the stop and all events following.
During the minute preceding the stop, the video does not show the Intrepid weaving or
crossing any lane lines.
Officer Lucero asked Mr. Harmon for his license, registration, and insurance.
While standing next to the car, he noticed a “strong odor of air freshener emitting from
the vehicle.” Vol. III, DNM 14. Air freshener is sometimes used to mask the smell of
illegal narcotics in vehicles. Id. at 14-15. Officer Lucero then asked Mr. Harmon to walk
back with him to his police cruiser where he asked Mr. Harmon if he was tired or had
been drinking, apparently receiving satisfactory negative answers. Officer Lucero did not
administer any field sobriety tests. He told Mr. Harmon that he stopped him because he
3
had been weaving within the lane and because he crossed the fog line in the construction
zone.1
Officer Lucero inquired about Mr. Harmon’s travel plans, learning that he was
driving from Arizona to Michigan to watch his daughter’s graduation. He issued a
written warning for failing to maintain a lane in violation of N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-7-317
and told Mr. Harmon he was free to go.
Officer Lucero, however, was uneasy. He thought Mr. Harmon’s travel plans
seemed odd, and he was suspicious about the strong odor coming from the car. As Mr.
Harmon walked back to his car, Officer Lucero called out to him and asked if he would
mind answering a few more questions. Mr. Harmon returned to Officer Lucero’s cruiser,
and Officer Lucero asked if there were any illegal materials in the car. Mr. Harmon said
there were not, and he consented to Officer Lucero’s request to search the car.2 The
ensuing search revealed packages of marijuana and cocaine hidden in the spare tire.
Mr. Harmon was charged with possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or
more of cocaine and possession with intent to distribute 50 kilograms of marijuana. He
entered a conditional plea and moved to suppress the evidence uncovered during Officer
Lucero’s search. At the hearing, Mr. Harmon made several arguments, but we will only
1
The latter explanation was mistaken. Later, Officer Lucero acknowledged that he saw
Mr. Harmon cross the fog line before the construction zone. He attributed his
misstatement to the fact that he was nervous.
2
In his briefs to this Court, Mr. Harmon argues that the resulting search exceeded the
scope of the traffic stop’s underlying justification. However, counsel conceded at oral
argument that “it was a consensual search” and that we need not address Mr. Harmon’s
arguments about the scope of the search exceeding the initial justification. The issue
before us is whether the stop was justified, not whether the consensual search that
followed was proper.
4
summarize those that were preserved in his appeal. First, he argued that the traffic stop
was not supported by reasonable suspicion of a violation of New Mexico’s lane statute.
Second, Mr. Harmon challenged Officer Lucero’s credibility by pointing to specific
instances of Officer Lucero’s behavior during the traffic stop.
The District Court denied the motion to suppress. In so doing, it made extensive
factual findings. The court found Officer Lucero to be a credible witness. It also found
that Mr. Harmon “swerved” before Officer Lucero initiated the traffic stop, although the
term “swerve” was actually introduced in the question of an Assistant United States
Attorney to which the officer assented. Vol. I, DNM 63; Vol. III, DNM 10. The district
court concluded that Officer Lucero had reasonable suspicion that a violation of the lane
statute was occurring or that Mr. Harmon was intoxicated or fatigued. Vol. III, DNM
30.3
A few months after Mr. Harmon was sentenced he filed motions to withdraw his
plea and to reopen the motion to suppress based on information regarding a different
traffic stop conducted by Officer Lucero in United States v. Sheridan, No. CR 10-0333
JC. Vol. III, DNM 122. Mr. Harmon claimed Officer Lucero’s actions in the Sheridan
case undermine his credibility and provide impeachment evidence that should have been
3
New Mexico’s prohibition on driving under the influence is codified at N.M. Stat. § 66-
8-102. Mr. Harmon contends that the district court based its conclusion solely on the
existence of reasonable suspicion of a violation of the lane statute and not on a reasonable
suspicion of driving while impaired. While it is true that the district court concluded its
analysis of this issue by pointing to “reasonable suspicion [of] a violation of N.M. Stat. §
66-7-317,” Vol. III, DNM 34, the order repeatedly refers to Officer Lucero’s suspicion of
impairment, Vol. III, DNM 30-31. The district court could have been more explicit in its
reliance on the impairment statute, but that reliance is undoubtedly there.
5
disclosed before Mr. Harmon’s suppression hearing. Specifically, during this earlier,
unrelated traffic stop, Officer Lucero informed the dispatcher that the stop was motivated
by a tip from the DEA. He also asked that the dispatcher omit that information from the
Computer Aided Dispatch (“CAD”) report. Unmoved by this peek behind the law
enforcement curtain, the District Court denied Mr. Harmon’s motion, finding that this
newly uncovered evidence possessed neither exculpatory nor impeachment value, nor
was it material to Mr. Harmon’s defense. Vol. III, DNM 218.
On appeal to this Court, Mr. Harmon renews his arguments that his motion to
suppress ought to have been granted because Officer Lucero lacked sufficient reasonable
suspicion to make the initial traffic stop; that the scope of the search exceeded the initial
justification for the stop (but see n.2 supra); that his motion to reopen ought to have been
granted in light of Officer Lucero’s behavior in the Sheridan case; and finally that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel in entering into his plea agreement.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Reasonable Suspicion for the Stop
Here, the district court found two potential justifications for Officer Lucero’s stop
of Mr. Harmon: reasonable suspicion of violating the lane statute and reasonable
suspicion of driving while intoxicated or fatigued. While we are unable to forecast with
certainty how the New Mexico Supreme Court would apply the lane statute in this case,
we nonetheless agree that Officer Lucero had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle on
suspicion of impairment under New Mexico law.
6
In reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we apply
two standards of review. The district court’s factual findings receive clear error review.
In light of those facts, we review the reasonableness of the underlying seizure de novo.
United States v. McHugh, 639 F.3d 1250, 1255 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v.
Worthon, 520 F.3d 1173, 1178 (10th Cir. 2008)). We review the evidence in the light
most favorable to the government. Id.
A traffic stop is a seizure for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, United
States v. Bradford, 423 F.3d 1149, 1156 (10th Cir. 2005), and the “reasonable suspicion”
standard from Terry v. Ohio applies. United States v. Winder, 557 F.3d 1129, 1133 (10th
Cir. 2009) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). An investigatory stop “is justified at
its inception if the specific and articulable facts and rational inferences drawn from those
facts give rise to a reasonable suspicion a person has or is committing a crime.”
McHugh, 639 F.3d at 1255. We look to the totality of circumstances to determine
whether reasonable suspicion exists. Id. at 1256. This is an objective inquiry, and an
officer’s subjective motivation for the stop “play[s] no role in ordinary [reasonable
suspicion] Fourth Amendment analysis.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813
(1996); see also Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d at 787.
In applying these standards, we defer to the reasonable inferences of law
enforcement officers. Winder, 557 F.3d at 1133. Generally an officer’s reasonable
mistake of fact may support a finding of reasonable suspicion whereas a mistake of law
usually cannot support such a finding. United States v. Orduna-Martinez, 561 F.3d 1134,
1137 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132, 1138 (10th Cir. 2005)
7
(“we have also held that failure to understand the law by the very person charged with
enforcing it is not objectively reasonable”).
According to the district court and the government in its appeal, Officer Lucero
had reasonable suspicion that Mr. Harmon violated N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-7-317 or of
driving while impaired when the tires of Mr. Harmon’s car crossed the white fog line that
separates the right lane of the interstate from the shoulder. The statute states in part that
“a vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall
not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can
be made with safety.” N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-7-317. At the time of the suppression
hearing, New Mexico’s state courts had not authoritatively interpreted this statute. As a
result, it was an open question whether crossing the white fog line a single time when
accompanied by weaving within the lane constituted a violation of the statute or could
give rise to a reasonable suspicion of a violation of the statute.4
In the absence of a state court case interpreting the relevant state law, federal
courts must predict how the state court would interpret the statute in light of existing state
court opinions, comparable statutes, and decisions from other jurisdictions. United States
v. DeGasso, 369 F.3d 1139, 1145-46 (10th Cir. 2004). A district court’s statutory
construction of a state traffic law receives de novo review on appeal. United States v.
Valadez-Valadez, 525 F.3d 987, 991 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing DeGasso, 369 F.3d at 1144).
To resolve the question of how the New Mexico Supreme Court would apply this
statute to Mr. Harmon’s case, the district court examined two unpublished decisions from
4
This is still, to our knowledge, an open question in New Mexico.
8
the Tenth Circuit that interpreted N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-7-317. Both cases ultimately
concluded that when officers observe a car crossing the lane line and also observe other
behaviors that could indicate the driver might be unsafely operating a vehicle, then there
is reasonable suspicion of a violation of the statute. United States v. Bassols, 775 F.
Supp. 2d 1293 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that an officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a
van that veered back and forth multiple times between the fog line and the center line,
crossing the fog line at least once in the process); United States v. Herrell, 41 F. App’x
224 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that officers had reasonable suspicion of a violation of the
lane statute or of driving while impaired where a van twice crossed the centerline for no
apparent reason).
On appeal, Mr. Harmon points us to several unpublished cases from the New
Mexico Court of Appeals applying the statute. 5 In the first, City of Farmington v.
Fordyce, No. 30,638, 2011 WL 6016937 (N.M. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2011), an officer
observed a pickup truck swing wide during a right turn, crossing the center line in the
process. Believing the driver to have violated N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-7-317, the officer
stopped the pickup, during which he discovered that the driver was intoxicated. The New
Mexico Court of Appeals held that “the plain language of the statute does not make
touching or crossing the center line a per se violation of the statute.” Id. at *3. Indeed,
5
Mr. Harmon identified two cases, and we note that a third, State v. Lucero, No. 31,932,
2013 WL 4516412, (N.M. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2013), was released more recently. Because
these are not intervening decisions from the New Mexico Supreme Court, we examine
these cases merely for their persuasive value. See Kokins v. Teleflex, Inc., 621 F.3d 1290,
1295 (10th Cir. 2010) (noting that a federal court must look to “recent decisions of the
state’s highest court” when interpreting state law) (quoting Huddleson v. Dwyer, 322 U.S.
232, 236 (1944)).
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the court went on to rule that “the officer had reasonable suspicion for the stop only if the
turn was unsafe and maintaining the line was practicable, or Defendant was otherwise
engaged in erratic driving that needed further investigation.” Fordyce, 2011 WL
6016937, at *4. Because those other circumstances requiring further investigation were
not present, the court concluded that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to make the
stop. The driver in Fordyce was not, however, also weaving.
In the second case, New Mexico v. Jamon, No. 31,578, 2012 WL 2890685 (N.M.
Ct. App. June 5, 2012), an officer observed a car cross over the center line, veer back to
touch the shoulder line, and then veer towards the center and back to the shoulder again.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals held that while Mr. Jamon could not be convicted of
violating N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-7-317 under those facts, his driving did generate
reasonable suspicion that he violated the lane statute or was driving under the influence.
The Court of Appeals rejected Mr. Jamon’s argument that reasonable suspicion for a
violation of the statute only arises where the driving creates a danger.
Finally, in the latest case, State v. Lucero, No. 31,932, 2013 WL 4516412 (N.M.
Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2013), the New Mexico Court of Appeals found no reasonable
suspicion of a lane statute violation where a driver’s tires crossed the fog line three times
and touched it an additional two times over a two and one half mile span but there was no
traffic near the vehicle. Id. at *3 (citing Archibeque v. Homrich, 543 P.2d 820, 825
(N.M. 1975) (holding that the purpose of the lane maintenance statute is to protect the
motoring public from “head-on collisions or sideswiping” oncoming traffic)). This
arguably is inconsistent with the holding in Jamon which suggested that a car leaving its
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lane without an obvious reason could give rise to reasonable suspicion of a violation of
the lane statute. Lucero is notable, however, for at least one distinguishing fact.
Although the officer testified at the suppression hearing that the line crossings raised a
concern about impairment, the state did not address or argue that the possibility of
impairment was a basis for the stop. The state did raise the impairment issue on appeal.
The appellate panel acknowledged that the officer’s testimony potentially could support a
stop based upon reasonable suspicion of violating statutes prohibiting careless driving
and driving while impaired, but the state had not preserved that argument for appeal. Id.
Here, by contrast, the potential justification of suspicion of impairment was a basis of the
district court’s order.
Lucero, in particular, seems to be at odds with the other cases from the Tenth
Circuit and the New Mexico Court of Appeals on the issue of what constitutes reasonable
suspicion for violation of the lane statute. That case, while it involved multiple crossings
of the lane line, indicates that such behavior does not create a reasonable suspicion of
violation of the lane statute. Moreover, it explicitly distinguishes Jamon as a case
involving reasonable suspicion of impairment, notwithstanding the fact that the Jamon
court held that multiple line crosses and weaving constituted reasonable suspicion of both
a violation of the lane statute and driving while impaired or fatigued. This apparent
disagreement muddies the waters regarding how the New Mexico Supreme Court would
apply the statute in this case.
But luckily, we are not required to wade into that muddy water because we
conclude that under the facts of the instant case, Officer Lucero could have had a
11
reasonable suspicion of impairment, and the district court included this justification in its
ruling. See, e.g., Herrell, 41 F. App’x at 230. We take it as factual that the officer
observed the vehicle weaving and, in one instance, crossing the fog line with the front
and rear passenger wheels. We also note that there is no evidence in the record indicating
difficult driving conditions or adverse weather that could have explained Mr. Harmon’s
driving errors. Cf. United States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that a
single isolated instance of a vehicle moving into the emergency lane on a mountain road
in windy conditions does not raise a reasonable suspicion of violating Utah’s identical
lane statute). The combination of these facts justifies a stop based on concern of
impairment under New Mexico law.
B. Scope of the Search
Mr. Harmon argues in his brief that Officer Lucero’s investigatory stop
exceeded the scope of the initial justification, thereby violating the Fourth Amendment
and entitling him to suppression of the drugs discovered in the Intrepid. Not only must
the initial stop be justified, but the scope of the resulting detention must remain
reasonably related to the initial justification. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d at 783; United
States v. Gonzales-Lerma, 14 F.3d 1479, 1483 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that the officer
may request documents, run a computer check, and issue a citation before releasing the
detainee) (overruled on other grounds). Therefore once the officer has satisfied his initial
reasonable suspicions, “unless the officer obtains ‘a new and independent basis’ for
suspecting the detained individual of criminal activity, his investigation must end.”
12
Winder, 557 F.3d at 1135 (quoting United States v. Peters, 10 F.3d 1517, 1522 (10th Cir.
1993)).
However, as indicated above at note 2, counsel conceded during oral argument
that the search was consensual. An officer may continue questioning the driver if the
stop has transitioned from a detention to a consensual encounter. Id. (citing United States
v. DeWitt, 946 F.2d 1497, 1502 (10th Cir. 1991).
C. Motion to Reopen and Reconsider the Motion to Suppress
Mr. Harmon also contends that the district court improperly denied his motion to
reopen and reconsider the previous denial of the motion to suppress. In that motion, he
renewed his arguments about the lack of reasonable suspicion for the stop. He also
claimed that evidence regarding Officer Lucero’s communications with dispatch in an
unrelated case constituted impeachment material that should have been disclosed prior to
the suppression hearing. We review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Wiseman, 172 F.3d 1196, 1207-08 (10th Cir. 1999).
As a foundational matter, due process requires that the prosecution disclose any
evidence favorable to the defendant and material to his or her guilt or punishment. Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Evidence is considered “material” for Brady
purposes “only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed
to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A ‘reasonable
probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” United
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). Evidence bearing on a witness’s credibility
may be material in some cases. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)
13
(“When the reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,
nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within this general rule.”) (quotation
marks omitted).
Because the district court relied on Officer Lucero’s credibility in determining the
reasonableness of the search and denying the suppression motion, Mr. Harmon believes
evidence from the Sheridan case would have potentially changed the outcome of that
proceeding and thus, it was required to be disclosed under Bagley and Brady.
Specifically, Mr. Harmon believes that “Officer Lucero intentionally placed false
information into a police report and allowed another officer to use that same false
information in preparation of an affidavit to be filed in court.” Appellant Reply Br. 20.
His best argument is that Officer Lucero’s character for truthfulness is suspect given that
he instructed the dispatcher to keep the true motivation for the stop out of the report.
Nevertheless, that argument is unavailing for several reasons. First, we agree with
the district court that it appears from the record in Sheridan that Officer Lucero did not
violate the Fourth Amendment in his search of Mr. Sheridan’s car. Vol. I, DNM 259-66.
Second, as far as we can tell there is no obligation that the CAD report be exhaustive. No
one has provided us any authority to indicate the existence of such an obligation, and in
fact, the district court noted at least one case suggesting there is no obligation to be
exhaustive. See United States v. Cannon, No. IP 05-52-CR-01-T/F, 2006 WL 3206267,
at *1 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 7, 2006). Third, law enforcement may at times have legitimate
reasons to keep certain information confidential, as in the case of keeping an
14
investigation secret. See e.g., John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 156
(1989).
Thus, we note that Officer Lucero was under no obligation to place every piece of
relevant information into the CAD report; he had a valid independent basis for his search
of Mr. Sheridan’s vehicle; and there were legitimate reasons that he might want to keep
confidential the DEA investigation leading to Mr. Sheridan’s vehicle. We note as well
that there was never any determination in the Sheridan case that Officer Lucero had done
anything improper. Indeed, although the defendant raised the issue, he later abandoned
it. In light of these facts, we cannot see how Officer Lucero’s behavior reflects on his
“character for truthfulness.” Fed. R. Evid. 608(b).6 Cf. United States v. Lee Vang Lor,
706 F.3d 1252 (10th Cir. 2013) (seeing possible impeachment material where an arresting
officer later, in an unrelated case, affirmatively lied to the dispatcher about the grounds
for a stop when no such grounds existed); United States v. Beltran-Garcia, 338 F. App’x
765, 771 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding impeachment value in evidence of a testifying
officer’s prior misconduct in 1) misrepresenting the extent of consent given to search a
house and 2) omissions in the officer’s reports of material facts).
We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
deciding that the evidence did not possess impeachment value and was unlikely to change
the outcome of the suppression hearing—a conclusion bolstered by the district court’s
6
We recognize that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to suppression hearings.
See Fed. R. Evid. 104(a). However, like the district court, we believe the standards
governing impeachment can help frame how much weight to give this purported
impeachment evidence from Sheridan.
15
own explanation that the evidence did not change its mind about Officer Lucero’s
credibility. Vol. I, DNM 270-71. We can find no clear error requiring us to reverse the
district court’s denial of the motion to reopen.
D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Mr. Harmon’s argument is essentially that his original attorney should not have
counseled him to enter the plea agreement and failed to perform due diligence in
investigating the facts surrounding the traffic stop. We review these claims de novo.
United States v. Prows, 118 F.3d 686, 691 (10th Cir. 1997).
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should normally be brought in
collateral proceedings in order to fully develop a factual record for review. United States
v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1240 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc). In fact, when these claims
are brought on direct appeal they are “presumptively dismissible.” Id. Exception will be
made for those “rare cases” needing “no further development.” Id.
This is not one of those rare cases. We have before us no opinion from the district
court on the performance of Mr. Harmon’s attorneys, nor do we possess many of the facts
we would need in order to determine whether the attorneys were deficient and whether
that deficient performance prejudiced Mr. Harmon. We have nothing more than Mr.
Harmon’s assertions. As a result, we reject Mr. Harmon’s claims regarding ineffective
assistance of counsel.
IV.CONCLUSION
This is a close and difficult case. However, in light of the district court’s factual
findings, we predict that the New Mexico Supreme Court would probably find that
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Officer Lucero had reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Harmon for driving while impaired
in violation of New Mexico law. The judgments of the district court denying the motion
to suppress and motion to reopen are affirmed.
17