Matumona v. Barr ( 2019 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
PUBLISH Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 30, 2019
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
_________________________________
ADAMA HEUREUX MATUMONA, a/k/a
Nikuna Adao,
Petitioner,
v. No. 18-9579
WILLIAM P. BARR, United States
Attorney General,
Respondent.
NEW MEXICO IMMIGRANT LAW
CENTER; SANTA FE DREAMERS
PROJECT; AMERICAN IMMIGRATION
LAWYERS ASSOCIATION; STEVEN R.
ABRAMS; JEFFREY S. CHASE;
TEOFILO CHAPA; GEORGE CHEW;
BRUCE J. EINHORN; CECELIA M.
ESPENOZA; NOEL FERRIS; JOHN F.
GOSSART, JR.; MIRIAM HAYWARD;
REBECCA JAMIL; CAROL KING;
ELIZA KLEIN; ELIZABETH A. LAMB;
MARGARET MCMANUS; CHARLES
PAZAR; GEORGE PROCTOR; LAURA
RAMIREZ; JOHN W. RICHARDSON;
LORY D. ROSENBERG; SUSAN ROY;
PAUL W. SCHMIDT; WILLIAM VAN
WYKE; GUSTAVO D. VILLAGELIU;
POLLY WEBBER, Retired Immigration
Judges and Former Members of the Board
of Immigration Appeals,
Amici Curiae.
_________________________________
Petition for Review from the Board of Immigration Appeals
_________________________________
Tassity Johnson (Matthew E. Price, Jenner & Block LLP, Washington, D.C., and Keren
Zwick andTania Linares Garcia, National Immigrant Justice Center, Chicago, IL, with
her on the briefs), Jenner & Block LLP, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner.
Remi Da Rocha-Afodu, Trial Attorney (Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General,
Civil Division, and Mary Jane Candaux, Assistant Director, Office of Immigration
Litigation, with her on the brief), U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for
Respondent
Nicole C. Henning, Jones Day, Chicago, Illinois, filed an Amici Curiae brief for the New
Mexico Immigrant Law Center, Santa Fe Dreamers Project, and American Immigration
Lawyers Association, in support of Petitioner.
Jean-Claude André and Katelyn N. Rowe, Sidley Austin LLP, Los Angeles, California,
filed an amici curiae brief for Retired Immigration Judges and Former Members of the
Board of Immigration Appeals, in support of Petitioner.
_________________________________
Before LUCERO, HARTZ, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
HARTZ, Circuit Judge.
_________________________________
Petitioner Adama Matumona is a native and citizen of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (DRC). He petitions for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) denying his application for asylum and withholding of removal.
Regarding asylum, Petitioner argues that the BIA (1) erred in determining that he had
firmly resettled in Angola, which barred him from applying for asylum, and (2) engaged
in improper factfinding in determining he was ineligible for an exception to the firm-
resettlement bar. On withholding of removal, he argues that the BIA improperly rejected
his claims of past persecution and a well-founded fear of future persecution. Petitioner
2
also contests the BIA’s determination that his due-process rights and his statutory right to
a fair hearing were not violated by the failure of the immigration judge (IJ) to adequately
develop the record and to implement appropriate safeguards for a pro se litigant detained
in a remote facility.
Exercising jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), we affirm on all issues except
that we remand to the BIA to consider Petitioner’s claim that he is entitled to withholding
of removal because of the alleged pattern or practice of the DRC government of
persecuting persons with Petitioner’s political views.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Petitioner presented himself to immigration officials at the United States border on
January 4, 2017. He was detained and placed in removal proceedings as a noncitizen
seeking admission without valid entry documents. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I).
During the proceedings he was detained at the Cibola County Correctional Facility in
Milan, New Mexico.1
At Petitioner’s first master-calendar hearing in immigration court, he informed the
IJ he was seeking asylum because he feared returning to the DRC. The IJ gave him a list
of legal-aid attorneys and an asylum application. He expressed concern about being able
to complete the application in English, which he does not understand. The IJ explained
that although she could not complete the form for him, “we’ll probably have to find
1
The government notified this court on October 1, 2019, that Petitioner was removed to
the DRC by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) on September 24, 2019.
3
someone to help you.” Certified Administrative Record (CAR) 441. Petitioner, who
does understand French, ultimately completed his asylum application with the help of a
French-speaking volunteer at Cibola. His asylum application alleged the following
facts:2 Petitioner was born in Kinshasa, DRC, and was a leader for five years in a
political movement that opposed the then-government of the country. He took part in a
January 2015 opposition march where state security officials attacked participants and
killed at least five while the participants fled. After this incident he “was told that [he]
needed to escape,” so he fled to Angola with his common-law wife and changed his
name. CAR 550. He feared the government would kill him if he returned to the DRC
because of his political activism.
At the merits hearing the IJ offered Petitioner a continuance but he declined,
saying that he wanted to proceed because he was currently “cut off from [his] family”
and was dealing with unspecified medical issues. CAR 461–62. His asylum application
was entered as an exhibit at the hearing, and the government submitted the 2016
Department of State Human Rights Report for the DRC. Petitioner testified that he had
been a community organizer for Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social (UDPS), a
political party that opposed then-President Kabila’s regime. His UDPS activities
included organizing youth and others in his neighborhood to march in protest. In 2013
2
The IJ and the BIA considered Petitioner’s application as seeking three forms of relief:
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture
(CAT). Although the application did not expressly state that he was seeking withholding
of removal, a request for asylum is also deemed a request for withholding. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.3(b). And Petitioner applied for relief under the CAT by checking a box on the
first page of the Form I-589.
4
and 2014 he helped organize marches in response to the government’s “Operation
Likofi,” which targeted opposition leaders and led to the kidnapping and killing of over
400 people. He went into hiding after the 2013 march, but he was able to move about in
the open, albeit cautiously, after the march in 2014. A January 2015 march protested a
proposed constitutional change to allow President Kabila to serve a third term. President
Kabila responded by sending his men to the streets to injure and kill march participants.
The government then began looking for the protest leaders, including Petitioner.
Although he had not been physically harmed in the DRC, the killings of some organizers
and the ongoing search for others caused him to fear for his safety. He fled to Angola in
February 2015.
Petitioner initially fled to Angola alone, but he was later able to bring over his
eight children and wife. His wife had their ninth child in Angola. He said that he was
still fearful for his safety in Angola because the Angolan government is an ally of the
Congolese government, and thus he could still be discovered and harmed there. He also
testified, however, that he experienced no actual problems in Angola. To get documents
to leave Angola, Petitioner found an Angolan family to “adopt” him so he could take
their Angolan name and get an Angolan passport. CAR 467. When asked by the DHS
attorney, “So you also have citizenship in Angola, correct,” he responded: “Yes. I did
went—I did go to through the process of trying to get a document to become an Angolan,
but it is just a way of me getting the right documents so that I can move from Angola to
Congo—to Brazil, but my real identity, I am a Congolese.” Id. at 475. And when later
asked by the IJ, “[W]hen you became a citizen of Angola, did you have to renounce your
5
citizenship in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” he responded similarly, saying: “It is a
need. It was a need-base kind of situation. I was never intended to become an Angolan.
It was just a way for me to get the papers that I needed to get here but I maintain that, I
still have my Congolese nationality and I think myself as a Congolese.” Id. at 481. After
staying in Angola for a little over a year, he left for Brazil without his family in March
2016. He chose Brazil because he believed it was easiest to obtain a Brazilian visa. He
stayed in Brazil until he traveled to the United States to seek asylum.
B. Procedural History
The IJ denied Petitioner’s request for asylum on the ground of statutory
ineligibility because he had firmly resettled in Angola. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi).
The IJ denied his request for withholding of removal on the merits, ruling that he had not
established past persecution or a clear probability of future persecution. Petitioner’s
request for protection under the CAT was also denied.
Petitioner obtained pro bono counsel and appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA.
He also filed a motion asking the BIA to remand his case to the IJ to consider new
allegedly material evidence, including additional country-conditions evidence and an
affidavit of his own. The BIA dismissed the appeal. It affirmed the IJ’s ruling that
Petitioner had firmly resettled in Angola and decided that he did not qualify for any
exception to the firm-resettlement bar to asylum. It also affirmed the IJ’s decision that
6
Petitioner was not eligible for relief under withholding of removal or the CAT. And it
rejected Petitioner’s due-process arguments and denied his motion to remand.3
When Petitioner filed his first petition for review with this court, the government
moved to remand to the BIA for consideration of his testimony that he fled the DRC
because government officials were looking specifically for him. We granted the motion
with instructions that the BIA could consider any matter Petitioner had properly
preserved.
On remand the BIA dismissed Petitioner’s appeal on the same grounds as before.
The BIA stated that it had previously acknowledged the testimony that officials were
looking for Petitioner and that even accepting the testimony as true, Petitioner could not
establish that he faced an individualized risk of harm.
II. DISCUSSION
Petitioner appeals the BIA’s denial of both asylum and withholding of removal.4
He also makes several procedural challenges to the administrative proceedings, some of
which are discussed below as part of his substantive claims and some of which are
addressed afterwards.
A. Standard of Review
3
In support of the motion to remand, Petitioner submitted his affidavit and other
materials. But the BIA ruled that the affidavit was improper because he had not shown
that its contents were previously unavailable. Petitioner has not challenged that ruling in
this court.
4
The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision that Petitioner did not meet his burden with regard
to relief under the CAT, but he has not sought review of that decision in this court.
7
“We consider any legal questions de novo, and we review the agency’s findings of
fact under the substantial evidence standard.” Elzour v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 1143, 1150
(10th Cir. 2004). Under the substantial-evidence standard, we examine whether the
“factual determinations are supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence
considering the record as a whole.” Id. at 1150. We have characterized the issue of
whether an alien has established persecution as a question of fact. See Vicente-Elias v.
Mukasey, 532 F.3d 1086, 1091 (10th Cir. 2008).5 Also, we must “decide the petition [for
review] only on the administrative record on which the order of removal is based.” 8
U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A). “[O]ur review is confined to the reasoning given by the IJ [and
BIA], and we will not independently search the record for alternative bases to affirm.”
Elzour, 378 F.3d at 1150 (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943)).
B. Asylum
Only refugees are eligible for asylum. To be considered a refugee, an applicant
“must demonstrate either past ‘persecution or a well-founded fear of [future] persecution
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.’” Woldemeskel v. INS, 257 F.3d 1185, 1188 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)) (brackets in the original). A refugee is not eligible, however, if
5
In Xue v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 1099, 1104–05 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. dismissed, 138 S. Ct.
420 (2017), we recognized the conflict between our characterization of the BIA’s
decision of whether persecution has been shown as a question of fact and the BIA’s own
characterization of an IJ’s identical determination as a question of law reviewed de novo.
Although the circuits are split on the standard of review applicable to the issue, the
Supreme Court has yet to resolve it. See Xue, 846 F.3d at 1105, n.11 (collecting cases).
Until it does, we are bound by our decision in Vicente-Elias.
8
he “was firmly resettled in another country prior to arriving in the United States.”
Elzour, 378 F.3d at 1149; see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi). An applicant “is considered
to be firmly resettled in a third country when ‘prior to arrival in the United States, he or
she entered into another country with, or while in that country received, an offer of
permanent resident status, citizenship, or some other type of permanent resettlement.’”
Elzour, 378 F.3d at 1149 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.15).
An applicant for relief from removal has the burden of establishing eligibility for
asylum. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d). “If the evidence indicates that one or more of the
grounds for mandatory denial of the application for relief may apply, the alien shall have
the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that such grounds do not
apply.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, if the government presents evidence indicating that
the applicant may have firmly resettled in a third country, the applicant bears the burden
of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he had not firmly resettled. See
Matter of A-G-G-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 486, 501 (BIA 2011).
In Matter of A-G-G- the BIA set out its framework to determine whether an
applicant was firmly resettled. First, to satisfy the requirement of showing that the firm-
resettlement bar may apply, the government “bears the burden of presenting prima facie
evidence of an offer of firm resettlement.” Id. at 501. To make a prima facie showing,
the government “should first secure and produce direct evidence of governmental
documents indicating an alien’s ability to stay in a country indefinitely.” Id. “Such
documents may include evidence of refugee status, a passport, a travel document, or
other evidence indicative of permanent residence.” Id. at 501–02 (emphasis added). If
9
such direct evidence is unavailable, the government may rely on indirect evidence, such
as “the immigration laws or refugee process of the country of proposed resettlement; the
length of the alien’s stay in a third country; . . . family ties and business or property; . . .
and whether the alien had legal rights normally given to people who have some official
status, such as the right to work and enter and exit the country.” Id. at 502. Note again,
this prima facie case is not to establish firm resettlement by the preponderance of the
evidence but need only indicate that the applicant may have firmly resettled.
The applicant can rebut the prima facie evidence by “showing by a preponderance
of the evidence that . . . an offer [of firm resettlement] has not, in fact, been made or that
he or she would not qualify for it”—for example, by presenting evidence “regarding how
a law granting permanent residence to an alien is actually applied and why the alien
would not be eligible to remain in the country in an official status.” Id. at 503. If the
BIA determines that the applicant firmly resettled, the applicant bears the burden to show
by a preponderance of the evidence that he qualifies for an exception to firm resettlement
under 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.15(a) or (b). See id.The BIA concluded that the government’s prima facie burden was satisfied by
Petitioner’s Angolan passport. See id. at 501–02. Petitioner argues, however, that
because he retained his Congolese citizenship and the Angolan passport was obtained
fraudulently (he used the false name of his “adoptive” Angolan family to acquire it) it did
not suffice. We disagree.
In Matter of D-X- & Y-Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 664, 665 (BIA 2012), the BIA held that
the applicant’s “Permit to Reside in Belize” was prima facie evidence of an offer of firm
10
resettlement. The applicant then “sought to rebut the presumption of an offer of firm
resettlement by asserting that the permits were obtained by fraud.” Id. at 665–66. The
BIA was not persuaded. It said: “As noted by the Immigration Judge, the permits are
facially valid. Even if the [applicants] used some form of fraud or bribery through a
middleman to obtain them, there has been no showing that they were not issued by the
Belize Government. Furthermore, the female respondent used her permits to reenter
Belize after visiting the United States.” Id. at 666. The BIA then noted that three
different circuit courts had rejected claims that firmly-resettled status should be
disregarded if it had been acquired through fraud. See id. (citing Su Hwa She v. Holder,
629 F.3d 958, 962–64 (9th Cir. 2010); Firmansjah v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 598 (7th Cir.
2005); Salazar v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 45, 51 (1st Cir. 2004)). The BIA concluded:
“Accordingly, for these reasons, we hold that the [applicants’] claim of fraud in obtaining
permits to reside in Belize does not rebut the [government’s] prima facie evidence of firm
resettlement in that country.” Id. at 666–67.
Petitioner does not challenge the decision in Matter of D-X- & Y-Z- but asks us to
read it to hold that unless a fraudulently obtained document had been used for exit and
reentry of the country that issued it, and enabled the holder to remain indefinitely, the fact
that the document was fraudulent rebuts the prima facie case. But that overreads both
Matter of D-X- & Y-Z-and Matter of A-G-G-, which characterize the government’s
burden as only having to prove the applicant’s ability to stay in the country, without
mention of reentry. See Matter of D-X- & Y-Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 665 (requiring
evidence “indicating an alien’s ability to stay in a country indefinitely”); Matter of A-G-
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G-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 501–02 (same). Petitioner’s error is to focus on one fact in Matter
of D-X- & Y-Z- and ignore the general thrust of the opinion. In summarizing the three
circuit opinions supporting its decision, it made no mention that in those cases the
applicants had been able to reenter the country of issuance. Rather, the thrust of the BIA
opinion is simply that an applicant cannot rebut a firmly-resettled prima facie case by
simply showing that the firm resettlement was obtained through fraud. More is required.
For example, we assume that an applicant could rebut the prima facie case by showing
that the fraud could be readily detected (as when the documents are not facially valid).
See id. at 665–66 (indicating methods of rebutting a prima facie case, such as by showing
that the document was not actually issued by the government).
In this case, we hold that there was sufficient evidence to support the BIA’s
determination that the government had presented a prima facie case and Petitioner had
not rebutted that case by a preponderance of the evidence. Petitioner’s Angolan passport
allowed him to leave Angola, travel to and enter Brazil, and obtain and renew his
Brazilian visa, certainly indicating its facial validity. He advances no evidence that the
passport was not issued by the Angolan government, that it had ever been treated as
invalid, or that he would be denied reentry or be unable to remain in Angola with it. On
the contrary, at his merits hearing he did not contest the statements by the DHS attorney
and the IJ that he had become a citizen of Angola; he responded only that his actions
were so that he could ultimately get to this country and he still considered himself
Congolese.
12
Despite Petitioner's contention that the false name on his passport makes the
document an invalid offer of resettlement, he has failed to show that he would not be
allowed to live in Angola under his “adopted” name, as he managed to for over a year
before leaving. The false name does not undermine the passport’s facial validity in a
manner recognized by Matter of A-G-G- or Matter of D-X- & Y-Z-, nor does Petitioner
offer any authority suggesting that use of a false name is distinguishable from other ways
of “fraudulently obtain[ing]” a passport. (Indeed, as noted in the previous paragraph, he
acknowledged that the passport conferred Angolan citizenship on him.) We therefore
affirm the BIA’s decision that Petitioner did not rebut the government’s prima facie
evidence of an offer of firm resettlement.
Petitioner next contends that he has shown by a preponderance of the evidence
that an exception to the firm-resettlement bar applies. See Matter of A-G-G-, 25 I. & N.
Dec. at 503. A person is not considered firmly resettled if he establishes:
(a) That his or her entry into that country was a necessary consequence of his
or her flight from persecution, that he or she remained in that country only
as long as was necessary to arrange onward travel, and that he or she did
not establish significant ties in that country; or
(b) That the conditions of his or her residence in that country were so
substantially and consciously restricted by the authority of the country of
refuge that he or she was not in fact resettled.
8 C.F.R § 1208.15 (emphasis added). Only the first exception is at issue here.
The BIA ruled that Petitioner established significant ties to Angola because he
lived there over a year, obtained citizenship through his “adoptive” Angolan family, and
brought his wife and children to the country. It stated that “although [Petitioner] testified
13
that he obtained the Angolan passport in order to travel to Brazil, he did not testify that he
only stayed in Angola as long as it took to arrange onward travel.” CAR 4. Because a
finding of significant ties precludes him from meeting the first exception, the BIA
determined that he did not rebut the government’s showing that he was firmly resettled in
Angola.
Petitioner raises two additional arguments against the BIA’s resolution of the firm-
resettlement issue. First, he argues that the BIA improperly engaged in its own
factfinding in determining that he did not establish the exception. Under the BIA’s
regulations and precedents, the BIA should not make independent factual findings. See 8
C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv) (“[T]he Board will not engage in factfinding in the course of
deciding appeals.”); In re S-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 462, 465 (BIA 2002) (“If incomplete
findings of fact are entered and the Immigration Judge’s decision ultimately cannot be
affirmed on the basis that he or she decided the case, a remand of the case for further
fact-finding may be unavoidable.”). But just because the IJ herself did not make the
ultimate finding on the firm-resettlement exception does not mean the BIA necessarily
engaged in impermissible factfinding. The BIA relied solely on facts found by the IJ to
conclude that Petitioner established significant ties to Angola. Petitioner does not
identify any fact relied on by the BIA that was not found by the IJ. See Ullah v. U.S.
Att’y Gen., 760 F. App’x 922, 930 (11th Cir. 2019) (BIA did not engage in impermissible
factfinding to address argument not considered by IJ because “the BIA did not reject any
of the IJ’s fact findings, did not find any facts in the first instance, and did not reference
any evidence upon which the IJ did not also rely in making the [same] ultimate
14
determination”). The BIA did not exceed its appellate authority in determining that
Petitioner had been firmly resettled.
Petitioner next argues that the IJ denied him constitutional and statutory due
process by not adequately developing the record on firm resettlement. The government
does not dispute that an IJ has an affirmative duty to develop the record when the
applicant is not represented. Although this court has not explicitly recognized this
“affirmative” duty in a precedential decision, other circuits have. See Yang v. McElroy,
277 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he IJ . . . unlike an Article III judge, is not merely
the fact finder and adjudicator but also has an obligation to establish the record.” (citing
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1))); Abdurakhmanov v. Holder, 735 F.3d 341, 346 n.4 (6th Cir.
2012) (“An IJ has not only an ability, but an obligation, to ask questions of the alien
during the hearing to establish a full record” (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1))); Al Khouri
v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 461, 464 (8th Cir. 2004) (“[W]hen an alien appears pro se, it is the
IJ’s duty to fully develop the record.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Oshodi v.
Holder, 729 F.3d 883, 889 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[W]here an applicant is not represented, the
IJ has an affirmative duty to ensure that the record is fully developed for the benefit of
the applicant.”); see also Na Zheng v. Holder, 507 F. App’x 755, 762 (10th Cir. 2013)
(“[T]he IJ . . . has some duty to develop the record.”). For purposes of this appeal only,
we will assume that there is a duty to develop the record for a pro se applicant.
To prevail on this argument, Petitioner must identify evidence that the IJ should
have elicited that would have altered the BIA’s finding that he was firmly resettled in
Angola. See Berrum-Garcia v. Comfort, 390 F.3d 1158, 1165 (10th Cir. 2004) (requiring
15
showing of prejudicial error to establish due-process violation). But he argues only that
the IJ should have inquired more deeply into his “adoption” and resultant name change,
and that she should have asked whether he “legally changed his name or could otherwise
lawfully use a passport under someone else’s name to return to Angola.” Aplt. Br. at 45.
Except for the ability to reenter, however, none of this evidence would alter the
applicability of Matter of D-X- & Y-Z-, which allows fraudulently obtained documents to
serve as prima facie evidence of firm resettlement. And even on appeal he does not offer
any evidence that he would have been denied reentry with the Angolan passport issued to
him. As he points to no testimony or other evidence that could undermine the facial
validity of the passport as an offer of firm resettlement under Matter of D-X- & Y-Z-, he
cannot establish that the IJ’s development of the record was prejudicially inadequate.
C. Withholding of Removal
An applicant seeking withholding of removal must “establish a clear probability of
persecution in that country on the basis of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.” Elzour, 378 F.3d at 1149 (citing 8 U.S.C. §
1231(b)(3)(A)). “[S]uch persecution [must be] more likely than not.” Id. “If the
applicant is determined to have suffered past persecution . . . , it shall be presumed that
the applicant’s life or freedom would be threatened in the future in the country of
removal on the basis of the original claim.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)(i). The term
persecution is not defined in the Immigration and Nationality Act, but this court has held
that persecution “requires the infliction of suffering or harm . . . in a way regarded as
offensive and requires more than just restrictions or threats to life and liberty.”
16
Woldemeskel, 257 F.3d at 1188 (internal quotation marks omitted). Unlike in an asylum
claim, “firm resettlement in a third country is not a bar to restriction on removal.”
Elzour, 378 F.3d at 1149.
1. Past Persecution
The BIA concluded that Petitioner’s “perceived need to hide for short periods of
time in the DRC and his resettlement in Angola did not constitute past ‘persecution,’”
even accepting his testimony that the government looked for him after the 2013, 2014,
and 2015 demonstrations. CAR 5. The BIA further noted that Petitioner testified before
the IJ “that he was not harmed or personally threatened with violence in the DRC.” CAR
5. On appeal Petitioner contends the BIA erred by effectively concluding he was not
persecuted because he was never physically harmed. But the BIA did not rely on any
physical-harm requirement; rather, it merely determined that Petitioner had not
experienced persecution by going into hiding for fear of being arrested or otherwise
harmed. We see no error.
Petitioner relies on our statement that threats can “constitute actual persecution . . .
when they are so immediate and menacing as to cause significant suffering or harm in
themselves.” Vatulev v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 1207, 1210 (10th Cir. 2003). But that
standard is very difficult to satisfy. Vatulev said that “only rarely” do threats constitute
actual persecution, id., and in neither of the two cases we cited in support of our
statement—Mendez-Gutierrez v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 865, 869 n.6 (9th Cir. 2003), and
Boykov v. INS, 109 F.3d 413, 416 (7th Cir. 1997)—did the court decide that the threats
alone constituted persecution. Indeed, the cited footnote in Mendez-Gutierrez included
17
the following citation and parenthetical in support of the proposition that unfulfilled
threats standing alone rarely establish persecution: “Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929, 936 (9th
Cir. 2000) (finding that alien who had received numerous death threats, and whose
colleagues were murdered by the military, had not suffered past persecution).” We think
our circuit precedent is clear that the BIA did not err in deciding that there was no past
persecution in this case. Even if we believed that the out-of-circuit opinions cited in
Petitioner’s briefs would support his claim and are persuasive, we are bound by circuit
precedent.
We note, however, that this does not mean that Petitioner’s account of why he
fled the DRC is irrelevant. As we stated in Vatulev, “[U]nfulfilled threats are still
properly considered in determining whether a petitioner has a reasonable fear of future
persecution.” 354 F.3d at 1210. In particular, as we explain below, we are remanding
this case to the BIA for further consideration of Petitioner’s claim that his fear of future
persecution is based on a pattern or practice of the DRC government, and his testimony is
relevant on that issue.
Petitioner also contends that the IJ failed to sufficiently develop the record on past
persecution. We disagree. The IJ, together with the government attorney, adequately
asked questions that gave Petitioner the opportunity to provide the testimony he claims
should have been elicited. For example, he argues that he had no chance to explain that
state security officials repeatedly searched for him after he participated in opposition
marches. But he was asked multiple times what happened to him, if anything, because of
the marches he participated in. Petitioner also claims that he was not prompted to share
18
that two fellow UPDS organizers were arrested and disappeared. His testimony and
asylum application, however, both stated that several fellow organizers and participants
were killed at the marches and others were hunted afterwards. As a final example,
Petitioner argues that he was not given an opportunity to explain that Angolan security
officers were looking for him and that his beliefs would cause him to be harmed there.
But this ignores that he was specifically asked whether he had any problems in Angola,
and that he answered in the negative. The IJ adequately developed the record on past
persecution.
2. Future Persecution
“The restriction statute is satisfied by a showing that it is more likely than not that
the alien would be subject to persecution on one of the specified grounds upon returning
to [his] country of origin.” Tulengkey v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 1277, 1280 (10th Cir. 2005)
(internal quotation marks omitted). While an applicant who demonstrates past
persecution is entitled to a presumption of future persecution, see 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.16(b)(1)(i), the failure to show past persecution does not bar an independent
showing of future harm, see id. The likelihood of future persecution can be established
by showing either (1) an individualized risk of harm upon return, or (2) “a pattern or
practice of persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to applicant on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion,”
and that the applicant belongs to and identifies with the group “such that it is more likely
19
than not than his or her life or freedom would be threatened upon return to that country.”
Id. (emphasis added).6
The BIA rejected any claim based on the first alternative—an individualized risk
of harm. It ruled that Petitioner did not demonstrate a clear probability of future
persecution because he could not show “a continued government interest in him since his
departure from the DRC in 2015.” CAR 5. It further observed that Petitioner’s ability to
return to a relatively normal life in the DRC after his participation in the 2013 and 2014
marches undermined his claim. Petitioner does not suggest that the BIA overlooked
evidence of individualized risk, but he argues that having to prove that the DRC
government still has an interest in him was “an impossible standard” given his inability to
obtain evidence while detained in the United States. Aplt. Br. at 41. If there had been
interest in him, however, one would expect that to be apparent to his family and
6
The pattern-or-practice regulation states:
(2) In evaluating whether it is more likely than not that the applicant’s life or
freedom would be threatened in a particular country on account of . . . political
opinion, the asylum officer or immigration judge shall not require the applicant
to provide evidence that he or she would be singled out individually for such
persecution if:
(i) The applicant establishes that in that country there is a pattern or
practice of persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to
the applicant on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion; and
(ii) The applicant establishes his or her own inclusion in and
identification with such group of persons such that it is more likely
than not that his or her life or freedom would be threatened upon
return to that country.
8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b) (emphasis added).
20
associates in the DRC, who could have communicated this to him after his departure
from the DRC in 2015. In any event, a claim for withholding of removal must be based
on evidence, not speculation.
Petitioner fares better on his argument that he has made a showing of future
persecution based on a pattern or practice of persecution. The BIA did not address
whether the evidence was sufficient to establish a pattern-or-practice claim. It stated its
ruling only in terms of individualized risk. See CAR 5 (“[Petitioner] has not provided
sufficient evidence to demonstrate a continued government interest in him since his
departure from the DRC in 2015, so as to establish that he will more likely than not face
future persecution.” (emphasis added)). The government argues that Petitioner failed to
exhaust a pattern-or-practice claim by not presenting it to the BIA. See Torres de la Cruz
v. Maurer, 483 F.3d 1013, 1017 (10th Cir. 2007) (“We have jurisdiction only over those
claims that were presented to the BIA.”); 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (d)(1). We disagree.
Petitioner contended in his first BIA brief that the IJ’s findings on the likelihood of
future persecution were incorrect because:
As Mr. Matumona’s testimony and the country conditions evidence
demonstrate, the Congolese government continues to subject opposition
activists and political opponents to arbitrary arrests, disappearances, torture,
and death. . . . Based on the current country conditions, Mr. Matumona, as
a community organizer for the UDPS, has a well-founded fear of future
persecution even two years after having left the country. . . .
Based on the past threats and psychological abuse [he] has suffered, along
with the current country conditions evidence that the government continues
to target opposition activists with impunity clearly establishes that [he] has
a well-founded fear of persecution. And this evidence also establishes that
he can meet the higher “clear probability” standard of future persecution in
the withholding of removal context.
21
CAR 367–68 (emphasis added). The italicized language bases his fear-of-future-
persecution claim on the DRC’s treatment of other dissidents. The risk of harm that may
befall an applicant if he resumes protected conduct as a member of a social or political
group can support a pattern-or-practice claim. See Velasquez-Banegas v. Lynch, 846 F.3d
258, 261 (7th Cir. 2017) (under the pattern-or-practice regulation, “to be a member of a
group that faces a high probability of persecution in a foreign country is enough to
establish that he’s at risk of persecution if deported to that country,” even if the petitioner
could not establish that he, specifically, was at risk of harm).
In his brief on remand to the BIA, Petitioner repeated his argument that the IJ
erred in assessing future persecution because:
Country-conditions evidence showed that the DRC continues to target
UDPS members. For example, the State Department’s country report
specifically discussed a 2016 assault on the UDPS, in which security forces
fire-bombed UDPS headquarters, killing eleven members, seven of whom
“burned to death, possibly after being tortured and hacked with machetes.”
(ROA-385). Mr. Matumona’s own experiences were consistent with this
objective evidence. Accordingly, the BIA erred in finding that he did not
face a clear probability of persecution if returned to the DRC.
CAR 37.
When the BIA “has failed to address a ground raised by an applicant in support of
[his] claim, we should ordinarily not reverse on that ground but should instead remand if
the ground appears to have any substance.” Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1197
(10th Cir. 2005). On remand the BIA can address whether the pattern-or-practice issue
22
was preserved before the IJ, can address the merits, and may consider evidence about
present conditions in the DRC.7
D. Additional Procedural Arguments
Petitioner raises additional claims that he is entitled to relief because of violations
of his due-process and statutory procedural rights. As a matter of due process, aliens are
entitled to “the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.” Schroeck v. Gonazles, 429 F.3d 947, 952 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation
marks omitted). To prevail on a due-process challenge, the petitioner must show
prejudicial error. See Berrum-Garcia, 390 F.3d at 1165.
First, Petitioner claims that his inability to understand and speak English impeded
his ability to present his case and the IJ should have taken steps to enable him to
adequately proceed. But the factual record belies this assertion, with respect to both his
asylum application and the merits hearing. There was nothing more for the IJ to do
regarding Petitioner’s application. After Petitioner expressed at his initial hearing his
concern about having to complete his application in English, the IJ stated that “we’ll
probably have to find someone to help you,” and that this would be discussed further at
Petitioner’s next master-calendar hearing. CAR 441. But by the time of that hearing,
7
The government at oral argument asked us to take judicial notice of the presidential
election in the DRC on December 30, 2018, and the resultant change in leadership. It
claims that the change undermines Petitioner’s fear of future persecution because it was
“favorable” to Petitioner’s views. But “[w]e are not at liberty to search for grounds to
affirm that were not relied on by the agency.” Uanreroro v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1197,
1205 (10th Cir. 2006). The agency must be the first to consider the effect of this election,
if any, on Petitioner’s claim.
23
which was less than three weeks after his first hearing, Petitioner had already submitted a
completed asylum application. A French-speaking volunteer had helped him complete
his application. Although Petitioner did not receive the aid of a volunteer who spoke
Lingala, his native language, his asylum application indicates that he speaks French
fluently. The IJ also properly addressed at the merits hearing the inability of Petitioner to
speak or understand English. He was provided a satisfactory Lingala interpreter at the
hearing, enabling him to follow the proceedings and testify in his native language.
Although Petitioner contends that his right to present evidence was impaired by his lack
of access to translated evidence, he points to no prejudice that he suffered. His briefs do
not identify any particulars that could have assisted him at the hearing. In other words,
he makes no argument that with specified translated evidence he could have raised an
argument or claim that was not made before the IJ and could have altered the outcome.
Petitioner next claims that the conditions of his confinement obstructed his
statutory right to counsel. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (“[T]he alien shall have the
privilege of being represented, at no expense to the Government, by counsel of the alien’s
choosing”). On the record before it, the BIA properly rejected this claim. At Petitioner’s
first appearance before the IJ, the IJ advised him of his rights, including his right to have
an attorney at no expense to the government. The IJ inquired whether Petitioner had
already received the list of legal-aid attorneys who could represent him for free or at a
reduced rate and asked a court officer to give him a copy of the list. Petitioner
responded: “Okay, this list here, when you call people, they don’t answer. They don’t
pick up the phone. A lot of people are calling them but nobody is picking up their
24
phones.” CAR 438. At the merits hearing Petitioner had still not obtained an attorney,
but he did not request more time to obtain counsel and he stated that he wanted to
proceed with the hearing, even though the IJ repeatedly indicated her willingness to
continue the hearing. We agree with the BIA that the fact that legal-aid providers did not
answer Petitioner’s calls does not establish a due-process violation by the government.
Petitioner argues that he could not obtain an attorney because he did not have
access to a phone. But the record indicates otherwise. He stated, “[W]hen you call
people, they don’t answer. They don’t pick up the phone.” CAR 438. He points to his
statement that he did not have a phone; but we read his comments as saying that his
custodians took his personal phone and did not give him another one, not that they did
not provide access to any phone.8
8
The relevant exchange between the IJ and Petitioner at his May 2, 2017 master calendar
hearing regarding phone access was as follows:
Judge to Mr. Matumona: Well, are they allowing you to use the telephone, sir?
Mr. Matumona: They don’t give me a phone. That’s – okay. They don’t give me
a phone, that’s why I think I’m going to be mentally sick because I don’t have
anybody. I’m in the prison right now. I don’t have anybody to call, to help me. I
don’t have anybody.
Judge: Okay. So you don’t know anybody in the United States, sir?
Mr. Matumona: No, I don’t have anybody. On my phone, I have all the numbers,
it turn off and then it’s in their hands. Maybe I could have found a number over
there and called but all my phone is in their hands.
Judge: Okay. And, sir, I want to make sure you have the legal aid list. Let me
ask the officer to give you another copy of that if you haven’t already received it.
Mr. Matumona: Okay, this list here, when you call people, they don’t answer.
They don’t pick up the phone. A lot of people are calling them but nobody is
picking up their phones.
CAR 437–38.
25
Petitioner further argues that he was deprived of his right to obtain counsel
because of the remoteness of his detention facility in Milan, New Mexico, and the dearth
of attorneys in the area who could have represented him at his merits hearing. But there
is no factual support in the record for this argument. Before the BIA and here he relies
on a written statement by a New Mexico attorney labeled as the attorney’s “Affidavit.”
But the label is incorrect. The statement was not sworn or made under penalty of perjury.
As the BIA correctly stated, assertions by counsel are not evidence. We therefore must
reject this argument.
Finally, Petitioner complains that the BIA improperly rejected his due-process
claims by stating that it lacked jurisdiction to address them. This complaint is misguided.
The BIA addressed the merits of Petitioner’s due-process arguments insofar as they
concerned his challenge to the decision by the IJ. It then stated: “In addition, this Board
does not have jurisdiction over complaints related to the conditions of [Petitioner’s]
detention, including the adequacy of his facility’s telephones and law library. Our
authority to protect an alien’s rights cannot extend beyond the scope of our appellate
jurisdiction.” CAR 154. All the BIA was saying is that its jurisdiction was limited to
resolving Petitioner’s appeal and it could not independently take action to correct
problems with his detention. It is an appellate tribunal, not a venue for overseeing the
treatment of aliens. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b) (delineating scope of BIA’s appellate
authority). The BIA has explained: “Of course, this Board is empowered to find that a
violation of the statutes or regulations has infringed upon an alien’s procedural rights,
which may in turn affect determinations regarding deportability, . . . or other benefits
26
under the immigration laws. However, this authority exists only to the extent that it is
encompassed by our appellate jurisdiction.” Matter of Hernandez-Puente, 20 I. & N.
Dec. 335, 339 (BIA 1991); see Matter of Rahman, 20 I. & N. Dec. 480, 484 n.4 (BIA
1992) (concerns regarding place of detention are outside IJ and BIA authority).
III. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM on all grounds raised by Petitioner except that we REVERSE and
REMAND for further proceedings to consider Petitioner’s pattern-or-practice argument.
We GRANT Petitioner’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
27