United States v. Moore , 37 F. App'x 963 ( 2002 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUN 19 2002
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 01-1156
v. (D.C. No. 98-CR-193-M)
IRA L. MOORE, (D. Colorado)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO and ANDERSON , Circuit Judges, and BROWN , ** District
Judge.
Following a jury trial, defendant Ira Moore was found guilty of one count
of robbery, in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); one count of using
and carrying firearms in connection with the robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c); unlawful possession of a machine gun, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
The Honorable Wesley E. Brown, United States District Judge for the
District of Kansas, sitting by designation.
§ 922(o)(1); and being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g). The district court sentenced Moore to a total of 138 months
imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised release. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Chad Lawrence was a firearms dealer and owner of Cal’s Sporting Armory
in Englewood, Colorado. Cal’s Sporting Armory was authorized to sell restricted
firearms such as machine guns, silencers and sawed-off shotguns.
At approximately 7:30 p.m. on April 22, 1998, Lawrence was pricing
inventory behind one of the store’s glass display cases when Kevin Shuler,
accompanied by another individual, entered the store. 1
Both men wore dark pants,
gray pinstripe shirts, and baseball caps. Shuler was taller than his companion.
The shorter of the two individuals asked Lawrence where a particular item was
and Lawrence left the counter to show him. After talking to the man for a few
minutes, Lawrence turned to walk back to the counter. The shorter man grabbed
him from behind and pinned his arms to his side while Shuler held a gun to his
head.
Shuler and Moore were codefendants. Shuler ultimately plead guilty to the
1
robbery. We affirmed his conviction. United States v. Shuler, 181 F.3d 1188,
1191 (10th Cir. 1999).
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The shorter robber then took Lawrence’s keys and went to a back room.
Shuler continued to restrain Lawrence and asked him where the bulletproof vests
and MP5s were. 2
Lawrence was taken into a back room, forced to lie down on the
floor, and taped with duct tape on his hands, feet and eyes. He heard the two men
opening cabinets and walking in and out of the store. When the store sounded
empty, Lawrence freed his hands, triggered the alarm system and grabbed a
shotgun. When he saw Shuler returning to the store, Lawrence fired the shotgun
at him. Shuler and his companion fled the store, taking with them several
firearms, including an MP5, and Lawrence’s keys and wallet. 3
Early the following morning, the Arapahoe County Sheriff’s Department
developed computer-generated sketches of the two robbers, based upon
Lawrence’s descriptions of them. Later that day, an attorney contacted the
Sheriff’s Department, stating that he had a client who wished to remain
anonymous who had information about the Cal’s Sporting Armory robbery.
Investigator Paul Goodman interviewed the informant by phone. The informant
provided a detailed account of the robbery and identified Shuler as one of the
MP5s are German-made machine guns which Lawrence had in his store for
2
demonstration purposes and to sell to law enforcement.
3
The firearms stolen, besides the MP5, were three Bushmaster semi-
automatic assault rifles, two .45 caliber handguns, one of which was equipped
with a silencer, and one .9 millimeter handgun. Tr. of Hr’g on Motions at 17, R.
Vol. 7.
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robbers. He described Shuler as a 6’1” African-American man with several
tattoos on his chest. The informant told Goodman that, during the robbery, Shuler
had knocked over the store video camera and simultaneously dropped his own gun
(a .9 millimeter Norinco handgun), that the owner had been duct-taped, that the
robbers made several trips in and out of the store, and that the owner had fired at
Shuler. The informant also provided details about where Shuler worked and
lived, the kind of car he drove, and the whereabouts and identities of his
girlfriends. Police were able to corroborate much of the informant’s information
about the robbery and Shuler. 4
The informant also provided some information on
the second robber–that he was a shorter, stockier, African-American male known
as “Ira,” “Iroc,” or “Roc.”
Law enforcement officers presented Lawrence with a six-man photographic
array early in the morning of April 24. He identified Shuler as the taller of the
two robbers. Later that day, police arrested Shuler soon after he arrived at his
construction job. The police interviewed Shuler’s girlfriend, Orchid Field, when
she arrived at his place of work for lunch. Field testified that on the night of the
robbery, she had picked Shuler up at the intersection of First and Havana, near the
4
For example, the store video camera had in fact been knocked over, and a
loaded .9 millimeter Norinco handgun found in the store was not in Lawrence’s
inventory. Further, the informant accurately identified Shuler’s residence, his
girlfriends, his place of work, and the fact that he had tattoos on his body.
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Timber Leaf Apartments. Tr. of Hr’g on Motions at 112, R. Vol. 7. One of the
officers involved testified that Field said that “he [Shuler] was carrying a duffel
bag that clinked when he placed it in the car.” Id. at 30. Field later denied
making such a statement, testifying that she only mentioned the bag because she
felt compelled to do so by the police. Id. at 121-22.
Field further stated that she had taken or met Shuler there on other
occasions, and was under the impression that Shuler’s friend, Ira, lived in the
Timber Leaf Apartments. Field indicated she did not know Ira’s last name, but
knew he was referred to as “Roc.”
Field and, apparently at times, Shuler lived with Field’s mother, Janet
Field. Janet Field consented to a search of their apartment, which turned up the
three stolen Bushmaster semi-automatic rifles, two handguns, some ammunition,
Lawrence’s wallet and keys, and a pair of pants, shirt and cap matching the
description of the clothes worn by the robbers.
On the afternoon of April 24, Arapahoe County Sheriff’s Investigator
Jeffrey Britegam went to the Timber Leaf Apartment Leasing Office to look for a
short, stocky African-American in his early 30’s named “Ira” and with a possible
last name of “Griffin.” The apartment management staff told Britegam that the
only “Ira” living at the apartment complex was the defendant, Ira Moore. They
gave him Moore’s apartment number, date of birth and phone number, and
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showed him a photocopy of Moore’s driver’s license. Britegam communicated
this information to his command center.
As Britegam was walking near Moore’s apartment, the door suddenly
opened and Moore and another man walked outside carrying several cardboard
boxes. When back-up officers arrived at the apartment complex, officers at the
command station arranged for Orchid Field to make a controlled telephone call to
Moore. 5 During this monitored call, Field told Moore that the police had arrested
Shuler and that she did not know what to do with “the guns.” Tr. of taped
conversation at 1, Attachment 1 to Mot. to Exclude Evid. of Tape Recorded
Conversation, R. Vol. 2, Doc. 191. Moore responded, “[i]f you can, get ‘em out.”
Id. Moore asked Field where she was and whether he could call her back. Moore
also stated, “I told him,” and “I hope he knows to do the right thing.” Id. at 2.
The officers outside Moore’s apartment arrested Moore when he stepped outside
his apartment while talking on the telephone to Field. A search of his apartment
uncovered clothes similar to those worn by the robbers. Moore was then taken to
the Arapahoe County Sheriff’s Office, booked by Deputy Sheriff Douglas Cover,
and photographed as part of the booking process.
5
The district court subsequently suppressed the contents of this telephone
call, concluding that Field had not made the call voluntarily.
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On April 27, Lawrence was shown a six-man photo array containing the
booking photograph of Moore. Lawrence identified Moore as the second robber.
In a November 1, 2000, post-indictment lineup, containing Moore and five other
men, Lawrence again identified Moore as the second robber. 6
At this line-up,
each participant was asked to step forward and repeat three times a question the
shorter robber had asked Lawrence during the robbery. At trial, Lawrence again
identified Moore as the second robber.
Moore filed a motion to suppress his post-arrest statements, evidence seized
at his apartment, and the booking photograph taken at the police station. After an
evidentiary hearing, the district court granted the motion with respect to his
statements and the evidence seized from his apartment. The district court
concluded that, while there was probable cause to arrest Moore, the officers at the
apartment who actually arrested Moore were not “privy to” the information
establishing probable cause. Tr. of Trial Preparation Conference Proceedings at
5-7, R. Vol. 10. The court rejected the government’s argument that the
“collective knowledge” of the officers at the station and the arresting officers
provided probable cause for the officers at the apartment complex to arrest
Moore, because there had been no “actual communication” of the information
6
There was a two-year delay between Moore’s indictment and his trial.
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establishing probable cause from the officers at the station to the officers at the
complex. Id. at 5.
However, the court denied the part of the motion seeking suppression of the
booking photograph, concluding that, because there was probable cause to arrest
Moore (even though the arresting officers were not aware of that probable cause),
“ultimately he would have been arrested . . . [and] upon arrest, the defendant
would have been photographed and, therefore, the photograph used in the photo
I.D. identification procedure is not covered by the exclusionary rule because it
would have inevitably been obtained under any circumstance of this case.” Id. at
6-7.
The jury convicted Moore. The primary issue at trial was whether Moore
was, in fact, the shorter robber. Lawrence identified Moore at trial and testified
concerning his identification of Moore from the photographic array, which
included the booking photograph.
Moore appeals, arguing the district court erred “in holding that the police
would have inevitably arrested Mr. Moore, where the objective indications are
that the police did not believe they had probable cause, the showing of probable
cause was not overwhelming, and the government offered no testimony that the
police would have arrested Mr. Moore had the officers at the scene not illegally
arrested him.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 2. He thus argues the court erred in
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declining to suppress his booking photograph and the identifications allegedly
based thereon.
DISCUSSION
“In assessing a challenge to a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress
evidence, this court reviews de novo the question of reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment.” United States v. King , 222 F.3d 1280, 1283 (10th Cir.
2000). Further, “[w]e view the evidence produced at the pretrial suppression
hearing in the light most favorable to the government and accept the district
court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.” United States v.
Yazzie , 188 F.3d 1178, 1193 (10th Cir. 1999).
The district court denied suppression of Moore’s booking photograph in
reliance on the “inevitable discovery” doctrine. Under this doctrine, even if
Moore’s initial arrest was unlawful, “the exclusionary rule is inapplicable if the
evidence inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.” United States
v. Souza , 223 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 2000). “The government has the burden
of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the evidence in question
would have been discovered in the absence of the Fourth Amendment violation.”
Id. at 1203. In examining whether the government has met its burden of proof,
we look at “demonstrated historical facts,” not at “speculative elements.” Nix v.
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Williams , 467 U.S. 431, 444 n.5 (1984). Thus, in this case, we may affirm the
district court’s refusal to suppress the booking photograph if we conclude that the
government proved by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have
obtained the booking photograph even without Moore’s illegal arrest.
We begin by noting that the district court specifically found that, at the
time of Moore’s arrest, the officers at police headquarters had sufficient
information establishing probable cause to arrest Moore. Moore does not dispute
this finding on appeal. 7
We have said that “‘what makes a discovery “inevitable” is not probable
cause alone . . . but probable cause plus a chain of events that would have led to a
warrant (or another justification) independent of the search.’” Souza , 223 F.3d at
1204 (quoting United States v. Brown , 64 F.3d 1083, 1085 (7th Cir. 1995)).
“The key issue in these cases, one of probability, is how likely it is that a warrant
would have been issued and that the evidence would have been found pursuant to
the warrant.” Id.In Souza , we approved the following factors as “helpful” in assessing
inevitability:
1) “the extent to which the warrant process has been completed at the
time those seeking the warrant learn of the search” . . . ; 2) the
7
Moore conceded at oral argument that, while he pursued this issue in the
district court, he does not press it on appeal.
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strength of the showing of probable cause at the time the search
occurred . . . ; 3) whether a warrant ultimately was obtained, albeit
after the illegal entry . . . ; and 4) “evidence that law enforcement
agents ‘jumped the gun’ because they lacked confidence in their
showing of probable cause and wanted to force the issue by creating
a fait accompli[.]”
Id. (quoting United States v. Cabassa , 62 F.3d 470, 473-74 & n.2 (2d Cir. 1995)).
Moore argues that the following combination of circumstances compel the
conclusion that the police would not have inevitably arrested, booked and
photographed Moore without the prior illegal arrest: (1) the fact that the police
had not even begun the process of obtaining an arrest or search warrant, (2) the
fact that a warrant was never in fact obtained, and (3) the fact that, in his view,
the police only had a modest degree of probable cause for his arrest. We
disagree.
The objective historical facts facing the police at the time of Moore’s arrest
were as follows: an anonymous informant had provided accurate and
corroborated information about Shuler’s involvement with the robbery; this same
informant had told police that Shuler’s accomplice was a shorter, stockier
African-American known as “Ira” or “Roc;” on the night of the robbery, Orchid
Field had picked up Shuler from a location very near Moore’s apartment complex,
to which Field had taken Shuler and from which she had picked him up on prior
occasions and where she believed his friend Ira or “Roc” lived; Moore was the
only “Ira” living at that apartment complex; and Moore appeared generally, from
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the photocopy of his driver’s license on file with the apartment manager, to match
the description of Shuler’s accomplice. Further, the police were in the process of
obtaining information from the recorded phone conversation between Field and
Moore which strongly suggested Moore’s familiarity with Shuler and with the
stolen guns found in Field’s apartment. Additionally, police had sent several
back-up officers to Moore’s apartment complex, and they knew they were dealing
with a suspect in an armed robbery of a firearms store in which a number of very
dangerous weapons had been stolen. Thus, the police had ample probable cause
to believe that Moore was involved in a serious robbery. 8
Furthermore, while Souza and some of our other cases discussing the
inevitable discovery doctrine emphasize the importance of the police taking steps
toward obtaining a warrant, and that probable cause alone will not excuse the
absence of a warrant otherwise required, in those cases an actual warrant was a
prerequisite to a lawful search. For example, in Souza , the police developed
probable cause to search a package at a United Parcel Service facility. As we
observed, “[t]he police had probable cause to open the package and intended to
8
We only consider the suppressed phone conversation for the purposes of
determining whether the police would inevitably have arrested Moore. Because
Moore does not contest the legal question of whether the police at headquarters
had probable cause, we therefore do not consider the conversation for the
purposes of determining the legal question of whether there was probable cause to
arrest Moore.
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obtain a search warrant to do so, but prematurely caused the package to be opened
in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Souza , 223 F.3d at 1203. In that case,
obtaining a warrant was the only way the police could have legally opened the
package: “there is no exception to the warrant requirement that could serve as a
basis for the inevitable discovery exception [in this case].” Id. In such a
situation, we have held that the police may not simply ignore the warrant
requirement and conduct an illegal search, but must, instead, demonstrate that
“‘the police would have obtained the necessary warrant absent the illegal
search.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Allen , 159 F.3d 832, 841 (4th Cir. 1998)).
They could make such a demonstration with “‘proof that, based on independent
evidence available at the time of the illegal search, the police . . . took steps to
obtain a warrant prior to the unlawful search.’” Id. (quoting Allen , 159 F.3d at
841.)
In Souza , we in fact upheld application of the inevitable discovery
exception, although we noted we rarely do so in the circumstances of that case:
Although we are very reluctant to apply the inevitable discovery
exception in situations where the government fails to obtain a search
warrant and no exception to the warrant requirement exists, in this
case the inevitability of discovery of the evidence convinces us that
this is one of those occasions when the doctrine should apply.
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Souza , 223 F.3d at 1206. A factor heavily influencing our decision was that the
police had taken steps to obtain a warrant, although they had not yet obtained one
at the time of the premature, illegal search.
We further observed in Souza that we more typically and readily apply the
inevitable discovery exception in situations where some “exception[] to the
warrant requirement would have inevitably led to discovery of the evidence.” Id.at 1203 (citing United States v. Haro-Salcedo , 107 F.3d 769, 773-74 (10th Cir.
1997); United States v. Elycio-Montoya , 70 F.3d 1158, 1165 (10th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Horn , 970 F.2d 728, 732 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Romero , 692 F.2d 699, 704 (10th Cir. 1982)). Such is the case here.
In this case, as Moore acknowledges, the police could have made a
warrantless arrest of Moore outside his apartment complex once they had probable
cause to believe he was involved in the robbery. That is precisely what they did.
Indeed, all the evidence in this cases suggests that, although there was confusion
about whether the order to arrest Moore had officially been transmitted to the
officers on the scene at Moore’s apartment, the police were poised and ready to
give that order once Moore got off the phone with Field. Thus, while Moore
invites us to speculate that, for some reason, the police did not feel they had
adequate probable cause to make a warrantless arrest, and would, therefore, not
have arrested Moore the moment he stepped outside his apartment door, the
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record in this case indicates the exact opposite—that the police at headquarters
had probable cause to arrest Moore, that they knew he was in the apartment and
had recently been seen going in and out of it, that they had directed officers at the
scene to, in effect, conduct a de facto stakeout of Moore’s apartment, and that
they were going to arrest him as soon as he emerged from his apartment.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s conclusion that the police,
possessing probable cause to arrest Moore, would inevitably have ordered the
police staking out his apartment to arrest him once he emerged therefrom. Once
arrested, he would most certainly have been taken to police headquarters, booked
and photographed. Thus, the police would have inevitably obtained a booking
photograph of Moore.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Moore’s conviction.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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