Dubbs Ex Rel. Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc. , 336 F.3d 1194 ( 2003 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
JUL 21 2003
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
JACK DUBBS, individually, and as
father and next friend of Tiffani
Dubbs, a minor; FRANCISCO
AGUIRRE, individually, and as father
and next friend of Jessica Aguirre, a
minor; JOY BROWN, individually,
and as mother and next friend of Marii
Brown, a minor; KEENYA COWANS,
individually, and as mother and next
friend of Keymiya Cowans, a minor;
SHANIKA CROWLEY, individually,
and as mother and next friend of
Kwanita M. Crowley, a minor;
RAICHELLE LOFTIN, individually,
and as mother and next friend of
Quenten Loftin, a minor; ELISHA
PORTERFIELD, individually, and as
mother and next friend of LaQuante
Porterfield, a minor; DAPHINE
SUDDARTH, individually, and as
mother and next friend of Ronisha
Suddarth, a minor,
Plaintiff-Appellants,
v. Nos. 01-5098 & 01-5177
HEAD START, INC., an Oklahoma
corporation; INDEPENDENT
SCHOOL DISTRICT, NO. 1 OF
TULSA COUNTY, OKLAHOMA;
JOHN DOE, Sued as Doe Government
Agents 1 through 5, and John Does 1
through 10; JOHN DOES 1
THROUGH 10; PEGGY DOE,
Defendants,
and
COMMUNITY ACTION PROJECT
OF TULSA COUNTY, OKLAHOMA,
an Oklahoma not-for-profit
corporation; TULSA CITY-COUNTY
HEALTH DEPARTMENT; KD
ENTERPRISES, INC., an Oklahoma
corporation; JACKIE STRAYHORN,
ARNP; KIM BAKER, sued as: K.
Baker, RN,
Defendants-Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. NO. 99-CV-732-K(E))
Steven H. Aden, The Rutherford Institute, Charlottesville, Virginia (John W.
Whitehead, The Ruthersford Institute, Charlottesville, Virginia, Jack Y. Goree
and Christopher Goree, Goree & Goree, P.C., Tulsa, Oklahoma, and Leah Farish,
Tulsa, Oklahoma, with him on the briefs), for Plaintiffs - Appellants.
Kevin D. Jewell, Magenheim, Bateman & Helfand, P.L.L.C., Houston, Texas,
Roni S. Rierson, Atkinson, Haskins, Nellis, Holeman, Phipps, Brittingham &
Gladd, Tulsa, Oklahoma, Scott B. Wood, Whitten, Nelson, McGuire, Wood,
Terry, Roeslius & Dittrich, Tulsa, Oklahoma, (William S. Helfand and Barbara E.
Roberts, Magenheim, Bateman & Helfand, P.L.L.C., Houston, Texas; Galen L.
Brittingham, Atkinson, Haskins, Nellis, Holeman, Phipps, Brittingham & Gladd,
Tulsa, Oklahoma; Elizabeth A. Hart, Whitten, Nelson, McGuire, Wood, Terry,
Roeslius & Dittrich, Tulsa, Oklahoma; John E. Dowdell and Christine D. Little,
Norman, Wohlgemuth, Chandler, & Dowdell, Tulsa, Oklahoma, with them on the
briefs) for Defendants - Appellees.
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Before SEYMOUR and McCONNELL , Circuit Judges, and KRIEGER , District
Judge. *
McCONNELL , Circuit Judge.
In this civil rights action, parents of eight pre-school children enrolled in
the Head Start program in Tulsa, Oklahoma, complain that their children were
subjected to intrusive physical examinations, including genital examinations and
blood tests, on school premises without parental notice or consent. They claim
that the Head Start agency, defendant Tulsa Community Action Project, falsely
represented to medical personnel that consent forms had been obtained for each of
the children and insisted on examinations even for children with up-to-date
physicals supplied by their own doctors. They claim that these examinations
violated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution and under state law.
In a series of orders, the district court disposed of all claims against all
defendants, either on dismissal for failure to state a claim on which relief may be
granted or on summary judgment. The district court then ordered the plaintiffs to
pay the costs of the litigation.
*
The Honorable Marcia S. Krieger, United States District Judge for the
District of Colorado, sitting by designation.
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For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the judgment of the district
court insofar as it granted summary judgment on the claims against the Tulsa
Community Action Project under the Fourth Amendment, technical battery, and
invasion of privacy under Oklahoma law, also reverse the dismissal of the
parents’ claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, but affirm as to all other claims,
and remand for further proceedings, including reconsideration of the assessment
of costs against the parents.
Factual and Procedural Background
Head Start is a program designed to provide qualified low-income children
with pre-elementary instruction to enable them to succeed when they enter school.
Recognizing the connection between health care and educational readiness, Head
Start program regulations require Head Start agencies, within 90 days of
enrollment of a child in the program, in “collaboration with the parents,” to
“make a determination as to whether or not each child has an ongoing source of
continuous, accessible health care.” 45 C.F.R. 1304.20(a)(1)(i). If not, the
agency must “assist the parents” in “accessing a source of care.” Id. In addition,
the agency must “[o]btain from a health care professional” a “determination as to
whether the child is up-to-date on a schedule of age appropriate preventive and
primary health care,” in accordance with professional standards. Id.,
§1304.20(a)(1)(ii). Again, if children are not “up-to-date” on this schedule of
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care, the agency is instructed to “assist parents in making the necessary
arrangements to bring the child up-to-date.” Id., §1304.20(a)(1)(ii)(A). The
regulations do not authorize, nor do they permit, Head Start agencies to provide
medical examinations or health care to enrolled children without parental
knowledge or consent.
Defendant-Appellee Tulsa Community Action Project (“CAP”) is a not-
for-profit organization that oversees the Head Start program in Tulsa, Oklahoma.
It is a “Head Start Agency” or “grantee” as defined by the applicable regulations,
45 C.F.R. § 1301.2. It receives both state and federal funds. Other defendants
(and appellees) are the Tulsa City-County Health Department (the “County Health
Department”), K.D. Enterprises (“KD”), and two individual nurses, Jacqueline
Strayhorn, ARNP, and Kimberly Baker, RN. CAP contracted with the County
Health Department to perform the examinations at issue. The Health Department
employed nurses Strayhorn and Baker, who performed the examinations. CAP
contracted with KD to perform the educational component of the Head Start
program in Tulsa. CAP leased space at the Roosevelt Elementary School, in
Tulsa, to administer the Head Start program.
On November 5, 1998, Peggy Terry, a registered nurse and a CAP
employee, entered a classroom of pre-school children participating in the Head
Start program at Roosevelt Elementary in Tulsa. She announced that the children
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were to be taken to a another classroom in the building for physical examinations.
One parent, Misti Dubbs, who was employed as an aide in the Head Start
program, protested that CAP had not obtained consent for the examinations and
that many of the families had already turned in physical examination reports from
their own doctors. When nurse Terry insisted on examinations for all the
children, Mrs. Dubbs approached a KD supervisor who in turn consulted the
supervisor of employees at KD’s Roosevelt site. Neither of these supervisors
intervened.
CAP had previously told the County Health Department that CAP would
obtain the requisite consent from parents prior to the medical examinations.
Relying on that representation, the Health Department conveyed this information
to nurses Strayhorn and Baker. On November 5, Strayhorn and Baker arrived at
Roosevelt before the appointed time for the exams and queried the CAP Head
Start representative, Peggy Terry, about whether the children’s parents had
completed consent forms. Strayhorn and Baker looked for consent forms in the
students’ file folders and found none. The nurses raised concerns about the
absence of consent forms with nurse Terry, but Terry assured them that CAP had
previously obtained consent and that the proper forms were on file. Strayhorn and
Baker relied on that information and proceeded with the exams.
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The central question in this case is whether CAP and the other defendants
had a reasonable basis for believing that the parents had consented to the
examinations 1. At the time of enrollment in the Head Start program, CAP gave
parents of the enrolled children three forms. It is undisputed that these are the
only consent forms for medical procedures used by CAP, and that no other form
of consent, oral or written, was requested or provided. Two of the forms were to
be signed by the parent and returned to CAP. One of these was entitled “Parent
Consent Form,” and solicited parental permission for eight specified tests “if
needed”: tuberculosis, speech/language, dental, developmental screening, hearing,
hemoglobin/HCT, vision screening, and hearing screening. The form also
solicited permission for the child to appear in CAP advertising, for name and
phone number to appear on a classroom roster, and for CAP to maintain, use, and
release “my child’s complete history” for use in “health and educational
planning.” The second form was entitled “Authorization For Treatment to
Minors.” It solicited parental consent for “diagnosis or treatment” by a
“physician or dentist,” as well as transportation to a medical facility “for
emergency care.” At the bottom of the form, parents were given the option to
1
Under some circumstances, child welfare authorities are permitted to
override parental refusal of consent to medical or other examinations of their
children, upon judicial authorization or in emergency situations. No one contends
that this was such a case.
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refuse permission to transport their child “for emergency medical/dental care,”
and to indicate what should be done “[i]n the event of illness or injury which
require emergency medical/dental treatment.” Neither of the forms to be signed
by parents or guardians authorized a general physical examination or a genital
examination.
The third form, provided to at least some of the parents, was entitled “Child
Health Record: Form 3, Screenings, Physical Examination/Assessment.” This was
a physical examination form to be filled in and signed by a “health care provider,”
with a checklist of tests and procedures to be performed. Among the items on this
checklist were a blood test (hematocrit or hemoglobin) and a genital examination.
Nowhere on Form 3 was there any place for parental signature, acknowledgment,
or consent.
Prior to the examinations at issue, at least four of the eight plaintiff parents
had arranged for physical examinations by their own physicians. These
physicians filled out “Form 3,” which was then submitted to CAP. Even though it
received these examination forms, CAP arranged to have these children examined
along with the others on November 5.
The examinations challenged in this case were conducted in an ordinary
classroom, with desks used as examination tables. The examining areas were
separated only by partitions, so that it was possible for other children to see or
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hear portions of the examinations performed on their classmates. According to
the plaintiffs, no doctor was present and the nurses were not in uniform, and the
children were given no explanation regarding what was happening. The children
were required to lower or remove their underclothes and were given a medical
examination that included, among other things, a genital exam and blood test.
The nurses used “Form 3” to record the results of the examinations. During the
examinations, all of the children were subjected to genital inspections. The girls
were asked to lay spread-legged on a table where the nurses inspected the girls’
labia; in some cases the nurses would “palpate,” or touch, the genital area when a
visual inspection was not adequate. Similarly, the nurses would palpate the boys’
genitals to test for the presence of testes. Blood samples were taken by the finger
stick (or “hematocrit”) method, which can be frightening to small children.
According to the plaintiffs, some of the children were upset and confused about
the event, though testimony regarding their exact words was the subject of a
motion in limine pending as of the grant of summary judgement. With the
exception of Misti Dubbs, who was present in her capacity as a Head Start aide,
no parents or guardians were with their children during the examinations. Parents
were not given prior notice, and were not informed by telephone that day
regarding the examinations. According to CAP, notification letters were prepared
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and available at the project site, but “[u]nfortunately” were “not distributed to the
children to take home to their parents.”
The nurses who administered the examinations, Strayhorn and Baker,
testified that the exams were in conformity with standards for well-child
examinations and were not performed for the purpose of detecting child abuse.
The plaintiffs’ expert similarly testified that – aside from the lack of consent and
the “improper setting” – the examinations were conducted in conformity to
standards for well-child examinations. Thus, there is no remaining issue in the
case regarding the manner in which the examinations were conducted.
Subsequent to the examinations, eight parents, Jack Dubbs, Francisco
Aguirre, Joy Brown, Keenya Cowans, Shanika Crowley, Raichelle Loftin, Elisha
Porterfield, and Daphine Suddarth , filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Oklahoma, on their own behalf and on behalf of their
minor children. They asserted multiple causes of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983: unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments; lack of substantive due process by interfering with the right of
privacy in violation of U.S. Constitution article IV, § 2, clause 1, and amendments
I, IV, IX and XIV; and interference with the parents’ liberty rights in violation of
U.S. Constitution article IV, § 2, clause 1, and amendments I, IX, and XIV.
Under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986, the parents alleged a conspiracy to deprive
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them of equal protection under the law. They also asserted various state common
law and constitutional claims, including: unreasonable search and seizure in
violation of Oklahoma Constitution, article 2, § 30; interference with parental
liberty rights under Oklahoma Constitution, article 1, §§ 1 and 2, and article 2, §§
2 and 30; assault; battery; invasion of privacy/intrusion upon seclusion;
intentional infliction of emotional distress; negligent infliction of emotional
distress; negligence; gross negligence; and medical malpractice.
CAP, the nurses, the County Health Department, and KD first moved to
dismiss, arguing failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and,
for the individual nurses, qualified immunity. The district court granted the
motions to dismiss on the substantive due process claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983and conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986 as to all defendants. As
to the motions of individual defendants Baker and Strayhorn, the district court
granted the motions to dismiss based on the nurses’ assertion of qualified
immunity to the § 1983 claim alleging unreasonable search and seizure.
Subsequently, all defendants sought summary judgment on the remaining
constitutional and state claims. The district court granted these motions in a
series of orders dated May 16, 2001.
In substance, the district court concluded (1) that the defendants’ conduct
did not rise to the “shocks the conscience” level necessary to state a claim under
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substantive due process; (2) that the examinations were a “search” for purposes of
the Fourth Amendment; (3) that the search was “reasonable” under the Fourth
Amendment both because it was objectively reasonable for the defendants to
believe they had consent and because the examinations fell within the “special
needs” exception to the Fourth Amendment; (4) that for various reasons,
including consent, plaintiffs failed to make out a claim under their various state
law causes of action; and (5) that the individual defendants, Strayhorn and Baker,
were entitled to qualified immunity.
Standard of Review
The district court granted motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) as to all defendants on the substantive due process
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985and 1986. It also granted motions by the individual defendants Strayhorn and
Baker to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for alleged Fourth Amendment violations on
grounds of qualified immunity. We will uphold a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)
"only when it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the
claims that would entitle him to relief, accepting the well-pleaded allegations of
the complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff." Yoder v. Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir. 1997)
(internal citations omitted), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 812 (1997). The legal
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sufficiency of a complaint is a question of law; therefore, a Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal is reviewed de novo. Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf & Blind,
173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999). “The court’s function on a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion is not to weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial,
but to assess whether the plaintiff’s complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a
claim for which relief may be granted.” Id., quoting Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d
1562, 1565 (10th Cir. 1991).
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on
all remaining claims. We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary
judgment. Phelan v. Laramie County Cmty. Coll. Bd. of Trs., 235 F.3d 1243,
1246 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1020 (2001). Accordingly, summary
judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). When we apply this
standard, we examine the record and any reasonable inferences drawn therefrom
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 19 Solid Waste Dept. Mechs.
v. City of Albuquerque, 156 F.3d 1068, 1071 (10th Cir. 1998).
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Discussion
I. Constitutional Claims
The parents contend that the physical examinations conducted on November
5, 1998, violated their constitutional rights, and those of their children, to be free
from unreasonable searches under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 2 They
also assert that the physical examinations violated their children’s privacy rights,
which are protected as a matter of “substantive due process” 3 under the
Fourteenth Amendment, as well as their own substantive due process rights.
2
In addition to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, the parents pressed claims of conspiracy to
deprive them and their children of equal protection of the law and of privileges
and immunities guaranteed by the Constitution. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985, 1986. The
district court dismissed for failure to state a claim, and the parents have not
appealed this dismissal or briefed these issues in this Court. We therefore do not
consider these claims on appeal. See, e.g., Murrell v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1388, 1389
n.2 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting failure to develop argument results in denial of
appellate review).
3
Substantive due process is the rubric under which the Supreme Court has
addressed unenumerated rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g.,
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). There is some debate about
whether the Privileges or Immunities Clause of that amendment is the more
historically accurate ground for such rights. See John Hart Ely, Democracy and
Distrust 18 (1980); Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 101 Yale L.J. 1193, 1257-59 (1992); John Harrison, Reconstructing
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 Y ALE L.J. 1385, 1466-69 (1992);
Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudence of Tradition,
1997 Utah L. Rev. 665, 691-98 (1997). But see Robert Bork, The Tempting of
America: The Political Seduction of the Law 36-39 (1990). As discussed below,
because the Fourth Amendment provides the explicit textual source for the rights
at issue in this case, this debate does not effect the resolution of the present case.
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A. Due Process
The parents maintain that the physical examinations compromised: 1) their
children’s fundamental right to privacy by interfering with individual bodily
integrity, medical decisions related to reproduction, and the right to refuse
medical treatment; and 2) their own fundamental liberty interest in the care,
custody and management of their children. They claim that these rights are
protected under the doctrine of “substantive due process” under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 4 The district court dismissed on the ground that a substantive due
process claim must be more than an ordinary tort and must shock the conscience
of the court. See, e.g., Tonkovich v. Kansas Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 528
(10th Cir. 1998); Abeyta By and Through Martinez v. Chama Valley Indep. Sch.
Dist. No. 19, 77 F.3d 1253, 1257-58 (10th Cir. 1996). Applying that standard, the
district court dismissed each substantive due process claim, finding that, as
alleged, the conduct here did not rise to conscience shocking level.
4
In district court, the parents also asserted a violation of their procedural
due process rights, which was dismissed on motion for summary judgment. Order
Granting CAP’s Motion for Summary Judgment dated May 16, 2001, at 14, App.
205-06. In their briefs as Appellants in this court, the parents do not develop this
procedural due process claim. It is therefore waived. See Utahns for Better
Transp. v. United States Dept. of Transp., 305 F.3d 1152, 1175 (10th Cir. 2002),
citing Phillips v. Calhoun, 956 F.2d 949, 954 (10th Cir. 1992) (“even issues
designated for review are lost if they are not actually argued in the party’s brief”).
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We question the district court’s rationale for dismissing these claims, for
two reasons. First, the district court’s evaluation of the seriousness of the
defendants’ challenged actions was evidently affected by the court’s conclusion
that the parents consented to the examinations or, in the alternative, that the
examinations were necessary to conform to Head Start regulations. Order
Granting CAP’s Motion for Summary Judgment, dated May 16, 2001, at 7-12,
App. 198-203. For reasons explained below, those conclusions were erroneous as
a matter of law. Second, the district court misapprehended the legal standard
applicable to purported substantive due process rights that – like the right to
consent to medical treatment for oneself and one’s minor children – may be
“objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” Washington v.
Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 2268 (1997); Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503
U.S. 115 (1992); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). It is
not implausible to think that the rights invoked here – the right to refuse a
medical exam and the parent’s right to control the upbringing, including the
medical care, of a child – fall within this sphere of protected liberty. See Cruzan
v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (the
“principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest
in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior
decisions”); Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2060 (2000) (“the interest of
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parents in the care, custody, and control of their children – is perhaps the oldest
of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court”). While the “shocks
the conscience” standard applies to tortious conduct challenged under the
Fourteenth Amendment, County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848-51
(1998), it does not exhaust the category of protections under the Supreme Court’s
substantive due process jurisprudence, or eliminate more categorical protection
for “fundamental rights” as defined by the tradition and experience of the nation.
With respect to the children’s claims, however, we decline to resolve these
questions because the children’s interests advanced under the rubric of
substantive due process are more precisely addressed under the Fourth
Amendment. The Supreme Court has explained:
Because we have always been reluctant to expand the concept of
substantive due process, . . . we [have] held . . . that where a
particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of
constitutional protection against a particular sort of government
behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of
substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these
claims.
Lewis, 523 U.S. at 842 (citations and internal quotations omitted); cf. Bateman v.
City of West Bountiful, 89 F.3d 704, 709 (10th Cir. 1996) (analyzing a claim
under the Takings Clause rather than the Due Process or Equal Protection
Clauses). The Fourth Amendment recognizes the “right of the people to be secure
in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches. . . .” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
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As we explain below, the physical examinations challenged here were searches
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, and the privacy interests of the children
can fully be vindicated under that “explicit textual source of constitutional
protection.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989); see also Darryl H. v.
Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 901 n.7 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting that the Fourth Amendment
claim in that case involves “the same basic analysis” as a privacy claim under the
Due Process Clause). Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment, and “not the more
generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing
these claims.” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 842.
The same cannot, however, be said of the parents’ Fourteenth Amendment
claim regarding their right to direct and control the medical treatment of their
children. While the parents have standing to assert a Fourth Amendment claim on
their children’s behalf, they can assert no independent Fourth Amendment claim
of their own under these facts. Hollingsworth v. Hill, 110 F.3d 733, 738 (10th Cir.
1997). Yet their substantive due process claim, based on alleged violation of
their parental rights, is independent of their children’s claim based on unlawful
search.
Given the particular posture of this case, we decline to resolve the difficult
questions regarding the standard to be applied to this claim because the district
court gave only cursory treatment to the parents’ substantive due process claims,
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possibly due to its conclusions regarding consent. Moreover, the parent plaintiffs
have not further developed their substantive due process claims on appeal. For
these reasons, and because we determine below that a remand is necessary
regarding the issue of parental consent, we reverse the district court’s disposition
of the parents’ substantive due process claim and remand to the district court for
further consideration.
We turn, then, to the Fourth Amendment claim and the issue of consent.
B. Search and Seizure
Plaintiffs argue that the medical examinations violated the children’s right
to be free from unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment, as applicable
to the states through the Fourteenth. 5 This claim raises three subsidiary questions:
(1) Were the physical examinations in this case “searches” for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment? (2) Did CAP and the other defendants have a reasonable
basis for belief that the parents consented to the examinations? (3) Did the
5
Plaintiffs asserted similar claims under Okla. Const. Art. 2, § 30, which is
the state constitutional parallel to the Fourth Amendment. See Sloan v. Sprouse,
968 P.2d 1254, 1258 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998). The district court granted
summary judgment on these state constitutional claims on the ground that the
plaintiffs had not adequately briefed the issue. Nor have they done so in this
Court. The claims are accordingly waived. See Utahns for Better Transp., 305
F.3d at 1175, citing Phillips v. Calhoun, 956 F.2d 949, 954 (10th Cir. 1992)
(deeming claims “waived under the general rule that even issues designated for
review are lost if they are not actually argued in the party’s brief”).
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examinations fall within the “special needs” exception to the requirement of
consent or a warrant?
1. Were the physical examinations in this case “searches” for Fourth
Amendment purposes?
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that the
Government shall not violate “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures....” U.S. Const. amend IV. Under our jurisprudence, “[s]earches
conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment–subject only to a few ‘specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.’” Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1248 (10th Cir. 2003), quoting
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
The defendants contend that because the exams were not conducted upon
suspicion of criminal activity and the data collected were not to be used for law
enforcement purposes, the examinations were not “searches” subject to Fourth
Amendment requirements. Relying on United States v. Attson, 900 F.2d 1427,
1429-30 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 961 (1990), they argue that where
the alleged search is “noncriminal” and “noninvestigatory,” the “application of
the Fourth Amendment is limited.” CAP Br. 5.
The district court concluded that the defendants were not entitled to
summary judgment on this issue, because there was evidence in the record
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(controverted, to be sure) that discovery of child abuse was one purpose of the
exams. Indeed, the district court noted, citing 10 O.S. §§ 7103, 7104, that under
Oklahoma law medical professionals would be required to report any evidence of
abuse encountered during such routine exams. We agree.
More fundamentally, however, the defendants’ contention that the Fourth
Amendment does not apply in the “noncriminal” and “noninvestigatory” context is
without foundation. The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people to be
“secure in their persons” from government intrusion, whether the threat to privacy
arises from a policeman or a Head Start administrator. There is no “social
worker” exception to the Fourth Amendment. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston,
532 U.S. 67, 76 n.9 (2001) (“we have routinely treated urine screens taken by
state agents as searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment even
though the results were not reported to the police.”); Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492,
509 (7th Cir. 2003) (“the strictures of the Fourth Amendment apply to child
welfare workers, as well as all other governmental employees”). 6
6
To be sure, searches that have noninvestigatory, noncriminal purposes
often fit within the category of “special needs,” which are subject to a balancing
test rather than to the more rigorous requirement of warrant or consent. The
district court held that this is such a “special needs” case, a conclusion we will
address below. In this section, we discuss the defendants’ more far-reaching
contention, that noncriminal, noninvestigatory examinations are not “searches”
for Fourth Amendment purposes at all.
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The defendants rely on United States v. Attson, 900 F.2d 1427, 1429 (9th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 961 (1990), for the proposition that because the
intent in collecting the data was not for law enforcement purposes the exams were
not “searches” subject to Fourth Amendment protections. In Attson, a man
injured in an automobile accident was taken to a public hospital for emergency
treatment. He gave express consent for the taking of blood for medical purposes
and blood was drawn for medical purposes, after which information regarding his
blood alcohol level was supplied to the police for law enforcement purposes. The
Ninth Circuit ruled that the doctor had not performed a search in violation of the
Fourth Amendment because the record reflected that the doctor acted solely for
health purposes of the patient and acted entirely independently of a governmental
intent to collect evidence for use in the defendant’s prosecution. Id. at 1433. The
case is thus distinguishable. In Attson, the medical procedure was consensual; the
real issue was the legality of providing the results to police. Here, the plaintiffs
contend that the medical examination itself was performed without consent.
Moreover, contrary to the defendants’ argument, the Attson decision did not
suggest that all “noncriminal, noninvestigatory” examinations fall outside the
protection of the Fourth Amendment. The court held: “for the conduct of a
governmental party to be subject to the fourth amendment, the governmental party
engaging in that conduct must have acted with the intent to assist the government
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in its investigatory or administrative purposes and not for an independent
purpose.” 900 F.2d at 1433 (emphasis added). Thus, even under the Ninth
Circuit’s interpretation, Fourth Amendment protections extend to searches
conducted for “administrative” purposes. In its brief, CAP itself asserts that the
exams in this case were “mandated by federal regulation” and that its policy of
conducting these exams within ninety days of enrollment was to ensure that it
followed these regulations. CAP Br. at 5. The nurses and the County Health
Department also characterize the exams as “solely for medical evaluation required
by the government.” County Health Department and Nurses Br. at 14. Thus, even
under the standard of Attson, the examinations were searches for Fourth
Amendment purposes because they were to determine whether the children were
in compliance with federal Head Start regulations.
Nothing in the language of the Fourth Amendment or the precedents of the
Supreme Court supports the defendants’ restrictive interpretation. The
Amendment is expressed in passive voice (“the right of the people to be secure in
their persons ... shall not be violated”) without specifying or limiting the
governmental actors who are to be constrained. The focus of the Amendment is
thus on the security of the person, not the identity of the searcher or the purpose
of the search. The Supreme Court has posed the Fourth Amendment inquiry in
terms of whether the governmental conduct at issue compromises “an expectation
-23-
of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable.” O’Connor v. Ortega,
480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987) (internal quotation omitted); see also Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (“The basic purpose of this
Amendment . . . is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against
arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.”). As the Court has explained:
Because the individual’s interest in privacy and personal security
suffers whether the government’s motivation is to investigate
violations of criminal laws or breaches of other statutory or
regulatory standards, . . . it would be anomalous to say that the
individual . . . [is] fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only
when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior.
O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 715 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
In accordance with this understanding of the purposes of the Amendment,
the Supreme Court has held that medical examinations including a blood or urine
test trigger, at a minimum, the Fourth Amendment balancing test. See, e.g.,
Schmerber v. State of California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966) (“compelled”
blood test an intrusion constituting search); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-17 (1989) (breathalyzer exam for chemical analysis
constitutes search); Board of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie,
County v. Earls, 122 S.Ct. 2559, 2568-69 (2002) (urine test search triggering
Fourth Amendment inquiry under special needs balancing test); Vernonia Sch.
Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656-58 (1995) (same); see Yin v. State of
California, 95 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1114 (1997)
-24-
(O’Scannlain, J., concurring) (“certain aspects of the routine physical examination
at issue here would implicate the requisite ‘concerns about bodily integrity,’” and
thus trigger protection under the Fourth Amendment). Indeed, in the Court’s
“special needs” cases involving medical examination procedures, the Court did
not hold that the practices at issue were or were not constitutional because they
were or were not searches; rather, their permissibility under the Fourth
Amendment depended upon the “reasonableness” of the procedure. See, e.g.,
Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2564 (finding school policy of urine testing a “governmental
search” but “reasonable”).
The defendants’ argument seems to be based, at bottom, on the view that in
the absence of a criminal or other investigatory purpose, medical examinations
such as those conducted at CAP’s Head Start program at Roosevelt Elementary
are for the good of the children and should not be hamstrung by legalistic
requirements like warrants or consent. We do not doubt that CAP was acting in
the interest of the children, as it understood them. But the requirement of patient
consent, or of parental consent in the case of minor children, serves important
practical as well as dignitary concerns, even when a social welfare agency, like
CAP, believes it is acting for the good of the child.
It should go without saying that adequate consent is elemental to proper
medical treatment. In medical procedures involving children, ensuring the
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existence of parental consent is critical, because children rely on parents or other
surrogates to provide informed permission for medical procedures that are
essential for their care. American Academy of Pediatrics, Informed Consent,
Parental Permission, and Assent in Pediatric Practice, 95 Pediatrics 314-17
(February, 1995).
Even beyond constitutional values of privacy, dignity, and autonomy,
parental notice and consent for childhood physical examinations are of significant
practical value. Because of CAP’s failure to notify parents in advance of the
examinations, no parents were present to provide medical histories, discuss
potential issues with the health care professionals, help to explain the procedures
to the children, and reassure them about the disturbing and unfamiliar aspects of
the exam – which included blood-letting, which is painful, as well as visual and
sometimes tactile inspection of genitals by strangers. At least half of the plaintiff
children were subjected to a duplicative exam by unfamiliar health care
professionals in a makeshift setting, even though they had already obtained exams
from their own doctors. These practical consequences might well have been
averted by more careful attention to the children’s Fourth Amendment rights.
Accordingly, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that the physical
examinations performed by the defendants in this case constituted “searches”
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and thus were unconstitutional
-26-
unless they were performed with warrant or parental consent, or fall within the
“special needs” exception to the warrant requirement.
2. Did CAP have a reasonable basis for believing that the parents gave
consent for the physical examinations?
As already noted, the central disputed issue in this case is consent. It is
well established that a search conducted pursuant to a valid consent is
constitutionally permissible. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222
(1973). Thus, if the trier of fact concluded that the parents in this case, on behalf
of their minor children, actually consented to the examinations, there would be no
Fourth Amendment violation. United States v. Rith, 164 F.3d 1323, 1330 (10th
Cir. 1999). Moreover, because the Fourth Amendment prohibits only
“unreasonable” searches and seizures, the Supreme Court has held that the
Amendment is satisfied when, under the circumstances, it is objectively
reasonable for the official to believe that the scope of a person’s consent
permitted him to conduct the search. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251
(1991); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990); United States v. Osage,
235 F.3d 518, 519-21 (10th Cir. 2000).
CAP maintains that “the evidence unequivocally established, and the
district court correctly held, that the parents consented to the medical
examinations of their children.” CAP Br. 9. That is a misstatement of the district
court’s holding. The district court analyzed the consent forms used by CAP in
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this case and found sufficient ambiguities and inconsistencies to permit a jury to
conclude that the parents had not given their consent:
[T]he consent forms are not models of draftsmanship. At one point in their
supplemental brief, defendants assert the “Authorization for Treatment to
Minors” form must be read in bifurcated fashion, the bottom half limited to
emergency care and the top half not so limited. The language of the forms
is ambiguous at times. For example, plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Nelson testified
that the “Authorization for Treatment to Minors” form is limited to
treatment, as the title suggests. However, defendants point out that, in
smaller print within the body of the form, it authorizes “diagnosis or
treatment” (emphasis added), which more clearly suggests a routine
physical examination. The forms utilized, as this litigation has brought
home to CAP, could have been crafted more precisely. In other words, if
the dispositive issue were whether Parent Plaintiffs gave a fully-informed
consent to the specific procedures of genital examination and blood test,
the Court would deny summary judgment based upon a genuine issue of
material fact.
Order Granting CAP’s Motion for Summary Judgment, dated May 16, 2001 at 11,
App. 202 (citations omitted; emphasis added). The district court granted
summary judgment on the theory that CAP had an “objectively reasonable, good-
faith belief in the fact of consent and the scope of that consent.” Id. See also id.
at 203 (“the examinations of all of the Minor Plaintiffs in this case were
conducted with a reasonable belief that parental consent had been properly
obtained and the scope included genital examination and blood tests”). In other
words, the record did not show that the parents actually consented, but CAP had a
reasonable belief that they did.
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As the Supreme Court’s decisions illustrate, there can be cases of
ambiguous consent; there is a difference between an individual’s actual consent to
a search and the reasonableness of a government official’s belief that consent was
given. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 183-84. But this is not one of them. In this case,
consent – if it existed – took the form of signatures on forms prepared by CAP
and distributed to the parents. The forms themselves indicate precisely what the
parents consented to. It is a common-law rule to construe ambiguous language
against the interest of the party that drafted it. Cf. Mastrobuono v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62-63 (stating this principle in the context of
contract interpretation). If there are any ambiguities here, the drafter of the forms
– CAP – is responsible. A trier of fact might well conclude that it is not
reasonable to allow the drafter of a defective consent form to claim latitude to go
beyond the express terms of the consent on the basis of ambiguities that are its
own handiwork.
In the context of a criminal investigation, the Supreme Court has held that
the “standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth
Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness – what would the typical
reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the
suspect?” Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251. In the context of this case, the parallel
standard of “objective reasonableness” is: what would the “typical reasonable
-29-
person” have understood by the exchange between the Head Start agency and the
parents? Because it is undisputed that the only relevant “exchange” between CAP
and the parents was the distribution of the “consent forms” by CAP to the parents
and the return of those forms to CAP, the issue here is what the typical reasonable
person would have understood by the forms. We must bear in mind that the
persons for whom the forms were prepared were not sophisticated professionals,
but ordinary parents of low-income children, who had no reason to suppose that
they had to parse the small print for hidden meanings.
The record contains three forms distributed and used by CAP: (1) a “Form
3” provided to at least some of the parents at the time of enrollment, but not
signed by the parent, to be completed by a medical professional; (2) a form
entitled “Parent Consent Form” that contains consent to certain procedures such
as hemoglobin/HCT tests and ear exams; and (3) a form entitled “Authorization
for Treatment of Minors” that pertains to emergency procedures. CAP contends
that “[o]nce CAP received these consent forms, it believed it had parental consent
to perform physical examinations on its enrollees.” In addition to the forms, CAP
points to Head Start program regulations that, it says, require each Head Start
enrollee “to receive a physical examination within ninety days of enrollment.” It
contends that, in light of these regulatory requirements, a Head Start grantee is
reasonably entitled to interpret the consent forms signed by the parents as
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encompassing consent to a general physical examination, including genital
examination. 7
None of these forms proves that the parents consented to the examinations
performed here. Only Form 3 appears on its face to have anything to do with
general physical examinations, and only Form 3 contains any reference to genital
examinations. Form 3, however, is not an instrument for parental consent to an
examination. It is a checklist for health care professionals to record medical
histories and examination results. Its top portion, the medical history section,
specifically says that it is to be filled out by “Head Start Staff or Health Care
Provider before Physical Examination/Assessment[,]” while the bottom portion is
to be completed by the “Health Care Provider During and After Physical
Examination/Assessment.” Nowhere on the form is there any place for parental
signature.
CAP appears to acknowledge that this form was not itself a consent form,
but it argues, and the district court agreed, that the form gave notice to the parents
that general physical examinations would include blood tests and genital
examinations. See Order Granting CAP’s Motion for Summary Judgment, dated
7
In its brief in this Court, CAP asserts (without citation to the record or
briefs) that “the parents concede that they consented to the physical
examinations.” CAP Br. 12. We can discover no such concession. The parents
“concede” that they consented to the procedures specified by the consent forms
they signed, and nothing more.
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May 16, 2001 at 13, App. 204 (referring to the defendants’ “objectively
reasonable belief that the Form 3 gave Parent Plaintiffs at least constructive
notice that the medical examinations would involve the genitalia and a blood
test”). The problem with this argument is that the parents did not consent to
administration of general physical examinations by CAP-supplied health care
professionals. “Form 3” is the form that the parents are asked to supply to their
own physicians to record the results of the physical exam and to report the results
to the Head Start authorities. At least four of the eight plaintiffs took this form to
their own doctors, and supplied the completed form to CAP. Nothing in the
language of Form 3 provides any reason to suspect that CAP would conduct
physical examinations on its own authority, without further notice or consent by
parents.
This understanding is confirmed by the very regulations CAP relies upon.
The regulations require the Head Start agency “[i]n collaboration with the parents
and as quickly as possible, but no later than 90 calendar days” after enrollment to
“[m]ake a determination as to whether or not each child has an ongoing source of
continuous, accessible health care,” and to “[o]btain from a health care
professional a determination as to whether the child is up-to-date on a schedule of
age appropriate preventive and primary health care . . . .” 45 C.F.R. § 1304.20(a).
As to both determinations, if the child does not have a source of ongoing health
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care or is not up-to-date on an age appropriate schedule of well child care, the
regulations require the Head Start agency to “assist the parents” in satisfying the
requirement. Id. In no circumstances do the regulations authorize the Head Start
agency to subject enrolled children to physical examinations without parental
notice or consent. The regulations contain a section entitled “Involving parents,”
which explicitly requires Head Start agencies to “[c]onsult with parents
immediately when child health or developmental problems are suspected or
identified,” to “[f]amiliarize parents with the use of and rationale for all health
and developmental procedures administered through the program,” and to “obtain
advance parent or guardian authorization for such procedures.” Id., § 1304.20 (e)
(1), (e)(2).
According to these regulations, the parents of Head Start children are
responsible in the first instance for obtaining a physical examination and medical
history and for providing a report of this to the Head Start agency. This would
appear to be the function of “Form 3.” If such a form is not provided, the Head
Start agency must “assist the parents” in complying. It may well be reasonable
for the Head Start agency to make arrangements with the County Health
Department to provide free physicals on the premises of the Head Start project,
but it is not reasonable to do so without notifying the parents and obtaining their
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consent, nor is it reasonable to subject children who have already filed an up-to-
date “Form 3” to a second examination.
Nor do the other two forms evince consent to the examinations. The
“Parent Consent Form” contained in the record provides permission for the
following “if needed:” “TB Test,” “Speech/Language Services,” “Dental
Examination/Treatment,” “Developmental Screenings,” “Hearing Screening,”
“Hemoglobin/HCT,” “Vision Screening,” “Hearing Screening,” and “Permission .
. . to Collect, Maintain, Use and Release . . . Child’s Complete History.”
Nowhere on this form is consent given to the procedures complained of here, such
as genital examination. 8 While some of these procedures are typically performed
as part of a well-child examination, as the record shows, most or all of them can
also be performed outside the context of a physical exam. A form granting
consent to certain specified procedures does not constitute consent to other
procedures, or to a general physical examination.
Similarly, the form entitled “Authorization for Treatment to Minors” does
not evince consent to the examination at issue here. In bold print at the top of the
document, the form is entitled “Authorization for Treatment To Minors.”
“Treatment” is obviously not the same thing as a routine physical examination,
and a parent is unlikely to understand it as such. In the middle section, the form
8
The form does, however, authorize a blood test.
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authorizes CAP to transport the child “for emergency care” or “emergency dental
care,” allowing the parents to designate the hospital or dentist of their choice.
The bottom of the form is entitled “Refusal to Grant Permission.” It allows the
parent to sign a statement that “I do not give permission to Tulsa County Head
Start to transport my child [space for name] for emergency medical/dental care.” 9
The plaintiffs’ expert, an experienced pediatrician, testified that a physician
would understand this form as “a form for emergency treatment,” having “nothing
to do with specific on-site consent for a physical examination.”
As the district court noted, CAP argued that the “Authorization for
Treatment to Minors” form “must be read in a bifurcated fashion, the bottom half
limited to emergency care and the top half not so limited.” Order of Granting
CAP’s Motion for Summary Judgment, dated May 16, 2001 at 11, App. 202.
Focusing solely on the top half, CAP argued that although the title of the form is
limited to “Treatment,” “in smaller print within the body of the form, it
authorized ‘diagnosis or treatment’ (emphasis added).” “Diagnosis,” CAP says,
includes examination. But consent forms for parents of children in Head Start
programs should not be an exercise in obfuscation and misdirection. The question
9
One parent, Joy Brown, signed in refusal to transport her child for
treatment in order that she be the person to transport in such instances. This
belies CAP’s assertion that “none of the parents ever withdraw [sic] their consent
or to limited [sic] their consent in any manner.” CAP Br. 10.
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is what a “typical reasonable person” would understand from the form. A three-
part form, whose top part is entitled “treatment,” and whose middle and bottom
parts are explicitly confined to “emergency” treatment, falls considerably short of
the evidence that would be needed to establish conclusively the consensual
character of these examinations. At the very least, we cannot agree with the
district court’s conclusion that there was no issue of material fact regarding the
objective reasonableness of CAP’s belief that it had consent based on these forms.
Indeed, even if we were to accept CAP’s invitation to “read [the form] in a
bifurcated fashion,” and to focus on the “smaller print within the body of the
form” instead of the bold print title at the top, we still would come to the same
conclusion: the “Authorization for Treatment To Minors Form” does not grant
consent for well-child physical examinations. The top portion of the form reads
as follows, in full:
Authorization For Treatment to Minors
We, the undersigned parent(s) or legal guardian of the minor listed
below:
_______________________ Birth date: ________________
Do hereby authorize any x-ray examination, anesthetic, dental,
medical or surgical diagnosis or treatment by any physician or dentist
licensed by the State of Oklahoma and hospital service that may be
rendered to said minor under the general, specific or special consent
of the TULSA COUNTY HEAD START PROGRAM, the temporary
custodian of the minor, whether such diagnosis or treatment is
rendered at the office of the physician or dentist to call in any
necessary consultants, in his/their discretion.
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It is understood that this consent is given in advance of any specific
diagnosis or treatment being required, but is given to encourage those
persons who have temporary custody of the minor, and said physician
or dentist to exercise his/their best judgment as to the requirements
of such diagnosis or medical or dental or surgical treatment.
This consent shall remain effective during the 1998/99 school year, unless
sooner revoked in writing to the Tulsa County Head Start Program.
Parent’s Legal Signature _____________________ Date ____________
Putting aside the fact that the first paragraph contains garbled syntax and
evidently is missing some words, it does not grant consent for the type of
examination at issue here. To begin with, the form does not mention well-child
examinations or any other form of general physical exam. It refers, instead, to
“diagnosis or treatment.” Contrary to CAP’s argument in district court,
“diagnosis” does not “suggest[] a routine physical examination.” The term
“diagnosis” is defined as “the art or act of identifying a disease from its signs and
symptoms.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 622 (1976). While a
general physical examination might disclose a disease or condition that warrants a
“diagnosis,” the well-child examination itself is not a “diagnosis.” Moreover, the
form is limited to treatment or diagnosis by a “physician or dentist licensed by the
State of Oklahoma.” Nurses Baker and Strayhorn are neither physicians nor
dentists.
In summary, because no form signed by the parents gave CAP explicit
authorization to conduct general well-child examinations, including genitalia
-37-
examinations, the district court should not have held, as a matter of law, that it
was objectively reasonable for CAP to believe that it had been given consent to
authorize and arrange for the children to be examined. It bears emphasis that this
case comes to this Court on appeal of an order granting summary judgment in
favor of the defendants. The parents did not move for summary judgment and
there is no need for this Court to consider whether, on this record, they would be
entitled to it. We hold only that the district court correctly held that the
examinations at issue were a “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes, and that
the evidence in the record is at least sufficient to permit a trier of fact to conclude
that the examinations were not consensual and that it was not objectively
reasonable to believe that they were. Accordingly, it is necessary to consider
whether these examinations were otherwise “reasonable” or fell within an
exception to the warrant requirement.
3. Did the examinations fall within the “special needs” exception to the
requirement of consent or a warrant?
Not all searches lacking warrants or consent are unconstitutional under the
Fourth Amendment. The “touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness.” Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 250; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652; see also
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581-83 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring);
Akhil Reed Amar, The Constitution and Criminal Procedure: First Principles 7-
19 (1997); Telford Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 24-29
-38-
(1969). The general rule is that a warrantless search conducted without consent is
“presumptively” unconstitutional unless it fits within certain narrow exceptions to
the general rule. Roska, 328 F.3d at 1040. One of those exceptions is the so-
called “special needs” doctrine. Id. at 1241.
“Special needs” is the label attached to certain cases where “special needs,
beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-
cause requirement impracticable.” Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2565, quoting Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987). In special needs cases, the Court replaces
the warrant and probable cause requirement with a balancing test that looks to the
nature of the privacy interest, the character of the intrusion, and the nature and
immediacy of the government’s interest. Id. at 2565-67. Justice Blackmun first
coined the term “special needs” in his concurrence in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 351 (1985). The Court thereafter adopted the terminology in O’Connor,
480 U.S. at 720, and Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873, concluding that “in limited
circumstances, a search unsupported by either warrant or probable cause can be
constitutional when ‘special needs’ other than the normal need for law
enforcement provide sufficient justification.” Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 76 n.7.
At this stage in development of the doctrine, the “special needs” category is
defined more by a list of examples than by a determinative set of criteria. Among
the cases said by the Court to involve “special needs” are: a principal’s search of
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a student’s purse for drugs in school; a public employer’s search of an employee’s
desk; a probation officer’s warrantless search of a probationer’s home; a Federal
Railroad Administration regulation requiring employees to submit to blood and
urine tests after major train accidents; drug testing of United States Customs
Service employees applying for positions involving drug interdiction; schools’
random drug testing of athletes; and drug testing of public school students
participating in extracurricular activities. 10 The Supreme Court has not told us
10
See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 (“[T]he accommodation of the privacy
interests of schoolchildren with the substantial need of teachers and
administration for freedom to maintain order in the schools does not require strict
adherence to the requirement that searches be based on probable cause....”);
O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 725-26 (“[P]ublic employer intrusions on the
constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for
noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigation of work-
related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all
the circumstances.”); Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873-74 (“A State’s operation of a
probation system, like its operation of a school, government office or prison, or
its supervision of a regulated industry, likewise presents ‘special needs’ beyond
normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and
probable cause requirements.”); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620 (“The ... interest in
regulating the conduct of railroad employees to ensure safety, like its supervision
of probationers or regulated industries, or its operation of a government office,
school, or prison ... presents ‘special needs’ beyond normal law enforcement that
may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable cause requirements.”)
(citations and internal quotations omitted); Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666 (1989) (permitting drug testing by Customs Service
because of critical safety concerns and because results were not made available to
law enforcement); Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657-58 (upholding uniform policy of
suspicionless searches of student athletes); Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2264 (holding that
special needs “inhere in the public school context” thereby permitting drug testing
of participants in extracurricular activities).
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what, precisely, this set of cases has in common, but the cases seem to share at
least these features: (1) an exercise of governmental authority distinct from that
of mere law enforcement – such as the authority as employer, the in loco parentis
authority of school officials, or the post-incarceration authority of probation
officers; (2) lack of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, and concomitant
lack of individualized stigma based on such suspicion; and (3) an interest in
preventing future harm, generally involving the health or safety of the person
being searched or of other persons directly touched by that person’s conduct,
rather than of deterrence or punishment for past wrongdoing. It also appears
significant that each of these cases involved extraction of consent through a
threatened withholding of a benefit, rather than lack of consent. In Griffin, the
convicted felon agreed to the terms of probation as a condition to release from
incarceration; in Skinner and Von Raab, the employees agreed to drug testing as a
condition of employment; in Vernonia and Earls, the students were forced to
agree to the drug testing if they wished to participate in specified extracurricular
activities. 11 This latter factor suggests that the “special needs doctrine” is a
subspecies of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. See Kathleen Sullivan,
11
T.L.O. may be an exception, though it might be argued that students
accept the locker searches as a condition of the benefits of a free public
education. Alternatively, T.L.O. might better be analyzed as a holding that public
school students do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their lockers,
vis-a-vis school officials.
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Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1413, 1433-42 (1989); Richard
Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term–Forward: Unconstitutional Conditions,
State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 92-94 (1988);
Kenneth W. Simmons, Offers, Threats, and Unconstitutional Conditions, 26 San
Diego L. Rev. 289, 291-92 (1989).
It is not clear, therefore, that the “special needs” doctrine has any place in
this case. To be sure, the Head Start agency may have been exercising a form of
in loco parentis authority; there was no individualized suspicion of wrongdoing
and hence no stigma from being singled out for a search; and the stated purpose
of the examinations was to promote the health and educational readiness of the
children. On the other hand, the claim in this case involves lack of consent rather
than compelled consent. According to the plaintiffs, CAP simply used its power
over the children to conduct the examinations. Had CAP instead required the
parents to consent to an unscheduled examination, on condition of not permitting
their children to enroll in the Head Start program, this case would more closely
resemble a classic “special needs” case.
We need not resolve whether the “special needs” doctrine applies, however,
because it is plain that, if performed without the necessary consent, the searches
were unconstitutional even if we employ the “special needs” balancing test. The
sole “special need” invoked by CAP, and accepted by the district court, was “the
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‘special need’ that the physical examination of a child, ‘done in order to comply
with federal regulations, is an effective means of identifying physical and
developmental impediments in children prior to them starting school, a goal of
Head Start . . . .” Order of Granting CAP’s Motion for Summary Judgment, dated
May 16, 2001 at 7, App. 198 (ellipses in original). The district court found that
this qualified as a “special need” because “CAP is bound to follow the Head Start
regulations and those regulations require a health determination for each child. . .
. [I]t is clearly impracticable to demand adherence to the traditional warrant and
probable cause requirements considering the number of children dealt with by the
Head Start program.” Id.We cannot agree with this logic. While it is certainly true that a properly
conducted physical examination is “an effective means of identifying physical and
developmental impediments in children,” this supplies no justification for
proceeding without parental notice and consent. The premise of the “special
needs” doctrine is that these are cases in which compliance with ordinary Fourth
Amendment requirements would be “impracticable.” Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2564,
quoting Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873. There is no reason, however, to think that
parental notice and consent is “impracticable” in this context. On the contrary,
CAP claims to adhere to a policy of obtaining parental consent and providing
advance notice to the parents so that they can be present at the examination. The
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failure to do so in this case appears to be a product of sloppy draftsmanship (with
respect to consent forms) and carelessness (with respect to notice), rather than to
any inherent “impracticability” of compliance with ordinary Fourth Amendment
norms. 12
Nor does compliance with Head Start regulations excuse CAP’s failure to
obtain parental consent. On the contrary, the regulations expressly require Head
Start grantees to “obtain advance parent or guardian authorization” for “all health
and developmental procedures administered through the program.” 45 C.F.R. §
1304.20(e)(2). Contrary to CAP’s interpretation, the regulations do not require
them to obtain a physical examination within 90 days of enrollment. The
regulations require Head Start grantees, within 90 days of enrollment, to “make a
determination” as to whether enrolled children have an “ongoing source of
continuous, accessible health care” and whether they are “up-to-date on a
schedule of appropriate preventive and primary health care.” 45 C.F.R.
§ 1304.20(a)(1)(i), (ii). If the children are lacking in these respects, it is an
obligation of the Head Start grantee to “assist the parents in making the necessary
arrangements.” Id., § 1304.20(a)(1)(ii)(A). It is not the place of a Head Start
12
The other possible explanation is that, contrary to CAP’s protestations,
the examinations were for the purpose of detecting child abuse, and that CAP
deliberately obfuscated the consent forms and deliberately failed to provide notice
so that parents would not interfere. That possibility would raise Fourth
Amendment issues of a different order.
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agency to usurp the parental role. Indeed, to schedule medical examinations
without the knowledge of the parents would thwart the purpose of the regulations.
Examinations performed on the children without parental participation could not
reveal whether they had access to ongoing medical care or whether they were up
to date on a schedule of preventive and primary health care. To make those
“determinations,” the agency has to communicate with the parents and with the
children’s regular doctors.
For these reasons, we conclude that the “special needs doctrine” would not
excuse the failure to obtain parental consent for the examinations. We turn now
to the defenses put forward by each of the appellees.
C. Defenses
1. CAP Is Not Entitled As a Matter of Law To Immunity Under the
Monell Doctrine.
CAP argues that it is entitled to immunity from liability under the rule of
Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In
Monell, the Supreme Court held that a municipality cannot be held liable under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 merely on account of the unauthorized acts of its agents. To be
liable, the municipality must have had an “official municipal policy of some
nature,” id. at 691, that was the “direct cause” or “moving force” behind the
constitutional violations. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 820
(1985); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480-85 (1986) (finding
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municipal liability even when the “policy” was evinced by a single incident). In
reliance on this line of cases, the district court held that CAP cannot be held
liable for the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims “assuming arguendo a violation
occurred.” The district court explained:
When the execution of a government’s policy or custom deprives or
violates the constitutional rights complained of by a plaintiff, the
governmental entity may be responsible for the injury under §1983 [citing
Monell]. . . . Isolated, unprecedented incidents are insufficient to create
municipal liability. No evidence has been presented of a pattern of conduct
by CAP. A municipal policy or practice must be the “direct cause” or
“moving force” behind the constitutional violation [citing Tuttle]. Jerome
Lee, Director of CAP’s Head Start program, states in his affidavit that “It is
CAP’s policy that all examinations be conducted with parental consent.”
No evidence has been presented raising a genuine issue of material fact on
this point. Again, the Court is persuaded summary judgment is appropriate
as to the constitutional claims.
Order of Granting CAP’s Motion for Summary Judgment, dated May 16, 2001 at
14-15, App. 205-6 (some citations omitted). We do not agree.
Although the Supreme Court’s interpretation of § 1983 in Monell applied to
municipal governments and not to private entities acting under color of state
law, 13 caselaw from this and other circuits has extended the Monell doctrine to
13
As a state and federal grantee, acting for the government in carrying out
a government program in accordance with government regulatons, CAP does not
challenge its status as a person “acting under color of state law.” See Milo v.
Cushing Mun. Hosp., 861 F.2d 1194, 1196-97 (10th Cir. 1988) (finding private
corporation which managed hospital liable as a state actor because liability ran
with delegation of authority); DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co.,
Inc., 844 F.2d 714, 720-23 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that private party acting in
(continued...)
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private § 1983 defendants. Dickerson v. Leavitt Rentals, 995 F.Supp. 1242, 1247
(D. Kan. 1998), aff’d. 153 F.3d 726 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1110(1999); DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., Inc., 844 F2d 714, 722-
23 (10th Cir. 1988); see also Jackson v Illinois Medi-car Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 766
(7th Cir. 2002); Burke v. North Dakota Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 294 F.3d 1043,
1044 (8th Cir. 2002); Austin v. Paramount Parks, Inc., 195 F.3d 715, 729 (4th
Cir. 1999); Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1129-30 (11th Cir. 1992); Rojas v.
Alexander’s Dep’t Store, 924 F.2d 406, 408-09 (2d Cir. 1990). Therefore, a
private actor “cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor–or, in
other words . . . cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior
theory.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
That principle, however, does not entitle CAP to summary judgment in this
case, because CAP’s alleged liability is direct, not vicarious. The constitutional
violation alleged in this case is the performance of medical examinations on Head
Start children on the basis of forms that would not be understood by a typical
reasonable person as constituting parental consent. CAP drafted those forms and
has defended their use, claiming that the forms were sufficient to manifest
13
(...continued)
accordance with duties imposed by government contract, when sued solely on
basis of those acts dictated by government, is implicitly subject to liability but
able to raise qualified immunity defense).
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consent. That certainly constitutes evidence sufficient to demonstrate that the
conduct complained of was the policy and practice of CAP. 14 To be sure, as the
district court pointed out, CAP officials aver that they have a policy of obtaining
parental consent before arranging examinations, but the trier of fact could
conclude that by “parental consent,” CAP means something less than the knowing
and genuine consent required by the Fourth Amendment. The plaintiffs’ evidence
supports the conclusion that, by arranging the examinations without consent, CAP
directly violated the children’s Fourth Amendment rights. The district court’s
grant of summary judgment on this ground is therefore reversed as to CAP, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings.
2. Appellee KD Was Entitled to Summary Judgment Because It Did Not
Participate Directly in the Examinations
The trial court granted summary judgment to KD, the entity that CAP has
contracted with to provide the educational component of the Tulsa Head Start
program, on the grounds that the examinations did not violate the Fourth
Amendment and that KD was not a state actor. Order of Granting KD’s Motion
for Summary Judgment, dated May 16, 2001 at 1-2, App. 178-9. We affirm the
grant of summary judgement for KD on the alternative ground that there is no
We note, also, that evidence in the record points to similar examinations
14
performed pursuant to the same defective consent forms at CAP’s Head Start
program at Wiley Post Elementary School. This is further evidence that the
occurrence at Roosevelt Elementary was not an isolated incident.
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evidence that KD directly participated in the challenged conduct. See United
States v. Corral, 970 F.2d 719, 726 n. 5 (10th Cir.1992) (holding that appellate
court may affirm for any reason supported by the law and record). KD was
responsible for the educational component of the Head Start program. KD had no
role in performance of the examinations or in arranging for notice and consent.
To the extent that any KD personnel had an incidental role in facilitating the
examinations, KD was entitled to rely on CAP’s representations that parental
consent had been obtained. Accordingly, the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to KD is affirmed.
3. The County Health Department and the Nurses Were Entitled to
Summary Judgment Because They Reasonably Relied on CAP’s
Representation That Parental Consent Had Been Obtained
The district court also granted summary judgment to the County Health
Department and to nurses Baker and Strayhorn, on the ground that it was
objectively reasonable for them to believe that the parents had given consent to
the examinations. As discussed above, the standard for measuring “objective
reasonableness” in determining the scope of consent is what a “typical reasonable
person [would] have understood by the exchange.” Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251(citations omitted). Here, the record demonstrates that the County Health
Department and the nurses were objectively reasonable in believing that they had
been given consent to examine the children. CAP told the County Health
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Department that CAP would obtain consent for the examinations before the
County Health Department personnel conducted the exams. Nurses Baker and
Strayhorn relied on this information. In addition, when they questioned CAP
employee, Peggy Terry, about the consent forms, she told them that she had
consent forms on file. Given these exchanges, it was objectively reasonable for
the County Health Department and nurses Baker and Strayhorn to conclude that
CAP had obtained the requisite consent for the examinations. The district court’s
granting of summary judgment to the County Health Department, Baker, and
Strayhorn on this ground is therefore affirmed. 15
III. State Common Law Claims
A. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants on the claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress, also known in Oklahoma as the
tort of outrage. See Breeden v. League Services Corp., 575 P.2d 1374, 1376-77
(Okla. 1978) (discussing intentional infliction of emotional distress/outrage and
The district court granted Baker and Strayhorn’s motions to dismiss based
15
on qualified immunity grounds. However, as explained in text, there is no need to
reach the issue of qualified immunity because the nurses were objectively
reasonable in believing that CAP had obtained consent. See, e.g., United States v.
Corral, 970 F.2d 719, 726 n. 5 (10th Cir.1992) (holding in case not affirming on
immunity grounds that appellate court may affirm for any reason supported by the
law and record). Nor is it necessary to decide whether the County Health
Department has immunity for the state law tort claims under 51 O.S. §152.1(A).
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adopting standard from Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46). Under Oklahoma
law, a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires a showing of
conduct
so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to be beyond
all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is
one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the
community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead
him to exclaim, “Outrageous!”
Frank v. Mayberry, 985 P.2d 733, 776 (Okla. 1999) (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 46, cmt. d).
The district court granted summary judgment on this claim because, among
other things, the plaintiffs’ own expert opined that the examinations did not go
beyond the reasonable bounds of standard well-child examinations. Although we
have reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment with regard to
CAP’s actions under the Fourth Amendment, we agree with the district court that
there is nothing in the record to suggest that Appellees’ actions rise to the level of
extreme outrageousness required for liability on a claim of intentional infliction
of emotional distress or outrage. The district court’s disposition of this claim is
therefore affirmed.
B. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress/Negligence.
Under Oklahoma law, the negligent act of causing emotional distress is not
an independent tort but rather arises under the more general tort of negligence.
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Lockhart v. Loosen, 943 P.2d 1074, 1081 (Okla. 1997). Oklahoma does not allow
recovery for negligently inflicted mental distress alone. Richardson v. J.C.
Penney Co., Inc., 649 P.2d 565, 566 (Okla. Ct. App. 1982). In order to recover
on such a claim, the alleged mental distress must be “connected to some
manifestation of physical suffering to the plaintiff. . . .” McMeakin v. Roofing &
Sheet Metal Supply Co. of Tulsa, 807 P.2d 288, 290 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990). As
evidence of physical injury in this case, the plaintiffs noted the lance inflicted
upon the children to draw the blood and the removal of the children’s clothing.
No other ongoing trauma is alleged or argued. The district court found that
imposing liability on such alleged trauma would subject medical personnel to
excessive liability under the tort of negligent infliction of emotional
distress/negligence. We have found no case suggesting that such injuries are
sufficient to support a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, and we
therefore agree with the district court, and affirm its decision.
C. Assault/Battery
The Amended Complaint alleged both assault and battery claims. All
defendants were granted summary judgment on these claims. While the plaintiffs
have pursued their battery claim to some extent, they have failed to brief the issue
of assault. This Court has held that “issues will be deemed waived if they are not
adequately briefed” on appeal. Utahns for Better Transp., 305 F.3d at 1175,
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citing Phillips, 956 F.2d at 954 (deeming such claims “waived under the general
rule that even issues designated for review are lost if they are not actually argued
in the party’s brief”). Accordingly, there is no need to review the district court’s
decision on the assault claim on the merits. See Murrell, 43 F.3d at 1389 n.2.
Under Oklahoma law, in order to establish a claim of battery, a plaintiff
must prove that: 1) a defendant, without consent, acted either with the intent of
making a harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff or with the intent of
putting the plaintiff in apprehension of such a contact; and 2) the defendant’s act
resulted in a harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff. See OUJI Civ. Inst.
19.6. If medical treatment is unauthorized and performed without consent, the
result is a “technical battery.” Rosson v. Coburn, 876 P.2d 731, 734 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1994); see also Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 557 (Okla. 1980); Rolater v
Strain, 137 P. 96, 97 (Okla. 1913). “A ‘technical battery’ occurs when a
physician, in the course of treatment, exceeds the consent given by the patient.”
Rosson, 876 P.2d at 734 n.6 quoting Black’s Law Dictionary at 153 (6th ed.
1990).
“Consent,” for tort liability purposes, “is willingness in fact for conduct to
occur. It may be manifested by action or inaction and need not be communicated
to the actor.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892(1). “If words or conduct are
reasonably understood by another to be intended as consent, they constitute
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apparent consent and are as effective as consent in fact.” Id. at § 892(2).
Consent can also be either “apparent” or found to be implied by “custom.” Id. at
cmts. c, d. “Apparent consent” is present when “the words or acts or silence and
inaction [of the aggrieved party] would be understood by a reasonable person as
intended to indicate consent and they are in fact so understood by the other.” Id.,
cmt. c. “In determining whether conduct would be understood by a reasonable
person as indicating consent, the customs of the community are to be taken into
account.” Id., cmt. d.
The district court found no battery present in this case because it “found no
decision in which a recognized procedure performed in the standard manner in a
physical examination constitutes a harmful or offensive touching. . . .” Order
Granting CAP’s Motion for Summary Judgment, dated May 16, 2001 at 16, App.
207. It seems that the district court came to this conclusion after considering that
the plaintiffs’ expert said that the exam was in conformity to well-child exams.
The district court was correct in this conclusion. However, this analysis ignores
the fact that under Oklahoma law a technical battery occurs when medical
personnel treat patients without consent. Presumably, what makes such contact
“offensive” for purposes of liability for technical battery is the fact that the
procedure is performed without consent.
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As discussed above, both County Health Department and nurses Strayhorn
and Baker were assured by CAP that proper consent had been obtained for the
examinations. Strayhorn and Baker were assured by Peggy Terry that the proper
consent forms were on file. “Consent” in the legal sense is present as to these
defendants because, according to undisputed evidence in this case, it is the
custom of the industry to rely on assurances from other health care professionals
that proper consent has been obtained. The testimony of the plaintiffs’ expert,
advanced as a specialist in customs of the industry, supports this conclusion. The
expert was asked “can you . . . agree that if you are informed that there are signed
consent forms of the parents, that under that scenario, it is reasonable to
proceed?”; he replied: “Yeah. I think there’s a bit of a problem when you, you
know, are an outside provider of services.” This testimony demonstrates that it is
customary to rely on such consent. Therefore, Baker and Strayhorn committed no
battery because they had legal consent by custom, thus negating a claim for
technical battery. The district court’s disposition of the battery claim against the
nurses is therefore affirmed.
The district court granted summary judgment to CAP on the battery claim
on the ground that CAP had consent to arrange the examinations and that the
examinations themselves did not deviate from the industry standard of care.
ORDER of Granting CAP’s Motion for Summary Judgment, dated May 16, 2001
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at 16-7, App. 207-8. As discussed above, however, the plaintiffs have submitted
sufficient evidence to withstand a motion for summary judgment regarding
whether CAP had objectively reasonable grounds to believe that it had consent to
authorize the examinations. For the same reason, summary judgment must be
reversed with respect to CAP’s alleged technical battery under Oklahoma law.
D. Invasion of Privacy
The plaintiffs’ invasion of privacy is based on a theory of intrusion upon
seclusion, one of the four branches of the tort of invasion of privacy. See
generally Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 652A-E (describing four branches of
invasion of privacy tort); Warren & Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 Harv. L.
Rev. 193 (1980) (describing common law foundation for invasion of privacy tort);
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383 (1960) (describing four branches
of privacy tort). The Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that there are two
necessary elements to an intrusion upon seclusion claim: 1) a nonconsensual
intrusion, 2) which is highly offensive to a reasonable person. Gilmore v.
Enogex, Inc., 878 P.2d 360, 366 (Okla. 1994).
As to the first of these elements, we have already determined that the
plaintiffs have presented evidence supporting lack of consent. As to the second,
basing its conclusion on the fact that the Plaintiffs’ own medical expert concluded
the examinations did not deviate from the standards for a well-child examination,
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the district court held that the “intrusion” in this case would not be highly
offensive to a reasonable person. Order Granting CAP’s motion for Summary
Judgment, dated May 16, 2001 at 17, App. 208. We have found no Oklahoma
precedent that leads us to conclude that what is “offensive to the reasonable
person” depends upon whether the examination complied with standards for a
well-child examination, rather than an evaluation of the time, place, manner, and
substance of the examination. Such a determination of reasonableness is
classically reserved for resolution by the trier of fact. Thus, on both of these
points, we must remand for determination of possible liability as to CAP.
Because the district court found that the intrusion was consensual and not
offensive as a matter of law, it did not address the further element set forth in the
language of the Restatement, which Oklahoma has adopted, regarding intent.
“One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or
seclusion of another, or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the
other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person.” Munley v. ISC Fin. House, Inc., 584 P.2d 1336, 1339-40
(Okla. 1978) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B and explicitly
adopting standard). Cases from other circuits that directly address the issue of
intent explain that “[a]n intrusion occurs when an actor ‘believes, or is
substantially certain, that he lacks the necessary legal or personal permission to
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commit the intrusive act.’” Fletcher v. Price Chopper Foods of Trumann, Inc.,
220 F.3d 871, 876 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting O’Donnell v. United States, 891 F.2d
1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1989)). This analysis originates in an interpretation of
Pennsylvania law, but we find its analysis of Restatement sections 652B and 8A
persuasive and we believe the Oklahoma Supreme Court would as well. Thus, on
remand, CAP’s intent under this standard will need to be addressed.
As discussed above, however, based on industry custom it was reasonable
for the nurses and the County Health Department to believe that they had consent
to perform the examinations. As a result, under the facts here, the nurses and the
County Health Department lacked the requisite intent as a matter of law for
liability under a theory of intrusion upon seclusion. The district court’s judgment
for nurses Baker and Strayhorn and the County Health Department on the invasion
of privacy claim is therefore affirmed. The district court’s disposition of this
claim as to CAP is reversed and remanded for a determination of whether the
intrusion was nonconsensual, whether CAP’s actions were highly offensive to a
reasonable person, and whether CAP acted with the requisite intent, such that it
should be liable for intrusion upon seclusion.
E. Medical Malpractice/Negligence
The trial court correctly determined that, as a general matter, medical
malpractice encompasses the breach of a duty which a physician, by virtue of his
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or her relationship to the patient, owes to exercise reasonable care in treatment.
Order Granting County Health Department’s Motion for Summary Judgment,
dated May 16, 2001, at 4, App. 190, citing Daniels v. Gilbreath, 668 F.2d 477,
488 (10th Cir. 1982). A physician-patient relationship is essential to a medical
malpractice action. See generally Greenberg v. Perkins, 845 P.2d 530, 534-36
(Colo. 1993) (en banc) (surveying and collecting state and federal cases so
holding); cf. Johnson v. Fine, 45 P.3d 441, 445 (Okla. Ct. App. 2002) (declining
to extend malpractice actions beyond the immediate doctor-patient relationship).
On appeal, the plaintiffs do not challenge the district court’s dismissal of this
claim as to CAP.
With regard to the conduct of the nurses in this case the existence of a
physician-patient relationship is immaterial because, as the plaintiffs’ own expert
points out, neither Strayhorn nor Baker deviated from the requisite standard of
care. The examinations conformed to standards for well-child examinations and,
as discussed above, they followed customary industry practices in relying on the
representations of CAP that consent for the examinations had been given. It is
true that the plaintiffs’ expert testified that the consent forms themselves were
insufficient, but this does not change the fact that Baker, Strayhorn, and the
County Health Department were acting reasonably and within the norms of
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industry practice when they relied upon CAP’s representations. The district
court’s decision regarding medical malpractice/negligence is therefore affirmed.
IV. Costs
In granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants below, the district
court ordered the plaintiffs to pay costs. While it may sometimes be appropriate
to award costs against low-income plaintiffs bringing a suit under the civil rights
laws, this should be done with caution. Since we now reverse the grant of
summary judgment in substantial part, that order must also be reversed and the
issue of costs remanded to the district court. See Delano v. Kitch, 663 F.2d 990,
1001 (10th Cir. 1981); Amarel v. Connell, 102 F.3d 1494, 1523 (9th Cir. 1997)
(citing Farmer v. Arabian American Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227 (1964)).
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal or
grant of summary judgment on all claims with the following exceptions. First, we
reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to CAP on the Fourth
Amendment, technical battery, and invasion of privacy claims. We also reverse
the trial court’s dismissal of the parents’ Fourteenth Amendment claim against
CAP regarding interference with their constitutional right to direct and control the
medical treatment of their children. We reverse the district court’s award of costs
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as well, and remand the case to the district court for proceedings consistent with
this decision.
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