Turner, Henry v. Glickman, Daniel R. , 207 F.3d 419 ( 2000 )


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  • In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 99-1923
    Henry Turner, on his own behalf and
    on behalf of all those similarly situated,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.
    Daniel R. Glickman, in his official
    capacity as Secretary of the United States
    Department of Agriculture, and Peter J.
    Sybinsky, in his official capacity as
    Secretary of the Indiana Family and
    Social Services Administration,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
    No. 98 C 1084--Richard L. Young, Judge.
    Argued December 1, 1999--Decided March 16, 2000
    Before Bauer, Cudahy, and Flaum, Circuit Judges.
    Flaum, Circuit Judge. The class representative,
    Henry Turner, on his own behalf and on behalf of
    all those similarly situated, challenges the
    constitutionality of 21 U.S.C. sec. 862a./1
    That statute provides that individuals convicted
    of certain drug-related felonies are permanently
    ineligible for benefits under the federal food
    stamp and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
    ("TANF") programs. The plaintiffs-appellants
    allege that this statute violates the Due Process
    Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
    the equal protection component of the Fifth
    Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the Equal
    Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
    and the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
    Amendment to the United States Constitution. The
    district court rejected these constitutional
    claims and entered judgment for the defendants-
    appellees. For the reasons stated below, we
    affirm the decision of the district court.
    I.   Facts
    The statutory provision at issue in this case,
    21 U.S.C. sec. 862a, was enacted by Congress as
    part of the Personal Responsibility and Work
    Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
    No. 104-193, sec. 115, 
    110 Stat. 2105
    , 2180-81
    (1996). The statute was passed in response to
    growing concerns about the escalating costs of
    federal welfare programs. See 142 Cong. Rec.
    H9401 (daily ed. July 31, 1996) (statement of
    Rep. Smith); 142 Cong. Rec. S9390 (daily ed. Aug.
    1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Helms). In
    particular, Section 862a was an attempt to
    address what many members of Congress regarded as
    increasing and costly incidences of fraud in the
    food stamp program. See H.R. Doc. No. 104-651
    (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183,
    2201, 2202; Enforcement of the Food Stamp
    Program: Hearing Before the House Comm. on
    Agric., 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Roger C.
    Viadero, Inspector General of the U.S. Dep’t of
    Agric.).
    Section 862a attempts to reach the problem of
    fraud by permanently disqualifying individuals
    convicted of certain drug-related felonies from
    receiving benefits under either the federal food
    stamp program or the TANF program. Although
    Congress did not specify where this provision was
    to be codified, the Office of Law Revision
    Counsel placed the statute in Title 21 of the
    United States Code. The statute applies to all
    convictions occurring on or after August 22,
    1996. The law provides that states may exempt
    recipients from disqualification under Section
    862a, but the State of Indiana has chosen not to
    provide such an exemption to its citizens.
    The class representative, Henry Turner, is an
    Indiana resident and former recipient of food
    stamps. As part of an annual review of his food
    stamp eligibility, Turner was required to reapply
    for that program in January 1998. Subsequent to
    this reapplication, Turner was convicted of
    felony possession of heroin and cocaine based on
    conduct that occurred in April 1997. Solely
    because of this conviction, Turner’s pending
    reapplication for food stamps was denied under
    Section 862a.
    In August 1998, Turner commenced a class action
    suit for declaratory and injunctive relief in
    federal district court, challenging the
    constitutionality of Section 862a. Following a
    hearing on the parties’ cross-motions for summary
    judgment, the district court entered judgment for
    the defendants-appellees. The plaintiffs-
    appellants now appeal the decision of the
    district court, arguing that permanent
    disqualification from participation in the food
    stamp and TANF programs of those convicted of
    certain drug-related felonies violates the Due
    Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
    Amendments, the equal protection component of the
    Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the
    Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
    Amendment, and the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
    Fifth Amendment to the United States
    Constitution.
    II.   Analysis
    A.
    The plaintiffs-appellants first contend that
    Section 862a violates the equal protection
    component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
    Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the
    Fourteenth Amendment because it lacks any
    rational basis connected to a legitimate
    government interest. Because the statute at issue
    does not implicate any fundamental rights or
    involve any suspect classifications, see
    Department of Agric. v. Moreno, 
    413 U.S. 528
    , 533
    (1973), the question before us is whether the
    stated reasons proffered by the government are a
    sufficient justification to survive rational
    basis review, see Heller v. Doe, 
    509 U.S. 312
    ,
    320 (1993) ("[A] classification [neither
    involving fundamental rights nor proceeding along
    suspect lines] cannot run afoul of the Equal
    Protection Clause if there is a rational
    relationship between the disparity of treatment
    and some legitimate government purpose."). In
    rejecting the plaintiffs-appellants’ equal
    protection challenge, the district court found
    three rational bases for the legislation: (1)
    deterring drug use; (2) reducing fraud in the
    food stamp program; and (3) curbing welfare
    spending. The defendants-appellees assert these
    same three bases for the statute now, and argue
    that they all represent legitimate government
    interests.
    In attempting to show that the classification
    in Section 862a has no rational basis, the
    plaintiffs-appellants must meet a heavy burden.
    Rational basis review "is not a license for
    courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of
    legislative choices." FCC v. Beach Comm., Inc.,
    
    508 U.S. 307
    , 313 (1993). Rather, we must uphold
    the challenged classification if "there is a
    rational relationship between the disparity of
    treatment and some legitimate government
    purpose." Heller, 
    509 U.S. at 320
    . In order to
    show that Section 862a is irrational, the
    plaintiffs-appellants must "’negative every
    conceivable basis which might support it,’ . . .
    whether or not the basis has a foundation in the
    record." 
    Id. at 320-21
    (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake
    Shore Auto Parts Co., 
    410 U.S. 356
    , 364 (1973)).
    However, "the relationship of the classification
    to its goal [must] not [be] so attenuated as to
    render the distinction arbitrary or irrational."
    Nordlinger v. Hahn, 
    505 U.S. 1
    , 11 (1992) (citing
    City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 
    473 U.S. 432
    , 446 (1985)).
    The plaintiffs-appellants argue that Section
    862a is exactly the kind of arbitrary and
    irrational government sanction that the equal
    protection guaranties forbid. As the plaintiffs-
    appellants correctly point out, one of the
    express purposes of the Food Stamp Act is "[t]o
    alleviate . . . hunger and malnutrition . . .
    [by] permit[ting] low-income households to obtain
    a more nutritious diet through normal channels of
    trade." 7 U.S.C. sec. 2011. According to the
    plaintiffs-appellants, Section 862a is not
    relevant to this purpose because it deprives
    individuals convicted of drug-related felonies of
    food stamps despite their continuing financial
    and nutritional needs. Furthermore, the
    plaintiffs-appellants contend that Section 862a
    has no rational connection to the three
    justifications accepted by the district court:
    deterring drug use, reducing fraud in the food
    stamp program, and curbing welfare spending.
    Ordinarily, an argument as to the actual
    purpose of a legislature in passing a law would
    not be relevant to the question of whether the
    challenged classification had a rational
    connection to a legitimate government interest.
    See Beach Comm., 
    508 U.S. at 315
     (stating that
    "it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional
    purposes whether the conceived reason for the
    challenged distinction actually motivated the
    legislature") (citing Railroad Retirement Bd. v.
    Fritz, 
    449 U.S. 166
    , 179 (1980)). However, as we
    understand it, the plaintiffs-appellants’
    argument does not rest on their ability to prove
    that Congress acted with an unconstitutional
    motive. Rather, the plaintiffs-appellants argue
    that because no possible motive exists for
    passing this law other than punishment, Congress
    must have acted out of animus toward individuals
    convicted of drug-related felonies and that the
    district court’s assertion that the law functions
    to reduce welfare fraud, deter drug abuse, and
    decrease welfare expenditures is therefore
    implausible. If this is true, and the plaintiffs-
    appellants can "’negative every conceivable basis
    which might support [Section 862a],’ . . .
    whether or not the basis has a foundation in the
    record," id. at 320-21(quoting Lehnhausen, 
    410 U.S. at 364
    ), then the challenged statute would
    lack a rational relation to a legitimate state
    interest.
    After a consideration of Section 862a in light
    of the proffered government interests, we reject
    the plaintiffs-appellants’ equal protection
    challenge. First, as the district correctly
    found, there is a rational connection between the
    disqualification of drug felons from eligibility
    for food stamps and TANF and the government’s
    desire to deter drug use. Rendering those
    convicted of drug-related felony crimes
    ineligible to receive food stamps or aid under
    TANF is a potentially serious sanction, and
    individuals who are currently eligible for such
    assistance would undoubtedly consider potential
    disqualification from federal benefits before
    engaging in crimes involving illegal drugs. It
    was not irrational for Congress to conclude that
    the disqualification of drug felons from
    receiving certain kinds of federal aid under
    Section 862a would deter drug use among the
    population eligible to receive that aid. This is
    all that is required to sustain a classification
    in the face of an equal protection challenge when
    the challenged classification is subject to
    rational basis review. See Heller, 
    509 U.S. at 319
     ("[A] classification ’must be upheld against
    equal protection challenge if there is any
    reasonably conceivable state of facts that could
    provide a rational basis for the
    classification.’") (quoting Beach Comm., 
    508 U.S. at 313
    ).
    Similarly, the district court was correct in
    finding a rational connection between Section
    862a and the government’s desire to reduce fraud
    in the food stamp program. As we noted above,
    Congress passed this law at a time when serious
    concerns had arisen regarding rising welfare
    costs and increasing fraud in the food stamp
    program. The legislative record in this case
    contains testimony that food stamps were being
    traded for drugs. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-651, at
    68 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183,
    2202. In light of this testimony, it was not
    irrational for Congress to conclude that denying
    food stamps and TANF aid to those convicted of a
    drug felony would decrease the overall incidences
    of fraud in those programs. The challenged
    classification thus survives rational basis
    review on this ground as well.
    The plaintiffs-appellants contend that existing
    anti-fraud provisions in the Food Stamp Act, as
    well as the fact that this statute exempts those
    convicted of other felonies, undermine the
    government’s contention that this statute is
    aimed at deterring drug use and reducing welfare
    fraud. However, on the facts of this case, we
    find nothing in the equal protection guaranties
    that would inhibit Congress’s ability to attempt
    various means of reducing welfare fraud, nor that
    would require Congress to address every aspect of
    the problem at this time. Congress was concerned
    about loopholes in the existing legislation
    covering food stamp fraud, and it is entitled to
    take measures to prevent that fraud in addition
    to the existing anti-fraud provisions of the Food
    Stamp Act./2 See Lyng v. Castillo, 
    477 U.S. 635
    (1986) (upholding classification partly aimed at
    preventing food stamp fraud despite the anti-
    fraud provisions of the Food Stamp Act). Nor does
    the equal protection requirement prevent Congress
    from acting incrementally. See Milner v. Apfel,
    
    148 F.3d 812
    , 814 (7th Cir. 1998) ("Legislatures
    are permitted to correct a problem incrementally
    even though by doing so they create arbitrary
    distinctions until correction is complete.").
    Here, where the law is rationally based on the
    government’s desire to deter drug use and reduce
    welfare fraud,/3 the plaintiffs-appellants’
    argument that the law is actually aimed at
    punishment is not sufficient to show a violation
    of the plaintiffs-appellants’ equal protection
    rights. See Vance v. Bradley, 
    440 U.S. 93
    , 97
    (1979) ("The Constitution presumes that, absent
    some reason to infer antipathy, . . . judicial
    intervention is generally unwarranted.").
    B.
    The plaintiffs-appellants next contend that
    Section 862a unconstitutionally burdens their
    rights under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
    and Fourteenth Amendments. Because Section 862a
    does not implicate a fundamental right,
    substantive due process requires only that the
    statutory imposition not be completely arbitrary
    and lacking any rational connection to a
    legitimate government interest. See Washington v.
    Glucksberg, 
    521 U.S. 702
    , 722 (1997); Flemming v.
    Nestor, 
    363 U.S. 603
    , 611 (1960) (stating that a
    statute that does not implicate a fundamental
    right will not be deemed to violate the
    requirements of substantive due process absent a
    showing that "the statute manifests a patently
    arbitrary classification, utterly lacking in
    rational justification"). The plaintiffs-
    appellants’ due process claim, like their equal
    protection claim, is thus subject to highly-
    deferential rational basis review.
    For the same reasons that the plaintiffs-
    appellants cannot make out an equal protection
    claim, their due process argument fails as well.
    In order for us to uphold this statute, the
    government need only show a rational connection
    between Section 862a and a legitimate government
    interest. See Glucksberg, 
    521 U.S. at 722
    ;
    Flemming, 
    363 U.S. at 611
    . Here, as we discussed
    at length above, the challenged statute has a
    rational basis in both the government’s desire to
    deter drug use and to reduce the incidences of
    fraud in the food stamp program. In light of
    these rational bases proffered by the government,
    the plaintiffs-appellants have not made the kind
    of showing necessary for us to invalidate the
    statute under the deferential standard of
    rational basis review.
    C.
    Lastly, the plaintiffs-appellants contend that
    Section 862a inflicts a second punishment on
    those convicted of drug-related felonies in
    violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The
    representative plaintiff in this case was
    convicted of possession of cocaine and heroin,
    and was sentenced to one year in prison and one
    year of probation. According to the plaintiffs-
    appellants, this punishment was followed by a
    second punishment for the same conduct when,
    through the effect of Section 862a, he was
    permanently disqualified from receiving federal
    assistance under the food stamp and TANF
    programs. The plaintiffs-appellants allege that
    because Congress intended to punish those
    convicted of drug-related felonies when it passed
    Section 862a, that statute’s sanction is an
    unconstitutional second punishment based on the
    same underlying conduct from which his prison
    sentence and probation stemmed.
    The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no
    "person [shall] be subject for the same offence
    to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S.
    Const. amend. V. While "[t]he Clause protects .
    . . against the imposition of multiple criminal
    punishments for the same offense," Hudson v.
    United States, 
    118 S.Ct. 488
    , 493 (1997), it has
    long been "recognized that the Double Jeopardy
    Clause does not prohibit the imposition of any
    additional sanction that could "in common
    parlance" be described as punishment." 
    Id.
    (citing United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 
    317 U.S. 537
    , 549 (1943) (quoting Moore v. Illinois,
    
    14 How. 13
    , 19 (1852))). The question, then, is
    whether Section 862a functions as the kind of
    criminal punishment covered by the Double
    Jeopardy Clause, or whether the statute is a
    civil penalty not subject to the prohibitions of
    that Clause.
    Our analysis as to whether the penalty is
    properly deemed criminal or civil involves two
    steps: (1) an examination of congressional
    intent; and (2) a consideration of the effect and
    purpose of the statute. As to congressional
    intent, our inquiry is "at least initially, a
    matter of statutory construction." Hudson, 
    118 S.Ct. at 493
    . We look to whether Congress
    "indicated either expressly or impliedly" that
    Section 862a was a criminal or civil penalty.
    United States v. Ward, 
    448 U.S. 242
    , 248 (1980).
    If we determine that Congress intended the
    statute to be a criminal punishment of those
    convicted of drug-related felonies, our inquiry
    is at an end and the statute would constitute
    criminal punishment for purposes of the Double
    Jeopardy Clause. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,
    
    372 U.S. 144
    , 169 (1963). However, if we conclude
    that Congress intended a punishment to be civil
    in nature, we then turn to the purpose and effect
    of the statute to determine whether a penalty
    Congress intended to be civil in nature actually
    functions as a criminal one. 
    Id. at 168-69
    .
    1.   Congressional Intent
    The plaintiffs-appellants concede that Congress
    did not expressly indicate that Section 862a was
    to be a criminal penalty, but they argue that an
    examination of the statute and the legislative
    history reveals an implied intention to levy
    criminal punishment against those convicted of
    drug-related felonies. Specifically, the
    plaintiffs-appellants assert that the language of
    the statute, the placement of the statute in
    Title 21 of the United States Code, and the
    legislative history indicate that Congress
    intended Section 862a to function as criminal
    punishment. We will address each of these
    arguments in turn.
    The plaintiffs-appellants first contend that the
    language of the statute itself indicates a
    congressional intent to levy a criminal
    punishment through the enactment of Section 862a.
    In support of this argument, the plaintiffs-
    appellants note that the title of the statute
    states that its sanction applies only to "certain
    drug-related convictions." 21 U.S.C. sec. 862a.
    Furthermore, the plaintiffs-appellants assert
    that the statute defines the prohibited activity
    in criminal terms by referring to the "element[s
    of] . . . possession, use, or distribution of a
    controlled substance." 21 U.S.C. sec. 862a(a). We
    find this evidence drawn from statutory language
    inconclusive. The statute does apply to drug-
    related convictions, and speaks of the prohibited
    activity in criminal terms, but this is only
    evidence of the criminal nature of the underlying
    conduct triggering the sanction of Section 862a.
    These aspects of the statute do not speak to the
    nature of the sanction itself, and therefore we
    cannot conclude from the language of the statute
    alone that Congress intended it to function as a
    criminal punishment.
    The plaintiffs-appellants next argue that the
    placement of Section 862a in Chapter 13 of Title
    21 of the United States Code is illustrative of
    a congressional intent to criminally punish drug
    offenders. Although Congress enacted Section 862a
    as part of a package of welfare reform
    legislation, the statute was codified as an
    addition to Chapter 13 of Title 21, the section
    of the criminal code created by the Drug Abuse
    Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C.
    sec. 801 et seq. Part D of Chapter 13 of Title
    21, the section in which the challenged statute
    was placed, is entitled "Offenses and Penalties."
    According to the plaintiffs-appellants, Section
    862a’s inclusion in a section of the criminal
    code dealing with the enforcement of the nation’s
    drug laws indicates a clear congressional
    preference that it be classified as a criminal
    penalty.
    We generally agree with the plaintiffs-
    appellants’ assertion that the placement of a
    statutory provision in the criminal code, and the
    nature of the surrounding provisions, can be a
    relevant factor in determining whether Congress
    intended that provision to serve as a criminal
    punishment or a civil sanction. See Kansas v.
    Hendricks, 
    521 U.S. 346
    , 361 (1997). However, in
    this case, the plaintiffs-appellants’ argument as
    to the placement of Section 862a in Chapter 13 of
    Title 21 ignores Congress’s actual role in the
    codification decision. Section 862a was not
    placed in the criminal code according to the
    specification of Congress; that decision was made
    by the Office of Law Revision Counsel. See 2
    U.S.C. sec. 285b(4). Moreover, Congress has not
    approved this codification decision by
    subsequently enacting Title 21 into positive law.
    See United States Code, Preface, at VII (Supp.
    III 1997); see also LaCrosse v. Commodity Futures
    Trading Comm’n, 
    137 F.3d 925
    , 927 n.1 (7th Cir.
    1998) (noting that less than half the titles in
    the United States Code have been enacted into
    positive law). Because Congress did not make the
    decision to place Section 862a in the criminal
    code, that placement is not evidence of
    congressional intent to levy a criminal
    punishment. We therefore accord that placement no
    weight. See United States v. Welden, 
    377 U.S. 95
    ,
    99 n.4 (1964) ("Certainly where . . . the ’change
    of arrangement’ was made by a codifier without
    the approval of Congress, it should be given no
    weight.") (quoting Murrell v. Western Union Tel.
    Co., 
    160 F.2d 787
    , 788 (5th Cir. 1947)).
    Finally, the plaintiffs-appellants argue that
    the legislative history of Section 862a indicates
    Congress’s preference that the statute be
    criminally punitive. However, the plaintiffs-
    appellants concede that the legislative history
    addressing the statute is sparse at best. The
    only evidence the plaintiffs-appellants cite is
    a statement by the original author of the bill,
    Senator Phil Gramm of Texas, who urged that "if
    we are serious about our drug laws, we ought not
    to give people welfare benefits who are violating
    the Nation’s drug laws." 142 Cong. Rec. S8493,
    S8498 (July 23, 1996). Such a statement standing
    alone is no evidence of congressional intent, and
    at best reflects Senator Gramm’s own feelings
    that the law would help deter the illegal use of,
    and trafficking in, drugs. The legislative
    history in this case gives no indication of a
    congressional intent to criminally punish those
    convicted of drug-related felonies.
    The most significant indication we can find of
    congressional intent is the enforcement
    provisions provided by Congress. Significantly,
    the ineligibility provisions of Section 862a are
    not enforced through any criminal process.
    Rather, the permanent disqualification from the
    receipt of food stamps and TANF benefits of
    individuals convicted of drug-related felonies is
    enforced by the state agencies responsible for
    administering the food stamp program. In this
    case, the representative plaintiff’s
    reapplication for food stamps was denied by the
    Indiana Family and Social Services
    Administration, not the Indiana courts. It is
    widely-recognized that the fact that Congress
    makes a statute enforceable by an administrative
    agency "is prima facie evidence that Congress
    intended to provide for a civil sanction."
    Hudson, 188 S.Ct. at 103 (citing Helvering v.
    Mitchell, 
    303 U.S. 391
    , 402 (1938)); S.A. Healy
    Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review
    Comm’n, 
    138 F.3d 686
    , 688 (7th Cir. 1998);
    LaCrosse, 
    137 F.3d at 931
    .
    The plaintiffs-appellants contend that the fact
    that Section 862a is administered by state
    agencies is irrelevant because those agencies
    exercise no discretion in disqualifying persons
    convicted of a drug-related felony. According to
    the plaintiffs-appellants, it is the agency’s
    exercise of discretion that renders a punishment
    presumptively civil in character. We disagree. A
    statute administered by an agency is
    presumptively civil not because the agency
    exercises discretion in administering it, but
    rather because agency enforcement mechanisms do
    not contain the same procedural safeguards that
    criminal proceedings do. See Helvering, 
    303 U.S. at 402
     ("Civil procedure is incompatible with the
    accepted rules and constitutional guaranties
    governing the trial of criminal prosecutions, and
    where civil procedure is prescribed for the
    enforcement of remedial sanctions, those rules
    and guaranties do not apply."). Because the
    enforcement mechanism provided by Congress for
    Section 862a is enforced by administrative
    agencies who do not provide the kind of rules and
    guaranties attendant in criminal proceedings, we
    must presume that Congress intended it to act as
    a civil sanction. See Hudson, 
    118 S.Ct. at 495
    ;
    Helvering, 
    303 U.S. at 402
     ("That Congress
    provided a distinctly civil procedure . . .
    indicates clearly that it intended a civil, not
    a criminal, sanction.").
    2.   The Statute’s Effect
    Our conclusion that Congress intended the
    sanction of Section 862a to be civil in nature
    does not end our double jeopardy inquiry. Having
    found no congressional intent to criminally
    punish, we must now look for "the clearest
    proof," Hudson, 
    118 S.Ct. at 493
    , that "the
    statutory scheme [is] so punitive in purpose or
    effect," Ward, 
    448 U.S. at 248-49
    , as to
    "transform what was clearly intended as a civil
    remedy into a criminal penalty." Rex Trailer Co.
    v. United States, 
    350 U.S. 148
    , 154 (1956);
    United States v. Newman, 
    144 F.3d 531
    , 540 (7th
    Cir. 1998). If the statute does serve as a
    criminal punishment in purpose and effect, then
    we must disregard Congress’s intent to create a
    civil sanction.
    Our determination as to whether Congress
    intended Section 862a to criminally punish is
    made according to a number of guidelines,
    including: (1) "[w]hether the sanction involves
    an affirmative disability or restraint"; (2)
    "whether it has historically been regarded as a
    punishment"; (3) "whether it comes into play only
    on a finding of scienter"; (4) "whether its
    operation will promote the traditional aims of
    punishment--retribution and deterrence"; (5)
    "whether the behavior to which it applies is
    already a crime"; (6) "whether an alternative
    purpose to which it may rationally be connected
    is assignable for it"; and (7) "whether it
    appears excessive in relation to the alternative
    purpose assigned." Mendoza-Martinez, 
    372 U.S. at 168-69
    .
    The plaintiffs-appellants contend that five of
    the seven factors outlined in Mendoza-Martinez
    show that the sanction of Section 862a is so
    punitive in purpose and effect as to transform it
    into a criminal penalty. Specifically, the
    plaintiffs-appellants argue that Section 862a:
    (1) comes into play only on a finding of
    scienter; (2) operates to promote the traditional
    aims of punishment; (3) applies to conduct that
    is already a crime; (4) is not assignable to an
    alternative purpose to which it may be rationally
    connected; and (5) seems to be excessive in
    relation to any rational purpose that may be
    assigned to it. While we agree that the sanction
    of Section 862a comes into play only a finding of
    scienter, operates to promote the traditional
    aims of punishment, and applies to conduct that
    is already a crime, we do not agree that the
    other two factors cited by the plaintiffs-
    appellants indicate a criminally punitive purpose
    and effect. Nor do we agree that the three
    factors that do tip in the plaintiffs-appellants’
    favor demonstrate by the "clearest proof" that
    Section 862a functions as a criminal penalty.
    An examination of the Mendoza-Martinez factors
    that the plaintiffs-appellants allege indicate a
    criminally punitive purpose and effect reveals
    that those factors are at best inconclusive. For
    instance, because the majority of the underlying
    drug offenses that trigger disqualification under
    Section 862a contain a scienter requirement, the
    statute "comes into play only on a finding of
    scienter." LaCrosse, 
    137 F.3d at 931
    . However,
    this scienter requirement is not conclusive as to
    the criminal effect and purpose of the statute.
    See 
    id. at 932
    . Similarly, while it is undisputed
    that the statute in question has a deterrent
    effect, "the mere presence of this purpose is
    insufficient to render a sanction criminal, as
    deterrence ’may serve civil as well as criminal
    goals.’" Hudson, 
    118 S.Ct. at 496
     (quoting United
    States v. Ursery, 
    518 U.S. 267
    , 292 (1996)); see
    Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch,
    
    511 U.S. 767
    , 777 n.14 (1994). Moreover, the mere
    fact that the sanction of Section 862a is
    triggered by criminal conduct is insufficient to
    show that the statute is criminally punitive
    because "[i]t is well settled that ’Congress may
    impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in
    respect to the same act or omission.’" Ursery,
    
    518 U.S. at 292
     (quoting Helvering, 
    303 U.S. at 399
    ); see United States v. Dixon, 
    509 U.S. 688
    ,
    704 (1993) (rejecting "same-conduct" test for
    double jeopardy purposes).
    In contrast to the three factors discussed
    above, the remaining four factors weigh
    decisively in favor of the defendants-appellees.
    The Supreme Court has clearly recognized that
    "the mere denial of a noncontractual government
    benefit" does not constitute an "affirmative
    disability or restraint," Flemming, 
    363 U.S. at 617
    , and that the denial of such a benefit has
    not historically been viewed as punishment. See
    
    id. at 616-17
    . More significantly, the sanction
    of Section 862a rationally promotes alternative
    purposes to punishment such as deterring drug use
    and reducing welfare fraud, and there is no
    indication that the sanction is excessive in
    relation to those purposes. Having considered the
    sanction of Section 862a in light of the seven
    guidelines outlined in Mendoza-Martinez, we
    conclude that the plaintiffs-appellants have
    failed to establish "by the clearest proof" that
    disqualification from food stamps and TANF
    benefits under Section 862a serves as criminal
    punishment. Section 862a thus functions as a
    civil penalty, and we accordingly reject the
    plaintiffs-appellants’ double jeopardy claim.
    III.   Conclusion
    Because 21 U.S.C. sec. 862a is rationally
    related to legitimate government interests in
    deterring drug use and reducing welfare fraud,
    and because the challenged statute imposes only
    a civil sanction on individuals convicted of
    drug-related felonies, we AFFIRM the decision of
    the district court.
    /1 The statute reads in relevant part:
    An individual convicted (under Federal or State
    law) of any offense which is classified as a
    felony by the law of the jurisdiction involved
    and which has as an element the possession, use,
    or distribution of a controlled substance . . .
    shall not be eligible for--
    (1) assistance under any State program funded
    under part A of title IV of the Social Security
    Act, or
    (2) benefits under the food stamp program . . .
    or any State program carried out under the Food
    Stamp Act of 1977.
    /2 In Moreno, the Supreme Court addressed the
    constitutionality of Section 3(e) of the Food
    Stamp Act of 1964, which "denied federal food
    assistance" to "individuals who live in
    households containing one or more members who are
    unrelated to the rest." 
    413 U.S. at 529
    . While
    considering whether this classification could be
    justified by the congressional desire to reduce
    food stamp fraud, the Court stated that "[t]he
    existence of [anti-fraud] provisions [in the Food
    Stamp Act] necessarily casts considerable doubt
    upon the proposition that [Section 3(e)] could
    rationally have been intended to prevent those
    very same abuses." 
    Id. at 536-37
    . Under the
    plaintiffs-appellants’ reading of this holding,
    the anti-fraud provisions of the Food Stamp Act
    "cast[ ] considerable doubt" on the government’s
    contention that Section 862a can be justified by
    the desire to reduce food stamp fraud.
    Although we agree with the plaintiffs-appellants
    that the anti-fraud provisions of the Food Stamp
    Act are a relevant factor in determining whether
    Section 862a is rationally related to a desire to
    reduce food stamp fraud, we do not think that the
    presence of the anti-fraud provisions is
    decisive. Moreno did not establish a per se rule
    about the constitutionality of additional
    measures aimed at preventing food stamp fraud,
    nor did that case alter the basic analytical
    framework of rationality review. The Moreno Court
    ultimately found the classification in Section
    3(e) of the Food Stamp Act of 1964 irrational,
    and therefore unconstitutional, because "in
    practical operation, [Section 3(e)] exclude[d]
    from participation in the food stamp program, not
    those persons who are ’likely to abuse the
    program,’ but, rather, only those persons who are
    so desperately in need of aid that they cannot
    even afford to alter their living arrangements so
    as to retain their eligibility." Moreno, 
    413 U.S. at 538
    . In contrast, Section 862a excludes those
    persons Congress deemed most likely to engage in
    welfare fraud through the trafficking in food
    stamps. The classification contained in Section
    862a is thus rationally connected to the desire
    to reduce welfare fraud in a way that Section
    3(e) of the Food Stamp Act of 1964 was not.
    /3 The district court also found that Section 862a
    was rationally related to the government’s desire
    to conserve federal funds. Although we recognize
    that under certain circumstances the government
    could rationally determine not to spend limited
    program funds to benefit drug offenders, see
    Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Public Interest
    Research Group, 
    468 U.S. 841
    , 854 (1984); City of
    Chicago v. Shalala, 
    189 F.3d 598
    , 607-08 (7th
    Cir. 1999), we also note that this argument
    carried to its extreme would justify any
    government decision to deprive certain groups of
    the benefit of federal funds. However, because
    the challenged statute is justified by the
    government’s desire to deter drug use and
    decrease welfare fraud, we need not address
    whether the classification at issue could be
    justified by the government’s desire to conserve
    federal funds standing alone. See Lyng v.
    International Union, United Auto., Aerospace and
    Agric. Implement Workers of Am., UAW, 
    485 U.S. 360
    , 373 (1988).
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 99-1923

Citation Numbers: 207 F.3d 419

Judges: Per Curiam

Filed Date: 3/16/2000

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023

Authorities (28)

jacqueline-milner-and-kurt-r-johnson-individually-and-on-behalf-of-all , 148 F.3d 812 ( 1998 )

Craig J. LaCROSSE, Petitioner, v. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING ... , 137 F.3d 925 ( 1998 )

Vance v. Bradley , 99 S. Ct. 939 ( 1979 )

S.A. Healy Company v. Occupational Safety and Health Review ... , 138 F.3d 686 ( 1998 )

United States v. Willie A. Newman , 144 F.3d 531 ( 1998 )

city-daniel-alvarez-sr-commissioner-of-human-services-and-morris-i , 189 F.3d 598 ( 1999 )

Helvering v. Mitchell , 58 S. Ct. 630 ( 1938 )

United States Ex Rel. Marcus v. Hess , 63 S. Ct. 379 ( 1943 )

Moore v. Illinois , 14 L. Ed. 306 ( 1852 )

United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno , 93 S. Ct. 2821 ( 1973 )

Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co. , 93 S. Ct. 1001 ( 1973 )

United States v. Ursery , 116 S. Ct. 2135 ( 1996 )

Kansas v. Hendricks , 117 S. Ct. 2072 ( 1997 )

Washington v. Glucksberg , 117 S. Ct. 2258 ( 1997 )

Lyng v. Castillo , 106 S. Ct. 2727 ( 1986 )

Lyng v. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, &... , 108 S. Ct. 1184 ( 1988 )

Nordlinger v. Hahn , 112 S. Ct. 2326 ( 1992 )

Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications, ... , 113 S. Ct. 2096 ( 1993 )

Hudson v. United States , 118 S. Ct. 488 ( 1997 )

Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest ... , 104 S. Ct. 3348 ( 1984 )

View All Authorities »