Stallings v. State of New Mexico ( 1998 )


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  •                                                                            F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    DEC 1 1998
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    RICKY G. STALLINGS,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                                    No. 97-2382
    (D.C. No. CIV-95-896-SC/JHG)
    STATE OF NEW MEXICO;                                    (D. N.M.)
    ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE
    STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT            *
    Before PORFILIO, BARRETT,              and KELLY , Circuit Judges.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
    this appeal.   See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is
    therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    Petitioner Ricky G. Stallings appeals from an order of the district court
    denying his petition filed pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
     . 1 We affirm.
    In 1984, Stallings was convicted of five counts of passing forged checks
    and was sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment. In 1988, while serving that
    sentence, Stallings was found guilty by separate juries of aggravated battery with
    a deadly weapon and possession of a deadly weapon by a prisoner. The charges
    arose from separate incidents in which Stallings attacked a fellow inmate and a
    prison guard. The cases were consolidated for sentencing. Stallings was charged
    as a second habitual offender and sentenced to a total of fourteen years’
    incarceration on both convictions to run consecutively to the sentences for
    forgery he was currently serving.
    In 1994, this court vacated the forgery convictions pursuant to Stallings’
    § 2254 petition. We held that insufficient evidence was adduced at trial to
    support those convictions.    See Stallings v. Tansy, 
    28 F.3d 1018
    , 1024 (10th Cir.
    1994). Subsequently, the state amended Stallings’ 1988 sentences to vacate two
    1
    As Stallings filed his petition prior to the passage of the Antiterrorism and
    Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub L. No. 104-132, 
    110 Stat. 1214
    , the
    certificate of appealability provisions of that act do not apply.       See United States
    v. Kunzman, 
    125 F.3d 1363
    , 1364 n.2 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 
    118 S. Ct. 1375
     (1998). This court has granted Stallings a         certificate of probable cause and
    ordered briefing from the appellee.
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    years of the sentences which had been imposed as habitual offender enhancements.
    Stallings thereafter commenced this      § 2254 petition 2 contending that the
    1988 convictions should be vacated as he was not in lawful custody when the
    events underlying the 1988 charges occurred due to the fact that his forgery
    convictions were later overturned. He also alleged he was denied his
    constitutional right to testify at the 1988 trials because the unconstitutional
    forgery convictions caused him to decide not to testify for fear that they would be
    used to impeach his credibility.
    The district court held that Stallings was in lawful custody at the time of
    the 1988 trials and, therefore, his convictions were valid.     The court also held that
    because the forgery convictions were valid at the time of his trial, Stallings had
    not been denied his right to testify.
    On appeal Stallings does not contest the district court’s determination that
    he was in lawful custody when the events underlying the 1988 charges occurred,
    thus resulting in valid convictions. Stallings does argue that the district court
    2
    This is Stallings’ second federal habeas petition attacking the 1988
    convictions. The district court dismissed the claims it found to be successive
    under Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing      § 2254 Cases, which permitted the court
    to dismiss a successive petition if the petitioner failed to allege new or different
    grounds for relief or if the failure to allege the new or different grounds
    constituted an abuse of the writ. As Stallings’ first petition was decided prior to
    this court’s vacation of his forgery convictions, the court permitted his challenges
    based on our decision in Stallings , 
    28 F.3d 1018
    , to proceed.
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    erred in holding that he was not unconstitutionally denied his right to testify. He
    states that, as the case rested on conflicting testimony, permitting the jury to hear
    him testify “would have tipped the balance in his favor and caused verdicts of
    acquittal on all of the counts.” Appellant’s Br. at 18.
    On appeal from the district court’s determination of a § 2254 petition, we
    review the district court’s conclusions of law de novo, granting a presumption of
    correctness to the state court’s factual findings if they are fairly supported by the
    record. See Hatch v. Oklahoma, 
    58 F.3d 1447
    , 1453 (10th Cir. 1995). We
    review mixed questions of law and fact de novo. See 
    id.
     But see Wright v.
    West, 
    505 U.S. 277
    , 294-95 (1992) (declining to announce a standard for habeas
    review of the state court’s application of the law to the facts).
    A Supreme Court plurality has held that the use of a constitutionally invalid
    conviction to impeach a defendant’s general character and credibility deprives
    him of due process of law unless the use constituted harmless error.      See Loper v.
    Beto , 
    405 U.S. 473
    , 483 & n.12 (1972). Stallings asks     us to extend that holding
    to assert that if a defendant decides not to testify for fear that a currently valid,
    though later determined to be constitutionally invalid, conviction might be used to
    impeach him, his constitutional rights have been violated. We decline to make
    this leap. Further, requiring Stallings to choose between silence and facing the
    possibility that his credibility might be impeached did not violate his
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    constitutional rights. Cf. United States v. Simpson, 
    7 F.3d 186
    , 191 (10th Cir.
    1993) (no violation of constitutional rights occurs when defendant must choose
    between silence and presenting a defense).
    Even were we to accept Stallings’ proposition, his claim is speculative and
    any error would be harmless. Due to the nature of the charges and the testimony,
    the juries knew that Stallings had committed the charged offenses against both a
    fellow inmate and a prison guard while imprisoned. Stallings has failed to show
    how knowledge of the specific crimes he was convicted of would have impeached
    his credibility any more than the juries’ admitted knowledge that he was a
    prisoner. Speculation of the sort Stallings must engage in here to make his case
    does not warrant habeas relief. Stallings has not sustained his burden in proving
    that his constitutional rights were violated.
    The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of New
    Mexico is AFFIRMED.
    Entered for the Court
    James E. Barrett
    Senior Circuit Judge
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