Marino v. Drug Enforcement Administration ( 2021 )


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  •                             UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    GRISELLE MARINO,
    Plaintiff,
    v.
    Civil Action No. 06-1255 (TJK)
    DRUG ENFORCEMENT
    ADMINISTRATION,
    Defendant.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    In this case brought under the Freedom of Information Act, Plaintiff Griselle Marino
    seeks documents related to a witness who testified against her deceased spouse at his trial, at
    which he was convicted on federal drug charges. The parties have cross-moved for summary
    judgment. For the reasons explained below, Marino’s motion for summary judgment will be
    denied, and Defendant’s cross-motion will be granted.
    Background
    This suit concerns a FOIA request submitted in 2004 by Carlos Marino, which sought
    records connected to an individual, Everth Lopez, who testified at his criminal trial. 1 ECF No.
    95 at 2. Carlos Marino was ultimately convicted. Id. In his FOIA request, he asked the Drug
    Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) for “a copy of all documents indexed under No. 3049901
    of the Narcotics and Dangerous Drug Information System (“NADDIS”). I am only requesting
    information that is already public information or was required to be made public in public trials
    . . . .” ECF No. 136 ¶ 1. NADDIS numbers are unique numbers assigned to individuals in the
    1
    Following Carlos Marino’s death, Griselle Marino was substituted as Plaintiff in December
    2013. ECF No. 89.
    DEA’s database for various reasons, e.g., because the person is a subject of an investigation,
    defendant, witness, confidential source, victim, or family member. ECF No. 136-2 (“Myrick
    Decl.”) ¶ 9. Carlos Marino suspected that No. 3049901 was associated with Lopez. ECF No. 95
    at 6.
    In response to the request, the DEA issued what is known as a Glomar response, stating it
    could neither confirm nor deny the existence of the requested records because NADDIS No.
    3049901 was linked to a third party. Thus, according to the DEA, there would be an
    unwarranted invasion of privacy unless it was provided proof of the third party’s death or a
    notarized privacy waiver. ECF No. 136 ¶ 3; Myrick Decl. ¶ 15. As a result, the DEA did not
    search for any documents. Myrick Decl. ¶ 18. Carlos Marino filed this case in 2006, and the
    DEA maintained its Glomar response until 2013. ECF No. 136 ¶ 4; Myrick Decl. ¶ 15.
    Ultimately the DEA withdrew that response and conducted a search, but one limited to
    documents that had been made public. ECF No. 95 at 10, 23. The DEA argued that its search
    was reasonable based on the language of the request, and that even if the request were interpreted
    more broadly, all other documents could be “categorically” withheld under Exemption 7(C),
    which protects against “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” ECF No. 65 at 16. But
    Judge Kessler, to whom this case was previously assigned, rejected the DEA’s approach and
    ordered it to search for all documents indexed to NADDIS No. 3049901, no matter whether they
    were made public or required to be made public at the related trials. ECF No. 95 at 23–24.
    Although the DEA asserted it had already searched all its records for documents indexed to
    NADDIS No. 3049901, Judge Kessler found that the DEA “offered virtually no detail as to the
    methods . . . employed or the results of [the] search.” Id. at 23 n.8.
    2
    So the DEA went back and conducted a more thorough search for NADDIS No.
    3049901, which returned three case files. Myrick Decl. ¶ 19. In those files, the DEA searched
    page-by-page for documents “indexed to NADDIS number 3049901,” i.e., pages “that had a
    notation indicating that information on the page had been entered into NADDIS and linked to
    number 3049901.” Id. This search turned up 128 responsive pages. Id. Of those, in 2015, the
    DEA released 1 page in full, 35 pages with redactions, and withheld 92 pages in full. Id. ¶ 20.
    The DEA moved for summary judgment, while Marino moved for in camera review. See ECF
    Nos. 103, 105. Judge Kessler denied the DEA’s motion for summary judgment and granted
    Marino’s motion to review the 128 pages in camera. ECF No. 110. Ultimately, Judge Kessler
    upheld those redactions and withholdings. See Minute Order of June 11, 2015.
    Judge Kessler then ordered the parties to submit statements of remaining issues. Minute
    Order of July 28, 2015. In light of those filings and citing confusion in determining the posture
    of the case, Judge Kessler instructed the parties to submit another round of motions for summary
    judgment. ECF No. 127. In the meantime, the case was re-assigned to this Court. Griselle
    Marino filed her current motion for summary judgment first, ECF No. 130, in which she claimed
    that the DEA’s search was inadequate, the DEA’s assertion of exemptions other than 7(C) was
    untimely, and the DEA had failed to produce all reasonably segregable portions of the relevant
    records. The DEA then filed its current cross-motion, ECF No. 136—but not before it re-
    reviewed the three case files. This time, the DEA looked for any pages referring to Lopez
    regardless of whether they were indexed to NADDIS No. 3049901. Myrick Decl. ¶ 23. The
    DEA identified 406 additional pages through this search. Id. ¶ 24. In 2018, it released 62 pages
    in full, 260 pages with redactions, withheld 12 pages in full, and referred 73 pages to other
    agencies or components of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), only one of which is relevant to
    3
    the instant motions, an 11-page document withheld by DOJ’s Organized Crime Drug
    Enforcement Task Forces (“OCDETF”). Id. ¶¶ 24, 28.
    Marino then filed her combined opposition and reply, ECF No. 138, in which she
    maintained her challenges to the adequacy of the search and the timeliness of any exemption
    other than exemption 7(C), clarified that she challenged the segregability of material on only 45
    specific pages (34 pages redacted or withheld by the DEA in 2018, and the 11-page document
    withheld by OCDETF in 2018), and asserted that while the DEA had withheld two pages in full
    under exemption 7(C), it had only explained its basis for applying this exemption to one page in
    its affidavit.2 ECF No. 138-1 at 2; ECF No. 138-3 at 2. Marino requested in camera review of
    those 45 pages on both the timeliness issue and for segregability. ECF No. 138-1 at 2.
    In response, the DEA re-processed some of the documents one more time and resolved an
    indexing backlog issue. ECF No. 141-1 (“Miller Decl.”) ¶¶ 10–15. In all, in 2018, the DEA re-
    processed the 34 pages identified by Marino to disclose further information and minimize
    redactions. Id. ¶¶ 17(a)–(y). The DEA also realized that it had miscounted how many of those
    34 pages it had withheld in full—the correct total number was ten, rather than 11. Id. ¶ 16. In
    connection with the reprocessing, the DEA ultimately released five of those ten pages with
    redactions, and so it continues to withhold in full only five. Id. Because of the resolution of the
    backlog issue and re-processing, the Court permitted Marino to file a sur-reply addressing these
    issues. Minute Order of Feb. 5, 2021. The Court also ordered the DEA to produce the 45
    2
    This dispute is no longer relevant to resolving the instant motions. The DEA’s count of two
    pages withheld in full under exemption 7(C) turned out to be correct, but the DEA released in
    part those two pages as part of subsequent re-processing described above, ECF No. 141 at 11 n.3,
    and now explains the redactions on both pages, Miller Decl. ¶¶ 17(g), (w). Marino does not
    challenge those explanations, and as explained below, Marino dropped her timeliness and
    segregability challenges to all documents produced in 2018 except those pages that were
    withheld in full.
    4
    documents identified by Marino for in camera review. Id. Marino filed a sur-reply and clarified
    that of the 34 reprocessed pages, she now “limits [her] challenge . . . to the withholding in full of
    five of these pages.” ECF No. 149 at 1. She does not, however, appear to have made any
    concession as to the 11-page OCDETF document.
    So after all that, the disputes that remain for resolution are the following: (1) the
    adequacy of the DEA’s search, (2) its invocation of exemptions other than 7(C) as untimely as to
    the 92 pages withheld in 2015, the five pages the DEA withheld in full in 2018, and the 11-page
    OCDETF document withheld in full in 2018; and (3) the segregability of information in the five
    pages the DEA withheld in full in 2018 and the 11-page OCDETF document withheld in full in
    2018.
    Legal Standard
    “Congress enacted the FOIA in order to ‘pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and to
    open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.’” Morley v. CIA, 
    508 F.3d 1108
    , 1114 (D.C.
    Cir. 2007) (quoting Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 
    425 U.S. 352
    , 361 (1976)) (internal quotation
    marks omitted). “FOIA ‘mandates that an agency disclose records on request, unless they fall
    within one of nine exemptions.’” Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (“EPIC”),
    
    777 F.3d 518
    , 522 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 
    562 U.S. 562
    , 565 (2011)).
    “[T]he vast majority of FOIA cases can be resolved on summary judgment.” Brayton v.
    Office of U.S. Trade Rep., 
    641 F.3d 521
    , 527 (D.C. Cir. 2011). “Summary judgment is
    appropriately granted when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movants
    and drawing all reasonable inferences accordingly, no reasonable jury could reach a verdict in
    their favor.” Lopez v. Council on Am.–Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc., 
    826 F.3d 492
    ,
    496 (D.C. Cir. 2016). “The evidence presented must show ‘that there is no genuine dispute as to
    any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting Fed.
    5
    R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “In the FOIA context, a district court reviewing a motion for summary
    judgment conducts a de novo review of the record, and the responding federal agency bears the
    burden of proving that it has complied with its obligations under the FOIA.” MacLeod v. Dep’t
    of Homeland Sec., No. 15-CV-1792 (KBJ), 
    2017 WL 4220398
    , at *6 (D.D.C. Sept. 21, 2017)
    (citing 
    5 U.S.C. § 552
    (a)(4)(B)); see also Cable News Network, Inc. v. Fed. Bureau of
    Investigation, 
    271 F. Supp. 3d 108
    , 111 (D.D.C. 2017) (“Unlike the review of other agency
    action that must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary or capricious,
    the FOIA expressly places the burden on the agency to sustain its action . . . .” (quoting Dep’t of
    Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 
    489 U.S. 749
    , 775 (1989)) (internal quotation
    marks omitted).
    Analysis
    A.      Adequacy of the DEA’s Search
    “To prevail on summary judgment [in a FOIA case], an ‘agency must show that it made a
    good faith effort to conduct a search for the requested records, using methods which can be
    reasonably expected to produce the information requested,’ which it can do by submitting ‘a
    reasonably detailed affidavit, setting forth the search terms and the type of search performed, and
    averring that all files likely to contain responsive materials (if such records exist) were
    searched.’” Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press (“RCFP”) v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation,
    
    877 F.3d 399
    , 402 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (cleaned up) (quoting Oglesby v. Dep’t of Army, 
    920 F.2d 57
    ,
    68 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). “The agency fails to meet this burden such that summary judgment is
    inappropriate when the agency fails to set forth the search terms and the type of search
    performed with specificity or otherwise provides ‘no information about the search strategies of
    the agency components charged with responding to a FOIA request’” and “‘no indication of what
    each component’s search specifically yielded.’” Evans v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 16-cv-
    6
    2274 (BAH), 
    2018 WL 707427
    , at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 5, 2018) (quoting RCFP, 877 F.3d at 403)
    (cleaned up). “At a bare minimum, the agency’s affidavits need to specify ‘what records were
    searched, by whom, and through what process.’” Rodriguez v. Dep’t of Defense, 
    236 F. Supp. 3d 26
    , 38 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Steinberg v. Dep’t of Justice, 
    23 F.3d 548
    , 552 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
    The DEA has carried its burden. After Judge Kessler construed the FOIA request at issue
    as seeking “all documents indexed to NADDIS number 3049901,” ECF No. 95 at 20–21, the
    DEA searched its Investigative Reporting and Filing System (IRFS) for NADDIS No. 3049901,
    Myrick Decl. ¶ 19. A search of IRFS using a NADDIS number is a worldwide search for DEA
    records, including records maintained at field offices. Id. ¶ 12. The DEA’s search for NADDIS
    No. 3049901 identified three case files. Id. ¶ 19. The DEA searched those files for pages
    “indexed to NADDIS number 3049901,” i.e., pages with a notation showing that the information
    on the page had been entered into NADDIS and linked to No. 3049901, or a notation reflecting
    that information would be so entered and linked. Id. It identified 128 responsive pages. Id. As
    already mentioned, the DEA later re-processed these files to look for any pages referring to
    Lopez regardless of whether they were indexed to NADDIS No. 3049901. Id. ¶ 23. The DEA
    identified 406 pages through that search. Id. ¶ 24.
    Marino contends that the Court should find the DEA’s search inadequate and order it to
    search IRFS for Lopez’s name and known aliases because “the only way to get an adequate
    search is to direct the DEA to search for any documents in its investigative files that reference
    Mr. Lopez.” ECF No. 130-1 at 9. By searching for NADDIS No. 3049901, the DEA construed
    the request too narrowly, according to Marino, and the search was therefore not reasonably
    calculated to capture all relevant documents. But the request’s plain language sets the search
    parameters as documents indexed to that number. ECF No. 136 ¶ 1. Indeed, the DEA likely
    7
    went above and beyond what the request called for by searching the three case files for all
    documents referring to Lopez, even if they were not indexed to NADDIS No. 3049901.
    In addition, that Marino suspects further documents must exist for various reasons, ECF
    No. 138-1 at 3–4, is immaterial, see, e.g., Iturralde v. Comptroller of Currency, 
    315 F.3d 311
    ,
    315 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“[T]he adequacy of a FOIA search is generally determined not by the
    fruits of the search, but by the appropriateness of the methods used to carry out the search.”);
    SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 
    926 F.2d 1197
    , 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (presumption of good faith
    accorded agency affidavits “cannot be rebutted by purely speculative claims about the existence
    and discoverability of other documents”); Hedrick v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 
    216 F. Supp. 3d 84
    , 94–95 (D.D.C. 2016) (plaintiff cannot challenge adequacy of search based on speculation
    that agency is hiding or destroyed records). She also points to evidence of bad faith at Carlos
    Marino’s trial and the considerable delays in this case as reasons the Court should order a new,
    broader search. ECF No. 130-1 at 15–18. Although these issues are concerning, the DEA has
    shown on this go-round with detailed affidavits why its search was sufficient, and as already
    explained, the Court finds the search methodology reasonable and faithful to the request’s
    scope.3
    B.     Timeliness of Exemptions
    “In addition to demonstrating the adequacy of the search, the agency must ‘demonstrate
    that the records have not been improperly withheld.’” Evans, 
    2018 WL 707427
    , at *3 (quoting
    Ctr. for the Study of Servs. v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
    874 F.3d 287
    , 288 (D.C. Cir.
    3
    Marino also previously argued that an indexing backlog issue provided a basis for ordering a
    new, broader search. But Marino has since withdrawn that argument. ECF No. 149 at 1
    (characterizing backlog issues as “moot” because “[t]he DEA, by re-doing its search after all
    files had been entered into NADDIS, resolved the backlog issue Ms. Marino had raised”).
    8
    2017)). “The burden is on the agency to justify withholding the requested documents, and the
    FOIA directs district courts to determine de novo whether non-disclosure was permissible.”
    EPIC, 777 F.3d at 522. “Summary judgment is warranted on the basis of agency affidavits when
    the affidavits describe the justifications for nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail,
    demonstrate that the information withheld logically falls within the claimed exemption, and are
    not controverted by either contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence of agency bad faith.”
    Larson v. Dep’t of State, 
    565 F.3d 857
    , 862 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Miller v. Casey, 
    730 F.2d 773
    , 776 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). The agency cannot rely on “conclusory and generalized allegations
    of exemptions.” Morley, 
    508 F.3d at 1114
     (quoting Founding Church of Scientology of Wash.,
    D.C., Inc. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 
    610 F.2d 824
    , 830 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
    Marino does not challenge that the DEA has met the invoked exemptions’ requirements;
    rather she argues that the assertion of any exemption other than 7(C) as to certain documents is
    untimely under Maydak v. Dep’t of Justice, 
    218 F.3d 760
     (D.C. Cir. 2000) because that is the
    only exemption the DEA raised at the beginning of this litigation.4 ECF No. 138-1 at 15. In
    Maydak, the D.C. Circuit held that “as a general rule,” the government “must assert all
    exemptions at the same time, in the original district court proceedings.” 
    218 F.3d at 764
    . Essentially, Maydak prohibits the government from “play[ing] cat and mouse by
    withholding its most powerful cannon until after the District Court has decided the case and then
    4
    In connection with this argument, Marino requested in camera “Maydak review” of certain
    documents so that the Court could “reject[] . . . the attempt to raise new exemptions.” ECF No.
    138-1 at 15. Although the Court ordered the DEA to produce certain documents for in camera
    review of segregability, the Court finds that in camera review is unnecessary to resolve any
    Maydak issue. Maydak is mainly a legal question about the timeliness of the DEA’s assertion of
    certain exemptions, and Marino has identified no relevant factual issues that the Court’s review
    of the documents in camera would illuminate. No. 138-1 at 15.
    9
    springing it on surprised opponents and the judge.” August v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 
    328 F.3d 697
    , 699 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Senate of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (“Senate of
    Puerto Rico”) v. Dep’t of Justice, 
    823 F.2d 574
    , 580 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). But it did not establish a
    “rigid ‘press it at the threshold, or lose it for all times’ approach to agenc[ies’] FOIA exemption
    claims.” 
    Id.
     (quoting Senate of Puerto Rico, 
    823 F.2d at 581
    ). In that vein, even where the
    Maydak rule would otherwise apply, this Circuit has recognized two exceptions: (1)
    “extraordinary circumstances where, from pure human error, the government failed to invoke the
    correct exemption and will have to release information compromising national security or
    sensitive, personal, private information unless the court allows it to make an untimely exemption
    claim”; and (2) “a substantial change in the factual context of the case or an interim development
    in the applicable law forces the government to invoke an exemption after the original district
    court proceedings have concluded.” Maydak, 
    218 F.3d at 767
    .
    Marino invokes this doctrine as to the 92 pages withheld in 2015, the five pages the DEA
    withheld in full in 2018, and the 11-page OCDETF document withheld in full in 2018. The
    Court finds that the DEA has not run afoul of Maydak as to either the 2015 or 2018 production.
    First, Judge Kessler already decided that the DEA could assert these exemptions as to the 2015
    set, and the Court declines to reconsider that decision. In 2015, Judge Kessler upheld the DEA’s
    withholdings under exemptions 7(C), 7(D), 7(E), and 7(F) after reviewing the documents in
    camera. Marino argues that the application of Maydak to these withholdings remains an open
    question because Judge Kessler only issued a minute order approving the withholdings and did
    not specifically address Maydak. ECF No. 138-1 at 15. But the Maydak issue was before Judge
    Kessler when she reviewed the withholdings because Marino raised it in her motion for in
    camera review. ECF No. 105 at 5–6. Her review of the merits of the withholdings on that
    10
    record therefore implicitly acknowledged the exemptions as timely raised, and that conclusion is
    the law of the case. See Loma Linda Univ. Kidney Ctr. v. Burwell, 
    185 F. Supp. 3d 196
    , 199
    (D.D.C. 2016) (“[T]he law-of-the-case doctrine [provides that] the same issue presented a second
    time in the same case in the same court should lead to the same result.” (quoting LaShawn A. v.
    Barry, 
    87 F.3d 1389
    , 1393 (D.C. Cir. 1996))); Williamsburg Wax Museum, Inc. v. Historic
    Figures, Inc., 
    810 F.2d 243
    , 250 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“The doctrine encompasses a court’s explicit
    decisions, as well as those issues decided by necessary implication.”). And there has been no
    “intervening change in the law” or demonstration that “the previous decision was ‘clearly
    erroneous and would work a manifest injustice’” to justify revisiting this issue. See Loma Linda,
    185 F. Supp. 3d at 200 (quoting Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 
    199 F.3d 496
    , 500 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
    Second, as to the five withheld pages from the 2018 production and the OCDETF
    document withheld then as well, Maydak simply does not apply. The Maydak cases concern
    instances in which the government tries to raise additional exemptions late in litigation as to the
    same documents over which it previously asserted different ones. Marino has not suggested that
    is what has happened here, and she cites no case in which Maydak was applied to bar invocation
    of new exemptions over newly identified documents. In Maydak, the plaintiff sought his
    criminal case file from a U.S. Attorney’s Office. 
    218 F.3d at 762
    . At first, DOJ asserted only
    exemption 7(A), which protects documents when their release “could reasonably be expected to
    interfere with enforcement proceedings,” 
    5 U.S.C. § 552
    (b)(7)(A), because the plaintiff was
    litigating a series of direct and collateral challenges to his conviction. 
    Id.
     The district court
    granted summary judgment for DOJ, and the plaintiff appealed. Id. at 763. On appeal, once
    most of the plaintiff’s conviction challenges concluded, DOJ moved to remand, stating that 7(A)
    no longer applied and seeking to assert new exemptions over the same documents. Id. at
    11
    764. The court denied the motion for remand and ordered all requested documents released to
    the plaintiff because DOJ had not timely raised the exemptions before the district court and did
    not qualify for either of the two Maydak exceptions. Id. at 769.
    Here, in contrast, Marino does not suggest that the DEA is seeking to assert additional
    exemptions over the same documents as to which it once asserted different exemptions. Rather,
    the DEA asserted Exemption 7(E) the first time it addressed the five pages at issue, in its now-
    pending motion for summary judgment. Myrick Decl. ¶¶ 37–39. The same goes for OCDETF:
    the first time it addressed the 11-page document at issue, it asserted exemptions 5, 6, 7(C), and
    7(E). ECF No. 136 at 21. And obviously, the DEA has no obligation to anticipate documents
    that may be later identified as FOIA litigation runs its course and somehow preemptively raise
    exemptions. Finally, that the DEA may have previously asserted 7(E) in conjunction with 7(C)
    and 7(F) over these pages, but now asserts only 7(E), see ECF No. 149 at 2, does not violate
    Maydak either, because the DEA has added no new exemptions.
    C.      Segregability
    FOIA also requires that “[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be
    provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt,” 
    5 U.S.C. § 552
    (b), “unless the exempt portions are ‘inextricably intertwined with exempt
    portions,’” Johnson v. Exec. Office for U.S. Attorneys, 
    310 F.3d 771
    , 776 (D.C. Cir.
    2002) (quoting Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Dep’t of Air Force, 
    566 F.2d 242
    , 260 (D.C. Cir.
    1977)). “The agency is ‘entitled to a presumption that [it] complied with the obligation to
    disclose reasonably segregable material,’ but that does not excuse the agency from carrying its
    evidentiary burden to fully explain its decisions on segregability,” 100Reporters LLC v. Dep’t of
    Justice, 
    248 F. Supp. 3d 115
    , 165 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Hodge v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation,
    
    703 F.3d 575
    , 582 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (alteration in original). Indeed, the agency “must . . . provide
    12
    descriptions of excerpts deemed to be non-segregable, with explanations as to these
    decisions.” Am. Immigration Council v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
    950 F. Supp. 2d 221
    , 248
    (D.D.C. 2013).
    The DEA has met its burden. As it explained: “All responsive information was examined
    to determine whether any reasonably segregable information could be released,” and information
    was withheld only where it met the requirements for an exemption or where “the release of any
    additional information would . . . provide no useful information, or [be] incomprehensible words
    or phrases.” Myrick Decl. ¶ 49. Further, the DEA re-reviewed the documents and narrowed its
    redactions and withholdings, ECF No. 141-1 ¶ 17, which the Court then reviewed in camera.
    Based on the record and that review, the Court finds that the DEA redacted and withheld what it
    represents it did, and that any reasonably segregable portion of these records was provided to
    Marino.
    Conclusion
    For all the above reasons, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 136, will
    be granted, and Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 130, will be denied. A
    separate order will issue.
    /s/ Timothy J. Kelly
    TIMOTHY J. KELLY
    United States District Judge
    Date: August 26, 2021
    13
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2006-1255

Judges: Judge Timothy J. Kelly

Filed Date: 8/26/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/26/2021

Authorities (18)

Michele Steinberg v. United States Department of Justice , 23 F.3d 548 ( 1994 )

The Founding Church of Scientology of Washington, D. C., ... , 610 F.2d 824 ( 1979 )

GUILLERMO FELIPE DUEÑAS ITURRALDE v. COMPTROLLER OF THE ... , 315 F.3d 311 ( 2003 )

Carl Oglesby v. The United States Department of the Army , 920 F.2d 57 ( 1990 )

Senate of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico on Behalf of ... , 823 F.2d 574 ( 1987 )

Johnson, Neil v. Exec Off US Atty , 310 F.3d 771 ( 2002 )

Mead Data Central, Inc. v. United States Department of the ... , 566 F.2d 242 ( 1977 )

Safecard Services, Inc. v. Securities and Exchange ... , 926 F.2d 1197 ( 1991 )

Maydak v. United States Department of Justice , 218 F.3d 760 ( 2000 )

Morley v. Central Intelligence Agency , 508 F.3d 1108 ( 2007 )

August v. Federal Bureau of Investigation , 328 F.3d 697 ( 2003 )

Brayton v. Office of United States Trade Representative , 641 F.3d 521 ( 2011 )

williamsburg-wax-museum-inc-v-historic-figures-inc-national-civil-war , 810 F.2d 243 ( 1987 )

Lashawn A. v. Marion S. Barry, Jr. , 87 F.3d 1389 ( 1996 )

Larson v. Department of State , 565 F.3d 857 ( 2009 )

Department of the Air Force v. Rose , 96 S. Ct. 1592 ( 1976 )

United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee ... , 109 S. Ct. 1468 ( 1989 )

Milner v. Department of the Navy , 131 S. Ct. 1259 ( 2011 )

View All Authorities »