United States v. German ( 1996 )

PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Filed 1/31/96 TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 95-2162
)
DANIEL CURTIS GERMAN, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Mexico
(D.C. No. CR-95-108-HB)
Submitted on the briefs:
John J. Kelly, United States Attorney, and Kelly H. Burnham,
Assistant United States Attorney, Las Cruces, New Mexico, for
Plaintiff-Appellee.
Joseph (SIB) Abraham, Jr., El Paso, Texas, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before KELLY and BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and O'CONNOR, Senior
District Judge.*
O'CONNOR, Senior District Judge.
* The Honorable Earl E. O'Connor, Senior United States District
Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation.
The defendant, Daniel Curtis German, was indicted for
possession with intent to distribute more than 100 kilograms of
marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). He
appeals from the district court's order denying his motion to
dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds. We find that we
have jurisdiction of this appeal and affirm. 1
I. Background
The relevant facts are not in dispute. On February 11, 1995,
German was arrested for transporting over 700 pounds of marijuana
in the truck he was driving. At the time of his arrest, a Drug
Enforcement Administration ("DEA") agent seized the truck and gave
German a DEA notice entitled "Notice of Seizure of a Conveyance for
a Drug-Related Offense." The notice advised German that the truck
was seized because it was used to transport drugs and to facilitate
drug trafficking, and was subject to forfeiture pursuant to 21
U.S.C. § 881(a)(4). The notice also informed defendant that he
would receive a separate notice providing further details of the
seizure and his available rights at a later date. In addition, the
notice stated:
Upon the filing of a claim and the posting of a cost
bond, the merits of the claim and the determination of
forfeiture will be conducted through a judicial
proceeding pursuant to Title 21, U.S.C. Section 881;
Title 19, U.S.C., Sections 1602-1608; and Title 21,
C.F.R. Sections 1316.17-1316.81 and Sections 1316.90-
1316.99.
Defendant signed the notice acknowledging receipt of the same.
The DEA subsequently sent German another document relating to
the truck entitled "Notice of Seizure," dated March 20, 1995. On
1
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, the
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not
materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed.
R.App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
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March 25, 1995, German signed a Domestic Return Receipt
acknowledging receipt of the Notice of Seizure. The prefatory
language in the Notice of Seizure provided in part:
You may petition the DEA for the return of the property
or your interest in it (remission or mitigation), and/or
you may contest the seizure and forfeiture of the
property in court. Also, under certain circumstances,
you may petition for the expedited release of the
property. You should review the following procedures
very carefully.
Notice of Seizure (emphasis in original). With regard to the
specific procedure for contesting the forfeiture of the seized
property, the Notice of Seizure explained that:
In addition to or in lieu of petitioning for remission or
mitigation, you may contest the forfeiture of the seized
property in UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT. To do so, you
must file a claim of ownership and cost bond with the
DEA. . . . If you are indigent (needy or poor) you may
not have to post the bond. To request a waiver of the
bond, you must fully disclose your finances in a signed
statement called a "Declaration in Support of Request to
Proceed In Forma Pauperis" along with a claim of
ownership of the property. . . . The claim of ownership,
with either bond or the "Declaration in Support of
Request to Proceed In Forma Pauperis" must be filed
within twenty (20) days of the first date of publication
of the notice of seizure in the edition of USA Today
newspaper referenced above.
Id. (emphasis in original). The Notice of Seizure stated that the
date of first publication of the notice of seizure would be
March 29, 1995. Thus, in order for defendant to timely file the
papers necessary to properly contest the forfeiture of the truck,
he needed to file a claim of ownership, along with a cost bond or
an in forma pauperis declaration, by April 18, 1995.
On April 26, 1995, the DEA received from defendant an
"Affidavit in Forma Pauperis." The next day, the DEA sent German's
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attorney a letter, advising that the DEA was returning the in forma
pauperis affidavit because it had been filed after the April 18th
deadline date. The letter further advised that, as a matter of
discretion, the DEA would allow German twenty days from receipt of
the letter to file a petition for an administrative ruling.
Within the twenty days provided by the DEA, German submitted
a petition for remission and/or mitigation consisting of a letter
signed under oath dated May 15, 1995, and the affidavit in forma
pauperis he had previously filed. German's truck was forfeited and
sold at auction on July 20, 1995.
On appeal, German contends that the forfeiture of the truck
constituted punishment within the meaning of the double jeopardy
clause, and the government's current prosecution against him for
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) subjects him to double jeopardy.
II. Discussion
As an initial matter, we first address the government's
argument that the court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal. Our
authority to hear the appeal stems from Abney v. United States, 431
U.S. 651 (1977). There, the Supreme Court held that appellate
courts have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a pretrial
order denying dismissal sought on double jeopardy grounds. Id. at
663. The Court reasoned that, as the double jeopardy clause
forbids a second trial, such a denial was within the "collateral
order" exception to the final judgment rule of appellate
jurisdiction. Id. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to hear
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German's interlocutory appeal of the pretrial order denying his
motion to dismiss the superseding indictment on double jeopardy
grounds.
A district court's denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment
on double jeopardy grounds is reviewed de novo. United States v.
Hudson, 14 F.3d 536, 539 (10th Cir. 1994). The underlying factual
findings of the district court are reviewed for clear error.
O'Connor v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., Inc., 965 F.2d 893, 901 (10th Cir.
1992).
The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution prohibits successive prosecution or
multiple punishment for "the same offense." Witte v. United
States, ___U.S.___, 115 S.Ct. 2199, 2202 (1995). Significantly,
the language of the clause protects against more than the actual
imposition of two punishments for the same offense; by its terms,
it protects a criminal defendant from being twice put in jeopardy
for such punishment. Id. at 2204.
The Fifth Amendment's guarantee against double jeopardy
protects against three types of abuses: (1) a second prosecution
for the same offense after an acquittal; (2) a second prosecution
for the same offense after a conviction, and (3) multiple
punishments for the same offense. United States v. Halper , 490
U.S. 435, 440 (1989); see also United States v. McDermott, 64 F.3d
1448, 1454 (10th Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, (U.S.
Nov. 6, 1995) (No. 95-6653). Multiple punishments are permissible
if imposed in the same proceeding, but are impermissible if imposed
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in separate proceedings. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. at 450-
451.
The district court, in denying the defendant's motion to
dismiss the superseding indictment, stated as follows:
Several courts have held that a defendant who fails
to judicially contest a civil forfeiture by filing a
claim of ownership and bond never becomes a party to the
forfeiture proceeding and thus is neither punished nor
placed in jeopardy. See e.g., United States v. Torres,
28 F.3d 1463 (7th Cir.)(no double jeopardy without former
jeopardy in uncontested forfeiture action because
defendant did not become a party in forfeiture
proceeding); cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 669 (1994); United
States v. Arreola-Ramos, __F.3d__, 1995 WL 428059 (5th
Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Nakamoto, 876 F.
Supp. 235 (D. Haw. 1995); United States v. Walsh, 873 F.
Supp. 334 (D. Ariz. 1994); United States v. Kemmish, 869
F. Supp. 803 (S.D. Cal. 1994).
In the instant case, Defendant
did not judicially contest the forfeiture of the semi-truck by
filing a claim of ownership and bond. Instead, Defendant elected
to pursue only his administrative remedy by filing a Petition for
Remission. In an analogous case, Orallo v. United States of
America, the court stated:
[A] petitioner seeking remission or mitigation
of a forfeiture does not necessarily contest
the legitimacy of a forfeiture. In fact,
under remission/mitigation procedures,
forfeitability is presumed and the petitioner
seeks relief from forfeiture on fairness
grounds.
* * * * * *
A petition for remission or mitigation does
not resolve the issue of personal culpability,
in fact, forfeiture is presumed. Jeopardy can
only attach in a proceeding involving a
determination of guilt.
__ F. Supp. __, 1995 WL 319489 at *3 (D. Haw. May 23,
1995)(internal citations omitted); see also, United
States v. Crowell, Cr. 90-464 PHX RCB (D. Ariz. April 28,
1995)(Double Jeopardy Clause does not relieve defendants
from the consequences of their choice to pursue a course
which had effect of avoiding any judicial finding of
personal culpability; thus jeopardy did not attach.)
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Like the defendant in Orallo, Defendant's
culpability was never adjudicated in the forfeiture
proceeding. Therefore, Defendant was never placed in
jeopardy or "punished" in any constitutional sense
because he was never a party in any proceeding designed
to adjudicate his personal culpability. "A person who
avoids an adjudication of his or her guilt or innocence
cannot later claim double jeopardy when the government
seeks to obtain such an adjudication in a later
proceeding." Kemmish, 869 F. Supp. at 805. Accordingly,
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Superseding Indictment
is denied.
United States v. German, No. 95-108, slip op. at 3-5 (D. N.M.
1995).
In sum, the district court held that German's culpability was
never adjudicated because he did not judicially contest the
forfeiture by filing a claim of ownership and bond in district
court, but instead elected to pursue only his administrative remedy
by filing a Petition for Remission. Because defendant's
culpability was never adjudicated, he was never placed in jeopardy
or "punished" for double jeopardy purposes.
Several federal courts have addressed this issue. In United
States v. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
669 (1994), Torres, a narcotics trafficker, was arrested in a sting
operation during the commission of a drug transaction. He was
prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced to imprisonment for various
drug offenses. On the date of his arrest, federal agents seized
$60,000 he had presented to undercover agents for the purchase of
cocaine. Prosecutors thereafter instituted forfeiture proceedings
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6), on the grounds that the money
was used in an illegal drug transaction. Torres received notice
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inviting him to make a claim in the civil forfeiture proceeding.
He, however, failed to make any claim. Torres later sought to have
the administrative forfeiture of the $60,000 adjudicated prior
jeopardy barring his criminal conviction and imprisonment. In
rejecting Torres' request, the Seventh Circuit reasoned:
[P]arallel administrative and criminal actions do not
necessarily violate the double jeopardy clause. Torres
received notice inviting him to make a claim in the civil
forfeiture proceeding. He did not. As a result, he did
not become a party to the forfeiture. There was no
trial; the $60,000 was forfeited without opposition, and
jeopardy did not attach. You can't have double jeopardy
without a former jeopardy. Serfass v. United States, 420
U.S. 377, 389, 95 S. Ct. 1055, 1063, 43 L.Ed.2d 265(1975). As a non-party, Torres was not at risk in the
forfeiture proceeding, and "[w]ithout risk of a
determination of guilt, jeopardy does not attach, and
neither an appeal nor further prosecution constitutes
double jeopardy." Id. at 391-92, 95 S.Ct. at 1064.
Torres, 28 F.3d at 1465.
The Torres court buttressed its decision that jeopardy did not
attach as a result of the forfeiture of the drug money on the fact
that Torres failed to make a claim in the civil forfeiture
proceeding and thus was a non-party. The Third and Fifth Circuits
have likewise held that where a defendant does not contest a civil
forfeiture, jeopardy does not attach and, therefore, the
protections of the double jeopardy clause are not invoked. See
United States v. Baird, 63 F.3d 1213 (3rd Cir. 1995), petition for
cert. filed, 64 USLW 3318 (Oct. 17, 1995) (No. 95-630); United
States v. Arreola-Ramos , 60 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1995).
German does not undertake to distinguish Torres, Baird, or
Arreola-Ramos. Instead, he urges this court to follow the few
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district court decisions that have deemed a party's failure to
contest forfeiture irrelevant for purposes of raising a double
jeopardy argument. Specifically, he directs our attention to:
United States v. Aguilar, 886 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Wash. 1994)
(McDonald, J.) ("It is irrelevant whether, as the government
claims, Aguilar failed to contest the forfeiture."); United States
v. Heitzman, 886 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Wash. 1994) (McDonald, J.)
(civil administrative forfeiture provided initial jeopardy even
though defendant failed to file a claim in the administrative
forfeiture proceeding); and United States v. Ailemen, 893 F. Supp.
888 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (court held that government imposed a
punishment on the defendant by forfeiting defendant's money, even
though defendant failed to make a formal appearance in the
forfeiture proceeding).
Any persuasive authority that Aguilar and Heitzman may have
had is completely undercut by the more recent case of United States
v. Bradford , 886 F. Supp. 744 (E.D. Wa. 1995), in which Judge
McDonald took an approach directly opposite to that which he had
articulated in Aguilar and Heitzman. ("[A] defendant who elects
not to contest the forfeiture of his property . . . cannot avoid
the adjudication of his personal culpability at one stage, then
suddenly assert that the forfeiture of these items has exposed him
to jeopardy when such a position becomes advantageous." Id. at
748.) As explanation for his change in stance, Judge McDonald
noted that at the time of his decisions in Aguilar and Heitzman,
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the court was without the benefit of the more recently decided
cases from other jurisdictions. Id.We view those cases relied upon by defendant as contrary to
the better rule, and against the weight of authority. This court
chooses to follow the reasoning of the majority view as succinctly
expressed by our sister circuits in Torres and Arreola-Ramos.
Under the facts of the instant case, we hold that jeopardy did
not attach: German was never placed in jeopardy or "punished" in
any constitutional sense because he was never a party to any
proceeding designed to adjudicate his personal culpability. His
subsequent criminal prosecution is not barred by double jeopardy.
AFFIRMED.
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