Fry v. American Home Assurance , 636 F. App'x 764 ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                          FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    February 25, 2016
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    EVE CADONIA FRY, individually
    and as surviving spouse of Benny
    Dale Fry, deceased,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    No. 15-7012
    v.                                           (D.C. No. 6:14-CV-00131-RAW)
    (E.D. Okla.)
    AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE
    COMPANY,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before GORSUCH, BACHARACH, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
    After her husband was tragically killed while working on an oil well, Eve
    Fry sued his employer, AOK Energy Services, in Oklahoma state court. But Ms.
    Fry faced a problem: Oklahoma’s Workers’ Compensation Act. That statute
    affords some compensation to relatives of workers who suffer fatal “accidents”
    while on the job. 
    Okla. Stat. tit. 85, § 11
     (2006). But it also generally forbids
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
    however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
    Cir. R. 32.1.
    workers and their heirs from suing an employer for more money. See 
    id.
     § 12. So
    it seemed Ms. Fry faced a statutory barrier to suit.
    Seeking a way around the problem Ms. Fry appealed to Parret v. UNICCO
    Service Co., 
    127 P.3d 572
     (Okla. 2005). In Parret, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
    held that tort claims alleging intentional or knowing misconduct are not barred by
    the workers’ compensation statute because it addresses only “accidents.” 
    Id. at 579
    . Taking this cue, Ms. Fry filed suit against AOK alleging that the company
    had operated a hazardous job site “with the knowledge that there was a substantial
    certainty that serious injury or death would occur” to her husband. In reply to
    Ms. Fry’s suit, AOK asked its insurer, American Home Assurance Company, to
    mount a defense. But American Home refused and when AOK also failed to
    defend the suit, Ms. Fry won a default judgment. 1
    After her success against AOK, Ms. Fry turned her sights to American
    Home, filing this garnishment action against the insurer. And this time American
    Home mounted a vigorous defense — first removing the action to federal district
    court and then moving for summary judgment on the ground that its policy did not
    cover Ms. Fry’s claim as a matter of law. Ultimately, the district court agreed
    and entered judgment for the insurer.
    1
    The Oklahoma legislature has since effectively overruled Parret, making
    clear that the state workers’ compensation scheme bars even claims like Ms.
    Fry’s. See 
    Okla. Stat. tit. 85, § 12
     (2010), repealed and recodified at Okla. Stat.
    tit. 85A, § 5(B)(2) (2015).
    -2-
    Now Ms. Fry asks us to reverse that judgment, but we don’t believe we can.
    By its express terms American Home’s policy covers only “bodily injury by
    accident.” As the Oklahoma Supreme Court has explained, the term “accident”
    means “[a]n event that takes place without one’s foresight or expectation; an
    undesigned, sudden and unexpected event, chance, contingency.” U.S. Fid. &
    Guar. Co. v. Briscoe, 
    239 P.2d 754
    , 757 (Okla. 1951) (per curiam) (internal
    quotation mark omitted). And by Ms. Fry’s admission, her judgment against
    AOK rests on (and to avoid the workers’ compensation statute had to proceed on)
    a claim that her husband’s death was the result of anything but an “accident” and
    the product instead of “knowing” misconduct. See Parret, 127 P.3d at 579.
    Given this concession, we cannot help but find American Home’s policy
    inapplicable as a matter of law. See Pa. Mfrs. Ass’n Ins. Co. v. Lechner, 
    910 F. Supp. 2d 1291
    , 1295-99 (N.D. Okla. 2012); Am. Interstate Ins. Co. v. Wilson
    Paving & Excavating, Inc., No. 09-CV-342-JHP-TLW, 
    2010 WL 2624133
    , at *4-6
    (N.D. Okla. June 25, 2010); Evanston Ins. Co. v. Dean, No. 09-CV-0049-CVE-
    TLW, 
    2009 WL 2972336
    , at *7-8 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 11, 2009); CompSource Okla.
    v. L&L Constr., Inc., 
    207 P.3d 415
    , 420-22 (Okla. Civ. App. 2008).
    Even if American Home’s argument against coverage is compelling on the
    merits, Ms. Fry contends that Broom v. Wilson Paving & Excavating, Inc., 
    356 P.3d 617
     (Okla. 2015), precludes the insurer from presenting it in this case
    because it neither defended AOK in the underlying litigation nor later moved to
    -3-
    vacate the judgment entered in that case. But we do not read Broom as Ms. Fry
    does. As we understand the decision, an insurer who refused to defend its insured
    in a prior suit was forbidden in a subsequent garnishment action from contesting
    issues actually and necessarily decided in the prior suit. See 
    id. at 626-27, 634
    .
    Really, then, the case was all about issue preclusion. And before this court Ms.
    Fry has not identified any issue, factual or legal, resolved in her liability dispute
    against AOK that American Home seeks to relitigate in this insurance coverage
    dispute. To the contrary, American Home accepts the Parret-based judgment
    against AOK but simply contends that, as described by Ms. Fry in this appeal,
    that judgment is not covered by its policy. And, as American Home rightly notes,
    this coverage question was not at issue in the underlying action against AOK.
    See generally U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Dawson Produce Co., 
    68 P.2d 105
    , 106
    (Okla. 1937); Henderson v. Eaves, 
    516 P.2d 270
    , 272-73 (Okla. 1973);
    Hildebrand v. Gray, 
    866 P.2d 447
    , 449-51 (Okla. Civ. App. 1993).
    Failing all else, Ms. Fry argues that American Home is barred from
    “mending its hold” — that it has forfeited the right to deny coverage because it
    has shifted its rationale for doing so over time. But even assuming without
    deciding that Oklahoma would recognize a doctrine along these lines, we do not
    see how it might be fairly applied on the facts here. The record shows that
    American Home’s reasons for denying coverage have remained consistent from its
    initial denial through this appeal. In its 2009 coverage denial letter, American
    -4-
    Home explained that its policy covered only “bodily injury by accident” and
    excluded any injuries “intentionally caused” by AOK. See Aplt. App. at 234-35.
    Precisely the same sort of arguments American Home pressed in its motion for
    summary judgment, see id. at 242-43, 245-46, and in its brief on appeal, see Aple.
    Br. at 2-3. Ms. Fry faults American Home for failing to cite Parret in its 2009
    letter. But we are not aware of any authority placing dispositive weight on the
    presence or absence of citation to legal authority in coverage denial letters.
    Indeed, the authority on which Ms. Fry relies seems to require only fair notice of
    the theory for denying coverage — and that much has been consistently provided
    here. See Eugene R. Anderson & Nadia V. Holober, Preventing Inconsistencies
    in Litigation with a Spotlight on Insurance Coverage Litigation, 
    4 Conn. Ins. L.J. 589
    , 695-98 (1998).
    The motion for summary disposition is denied and the judgment of the
    district court is affirmed.
    ENTERED FOR THE COURT
    Neil M. Gorsuch
    Circuit Judge
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-7012

Citation Numbers: 636 F. App'x 764

Filed Date: 2/25/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023