Davis v. Akin's , 463 F. App'x 739 ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                       FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSJanuary 11, 2012
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                  Clerk of Court
    JUANITA DAVIS,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    No. 11-6144
    v.                                          (D.C. No. 5:10-CV-00743-HE)
    (W.D. Okla.)
    AKIN’S; CHAMBERLINS NATURAL
    FOODS,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before O’BRIEN and McKAY, Circuit Judges, and BRORBY, Senior Circuit
    Judge.
    Juanita Davis sued her former employer, Health Food Associates, Inc. d/b/a
    Akin’s Natural Foods (“Akin’s”), under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1981
     for discrimination on
    the basis of race in terminating her employment. After a jury found against her,
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
    this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
    therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
    not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
    and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
    consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    the district court entered judgment for Akin’s. Proceeding pro se, Ms. Davis
    appeals. Exercising jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , we affirm. 1
    Ms. Davis contends that the district court (1) failed to reiterate, just before
    deliberations, its initial instruction to jurors that they had access to depositions
    and exhibits; (2) admitted exhibits after the defense rested; (3) issued no findings
    or conclusions in support of the jury’s verdict; and (4) improperly refused to
    admit certain testimony. She also argues that there was insufficient evidence to
    support the jury’s verdict. 2
    The first, second, and fourth issues are all reviewed for abuse of discretion.
    See Johnson v. Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Cnty./Kan. City, Kan., 
    371 F.3d 723
    ,
    730 (10th Cir. 2004) (jury instructions); Smith v. Rogers Galvanizing Co.,
    
    148 F.3d 1196
    , 1197-98 (10th Cir. 1998) (reopening a case to accept additional
    evidence); Creative Consumer Concepts, Inc. v. Kreisler, 
    563 F.3d 1070
    , 1079
    (10th Cir. 2009) (exclusion of testimony). “Under the abuse of discretion
    1
    Before presiding over the jury trial, the district court granted summary
    judgment (1) to Chamberlins Natural Foods on all claims, and (2) to Akin’s on
    Ms. Davis’s claims of race, sex, and religious discrimination under Title VII of
    the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and of negligence and intentional infliction of
    emotional distress under state law. Ms. Davis’s opening brief does not present
    any arguments challenging the summary judgment on these claims.
    2
    Akin’s and Chamberlins note that Ms. Davis listed additional arguments in
    her docketing statement. Issues listed in docketing statements generally are
    waived if they are not also argued in an opening brief. Pino v. Higgs, 
    75 F.3d 1461
    , 1463 (10th Cir. 1996). The arguments we list are the only issues that
    Ms. Davis preserved for the court’s consideration.
    -2-
    standard, the district court will be reversed only if it made a clear error of
    judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances.”
    Creative Consumer Concepts, Inc., 
    563 F.3d at 1079
     (internal quotation marks
    omitted). Having considered the parties’ arguments, we cannot conclude that the
    district court abused its discretion with regard to any of these matters.
    Further, the jury, not the court, was the factfinder at this trial. Therefore,
    the court was not required to issue findings of fact or conclusions of law. See
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1) (directing courts to find the facts and make conclusions
    of law “[i]n an action tried on the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury”
    (emphasis added)).
    Finally, we address Ms. Davis’s argument about the sufficiency of the
    evidence. She highlights the evidence in her favor. On appeal, however, we must
    view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed at trial.
    Garrison v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc., 
    287 F.3d 955
    , 959 (10th Cir.
    2002). In addition, “[t]he jury has the exclusive function of appraising
    credibility, determining the weight to be given to the testimony, drawing
    inferences from the facts established, resolving conflicts in evidence, and
    reaching ultimate conclusions of fact.” 
    Id.
     (internal quotation marks omitted). A
    disagreement with the jury’s evaluation of the evidence is not grounds to overturn
    the verdict.
    -3-
    Ms. Davis’s “Motion Re-Urging Court to Reverse Order Denying Trial
    Transcript at Public Expense” is DENIED. The judgment of the district court is
    AFFIRMED.
    Entered for the Court
    Monroe G. McKay
    Circuit Judge
    -4-