Com. v. Straughen, W., Jr. ( 2018 )


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  • J-A11035-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee                :
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    WINFIELD KELLY STRAUGHEN JR.               :
    :
    Appellant               :     No. 1145 MDA 2017
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 5, 2017
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
    Criminal Division at No.: CP-06-SA-0000161-2017
    BEFORE:      STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and PLATT*, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.:                           FILED SEPTEMBER 20, 2018
    Appellant, Winfield Kelly Straughen, Jr., appeals pro se from the
    judgment of sentence in a summary appeal, at which he was found guilty of
    failure to have a commercial driver’s license and failure to have a required
    medical card.1 We affirm.
    We take the factual and procedural history in this matter from our
    review of the certified record and the trial court’s September 14, 2017 opinion.
    At the de novo hearing on July 5, 2017, Officer David M. Bentz testified that
    on January 31, 2017, he stopped Appellant. (Trial Court Opinion, 9/14/17, at
    1). Appellant was driving a Dodge Ram pickup truck and towing a trailer.
    ____________________________________________
    1  Although counsel entered appearance on behalf of Appellant after Appellant
    filed a pro se notice of appeal, he was later permitted to proceed pro se.
    ____________________________________
    * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-A11035-18
    (See id.). Counsel for the Commonwealth stated the Commonwealth believed
    that the gross combination weight rating (“GCWR”) for the Dodge truck was
    26,000 pounds and the trailer 20,000 pounds. (See N.T. Hearing, 7/5/17, at
    4).    These two weights required Appellant to have a commercial driver’s
    license.    (See id.).      The Commonwealth contended that the truck was
    registered in Virginia and introduced the registration, showing the GCWR for
    the truck was 26,000 pounds. (Id. at 7, 70).
    Appellant testified he had information from the manufacturer that the
    GCWR for the vehicle was 23,000 pounds. (Id. at 6).2       He contended the
    gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) for his truck was 12,200 pounds,
    according to the manufacturer label on the door, not 26,000 pounds. (Id. at
    7).
    Officer Benz testified that his “training has always been and prior
    enforcement efforts we certainly take the [GVWR] of the primary unit and the
    gross weight of the trailer and add them together to determine the
    combination.” (Id. at 9). Counsel for the Commonwealth stated that the
    registration for the trailer indicated the GVWR was 20,000 pounds. (Id. at
    14).     Appellant conceded that the value for the truck is assigned the
    “maximum value for its weight rating which the [GCWR] is the maximum that
    they specify for a truck and trailer combined. It’s a combination.” (Id. at
    ____________________________________________
    2   Appellant appeared pro se at the hearing.
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    20). He agreed that “[i]f my gross vehicle, my truck and trailer, actual weight
    exceeded 26,000 pounds, then it would become [sic] commercial vehicle. But
    I did not exceed it.” (Id. at 22).
    Officer Bentz testified that he “sent for certified registrations for both
    the truck and trailer from Virginia.”   (Id. at 31).    He received a certified
    registration from Virginia for the truck. (Id. at 32). The registration indicated
    the GVWR for the truck itself was 14,000 pounds. (See id.). The registration
    showed the GVWR for the trailer was 20,000 pounds. (Id. at 33).
    The Commonwealth showed Appellant the registration from the Virginia
    Department of Motor Vehicles for the trailer, indicating the GVWR of the trailer
    was 20,000 pounds. (Id. at 33.). Documentation from Virginia indicated the
    pickup truck had a GVWR of 14,000 pounds and the trailer had a GVWR of
    20,000 pounds. (Id. at 70, 72). Appellant contended that the actual weight
    of his truck was 6,000 pounds and the trailer weighed 15,000 pounds
    according to the manufacturer. (Id. at 38). At the time Officer Bentz stopped
    Appellant, Appellant admitted he did not have the registrations for the truck
    or the trailer. (Id. at 46). Appellant averred that “[t]he law used to say that
    [the officers] have to weigh the vehicles to determine whether it was a
    commercial vehicle. That’s the issue I had in 2011.” (Id. at 59).
    After the hearing, the court found Appellant guilty of driving without a
    commercial driver’s license, in violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1606(a), and
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    medical card.3 (See id. at 64-65). The court imposed a fine of $525.4 (See
    id.). This timely appeal followed, on July 24, 2017.5
    Appellant raises the following issue for our review:      “Is the correct
    measurement of [GCWR] upon which the truck driver can rely determined by
    the stated GCWR on either the side truck panel or the vehicle’s manual, as
    opposed to adding the [GVWR] of the trailer to the GCWR?” (Appellant’s Brief
    at 6). Appellant argues that the trailer’s GVWR should not be added to that
    of the truck in the absence of the actual weights of the towing vehicle and the
    trailer. (Id. at 11). This claim does not merit relief.
    When, as here, the appellant raises a question of statutory
    construction, our standard of review is de novo, and our
    scope of review is plenary.
    In matters involving statutory interpretation, the
    Statutory Construction Act directs courts to ascertain and
    effectuate the intent of the General Assembly. A statute's
    plain language generally provides the best indication of
    legislative intent. In construing the language, however,
    and giving it effect, we should not interpret statutory
    words in isolation, but must read them with reference to
    the context in which they appear.
    ____________________________________________
    3  See 
    49 CFR § 391.41
    . The trial court noted that both Appellant and the
    Commonwealth agreed that the citation for failure to have a medical card “was
    wholly dependent on the requirement that [Appellant] have a commercial
    driver’s license, and rises or falls along with that issue.” (See Trial Ct. Op.,
    at 4).
    4 The Commonwealth withdrew five separate traffic citations. (See 
    id.
     at 64-
    65).
    5Appellant also filed a statement of errors complained of on appeal. The trial
    court filed an opinion on September 14, 2017. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    -4-
    J-A11035-18
    Commonwealth v. Ford, 
    175 A.3d 985
    , 991–92 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations
    and quotation marks omitted).
    The applicable statutory provisions state, in relevant part, as follows:
    Requirement for commercial driver's license
    (a) When required.−No person, except those specifically
    exempted in subsection (b), shall drive a commercial motor
    vehicle unless:
    (1) the person has been issued a commercial
    driver's license;
    (2) the person's commercial driver's license is in
    his immediate possession; and
    (3) the person's commercial driver's license was
    issued for the class of commercial motor vehicle operated
    and contains all applicable license endorsements.
    75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1606(a)(1)-(3).
    “Commercial motor vehicle.”        A motor vehicle or
    combination designed or used to transport passengers or
    property:
    *    *    *. . .
    (1.1) if the vehicle has a gross combination weight rating
    or gross combination weight of 26,001 pounds or more,
    whichever is greater, inclusive of a towed unit with a
    gross vehicle weight rating or gross vehicle weight of
    more than 10,000 pounds, whichever is greater[.]
    75 Pa.C.S. § 1603(1.1).
    The statute provides the following definitions of terms included within
    Section 1603(1.1):
    “Gross combination weight rating (GCWR).” The value
    specified by the manufacturer as the loaded weight of a
    combination.
    -5-
    J-A11035-18
    “Gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR).” The value
    specified on the Federal weight certification label by the
    manufacturer as the loaded weight of a single vehicle.
    “Gross weight.” The combined weight of a vehicle or
    combination of vehicles and its load excluding the driver's
    weight.
    75 Pa.C.S.A. § 102.
    In Commonwealth v. Dugan, 
    769 A.2d 512
     (Pa. Super. 2001), this
    Court addressed the issue raised by Appellant. The appellant in Dugan was
    charged with violating Section 1606(a). 
    Id. at 515
    . “Section 1606(a) requires
    the driver of a “commercial motor vehicle” to have a “commercial drivers
    license.” 
    Id. at 516
    . “The Section 1606(a) term ‘commercial motor vehicle’
    is defined as a ‘motor vehicle designed or used to transport passengers or
    property’ where the vehicle's gross vehicle weight is 26,001 or more pounds .
    . . .” See 
    id.
     In Dugan, the “[a]ppellant was driving a ‘commercial motor
    vehicle’ that was, in fact, a motor vehicle towing another vehicle, which had a
    combined weight rating of over 26,001 pounds.” 
    Id. at 517
    . Therefore, this
    Court concluded the appellant was required to have a commercial driver’s
    license. See 
    id.
    In the instant case, the trial court opined that “any of the rating numbers
    in evidence for the truck itself, when added to the 20,000-pound rating for
    the trailer, will exceed 26,000 pounds; therefore, the [c]ourt found [Appellant]
    was required to have a commercial driver’s license, and as a result, the
    medical card as well.” (Trial Ct. Op., at 6). After careful review of the record,
    -6-
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    we agree with the trial court’s finding that Appellant was required to have a
    commercial driver’s license and a medical card. See Dugan, 
    supra
     at 516-
    17.   We discern no error. See Ford, supra at 991–92. Appellant’s issue
    does not merit relief.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 9/20/2018
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1145 MDA 2017

Filed Date: 9/20/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/20/2018