Pyle v. Woods , 874 F.3d 1257 ( 2017 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
November 1, 2017
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
RYAN PYLE and MARLON JONES,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v. Nos. 15-4163 and 15-4187
JAMES WOODS; KELVYN
CULLIMORE; COTTONWOOD
HEIGHTS,
Defendants - Appellees.
__________________________
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
OF UTAH; AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION OF COLORADO;
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
OF KANSAS; AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION OF NEW MEXICO;
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
OF OKLAHOMA; AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION OF WYOMING;
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
Amici Curiae.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
(D.C. NOS. 2:15-CV-00143-TC & 2:15-CV-00278-TS)
Scott Michelman, Public Citizen Litigation Group, Washington, D.C. (Taylor B.
Ayres, Ayres Law Firm, Draper, Utah; Scott C. Borison, Legg Law Firm LLC,
San Mateo, California; and Scott L. Nelson, Public Citizen Litigation Group,
Washington, D.C., with him on the briefs), for Appellants.
J. Michael Hansen, Nelson Jones, PLLC, Sandy, Utah (David C. Richards and
Sarah Elizabeth Spencer, Christensen & Jensen, P.C., Salt Lake City, Utah, with
him on the brief), for Appellees.
Nathan Freed Wessler, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, New York,
New York; Leah Farrell and John Mejia, ACLU of Utah Foundation, Inc., Salt
Lake City Utah; Mark Silverstein and Sara R. Neel, American Civil Liberties
Union Foundation of Colorado, Denver, Colorado; Stephen Douglas Bonney,
ACLU Foundation of Kansas, Overland Park, Kansas; Alexandra Freedman
Smith, ACLU of New Mexico Foundation, Albuquerque, New Mexico; Brady R.
Henderson, ACLU of Oklahoma Foundation, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; and
Courtney A. Bowie, American Civil Liberties Union of Wyoming, Cheyenne,
Wyoming, on the brief for Amici Curiae in support of Appellants.
Before BRISCOE, MURPHY, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
I. Introduction
After Detective James Woods accessed a state database containing the
prescription drug records of Plaintiffs Ryan Pyle and Marlon Jones, Pyle and
Jones brought separate lawsuits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, each challenging
Defendants’ conduct as violative of the Fourth Amendment and the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (“FCRA”). In both suits, the district court dismissed the claims
against Defendant Woods, concluding Woods was entitled to qualified immunity
because the law governing warrantless access to prescription drug information by
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law enforcement was not clearly established. The district court also dismissed the
FCRA claims because Defendants’ actions fit within an exemption set out in the
Act.
In Jones’s suit, the district court dismissed the constitutional claims against
the city of Cottonwood Heights with prejudice because Jones’s complaint failed
to state a claim for municipal liability plausible on its face. In Pyle’s suit, the
district court dismissed the constitutional claims against Cottonwood Heights
without prejudice, concluding Pyle failed to notify the Utah Attorney General of
those claims as required by Rule 5.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Pyle and Jones each appealed. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the district court’s judgments. 1
II. Factual Background
The Utah Controlled Substance Database (the “Database”) was created in
1995 pursuant to the Utah Controlled Substance Database Act (the “Database
Act”). Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37f-101, -201. The Database is administered by
the Utah Department of Occupational and Professional Licensing (“DOPL”) and
contains data “regarding every prescription for a controlled substance dispensed
in the state [of Utah] to any individual other than an inpatient in a licensed health
care facility.” Id. § 201(5). At the time of the events giving rise to this appeal,
1
The motion of the ACLU et al. for leave to file a brief, as amici curiae, is
granted.
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the Database Act permitted “local law enforcement authorities” to access the
Database without a warrant. 2 Id. § 58-37f-301(2)(i) (2013).
Defendant James Woods is a detective in the Cottonwood Heights Police
Department. In April 2013, Woods was informed by Utah’s Unified Fire
Authority (“UFA”) that medications, including opioids and sedatives, were
missing from several UFA ambulances. Detective Woods received a list of 480
UFA employees with access to the ambulances from Robbie Russo, the
Cottonwood Heights Chief of Police. Russo had obtained the list from Defendant
Kelvyn Cullimore, the Mayor of Cottonwood Heights. Detective Woods accessed
the Database and searched the prescription drug records of 480 UFA employees in
an effort to “develop suspect leads of those who have the appearance of Opioid
dependencies.” Consistent with Utah law at the time, Woods did not obtain a
search warrant before accessing the Database. Based on the information Woods
obtained from the Database search, he developed suspicions about Plaintiffs Pyle
2
The Database Act was later amended to add a warrant requirement. Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37f-301(2)(k) (2016). In 2016, the Drug Enforcement
Administration (“DEA”) filed a Petition in the United States District Court for the
District of Utah challenging the warrant requirement and arguing administrative
subpoenas issued by the DEA are sufficient to gain access to the Database. DEA
v. Utah Dep’t of Commerce et al., No. 2:16-cv-611, 2017 WL 3189868 (D. Utah
July 27, 2017). The district court issued a memorandum decision and order on
July 27, 2017, granting the DEA’s Petition to Enforce the Administrative
Subpoenas. Id. The Utah district court’s ruling that the DEA may access the
Database without a warrant is consistent with a recent ruling from the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. See Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program v.
DEA, 860 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 2017).
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and Jones. Neither Plaintiff, however, was ever prosecuted for the thefts from the
ambulances.
Pyle and Jones filed separate, but substantially similar, suits against
Detective Woods, Mayor Cullimore, and the city of Cottonwood Heights,
alleging, inter alia, violations of their Fourth Amendment rights because Woods
did not obtain a search warrant before accessing the Database. Plaintiffs also
alleged violations of the FCRA. Defendants filed motions to dismiss both
matters, 3 arguing, inter alia, (1) Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights were not violated,
(2) the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, and (3) the
FCRA does not prohibit a search of the Database under the facts at issue.
Defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted in the Pyle matter. As to Pyle’s
Fourth Amendment claims against Woods and Cullimore, the district court
concluded those defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the law
on the constitutionality of a warrantless search of the Database was not clearly
established. The court dismissed Pyle’s municipal liability claim against the city
of Cottonwood Heights without prejudice, concluding the claim implicated the
constitutionality of the Database Act and Pyle failed to notify the Utah Attorney
General of the claim, as required by Rule 5.1(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Finally, the district court dismissed the FCRA claim because
3
The suits were assigned to two different district court judges.
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Defendants’ conduct fell within an exception to the definition of “consumer
report.”
Defendants’ motion to dismiss Jones’s lawsuit was also granted. As in the
Pyle matter, the district court concluded Detective Woods and Mayor Cullimore
were entitled to qualified immunity because the constitutional right at issue was
not clearly established. The court dismissed the municipal liability claim against
the city of Cottonwood Heights on the ground that Jones did not identify any
municipal policy or show a link between a policy or custom and any injury caused
by the alleged Fourth Amendment violation. The district court concluded
Defendants’ actions were exempt under the FCRA and dismissed that claim also.
The two cases have been consolidated for purposes of appeal. Neither
Plaintiff appeals from the dismissal of the Fourth Amendment claims against
Mayor Cullimore.
III. Discussion
A. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity is a defense that shields “governmental officials
performing discretionary functions . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Detective Woods raised a qualified immunity defense to
the Fourth Amendment claims asserted against him by Pyle and Jones and sought
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dismissal of the claims. “When a defendant raises a claim of qualified immunity,
the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the defendant is not entitled to that
immunity.” Douglas v. Dobbs, 419 F.3d 1097, 1100 (10th Cir. 2005).
The qualified immunity test is a two-part inquiry involving the questions of
whether the defendant violated the constitutional rights of the plaintiff and
whether such rights were clearly established at the time of the defendant’s
conduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 236 (2009). In each case, the
district court addressed only the second prong, concluding the constitutionality of
a warrantless search of a prescription drug database was not clearly established
and, thus, Woods was entitled to qualified immunity. This court has the
discretion to determine “which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity
analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular
case at hand.” Id. at 236. The matters before this court involve a situation “in
which it is plain that a constitutional right is not clearly established but far from
obvious whether in fact there is such a right.” Id. at 237. Accordingly, under the
circumstances, we will also address only the second prong of the qualified
immunity test.
Whether a constitutional right is clearly established is a question of law
which we review de novo. Johnson v. Martin, 195 F.3d 1208, 1215-16 (10th Cir.
1999). Our analysis focuses on whether, at the time of the incident, “every
reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates” the
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constitutional right at issue. Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012)
(quotations and alteration omitted). A reasonable official possesses this
understanding if “courts have previously ruled that materially similar conduct was
unconstitutional, or if a general constitutional rule already identified in the
decisional law applies with obvious clarity to the specific conduct at issue.” Buck
v. City of Albuquerque, 549 F.3d 1269, 1290 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotation and
alternation omitted). To resolve the question, therefore, we must determine
whether “a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly
established weight of authority from other courts . . . have found the law to be as
the plaintiff maintains.” Clark v. Wilson, 625 F.3d 686, 690 (10th Cir. 2010)
(quotation omitted). The law is not clearly established unless this precedent
“place[s] the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-
Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011).
“The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a
constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.” California v.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (quotation omitted). Both Plaintiffs assert they
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their prescription drug records and,
thus, the warrantless search of the Database conducted by Detective Woods
necessarily violated their Fourth Amendment rights. According to Plaintiffs, the
issue of whether they had a reasonable expectation of privacy is beyond debate
because it was definitively decided by this court in Douglas. 419 F.3d at 1099.
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In Douglas, the plaintiff brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging her
civil rights were violated when defendants conducted a search of her pharmacy
records pursuant to a warrant issued by a magistrate. Id. at 1099-1100. The
Douglas plaintiff claimed the Assistant District Attorney violated her Fourth
Amendment rights “by authorizing the submission of the Motion and proposed
Order to the magistrate judge to obtain approval” to conduct the search. Id. at
1100. Relying on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Whalen v. Roe, this court held
that the right to privacy protecting the disclosure of medical information extended
to an individual’s prescription drug records. Id. at 1102; see also Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (considering whether a state’s assembling of
prescription information into a database violated the privacy rights of doctors and
patients). The Douglas court, however, made it clear that a plaintiff alleging a
Fourth Amendment violation is not entitled to relief “merely upon identifying an
abstract right to privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment.” Douglas, 419 F.3d
at 1103. A plaintiff must also show that the defendant’s actions violated the right
at issue. Id. at 1102-03.
Here, Plaintiffs allege Detective Woods violated their Fourth Amendment
rights by searching the Database for their prescription drug information without a
warrant. Plaintiffs concede that this court has never directly addressed whether a
warrantless search by law enforcement of a patient’s prescription records in a
state database violates the Fourth Amendment but they are correct that “a case
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directly on point” is not required. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741. Plaintiffs must only
identify existing precedent that “place[s] the . . . constitutional question beyond
debate.” Id. They assert two legal propositions, taken together, provided a clear
answer to the Fourth Amendment question at the time Woods conducted the
warrantless search of the Database, namely: (1) individuals have a
constitutionally protected privacy right in their prescription drug records and (2)
warrantless searches violate the Fourth Amendment absent an exception. This
argument is unavailing.
In Douglas, this court stated that any right to privacy in prescription drug
records “is not absolute . . . as it is well settled that the State has broad police
powers in regulating the administration of drugs by the health professions.” 419
F.3d at 1102 n.3 (quotation omitted). It is uncontested that Detective Woods
accessed the Database as part of an investigation into the theft of narcotics from
UFA vehicles. More than ten years ago, this court recognized that “[w]hether a
warrant is required to conduct an investigatory search of prescription records . . .
is an issue that has not been settled.” Id. at 1103. Because, as we have held, the
right to privacy in prescription drug records is not absolute, Plaintiffs’ two-part
paradigm does not provide an answer to the constitutional question. Instead,
resolution of the issue will involve a determination of the scope of the
constitutionally protected privacy right. At the time Detective Woods accessed
the Database to search Plaintiffs’ records, no court had conducted the necessary
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analysis and no judicial opinion held that a warrantless search of a prescription
drug database by state law enforcement officials is unconstitutional. 4
Our precedent makes clear that any right to privacy in prescription drug
records is not absolute under the circumstances present here. Neither Plaintiffs’
two-part paradigm nor existing precedent places the Fourth Amendment question
beyond debate. Accordingly, Plaintiffs cannot show Detective Woods acted
contrary to clearly established law and Woods is entitled to qualified immunity on
the claim he violated Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights by accessing the
Database without a warrant.
B. Municipal Liability
Qualified immunity is not available as a defense to municipal liability.
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 637-38 (1980); Mocek v. City of
Albuquerque, 813 F.3d 912, 933 (10th Cir. 2015). Thus, our conclusion the law
was not clearly established at the time Detective Woods accessed the Database
without a warrant does not resolve the claims against the city of Cottonwood
4
After Detective Woods accessed the database, the United States District
Court for the District of Oregon concluded individuals have an objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy in their prescription information. Or.
Prescription Drug Monitoring Program v. DEA, 998 F. Supp. 2d 957, 966 (D. Or.
2014). It further concluded the DEA’s use of administrative subpoenas to access
prescription records violates the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 967. The latter ruling
was reversed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See Or. Prescription Drug
Monitoring Program v. DEA, 860 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 2017); infra n.2.
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Heights. Those claims were resolved in two different ways by the two different
district court judges.
In the Pyle matter, the district court refused to address the issue of whether
Cottonwood Heights violated Pyle’s constitutional rights. The court, instead,
dismissed the claims without prejudice because Pyle failed to notify the Utah
Attorney General of the lawsuit as required by Rule 5.1 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Rule 5.1 requires a party “drawing into question the constitutionality of a
. . . state statute” to “promptly” notify the state attorney general of the lawsuit
and the question raised. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.1(a)(2). Pyle argues he was not
required to file a Rule 5.1 notice because he is only challenging the actions of the
Defendants, not the constitutionality of the Database Act. The district court
considered and rejected this argument, noting that allegations in Pyle’s complaint
and arguments he made in opposition to Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion left
“no doubt” Pyle was challenging the constitutionality of the Database Act. 5 The
district court is correct. Because Detective Woods acted in reliance on the
Database Act when he accessed the Database without a warrant, if his actions are
unconstitutional then the Database Act, which permitted him to do so, is also
5
As the district court noted, Pyle’s brief in opposition to Defendants’
motion specifically states: “If [the Database Act] allows government agents to
obtain confidential and sensitive medical records in criminal investigations
without a warrant or even reasonable suspicion of a crime then it does not comply
with the U.S. and Utah Constitutions . . . .”
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unconstitutional. Accordingly, Pyle was required by Rule 5.1 to notify the Utah
Attorney General of his lawsuit and the district court did not err by dismissing his
claims against Cottonwood Heights without prejudice.
Jones filed the required Rule 5.1 notice on October 29, 2015, two months
after briefing was completed on Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 6
Rule 5.1(c) requires that a district court give a state attorney general sixty days to
intervene in the matter before “enter[ing] a final judgment holding the statute
unconstitutional.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.1(c). If the court “reject[s] the constitutional
challenge,” however, it may act within the sixty-day period. Id. Here, the Utah
Attorney General received the Rule 5.1 notice via certified mail on November 9,
2015, less than one week before the district court ruled on Defendants’ motion to
dismiss. Cottonwood Heights argues the notice was not “promptly” filed, as
required by Rule 5.1(a). Any delay in filing the Rule 5.1 notice, however, did not
hinder Utah’s ability to defend the statute at that time because the district court
granted the motion to dismiss, concluding the allegations in Jones’s complaint did
not satisfy the pleading requirements for municipal liability.
On appeal, Jones challenges the dismissal of his municipal liability claims
with prejudice, arguing the dismissal can be affirmed only if it is both “patently
obvious” that he cannot prevail on the allegations contained in the complaint and
6
From the timing of the notice, it appears Jones filed the Rule 5.1 notice in
response to the district court’s identification of the omission in its October 1,
2015, ruling in the Pyle matter.
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that amendment of the complaint would be futile. See McKinney v. Okla. Dep’t of
Human Servs., 925 F.2d 363, 366 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements” are not sufficient to state a claim for relief. Id.Municipalities can be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only for their own
unlawful acts. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011). Accordingly, to
prove a § 1983 claim against a municipality, a plaintiff must show the existence
of a municipal policy or custom which directly caused the alleged injury. City of
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). A policy or custom includes a
formal regulation or policy statement, an informal custom that amounts to a
widespread practice, decisions of municipal employees with final policymaking
authority, ratification by final policymakers of the decisions of subordinates to
whom authority was delegated, and the deliberately indifferent failure to
adequately train or supervise employees. Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks
Charter Academy, 602 F.3d 1175, 1189 (10th Cir. 2010).
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Here, the district court concluded Jones’s complaint failed to adequately
allege either a municipal policy, or a link between a policy or custom and the
alleged injury. Jones argues his complaint is sufficient because it contains an
allegation it was the policy of Cottonwood Heights to query employees’
prescription drug records without a warrant. It is true Jones’s complaint does so
allege, but this allegation is the type of “formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action” that is insufficient to meet the Twombly pleading standard. 550
U.S. at 555.
Jones’s complaint contains insufficient factual allegations to support an
inference that Detective Woods was following a policy or custom when he
accessed Jones’s information in the Database. Jones’s assertion Chief Russo and
Mayor Cullimore were personally involved in supplying the list of UFA
employees to Woods is unavailing because the complaint does not allege that
those acts, or any other acts Chief Russo or Mayor Cullimore purportedly took in
relation to Detective Woods’s search of the Database, 7 were taken pursuant to a
7
We only consider the factual allegations related to the search of the
Database because Jones expressly abandoned all federal constitutional claims
except his Fourth Amendment claims. In his memorandum in opposition to
Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Jones referenced several paragraphs in his
complaint that allegedly support the propositions that Mayor Cullimore “directed
and approved the actions of . . . Chief of Police Russo and Detective Woods” and
that Mayor Cullimore and Chief Russo initiated and implemented policies and
procedures that disregarded Jones’s constitutional rights. The referenced
paragraphs, however, contain unrelated facts and appear to have been cited in
error.
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policy or custom. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that Jones’s
complaint does not contain factual allegations sufficient to support a plausible
inference that a municipal policy directly caused the injuries Jones allegedly
suffered.
Jones is correct that the district court sua sponte dismissed his claims
against Cottonwood Heights as inadequately pled without first giving him an
opportunity to amend the complaint. He asks this court to remand the matter to
the district court so he may be given that opportunity. We deny the request.
After the district court issued its memorandum decision but before
judgment was entered, Jones had an opportunity to file a motion seeking to amend
his complaint to clarify his factual allegations against Cottonwood Heights. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (providing a party may move to amend his complaint at
any time before judgment is entered); Ideal Steel Supply Corp. v. Anza, 652 F.3d
310, 325 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Prior to trial, after the time to amend as of right has
passed, the court should freely give leave to amend when justice so requires . . . .”
(quotation and alterations omitted)). Jones, however, did not file a Rule 15(a)(2)
motion. Instead, he filed a notice of appeal, presumably choosing to stand on his
complaint rather than amend it. 8 As we have concluded, that litigation strategy
8
The district court’s memorandum and order was docketed on November
16, 2015. Final judgment was not entered until December 16, 2015.
Accordingly, Jones had a full month in which to file a Rule 15(a)(2) motion.
Instead, he filed a notice of appeal on December 11, 2015.
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has not produced the result Jones hoped for. The courts of appeals are not
second-chance forums where litigants, whose appellate arguments are deemed
unavailing, are given the opportunity to relitigate their cases in ways previously
available to them. Jones’s request for a remand to provide him an opportunity to
amend his complaint is denied because, rather than seek that relief from the
district court when it was available to him, he instead chose to appeal the
dismissal of his original complaint.
C. The Fair Credit Reporting Act
In addition to their constitutional claims, Jones and Pyle alleged
Defendants violated their rights under the FCRA. Both Plaintiffs asserted
Defendants’ actions failed to comply with the requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1681b,
which permits a consumer reporting agency to furnish a consumer report only
under specifically delineated circumstances. The district court assumed, without
deciding, that the DOPL is a consumer reporting agency and the information in
the Database is a consumer report. It nevertheless dismissed the FCRA causes of
action for failure to state a claim, concluding the communications from the
Database were exempt under the Database Act because they were made in
connection with an investigation of suspected misconduct relating to employment.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(y)(1)(B)(ii).
On appeal, Plaintiffs argue the 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(y) exception is
inapplicable because the term “investigation” as used in that section should be
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read to incorporate a requirement of individualized suspicion. They assert any
investigation must involve a preexisting suspicion of a particular individual. This
argument finds no support in either the FCRA or the case law. And Plaintiffs’
“fishing expedition” argument rings hollow in this situation where Detective
Woods narrowed his search to those UFA employees who had access to the
ambulances from which the drugs were stolen. Accordingly, we can find no
reversible error in the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ FCRA claims and
that dismissal is affirmed for substantially the reasons stated by the court in its
orders dated October 1, 2015, and November 16, 2015.
IV. Conclusion
In Pyle’s appeal (Appeal No. 15-4163), the district court’s October 2, 2015,
judgment granting qualified immunity to Detective Woods, dismissing the Fourth
Amendment claims against Cottonwood Heights without prejudice, and
dismissing the FCRA claims with prejudice is affirmed. In Jones’s appeal
(Appeal No. 15-4187), the district court’s December 16, 2015, judgment granting
qualified immunity to Detective Woods, dismissing the Fourth Amendment claims
against Cottonwood Heights for failure to state a claim, and dismissing the FCRA
claims with prejudice is also affirmed.
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