United States v. Avalos-Gonzales , 304 F. App'x 662 ( 2008 )


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  •                                                                       FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    December 19, 2008
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                       No. 08-2079
    v.                                                District of New Mexico
    HERIBERTO AVALOS-GONZALES,                      (D.C. No. 07-CR-2089 JH)
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before TACHA, KELLY and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
    Heriberto Avalos-Gonzales was sentenced to 41 months imprisonment by
    the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, for reentry of a
    deported alien in violation of 
    8 U.S.C. §§1326
    (a) and 1326(b). He timely
    appealed his sentence, claiming that the district court relied on impermissible
    factors in sentencing and abused its discretion in imposing an unreasonable
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
    of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This case is
    therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not
    binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
    collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
    with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    sentence. We find that the district court did not rely on impermissible factors and
    that the imposed sentence was reasonable. We therefore affirm Mr. Avalos-
    Gonzales’ sentence.
    BACKGROUND
    On June 28, 2007, the United States Border Patrol arrested Mr. Avalos-
    Gonzales for re-entering the country less than a month after being deported for a
    second time on June 6, 2007. Mr. Avalos-Gonzales was first deported on January
    23, 2001. Prior to his 2001 deportation, he and two other individuals were
    arrested in a Barstow, California hotel room with three and a half pounds of
    methamphetamine, $1,331.00, a 9 mm handgun, and more than 150 rounds of
    ammunition. Mr.Avalos-Gonzales was subsequently convicted of possession of a
    controlled substance for sale and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment.
    Mr. Avalos-Gonzales pled guilty to the June 28 offense, and rejected the
    government’s fast-track offer in order to submit a sentencing memorandum to the
    district court and request a lower sentence. The Presentence Report (“PSR”)
    calculated Mr. Avalos-Gonzales’ offense level as 21. This reflected a base
    offense level of 8 and a 16-level enhancement for a prior crime of violence
    pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), because the defendant was previously
    deported after a conviction for a drug trafficking felony for which the sentence
    imposed exceeded 13 months. After reducing the level by 3 for acceptance of
    responsibility, the PSR calculated a total offense level of 21. His criminal history
    -2-
    score was calculated at 3 and his criminal history category at II, rendering a
    guideline range of 41-51 months. Mr. Avalos-Gonzales did not challenge the PSR
    calculation, but argued at sentencing that §3553 factors other than the guideline
    range warranted a sentence of 18 to 24 months. The government responded that
    Mr. Avalos-Gonzales’ circumstances did not distinguish his case from other
    defendants in similar situations and therefore did not warrant a variance from the
    guideline range. The government further asked that any reduction not be the
    same as what the fast-track offer would have given Mr. Avalos-Gonzales, as such
    a reduction would create a disincentive for other defendants to accept fast-track
    offers.
    The district court sentenced Mr. Avalos-Gonzales to 41 months
    imprisonment, based on the fact that his 1999 arrest involved a firearm and three
    and a half pounds of methamphetamine.
    ANALYSIS
    Mr. Avalos-Gonzales argues first that the district court improperly relied on
    the prosecution’s argument that it should sentence him at a level above what he
    would have received if he had accepted a fast-track offer, claiming that this was
    an impermissible sentencing factor. We need not consider the legal merits of this
    argument, however, because the record reflects that the district court relied
    entirely on the § 3553(a) factors. The district court explained the reasons for the
    sentence as follows:
    -3-
    I guess what distinguishes this case in my mind is the defendant’s
    history. . . .
    The thing that bothers me about the defendant’s history is, [] this
    prior conviction for possession of controlled substance. And I do note that
    it did involve a fairly large amount of drugs, three and half pounds of
    methamphetamine. And I do acknowledge that while the firearm charge
    was dismissed, I, it does concern me greatly that there was a firearm, well a
    firearm that was in the general area of the defendant; I’m not quite sure
    where the duffel bag was. But I don’t know, these are things that, that
    provide great concern to me. And while, yes, the arrest was in 1999, the
    sentence was imposed in 1999. I do note that the defendant was released
    from jail in 2001. So while the conviction was about nine years ago, eight
    and a half years ago, the defendant really had only been out of jail about
    six years when this particular offense occurred. So, so those are some of
    the things that enter into my thinking in assessing the sentence that should
    be imposed in this case.
    Tr. of Sentencing at 11-13. The district court made no mention of Mr. Avalos-
    Gonzales’ rejection of the fast-track offer as a relevant consideration.
    Mr. Avalos-Gonzales next argues that the guidelines provision for his
    offense is not based on empirical evidence. He cites various research and other
    courts’ findings to support his criticism of the Sentencing Guidelines on this
    point. Because he did not raise this argument before the district court, however,
    our review is for plain error. Whatever might be the abstract merit of his
    criticisms, the decision of a district court to impose a within-Guidelines sentence
    is not plain error.
    Next, Mr. Avalos-Gonzales challenges the substantive reasonableness of
    the sentence, claiming that the district court failed to give proper weight to all the
    § 3553(a) factors. Mr. Avalos-Gonzales’ sentence was at the low end of the
    -4-
    recommended Guidelines range. This court has held that “any sentence that is
    properly calculated under the Guidelines is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of
    reasonableness.” See United States v. Kristl, 
    437 F.3d 1050
    , 1054 (10th Cir.
    2006). The district court properly considered not only the recommended range,
    but also the statutory sentencing factors. As the sentencing judge stated: “the
    Court has reviewed the presentence report factual findings and has considered the
    advisory sentencing guideline applications, as well as all of the factors set forth
    in 18 U.S.C. 3553 A1 through 7.” Id. at 13 (emphasis added). We see no basis
    for overturning the sentencing court’s exercise of sentencing discretion.
    Finally, Mr. Avalos-Gonzales argues that the district court’s rationale for
    not granting him a variance was based on two disputed, judge-found facts: that
    there was a firearm associated with him at the time of his arrest for the prior
    crime and the amount of methamphetamine recovered at the scene of his crime.
    According to Mr. Avalos-Gonzales, judicial fact-finding is subject to the
    reasonable doubt standard and cannot be based on “probably accurate”
    information such as hearsay.
    This argument flies in the face of well-established precedent. See, e.g.,
    United States v. Magallanez, 
    408 F.3d 672
     (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that district
    courts are required to determine facts relevant to sentencing through application
    of the preponderance standard). Whatever might be the logic of the matter, the
    Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment does not preclude reliance on
    -5-
    facts found by a judge pursuant to a discretionary sentencing system. United
    States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
    , 273 (2005). The facts relied on by the district
    court were contained in the PSR and were not disputed by the defendant. The
    district court was therefore entitled to treat those facts as established. Fed. R.
    Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(A).
    CONCLUSION
    The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of New
    Mexico is AFFIRMED.
    Entered for the Court,
    Michael W. McConnell
    Circuit Judge
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 08-2079

Citation Numbers: 304 F. App'x 662

Judges: Kelly, McCONNELL, Tacha

Filed Date: 12/19/2008

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/3/2023