United States v. Villegas , 634 F. App'x 625 ( 2015 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT December 14, 2015
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 15-2063
(D.C. No. 1:14-CR-01761-JAP-1)
SHELIA VILLEGAS, (D. N. Mex.)
Defendant - Appellant.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, HOLMES, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Albuquerque Police Detective Kelly Sinclair stopped Shelia Villegas for driving
over the solid white line separating the roadway from the shoulder of Interstate 40. After
he checked and returned her license and registration, Detective Sinclair inquired whether
he could ask her some questions. She said yes. She consented again when Detective
Sinclair asked if he could search her vehicle. The search found methamphetamine and
cocaine.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Ms. Villegas was charged with possession of controlled substances. She moved to
suppress the evidence, challenging both the initial stop and the subsequent search. The
district court denied the motion after determining (1) Detective Sinclair had reasonable
suspicion that Ms. Villegas violated N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-7-317 when she crossed the
shoulder line, and (2) Ms. Villegas’s consent to the search was voluntary.
Ms. Villegas was found guilty at trial. At sentencing, the Government refused to
move for an offense level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under United States
Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“U.S.S.G.”) § 3E1.1(b), explaining such a reduction is
typically reserved for defendants who plead guilty before trial. The district court denied
Ms. Villegas’s motion to grant the reduction.
On appeal, Ms. Villegas challenges the traffic stop, the search, and the denial of
the reduction. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742, we
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual History
The following is based on evidence presented at the suppression hearing and
recounted, as we are required to consider it, in the light most favorable to the
Government. United States v. Huff, 782 F.3d 1221, 1225 (10th Cir. 2015).
1. Traffic Stop
On April 29, 2014, at 2:44 p.m., Detective Sinclair was sitting in his patrol vehicle
parked in the median of Interstate 40. He noticed a group of cars pass him travelling east.
He pulled into traffic to observe them and spotted a black Dodge Dakota with Arkansas
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license plates in the right lane at the back of the group. As Detective Sinclair followed
the group, he saw the Dakota cross the solid white line separating the roadway from the
shoulder.
Detective Sinclair noticed the driver of the Dakota, Ms. Villegas, drift across the
line as she was watching Detective Sinclair’s vehicle in her rear view mirror. He did not
notice any wind that would cause the Dakota to drift.
Detective Sinclair pulled the Dakota over to the side of the interstate and
approached the passenger side of the vehicle. He asked Ms. Villegas for her license,
proof of insurance, and registration, which she gave him. As Ms. Villegas was retrieving
her paperwork, Detective Sinclair noticed a single key in the ignition, multiple air
fresheners, and a “lived-in” appearance to the interior of the Dakota. ROA Vol. 1 at 69.
After reviewing Ms. Villegas’s license and other paperwork, Detective Sinclair
asked her to accompany him to his vehicle. She agreed. Ms. Villegas sat in the front
passenger seat. Detective Sinclair sat in the driver’s seat as he talked with Ms. Villegas
and checked her paperwork on his computer. His police dog was in the back. According
to Detective Sinclair, she did not appear threatened or concerned by the police dog. After
the check was complete, Ms. Villegas received a warning citation for crossing the solid
white line. Detective Sinclair returned the paperwork to her and asked her if she was
“good to go.” ROA Vol. 1 at 87.
2. Questioning and Search
As Ms. Villegas turned to the door and grabbed the handle, Detective Sinclair
inquired whether he could ask more questions. She agreed. Detective Sinclair then asked
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Ms. Villegas whether she was transporting drugs. She replied no. He next asked if he
could search the Dakota. She consented. Another officer arrived to assist with the
search.
Detective Sinclair used his police dog to search the Dakota. The dog indicated the
presence of narcotics near the rear bumper, the driver’s side door, and the center console.
Ms. Villegas told Detective Sinclair that the dog’s positive alert must have come from her
use of cocaine earlier that day. She produced a baggie of cocaine from her front pocket.
Detective Sinclair confiscated the baggie, proceeded to search the Dakota, and found
methamphetamine and cocaine in the doors and bumper.
Ms. Villegas was arrested and charged with one count of possession with intent to
distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) and one count
of possession with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of methamphetamine under
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).
B. Procedural History
1. Motion to Suppress
On June 25, 2015, Ms. Villegas moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the
search, arguing Detective Sinclair lacked reasonable suspicion to stop her for a traffic
violation. At the suppression hearing, defense counsel argued that Ms. Villegas did not
commit a traffic violation because N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-7-317 requires not only (1) the
departure of a vehicle from the traffic lane, but also (2) the presence of an unsafe
condition, which was absent. Counsel also argued that any consent Ms. Villegas gave to
Detective Sinclair to search her vehicle was not knowing or voluntary.
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Detective Sinclair testified that he saw Ms. Villegas’s vehicle cross the shoulder
line. He said there is typically tire debris on the shoulder of Interstate 40, which is a
safety hazard, and that he saw debris on the portion of the interstate where Ms. Villegas
was driving. He could not say how close the Dakota came to any debris that he observed.
He testified that “it appeared that [Ms. Villegas] was so intent and concentrated on
watching me through her rearview mirror that to me it made it appear that that was the
reason that she left her lane of travel.” ROA Vol. 1 at 64. Ms. Villegas testified at the
hearing that she never crossed the shoulder line.
The district court credited Detective Sinclair’s testimony and denied the motion to
suppress, determining (1) Detective Sinclair had reasonable suspicion to stop Ms.
Villegas for violating N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-7-317, and (2) Ms. Villegas voluntarily
consented to the search of her vehicle.
2. Trial and Sentencing
After the court denied her motion to suppress, Ms. Villegas expressed interest in a
conditional plea agreement, but the Government did not offer one. She also requested a
bench trial, but the Government insisted on a jury trial.
Before trial, both parties filed motions in limine and engaged in other trial
preparation. Ms. Villegas filed a motion to exclude testimony from the suppression
hearing. The motion to exclude triggered further briefing because Ms. Villegas filed her
reply to that motion late. The Government filed an unopposed motion in limine to
exclude reference to punishment in front of the jury. The parties also filed witness lists,
exhibit lists, proposed voir dire questions, and jury instructions.
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At trial, defense counsel presented a minimal defense—no opening argument, no
witnesses, and a brief closing argument. Ms. Villegas was convicted on both counts.
At sentencing, Ms. Villegas argued she should receive offense level reductions for
acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. §§ 3E1.1(a) and (b). The U.S. Probation
Office’s Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) recommended the district court not
apply any reduction for acceptance of responsibility because Ms. Villegas proceeded to
trial. When the Government refused to move for a reduction under § 3E1.1(b), Ms.
Villegas moved for one on her own behalf. After a hearing, the court granted a two-level
reduction under § 3E1.1(a), but denied an additional one-level reduction under §
3E1.1(b).
II. DISCUSSION
Ms. Villegas appeals the district court’s denials of her motion to suppress and her
motion for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1(b). She contends
the district court erroneously concluded (1) that Detective Sinclair had reasonable
suspicion to stop her based on N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-7-317 and (2) that the subsequent
search was consensual. She further asserts the district court erroneously refused the
reduction even though the Government had expended minimal resources in preparing for
trial. We affirm.
A. Motion to Suppress
1. Standard of Review
In reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Government and accept the district court’s
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factual findings unless clearly erroneous. See United States v. Hunter, 663 F.3d 1136,
1141 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v. Karam, 496 F.3d 1157, 1161 (10th Cir. 2007).
We review de novo the ultimate determination of the reasonableness of a search or
seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Karam, 496 F.3d at 1161.
2. Traffic Stop
Ms. Villegas contends the district court erred in concluding Detective Sinclair had
reasonable suspicion that she violated N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-7-317. She argues the statute
requires the presence of a safety concern and that the district court clearly erred in
determining a safety concern was present. We affirm because, even if § 66-7-317
requires a safety concern to be present, the district court did not clearly err in finding one
when Detective Sinclair stopped Ms. Villegas.
a. Legal Background
Under the Fourth Amendment, a traffic stop, to be justified at its inception, must
be “‘based on an observed traffic violation’” or a police officer’s “‘reasonable articulable
suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring.’” United
States v. Eckhart, 569 F.3d 1263, 1271 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Botero–
Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc)). “While ‘reasonable suspicion’ is a
less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less
than [a] preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a
minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528
U.S. 119, 123 (2000).
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Detective Sinclair cited Ms. Villegas for violating § 66-7-317, which states the
following:
Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more
clearly marked lanes for traffic the following rules in addition
to all others consistent herewith shall apply:
a. a vehicle shall be driven as nearly as possible entirely
within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane
until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can
be made with safety[.]
b. Analysis
Ms. Villegas interprets§ 66-7-317 to require (1) a vehicle to depart its traffic lane
and (2) the presence of a safety concern. The Government argues only the first element is
required. A reasonable officer in Detective Sinclair’s position would have had
reasonable suspicion even under Ms. Villegas’s view.
The district court found that the tire debris on the road posed a safety risk when
Ms. Villegas crossed the shoulder line. Ms. Villegas argues this finding is clearly
erroneous because Detective Sinclair was unable to specify the proximity of any debris to
her vehicle. But when asked if there was debris where Ms. Villegas crossed the shoulder
line, Detective Sinclair testified he saw debris “[o]n this particular day, at this particular
point on the highway . . . on the shoulder” and that there was therefore “a very high
probability that if you drove on the shoulder long enough . . . you would get a flat or a
blowout.” ROA Vol. 1 at 65.
His testimony shows the district court did not clearly err in determining that
“Detective Sinclair’s testimony established that Defendant’s movement of her vehicle
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into the shoulder of the highway implicated safety concerns due to debris he observed in
the shoulder on that day.” ROA Vol. 1 at 52. Detective Sinclair therefore had reasonable
suspicion to stop her under § 66-7-317.1
3. Questioning and Search
We affirm the district court’s determination that the search was lawful because
(1) reasonable suspicion supported the traffic stop, which therefore did not taint the
search; (2) the stop became a consensual encounter; and (3) Ms. Villegas consented
voluntarily to the subsequent search.
i. The Traffic Stop Did Not Taint the Search
As Ms. Villegas concedes, her argument that the traffic stop tainted the subsequent
search is “premised upon a ruling that the traffic stop was an illegal stop.” Aplt. Br. at
13. Because the underlying traffic stop was based on reasonable suspicion, it did not
taint the subsequent search.
ii. The Traffic Stop Became a Consensual Encounter
Ms. Villegas challenges the district court’s determination that the traffic stop
became a consensual encounter. A traffic stop generally “must last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” United States v. Pena–Montes, 589 F.3d
1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted); see also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S.
1We do not reach Ms. Villegas’s argument that Detective Sinclair committed an
unreasonable mistake of law in citing her for violating § 66-7-317 because we determine
above that Detective Sinclair had reasonable suspicion even under Ms. Villegas’s view of
§ 66-7-317.
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405, 407 (2005). A law enforcement officer conducting a routine traffic stop “may
generally request a driver’s license, registration, and other required papers, run requisite
computer checks, and issue citations or warnings as appropriate.” United States v.
Rosborough, 366 F.3d 1145, 1148 (10th Cir. 2004); see also United States v. Cervine,
347 F.3d 865, 871 (10th Cir. 2003) (stating an officer may also inquire about travel
plans). But an officer may not prolong the detention unless (1) he or she “develops an
objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver is engaged in some illegal
activity, or (2) the initial detention . . . becomes a consensual encounter.” Rosborough,
366 F.3d at 1148 (quotations and alterations omitted).
“A detention for a traffic citation can turn into a consensual encounter after the
trooper has returned the driver his documentation so long as ‘a reasonable person under
the circumstances would believe he was free to leave or disregard the officer’s request for
information.’” United States v. Wallace, 429 F.3d 969, 974-75 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting
United States v. Elliott, 107 F.3d 810, 814 (10th Cir. 1997)).
After Detective Sinclair returned Ms. Villegas’s paperwork, he asked if she was
“good to go,” and she reached for the door. Only after she reached for the door did
Detective Sinclair ask if he could ask her some more questions. The district court
concluded her reaching for the door showed she understood his returning of the
paperwork and question to be the end of the traffic stop detention. See Wallace, 429 F.3d
at 975 (encounter after initial traffic stop became consensual when officer returned
paperwork and stated, “‘That’s all I’ve got.’”). We agree. The traffic stop became a
consensual encounter because “a reasonable person” in Ms. Villegas’s position “would
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believe [s]he was free to leave or disregard the officer’s request for information.” Id. at
974-75 (quoting Elliott, 107 F.3d at 814).
Ms. Villegas contends that Detective Sinclair lacked reasonable suspicion to
extend the traffic stop. See Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1616-17 (2015)
(holding a delay of several minutes for a police dog to arrive after a driver refused
consent for a search was a seizure that was not constitutionally justified). We decline to
reach this argument because Ms. Villegas’s consent alone allowed Detective Sinclair to
search the vehicle. See United States v. Gregoire, 425 F.3d 872, 879 (10th Cir. 2005)
(holding that after an initial traffic stop is completed, “a driver must be allowed to
proceed on his way unless reasonable suspicion exists that the driver is engaged in
criminal activity or the driver consents to additional questioning”).
iii. Ms. Villegas Consented Voluntarily to Further Questioning and the
Subsequent Search
Ms. Villegas challenges the district court’s determination that she voluntarily
consented to Detective Sinclair’s questioning and subsequent search. “The question
whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary or was the product of duress or
coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all
the circumstances.” United States v. Harrison, 639 F.3d 1273, 1278 (10th Cir. 2011)
(quotations and alteration omitted). Because it is a question of fact, we review for clear
error. Id. at 1277.
Ms. Villegas’s presence with Detective Sinclair in the police vehicle did not make
her consent involuntary. See United States v. Taverna, 348 F.3d 873, 879 (10th Cir.
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2003) (holding that consent to questioning before driver entered police vehicle and
subsequent consent to search while driver was in police vehicle were both voluntary);
United States v. Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d 1046, 1055 n.6 (10th Cir. 1994) (upholding a
district court’s determination that consent obtained from driver who had been arrested
and placed in the back of a police vehicle was voluntary); United States v. Contreras, 506
F.3d 1031, 1037 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[D]etention is only one factor to be considered in
determining whether consent was voluntarily and freely given based on the totality of the
circumstances.”).
Apart from being in the police vehicle, Ms. Villegas identifies no portion of the
record suggesting she was coerced into giving consent for Detective Sinclair to ask
questions or search her vehicle. Under the totality of the circumstances, the district court
did not clearly err in finding Ms. Villegas’s consent was voluntary.2
* * * *
Detective Sinclair’s search of Ms. Villegas’s vehicle was lawful because (1) the
underlying traffic stop was lawful, (2) the traffic stop became a consensual encounter,
and (3) she voluntarily gave her consent to the questioning and to the search of the
vehicle.
2
Ms. Villegas does not argue that Detective Sinclair exceeded the scope of the
consent she gave, and the record supports that Ms. Villegas never revoked or limited her
consent.
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B. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b) Acceptance of Responsibility Reduction
Ms. Villegas contends the district court erred by denying her a reduction for
acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1(b). We affirm because she proceeded to trial
and caused the Government to expend resources in preparation.
1. Standard of Review and Legal Background
We review the district court’s decision to accept or reject the Government’s
refusal to file a § 3E1.1(b) motion for clear error. United States v. Salas, 756 F.3d 1196,
1204 (10th Cir. 2014).
If a defendant’s offense level is 16 or greater, § 3E1.1(b) authorizes an additional
one-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility “upon motion of the government
stating that the defendant has assisted authorities in the investigation or prosecution of his
own misconduct by timely notifying authorities of his intention to enter a plea of guilty,
thereby permitting the government to avoid preparing for trial and permitting the
government and the court to allocate their resources efficiently.” Section 3E1.1(b)
confers on the government “a power, not a duty, to file a motion when a defendant has
timely notified prosecutors of an intention to plead guilty.” United States v. Moreno–
Trevino, 432 F.3d 1181, 1186 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotations and citation omitted). Thus,
even if a defendant timely notifies the government of his intent to plead guilty, “such
timeliness does not automatically entitle him to the government’s filing for the additional
adjustment.” Id. at 1186.
Although the Government’s discretion to file a § 3E1.1 motion is broad, it is not
unfettered. United States v. Evans, 744 F.3d 1192, 1199 (10th Cir. 2014). A district
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court may review the government’s decision not to file a § 3E1.1 motion and grant a
remedy if it finds the refusal was “(1) animated by an unconstitutional motive, or (2) not
rationally related to a legitimate government end.” Id. (quotations omitted); United
States v. Blanco, 466 F.3d 916, 918 (10th Cir. 2006).
2. Analysis
Ms. Villegas contends the district court erred by declining to grant a § 3E1.1(b)
reduction. She states she helped the Government investigate others involved in drug
trafficking. She argues the Government’s trial preparation was largely for the
suppression hearing, and the Government’s decision not to move for acceptance of
responsibility was not rationally related to a legitimate government interest. She cites
cases in which courts have held that the Government should not take into account its
preparation for a motion to suppress hearing when determining whether to offer the
§ 3E1.1(b) reduction for acceptance of responsibility. See United States v. Marquez, 337
F.3d 1203, 1212 (10th Cir. 2003); United States v. Villaba, 86 F. Supp. 3d 1252, 1273
(D.N.M. 2015).
The district court did not clearly err in declining to grant the § 3E1.1(b) reduction.
The cases Ms. Villegas cites all involve defendants who, unlike Ms. Villegas, pled guilty
after their motions to suppress were denied. See Marquez, 337 F.3d at 1212; Villaba, 86
F. Supp. 3d at 1273. Although Ms. Villegas may have cooperated and presented little to
no defense at trial by not pleading guilty, she forced the Government to present its case at
trial. To the extent the Government is obligated to show more than Ms. Villegas’s
proceeding to trial, it has done so. As spelled out in more detail above, the Government
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filed several motions and responded to defend motions in preparation for, and during,
trial.
Thus, it was not error for the district court to accept the Government’s refusal to
offer a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, which is premised on “permitting the
government to avoid preparing for trial and permitting the government and the court to
allocate their resources efficiently.” U.S.S.G § 3E1.1(b).
III. CONCLUSION
The district court did not err in determining that Detective Sinclair constitutionally
stopped Ms. Villegas based on a reasonable suspicion of a N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-7-317violation, and that she gave voluntary consent for Detective Sinclair to ask her further
questions and to search her vehicle. Finally, the district court did not clearly err in
accepting the Government’s refusal to offer Ms. Villegas an offense level reduction for
acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. 3E1.1(b). We affirm.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT,
Scott M. Matheson, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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