Jimenez v. State of Utah , 665 F. App'x 657 ( 2016 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS October 31, 2016
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
JESUS A. JIMENEZ,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 16-4066
(D.C. No. 2:12-CV-01033-DAK)
STATE OF UTAH, (D. Utah)
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before KELLY, HOLMES, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
I
Pro se 1 state prisoner Jesus Jimenez appeals from the dismissal of his
application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district
court dismissed the action after Mr. Jimenez failed to comply with several court
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the
case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and
Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1.
1
We construe the filings of a pro se litigant liberally, see Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam), but our role is not to serve as his
advocate. See Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1067 (10th Cir. 2009).
orders. Mr. Jimenez now appeals and moves for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis (“IFP”).
Construing Mr. Jimenez’s notice of appeal as a request for a COA and
exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we deny his request for a COA
and dismiss the matter.
II
In 2008, Mr. Jimenez was convicted of aggravated robbery and criminal
homicide in Utah state court. A one-year enhancement was added to his sentence
because his co-defendant used a gun during the course of the crime. He appealed
the robbery conviction and sentence enhancement in state court; the Utah Court of
Appeals and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. Mr.
Jimenez then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2254 in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Utah. 2
Mr. Jimenez’s petition brought three claims for relief: (1) ineffective
assistance of counsel, based on his attorney’s failure to move for dismissal of the
aggravated-robbery charge and failure to object to the state court’s jury
2
In his § 2254 petition, Mr. Jimenez erroneously lists the respondent as “the
State of Utah.” R. at 1. The correct respondent was the Warden of the Utah State
Prison, since the proper respondent in a habeas corpus action is always the
petitioner’s custodian. See, e.g., Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S.
484, 494–95 (1973) (“The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner
who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be
unlawful custody.”).
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instructions; (2) plain error, based on the state court’s failure to dismiss the
aggravated-robbery charge and the court’s jury instructions; and (3) manifest
injustice, based on the one-year sentence enhancement. The district court ordered
the State of Utah (the “State”) to respond to Mr. Jimenez’s petition.
The State filed its answer on August 13, 2014. In that answer, the State
argued that Mr. Jimenez’s plain-error and manifest-injustice claims were both
procedurally barred because the Utah Supreme Court had denied relief on an
independent state-law basis. The State also argued that Mr. Jimenez had not
established any grounds for relief on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.
Specifically, the State contended that Mr. Jimenez had failed to argue that the
state court, in rejecting that claim, had acted contrary to clearly-established
federal law.
On December 7, 2015, the district court ordered the State to file a proposed
order of dismissal based on its response to Mr. Jimenez’s habeas petition. The
State complied with the order the same day, filing a proposed order of dismissal,
memorandum of the court, and order denying Mr. Jimenez a certificate of
appealability.
After thirty days, Mr. Jimenez had filed no objections to the State’s
proposed order, so the district court ordered him to show cause for his failure to
object. On February 1, 2016, he filed a document styled, Motion to Deny
Opposing Petition of Writ of Habeas Corpus. But that filing did not address the
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district court’s Order to Show Cause; instead, it simply argued the merits of his
claims.
Three days later, Mr. Jimenez asked for an extension to file objections to
the State’s proposed order. The district court granted that motion, giving him
until February 29, 2016, to file his objections. The February 29 deadline passed,
yet Mr. Jimenez still had not filed any objections to the proposed order. The
district court dismissed his petition the next month. In its dismissal order, the
district court invoked Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
noted that Mr. Jimenez had “fail[ed] to obey . . . the Court’s order and to
prosecute this case.” R. at 534 (Dist. Ct. Order, dated Mar. 28, 2016). The court
did not rule on whether to grant a COA.
III
As a state prisoner proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Mr. Jimenez must
receive a COA before we are authorized to resolve the merits of his appeal. See,
e.g., Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 867 (10th Cir. 2000); see also Gonzalez v.
Thaler, --- U.S. ----, 132 S. Ct. 641, 649 (2012) (noting the “‘clear’ jurisdictional
language . . . in § 2253(c)(1)”). Mr. Jimenez has not expressly asked for a COA
in his brief. But pursuant to Rule 22(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, his notice of appeal “constitutes a request” for a COA. See Fed. R.
App. P. 22(b)(2).
“We may grant a COA only if the petitioner makes a ‘substantial showing
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of the denial of a constitutional right.’” Milton v. Miller, 812 F.3d 1252, 1263
(10th Cir. 2016) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)). This requires a “showing that
reasonable jurists could debate whether . . . the petition should have been
resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were ‘adequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further.’” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
484 (2000) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)).
The issue becomes “somewhat more complicated” when a district court
denies a petition on procedural grounds. Id. In that situation, the petitioner must
also make a second showing: “that jurists of reason would find it debatable
whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id; see also
Coppage v. McKune, 534 F.3d 1279, 1281 (10th Cir. 2008) (“If the application
was denied on procedural grounds, the applicant faces a double hurdle.”).
Mr. Jimenez has not made a sufficient showing to warrant issuance of a
COA. His brief neither mentions the district court’s January 7, 2016 show-cause
order nor explains his own failure to respond to that order. Instead, he merely
restates his argument as to the merits of his petition. Without some argument as
to the district court’s dismissal order—which rested on procedural grounds—we
would be hard-pressed to conclude that reasonable jurists could debate the
correctness of the order. See, e.g., Luevano v. Clinton, 645 F. App’x 623, 624
(10th Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (rejecting COA where petitioner did not address
district court’s procedural grounds for denial of writ, but instead restated his
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request for relief on the merits); Blackfeather v. Boulder Cty. Combine Cts., 606
F. App’x 470, 471 (10th Cir. 2015) (unpublished) (“Petitioner makes no attempt
to excuse his failure to comply with the magistrate judge’s order to cure the
deficiencies or explain why it was impossible to do so.”).
In any event, it is patent that the district court had ample reason to dismiss
Mr. Jimenez’s petition: he never objected to the State’s proposed dismissal order
and failed to respond to the court’s order to show cause. Adams v. Wiley, 298 F.
App’x 767, 769 (10th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (“[I]t was not an abuse of
discretion for the district court to dismiss [the petitioner’s] action, as he had
failed to prosecute and to comply with the court’s orders.”). In light of Mr.
Jimenez’s repeated failures to comply with court orders, reasonable jurists could
not debate the correctness of the district court’s dismissal of his petition under
Rule 41(b).
We also deny Mr. Jimenez’s motion to proceed IFP. To qualify for IFP
status, he “must comply with the filing requirements and demonstrate ‘a financial
inability to pay the required [filing] fees and the existence of a reasoned,
nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support of the issues raised on
appeal.’” Watkins v. Leyba, 543 F.3d 624, 627 (10th Cir. 2008) (alteration in
original) (quoting McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 115 F.3d 809, 812 (10th Cir.
1997)). Though he easily meets the first two of these requirements, Mr.
Jimenez’s filings on appeal include no meaningful legal analysis. And without
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some argument about the court’s dismissal order, he cannot be said to have
presented a “reasoned . . . argument” to support his appeal. See, e.g., Thompson
v. Robison, 580 F. App’x 675, 677 (10th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (denying IFP
request when the petitioner never “address[ed] the district court’s . . . order
dismissing his action for failure” to comply with earlier orders).
IV
For the foregoing reasons, we deny Mr. Jimenez’s request for a COA and
dismiss this matter.
Entered for the Court
JEROME A. HOLMES
Circuit Judge
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