United States v. Davis , 628 F. App'x 619 ( 2016 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
January 7, 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 15-3174
CHICO C. DAVIS, (D.C. Nos. 15-CV-1069-MLB and
6:11-CR-10194-MLB-1)
Defendant - Appellant. (D. Kan.)
ORDER DENYING
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before HARTZ, BALDOCK, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Chico Davis pled guilty to one count of distributing cocaine base
and one count of distributing 50 grams or more of a methamphetamine mixture, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and eight counts of being a felon in possession
of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Relying on Defendant’s serious
criminal history and the 93% purity of the methamphetamine involved in this case,
the district court varied upward from the recommended guideline sentencing range
of 151 to 188 months and sentenced Defendant to 308 months in prison. 1
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the
case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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The district court subsequently reduced Defendant’s sentence from 308
months to 271 months pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).
A panel of this Court affirmed. United States v. Davis, 599 F. App’x 815
(10th Cir. 2013) (unpublished). We assume the reader’s familiarity with that
decision. In brief, the panel ably explained the complex calculation of Defendant’s
recommended guideline range and the justifications for an upward variance.
Employing plain error review, the panel rejected Defendant’s argument that the
district court failed to adequately consider “his argument that the recommended
Guidelines sentence was already enhanced based on the ten-to-one disparity between
actual methamphetamine versus methamphetamine mixture in the calculation of his
Guidelines sentence.” Id. at 819. The panel held “the district court gave
[Defendant’s] disparity argument its sufficient due,” and committed no legal error
“at all.” Id. at 820. The Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Defendant next filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255. In his motion Defendant thrice recast the argument he made on direct
appeal, with no success. First, he claimed his counsel was ineffective in failing to
object to the district court’s failure to address his sentencing disparity argument.
Second, he claimed he was indicted for a mixture containing methamphetamine but
inappropriately sentenced for actual methamphetamine. Third, Defendant claimed
his sentencing range was improperly enhanced based on facts not alleged in the
indictment. The district court summarily rejected Defendant’s arguments, denied his
§ 2255 motion, and informed him that any application for a certificate of
appealability (COA) would also be denied. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). After
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Defendant filed a notice of appeal, the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(3), certified his appeal was not taken in good faith and denied his motion
to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis (IFP). Now before this Court are
Defendant’s renewed application for a COA and motion to proceed IFP.
Defendant may not appeal the denial of relief under § 2255 without a COA.
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). We may issue a COA “only if the applicant has made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2). To
satisfy this standard, Defendant must demonstrate “that reasonable jurists could
debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved
in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)
(internal quotations omitted). Our careful record review reveals that Defendant
cannot satisfy the standard for issuance of a COA.
Defendant’s first claim—that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
based on counsel’s failure to understand the applicable case law and hence press the
aforementioned disparity argument upon the district court—is frivolous. As the
panel opinion explained in some detail, Defendant’s disparity argument, which his
counsel raised in the context of an objection to an upward variance both in a
sentencing memorandum and at the sentencing hearing, is a loser. 2 See Chico, 599
2
In Chico, plain error review applied because Defendant “did not raise a
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F. App’x at 20. Thus, Defendant cannot satisfy the prejudice prong of the Sixth
Amendment’s ineffective assistance standard. See Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).
Defendant’s argument that he was indicted for a methamphetamine mixture but
improperly sentenced for pure methamphetamine is also wholly without merit. As
the panel opinion explained:
The Guidelines dictate that a defendant’s advisory sentencing range for
methamphetamine distribution is to be calculated using whichever drug
weight—actual or mixed—would produce the greater offense level. See
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(B) . . . . In [Defendant’s] case, the ‘actual
methamphetamine” amount of 53.3913 grams produced the greater
offense level.
Chico, 599 F. App’x at 817 (emphasis added).
Lastly, Defendant says his sentence is unconstitutional in view of Supreme
Court decisions that prohibit enhancement of a statutory mandatory minimum or
statutory maximum sentence based on facts not charged in the indictment. See
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (addressing statutory maximums);
Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013) (addressing statutory mandatory
minimums). We think not. As the district court informed Defendant at his plea
hearing, Defendant’s mandatory minimum sentence was five years and his statutory
maximum was 40 years. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (viii). At sentencing, the
2
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contemporaneous objection to the district court’s explanation of his sentence at the
time of the hearing.” 599 F. App’x at 819.
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court found no fact that increased either the statutory mandatory minimum or
maximum sentence for Defendant’s methamphetamine offense.
Accordingly, Defendant’s application for a COA is DENIED and this appeal
is DISMISSED. Defendant’s motion to proceed on appeal IFP is DENIED as moot.
Entered for the Court,
Bobby R. Baldock
United States Circuit Judge
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