Bhomengo v. Hospital Shared Services, Inc. , 543 F. App'x 812 ( 2013 )


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  •                                                                     FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS         Tenth Circuit
    TENTH CIRCUIT                       October 29, 2013
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    EPIAH BHOMENGO,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.                                                          No. 13-1226
    (D.C. No. 1:12-CV-02496-REB-MJW)
    HOSPITAL SHARED SERVICES, INC.,                              (D. Colo.)
    a/k/a HSS, Inc.,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
    Before KELLY, HOLMES, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
    Plaintiff-Appellant Epiah Bhomengo, proceeding pro se,1 appeals the dismissal of
    *After examining Appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
    determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
    of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
    therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not
    binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
    collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed.
    R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    1
    We liberally construe Ms. Bhomengo’s pro se filings. Adams ex rel. D.J.W. v.
    Astrue, 
    659 F.3d 1297
    , 1302 n. 1 (10th Cir. 2011). But we may not “assume the role of
    advocate” and make her arguments for her. Yang v. Archuleta, 
    525 F.3d 925
    , 927 n. 1
    (10th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted).
    her Title VII claim against Defendant-Appellee Hospital Shared Services, Inc. (“HSS”).
    Exercising jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , we dismiss Ms. Bhomengo’s appeal.
    I. BACKGROUND
    Ms. Bhomengo was terminated from her employment at HSS on September 20,
    2011. In November 2011, she filed through counsel a charge of discrimination with the
    Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), asserting that the reason given
    by HHS for her termination was false, and that she was a victim of discrimination in
    violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
    The EEOC sent Ms. Bhomengo’s attorney a notice of Ms. Bhomengo’s right to
    sue HSS by filing a complaint within 90 days of receipt of the letter. Ms. Bhomengo
    missed that deadline; she filed a complaint in federal district court without the assistance
    of counsel 91 days after the letter’s date of receipt. HSS moved to dismiss the complaint
    as untimely.
    A new attorney represented Ms. Bhomengo on the motion to dismiss. A
    magistrate judge recommended that HSS’s motion to dismiss be granted. The
    magistrate’s recommendation included a notice, written in bold print, that failure to file
    specific objections to the recommendation within 14 days of service “waives appellate
    review of both factual and legal questions.”2 ROA at 81. Despite this notice, Ms.
    Bhomengo’s lawyer did not object to the recommendation.
    2
    The full text of the notice included in the magistrate’s recommendation states:
    Continued . . .
    -2-
    The district court, noting that no objections had been filed to the magistrate’s
    recommendation, entered an order adopting those recommendations and granting the
    motion to dismiss. Ms. Bhomengo’s complaint was dismissed in a separate judgment
    entered by the court. This appeal followed.
    II. ANALYSIS
    This court has adopted a “firm waiver rule,” which provides that “[t]he failure to
    timely object to a magistrate’s recommendations ‘waives appellate review of both factual
    and legal questions.’” Duffield v. Jackson, 
    545 F.3d 1234
    , 1237 (10th Cir. 2008)
    (quoting Moore v. United States, 
    950 F.2d 656
    , 659 (10th Cir. 1991)). The rule has two
    exceptions, and Ms. Bhomengo argues that both apply here.
    The first exception applies when “the magistrate’s order does not clearly apprise a
    pro se litigant of the consequences of a failure to object.” Talley v. Hesse, 
    91 F.3d 1411
    ,
    NOTICE: Pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 636
    (b)(1)(C) and Fed. R. Civ. P.
    72(b)(2), the parties have fourteen (14) days after service of this
    recommendation to serve and file specific written objections to the
    above recommendation with the District Judge assigned to the case. A
    party may respond to another party’s objections within fourteen (14)
    days after being served with a copy. The District Judge need not
    consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. A party’s failure
    to file and serve such written, specific objections waives de novo review
    of the recommendation by the District Judge, Thomas v. Arn, 
    474 U.S. 140
    , 148-53 (1985), and also waives appellate review of both factual and
    legal questions. Makin v. Colorado Dep’t of Corrections, 
    183 F.3d 1205
    ,
    1210 (10th Cir. 1999); Talley v. Hesse, 
    91 F.3d 1411
    , 1412-13 (10th Cir.
    1996).
    ROA at 81.
    -3-
    1412-13 (10th Cir. 1996). This exception does not apply here because the magistrate’s
    recommendation included a notice that failure to object waives appellate review of
    factual and legal questions. This notice, written in bold print, was sufficient to apprise
    Ms. Bhomengo of the consequences of a failure to object. See Morales-Fernandez v.
    I.N.S., 
    418 F.3d 1116
    , 1119 (10th Cir. 2005).
    The second exception to the firm waiver rule arises when the “interests of justice”
    indicate that the rule should not apply. Duffield, 
    545 F.3d at 1237
    . Ms. Bhomengo
    argues that this court should consider the merits of her underlying claim and her
    attorney’s failure to object to the magistrate’s recommendation to determine whether the
    interests of justice should relieve her of waiver.
    First, the rule in this circuit is that “in counseled, civil, nonhabeas cases, the merits
    of the underlying case should not be considered in determining whether the interests of
    justice exception has been met.” In re Key Energy Res. Inc., 
    230 F.3d 1197
    , 1200 (10th
    Cir. 2000). Second, litigants in Title VII cases are not guaranteed effective assistance of
    counsel under the Sixth Amendment, Nelson v. Boeing Co., 
    446 F.3d 1118
    , 1121 (10th
    Cir. 2006), and the Supreme Court has held in a variety of contexts that civil litigants
    “must be held accountable for the acts and omissions of their attorneys,” Pioneer Inv.
    Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 
    507 U.S. 380
    , 396 (1993). Consequently,
    the interests of justice exception to the firm waiver rule does not apply here.
    -4-
    III. CONCLUSION
    The firm waiver rule applies. Under that rule, Ms. Bhomengo waived her right to
    appellate review by failing to object to the magistrate’s recommendation. We therefore
    dismiss her appeal. Appellant’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is denied.
    ENTERED FOR THE COURT,
    Scott M. Matheson, Jr.
    Circuit Judge
    -5-