United States v. Metts ( 2018 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT September 5, 2018
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 17-2111
(D.C. No. 1:15-CR-01502-WJ-1)
JOSHUA METTS, (D. N.M.)
Defendant - Appellant.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before HARTZ, SEYMOUR, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Joshua Metts was arrested on October 2, 2014, upon suspicion of robbery and
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. During his arrest, police discovered a handgun
in his car. Upon being charged as a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), Mr. Metts moved to suppress evidence of the gun,
arguing that the police discovered the gun through an unconstitutional inventory search in
violation of the 4th Amendment. After hearing the matter, the district court denied
Metts’s suppression motion, concluding that police would have “inevitably discovered”
the handgun either in plain view or upon a full inventory search of Metts’s vehicle
through impoundment as evidence of a crime. We affirm.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
I.
Albuquerque Police Department (APD) officers dispatched to the scene of an
alleged robbery at a Dollar General store in Albuquerque, New Mexico on September 12,
2014. On that day, Mr. Metts’s girlfriend, S.C., entered the Dollar General and asked for
a refund on a phone card. The cashier refused to refund the purchase and S.C. left the
store, returning with Mr. Metts. He demanded a full refund from the cashier who again
refused to do so. An angry Mr. Metts bumped the cashier aside with his arm, retrieved
several packs of cigarettes, and left the store without paying for the cigarettes. The
security guard on duty, along with the cashier, followed Mr. Metts outside to the parking
lot where he and S.C. entered a 1991 blue Cadillac El Dorado. From inside the car, Mr.
Metts pulled out a handgun and pointed it at the security guard, warning him not to call
police. Mr. Metts and S.C. then drove off in the El Dorado.
While viewing the surveillance video of the crime, police officers recognized Mr.
Metts and S.C. from prior encounters. Based on an affidavit prepared and submitted by
Detective Perea, an arrest warrant for robbery and aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon was issued for Mr. Metts.
Twenty-days later, on October 2, 2014, detectives located a 1991 blue Cadillac El
Dorado registered to Mr. Metts and conducted a felony stop in the empty parking lot of a
partially abandoned strip mall. After boxing in his car with their police vehicles, the
detectives ordered Mr. Metts out of the driver’s side window of the vehicle. Once he
exited the vehicle through the window, detectives handcuffed and placed him under arrest
away from the vehicle. The driver’s side window was left rolled down.
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The detectives then secured the vehicle—checking it for persons and other threats
such as guns and explosive drugs—and called Perea to tell him they found a gun in Mr.
Metts’s car. When Perea arrived on the scene, he looked through the open driver’s side
door and saw the gun located between the driver’s side door and the driver’s seat. He
then ordered the vehicle sealed and towed to the crime lab for processing in accordance
with APD Procedural Orders governing the impoundment of motor vehicles. Perea, the
only witness at the suppression hearing, testified to the fact that he neither witnessed
Metts’s arrest nor the securing of the vehicle.
As relevant here, Mr. Metts was indicted on April 23, 2015, for interference with
interstate commerce occurring on September 12, 2014, and for being a felon in
possession of a firearm occurring on October 2, 2014. He filed a motion to suppress
evidence of the firearm.
At the outset, the district court found that the impoundment of Mr. Metts’s vehicle
was proper under a specific policy of the Albuquerque police for towing vehicles “for
evidentiary purposes related to armed robberies.” ROA vol. 1 at 127. In doing so, the
court determined that the police towed Mr. Metts’s car pursuant to this specific
evidentiary policy rather than under a more general policy of towing vehicles in all
instances of arrest. Because it had been used as the getaway car in the Dollar General
robbery during which Mr. Metts pointed a gun out the window and threatened the
witnesses, the car “clearly had evidential value, and indeed, the firearm allegedly used in
the commission of the armed robbery was found in [it].” Id. at 128.
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Noting that Detective Perea could not testify as to how the gun was found because
he arrived on the scene after the arresting officers discovered it, the court concluded that
regardless of whether the gun was found through an allegedly unwritten and
unconstitutional search policy covering all arrestees, the detectives would have inevitably
discovered it through either finding the gun in plain view when they opened the door to
remove the keys from the ignition and to roll up the window1 before leaving the car
parked where it was, or through an inventory search at the crime lab under the standard
operating procedure governing towing and impoundment of vehicles for evidentiary
purposes. Applying the inevitable discovery doctrine, the court denied Mr. Mett’s
motion to suppress.
II.
“When reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we accept its
factual findings unless clearly erroneous and view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government.” United States v. Tueller, 349 F.3d 1239, 1242 (10th Cir.
2003) (quoting United States v. Hargus, 128 F.3d 1358, 1361 (10th Cir.1997)). “In
contrast, ‘the ultimate determination of Fourth Amendment reasonableness is a question
of law which we review de novo.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Hill, 199 F.3d 1143,
1147 (10th Cir. 1999). We may also “affirm the district court ‘on any grounds for which
there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law, even grounds not relied upon by
1
While the district court found that the keys were still in the ignition at the
time of arrest, our review of the record does not support that finding. Instead we rely
on the court’s alternative finding that the windows were rolled down in Metts’s
vehicle.
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the district court.’” United States v. Edwards, 632 F.3d 633, 641 (10th Cir. 2001)
(quoting United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 542 n.6 (10th Cir. 1994)).
At the very heart of a suppression motion is the fundamental right to freedom
from unreasonable search and seizure by the government. The Fourth Amendment
protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
Evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment is precluded under the
exclusionary rule. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961). This rule excludes
evidence obtained through the original “‘illegal search or seizure,’” as well as
“‘evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality,’ the so-called
“‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’” Utah v. Strieff, 136 S.Ct. 2056, 2061 (2016) (quoting
Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984)).
In determining whether a violation has occurred, the “ultimate touchstone of
the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’” Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S.
398, 403 (2006) (citing Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 13 (1999) (per
curiam)). True to the measurement of reasonableness, “[t]his exclusionary rule does
not apply when the costs of exclusion outweigh its deterrent benefits.” Strief, 136
S.Ct. at 2059. “Suppression of evidence . . . has always been our last resort, not our
first impulse.” Id. at 2061 (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591(2006)).
When considering the “reasonableness” of a warrantless search under the
Fourth Amendment, a difference exists between houses and cars. Motor vehicles are
“a category of ‘effects,’” giving rise to “a reduced expectation of privacy.” Thornton
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v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 631 (2004) (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S.
295, 303 (1999)). Although the privacy interest of a motorist in his vehicle is a
constitutionally protected right, it is “less substantial than in his home.” Arizona v.
Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 345 (2009).
Even if reasonable suspicion did not exist enabling a lawful search of Mr.
Mett’s vehicle incident to arrest, the gun would still have been inevitably discovered
in plain view during the officers’ community caretaking duties. If the officers did not
have reasonable suspicion for a search incident to arrest, then the search was
undoubtedly illegal because it was done for investigatory rather than administrative
reasons. United States v. Edwards, 632 F.3d 633, 644 (10th Cir. 2001) (“To be
justified as an inventory search, however, the search cannot be investigatory in nature
but must instead be used only as a tool to record the defendant's belongings to protect
the police from potential liability.”). But the officers would have inevitably
discovered the gun when they reached in to roll up the window to secure the car
while it was in police custody.
The inevitable discovery doctrine “allows for the admission of evidence that
would have been discovered even without the unconstitutional source.” Strieff, 136
S.Ct. at 2061 (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443–44 (1984)). “Although a
search may violate the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule is inapplicable if the
evidence inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.” United States v.
Souza, 223 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 2000). The burden of proof is on the
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prosecution to prove by “a preponderance of the evidence that the information
ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.” Nix, 467
U.S. at 444. In addition, no requirement exists that the “independent investigation
inevitably . . . [leading] to discovery of the evidence . . . was ongoing at the time of
the illegal police conduct.” Souza, 223 F.3d at 1203 (quoting United States v.
Larsen, 127 F.3d 984, 986 (10th Cir. 1997)). In fact, the independent investigation
may be “hypothetical” only in nature. United States v. Tueller, 349 F.3d 1239, 1244
(10th Cir. 2003). In the context of a vehicle search, the inevitable discovery doctrine
provides that “if evidence seized unlawfully would have been inevitably discovered
in a subsequent inventory search, such evidence would be admissible.” United States
v. Blaze, 143 F.3d 585, 593 (10th Cir. 1998).
Here, the district court found two separate department policies that would have
inevitably led to the discovery of the firearm. First, the court noted that the keys
were left in the ignition with the front window down, and that it was a standard
department procedure to remove the keys from the ignition of a stopped vehicle.
Thus, once the officers opened the door to remove the keys, they would have seen the
gun in plain view. Second, the court found that under the ADP’s policy of
impoundment for evidentiary purposes related to armed robbery, the gun would have
been discovered during an inventory search at the crime lab. Mr. Metts argues that
the court erred in finding that the keys were left in the ignition because there was no
testimony at the suppression hearing to substantiate such a finding. He also argues
that an impoundment for evidentiary purposes, unlike a standard impoundment where
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an inventory is taken to safeguard the possessions of the vehicle’s owner, requires
probable cause and that there was no probable cause in this case.
We need not address Mr. Metts’s challenge to the constitutionality of the
inventory search or his challenge to the district court’s finding of fact because the
Supreme Court has spoken on this exact issue. In Harris v. United States, 390 U.S.
234, 235 (1968), the defendant’s vehicle was seized at the time of his arrest for
robbery. A department regulation required the office in charge of the impounded
vehicle to search it thoroughly, remove all the valuables, and attach an inventory tag
on it. Id. In this particular case, the window was left rolled down and the doors
unlocked. Id. The Court recounted the officer’s actions as follows:
The officer entered on the driver's side, searched the car, and tied
a property tag on the steering wheel. Stepping out of the car, he rolled
up an open window on one of the back doors. Proceeding to the front
door on the passenger side, the officer opened the door in order to
secure the window and door. He then saw the registration card, which
lay face up on the metal stripping over which the door closes.
Id. at 235-36. The Court reasoned that “[t]he admissibility of evidence
found as a result of a search under the police regulation [was] not presented”
in that case. Id. at 236. The Court viewed the actions of the police as simply
“a measure taken to protect the car while it was in police custody.” Id. The
Court concluded that once the officers had entered the car legally through their
role as community caretaker, the registration card could be seen in plain view
and thus subject to seizure. Id.8
Similarly, in this case, had the officers not performed an investigatory search
on Mr. Metts’s vehicle, they would have, at the very least, opened the door to roll up
the window. “Nothing in the Fourth Amendment requires the police to obtain a
warrant in these narrow circumstances.” Id. And when the officers opened the door,
the gun, wedged between the driver’s door and seat, would have come into plain view
and been discovered by the arresting officers. Evidence discovered in plain view
must pass a three-prong test in order to be admissible under the doctrine: (1) the
officer is lawfully in position to view the object in plain view; (2) the incriminating
nature of the object must be immediately apparent (illegal weapon possessed by felon
United States v. Gordon, 741 F.3d 64, 71-72 (10th Cir. 2014)); and (3) the officer had
a lawful right of access to the object. United States v. Soussi, 29 F.3d 565, 570 (10th
Cir. 1994). Here, the officers would have lawfully been in a position to view the
item and would have had a lawful right of access to the object because they would
have lawfully entered the car pursuant to their role as community caretakers. In
addition, the incriminating nature of the gun would have been readily apparent
because the officers knew Mr. Metts was just arrested for robbery and assault with a
deadly weapon. Accordingly, the exclusionary rule does not apply and the district
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court properly denied Mr. Metts’s motion to suppress the evidence.
We AFFIRM.
Entered for the Court
Stephanie K. Seymour
Circuit Judge
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