United States v. Martinez , 608 F. App'x 692 ( 2015 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT June 22, 2015
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 15-1092
(D.C. No. 1:13-CR-00159-WJM-11)
ARTURO MARTINEZ, a/k/a Tray Crip, (D. Colo.)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, EBEL and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
This matter is before the court on the government’s motion to dismiss
defendant Arturo Martinez’s appeal because it falls within the scope of the appeal
waiver contained in his Plea Agreement. We grant the government’s motion and
dismiss the appeal.
The defendant pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute and
possess with the intent to distribute one or more of the following: (1) 280 grams or
*
This panel has determined that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The
case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment
is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine base (crack
cocaine), and/or (2) 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a
detectable amount of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(iii)
and (b)(1)(B)(ii)(II) and 846. The Plea Agreement stated that the mandatory
minimum sentence for this offense is 120 months’ imprisonment. It also provided
that “[t]he parties agree that the defendant’s relevant conduct including that which
was reasonably foreseeable to him, was at least 280 grams of cocaine base but less
than 840 grams of cocaine base.” Mot. to Enforce, Attach. 1 at 8-9. The district
court sentenced the defendant to the mandatory minimum of 120 months’
imprisonment and imposed a term of supervised release with specified conditions.
In the Plea Agreement, the defendant “knowingly and voluntarily” waived his
right to appeal
any matter in connection with this prosecution, conviction, or sentence
unless it meets one of the following three criteria: (1) the sentence
imposed is above the maximum penalty provided in the statute of
conviction, (2) the Court, after determining the otherwise applicable
sentencing guideline range, either departs or varies upwardly, or (3) the
Court determines that the offense level is greater than 32 and imposes a
sentence based upon that offense level determination.
Id. at 4. The defendant also “knowingly and voluntarily” waived his “right to appeal
the manner in which the sentence is determined on grounds set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742.” Id. He nonetheless filed a notice of appeal. In his docketing statement he
indicates his intent to challenge the length of his sentence and certain conditions of
supervised release imposed by the district court.
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The government filed a motion to enforce the appeal waiver in the defendant’s
Plea Agreement under United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2004)
(en banc) (per curiam). In evaluating a motion to enforce a waiver, we consider:
“(1) whether the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate
rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate
rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice.”
Id. at 1325. In response, the defendant does not argue that his appeal falls outside the
scope of the appeal waiver or that his waiver was not knowing and voluntary. We
therefore need not address these issues. United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1143
(10th Cir. 2005). Rather, the defendant contends that enforcement of his waiver
would result in a miscarriage of justice. See Hahn, 359 F.3d 1325.
We will find that enforcement of an appeal waiver results in a miscarriage of
justice only “[1] where the district court relied on an impermissible factor such as
race, [2] where ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the negotiation of
the waiver renders the waiver invalid, [3] where the sentence exceeds the statutory
maximum, or [4] where the waiver is otherwise unlawful.” Id. at 1327. “This list is
exclusive: enforcement of an appellate waiver does not result in a miscarriage of
justice unless enforcement would result in one of the four situations enumerated
above.” United States v. Polly, 630 F.3d 991, 1001 (10th Cir. 2011) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
-3-
The defendant argues his waiver is “otherwise unlawful” because the district
court’s sentencing errors “seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation
of judicial proceedings.” Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327. (internal quotation mark,
alteration, and brackets omitted). He acknowledges that he has the burden to
demonstrate that enforcement of his appeal waiver would result in a miscarriage of
justice. See United States v. Anderson, 374 F.3d 955, 959 (10th Cir. 2004).
In support of his contention, the defendant sets forth his claims of sentencing
error, then asserts without further analysis that these errors affect the fairness,
integrity, and public reputation of the judicial proceeding. The defendant’s argument
fails for at least two reasons. First, his bald assertion that the district court’s errors
result in a miscarriage of justice is insufficiently developed to invoke our review.
Second, his contention fundamentally misunderstands “what must be ‘unlawful’ for a
waiver to result in a miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Sandoval, 477 F.3d
1204, 1208 (10th Cir. 2007).
Our inquiry is not whether the sentence is unlawful, but whether the
waiver itself is unlawful because of some procedural error or because no
waiver is possible. An appeal waiver is not ‘unlawful’ merely because
the claimed error would, in the absence of waiver, be appealable. To so
hold would make a waiver an empty gesture.
Id. (citation omitted). “The whole point of a waiver . . . is the relinquishment of
claims regardless of their merit.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
-4-
Having failed to challenge the lawfulness of his appeal waiver, the defendant
has not met his burden to demonstrate a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, we
grant the government’s motion to dismiss this appeal.1
Entered for the Court
Per Curiam
1
We have considered the supplemental authority tendered by Appellant and
concluded it does not change our analysis.
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