In the matter of CT v. ( 1997 )


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  •                                                                                F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    JUN 20 1997
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    TENTH CIRCUIT                            PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    IN THE MATTER OF THE
    APPLICATION OF CRAIG TWEEDY                                  No. 96-5238
    FOR REINSTATEMENT TO THE
    FEDERAL BAR OF THE NORTHERN                               (N.D. Oklahoma)
    DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA,                                     (D.C. No. M-267)
    Appellant.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
    Before ANDERSON, HENRY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
    appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered
    submitted without oral argument.
    Craig Tweedy, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of his
    application for reinstatement as a member of the bar of the Northern District of
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
    law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
    citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
    the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    Oklahoma. He contends that his original suspension resulted from a denial of due process
    and a fraud upon the court. We affirm.
    In January 1993, the judges of the Northern District of Oklahoma entered an order
    which suspended Tweedy from practice and from the district court rolls for a period of
    three years.1 Tweedy did not appeal that order. When the three years expired, Tweedy
    sought reinstatement. The primary basis for his request was that he had, in fact, done
    nothing to deserve the suspension. On appeal, he continues to argue the merits of the
    original suspension.
    The present appeal is, in fact, an attack on the January 1993 order, which we lack
    jurisdiction to review. In re Cascade Oil Co., 
    848 F.2d 1062
    , 1063 (10th Cir. 1988) (per
    curiam) (noting that Fed. R. App. P. 4 time limits for filing notice of appeal are
    mandatory and jurisdictional and citing Browder v. Director, Dept. of Corrections of
    Illinois, 
    434 U.S. 257
    , 264 (1978)). Moreover, to the extent that this appeal might be
    addressed to the order denying Tweedy’s recent application for reinstatement, res judicata
    bars any claim that the original grounds justifying disbarment were insufficient.2 Driver
    We note that we, too, have previously ordered Tweedy disbarred. In re Tweedy,
    1
    No. 93-672 (10th Cir. Mar. 9, 1994), R. Vol. I at 275.
    2
    In a rambling attack on the recent order, Tweedy states: “By the September 5
    [1996] Order . . . Chief Judge Brett again avoided mention of the engine fraud claim - the
    tar-baby attaching the dark badge of guilt to the players of the Rule 34(a) plan advertised
    in September, 1991.” Appellant’s Br. at 19-20. According to Tweedy, the district court’s
    action in the present case declared a “power showdown against law, rights and the
    Constitution by imposing egregious reinstatement conditions, such as . . . demonstrated
    (continued...)
    -2-
    Music Co. v. Commercial Union Ins., 
    94 F.3d 1428
    , 1435 (10th Cir 1996).
    Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
    ENTERED FOR THE COURT
    Stephen H. Anderson
    Circuit Judge
    2
    (...continued)
    consciousness of the wrongful conduct . . . that brought about [Tweedy’s] prior
    suspension.” 
    Id. at 26-27.
    -3-