United States v. Martinez-Gonzalez , 571 F. App'x 728 ( 2014 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS July 15, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 14-6030
(W.D. Okla.)
ENRIQUE MARTINEZ-GONZALEZ, (D.C. No. 5:13-CR-00263-R-1)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, ANDERSON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Defendant and appellant, Enrique Martinez-Gonzalez, a Mexican citizen,
appeals his fifty-seven-month sentence imposed following his guilty plea to one
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
count of illegally reentering the United States, following a previous deportation
after an aggravated felony conviction. His only argument on appeal is that his
sentence is substantively unreasonable. Finding his sentence to be substantively
reasonable, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Martinez-Gonzalez was born in Mexico, but has resided in the
Oklahoma City area since approximately 1989. While in the United States, he
pled guilty to various criminal offenses, including joy riding in 1993, and larceny
of merchandise from a retailer, concealing stolen property, and jumping bail, all
separate crimes committed in 1996.
In 1997, following his arrest for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, Mr.
Martinez-Gonzalez was ordered removed by an immigration judge and he was
granted a voluntary return to Mexico. He subsequently reentered the United
States and, in 1999, was convicted of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute.
Mr. Martinez-Gonzalez served two years in prison for that offense, before he was
paroled to the custody of the Immigration Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and
deported on January 25, 2001. He returned to the United States later that year
and, in October, was arrested for shooting with intent to kill. He was convicted
of that offense and served approximately nine years in prison, following which he
was deported on January 5, 2011.
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Mr. Martinez-Gonzalez subsequently reentered the United States for a final
time and, on November 21, 2012, he was arrested and charged with assault and
battery with a dangerous weapon. The charge was later dismissed when the
victim failed to appear.
On April 5, 2013, Mr. Martinez-Gonzalez was arrested for grand larceny.
On October 30, 2013, he was released to ICE custody, after the initial grand
larceny charges were dismissed. The charges were later re-filed and, as of the
time of briefing in this appeal, those charges were pending in Oklahoma state
court.
A federal grand jury indicted Mr. Martinez-Gonzalez on November 12,
2013, charging him with illegally reentering the United States, in violation of 8
U.S.C. § 1326(a). He then waived his right to a jury trial and pled guilty.
In preparation for sentencing under the United States Sentencing
Commission, Guidelines Manual (“USSG”), the United States Probation Office
prepared a presentence report (“PSR”). The PSR calculated a base offense level
of eight under USSG § 2L1.2. Mr. Martinez-Gonzalez’s prior convictions for
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and shooting with intent to kill
resulted in a sixteen-level increase to his base offense level, thereby creating a
total offense level of twenty-four. After a three-level decrease for acceptance of
responsibility, Mr. Martinez-Gonzalez’s total adjusted offense level was twenty-
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one. With a criminal history category of III, his advisory Guideline sentencing
range was forty-six to fifty-seven months’ imprisonment.
Mr. Martinez-Gonzalez filed a Sentencing Memorandum, requesting a
sentence below the advisory Guideline range “based on the excessive and
unwarranted severity of the illegal reentry guideline itself.” Sent. Mem. at 4; R.
Vol. 1 at 24. He argued that “[f]rom both a policy perspective and a fairness
perspective, it makes sense that a non-violent, non-drug-related offense that is
essentially a status crime would not be punished as severely as more factually
serious crimes.” Id. at 5; R. Vol. 1 at 25. Furthermore, because the sixteen-level
increase in the Guideline level is based on certain serious prior convictions, and
those convictions are also counted in calculating criminal history points, Mr.
Martinez-Gonzalez charged the Guidelines with impermissibly double-counting.
He also argued that the “fundamental flaw in the illegal reentry guideline is that it
was not based on empirical research concerning deterrent efficacy or any other
variable relevant to the purposes of sentencing.” Id. at 8; R. Vol. 1 at 28.
He reiterated these arguments at his sentencing hearing. The district court
listened to those arguments but declined to sentence Mr. Martinez-Gonzales
below the advisory Guideline range. In fact, the court concluded that, in view of
Mr. Martinez-Gonzalez’s extensive criminal history, a sentence at “the high end
of the guidelines [is] appropriate.” Tr. of Sent. Hr’g at 6; R. Vol. 3 at 65. As the
court bluntly stated to Mr. Martinez-Gonzalez, “frankly, looking at your criminal
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history, I believe the only appropriate place for you to be is in prison, given your
criminal history. I think you’re a threat to society.” Id. The court therefore
sentenced Mr. Martinez-Gonzalez to fifty-seven months’ imprisonment. This
appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Mr. Martinez-Gonzalez’s only argument on appeal is that his fifty-seven-
month sentence is substantively unreasonable. “[S]ubstantive reasonableness
addresses whether the length of the sentence is reasonable given all the
circumstances of the case in light of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”
United States v. Damato, 672 F.3d 832, 838 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation
marks omitted). We review substantive reasonableness claims for abuse of
discretion, “afford[ing] substantial deference to [the] district court.” United
States v. Smart, 518 F.3d 800, 806 (10th Cir. 2008). A sentence within the
properly-calculated Guidelines range is presumed on appeal to be reasonable.
United States v. Alvarez-Bernabe, 626 F.3d 1161, 1167 (10th Cir. 2010).
Mr. Martinez-Gonzalez argues that his fifty-seven-month sentence is
greater than necessary and unreasonable when compared to the Guidelines range
for crimes that are “factually more injurious or potentially injurious.”
Appellant’s Br. at 11. We have, however, “consistently observed that reentry of
an ex-felon is a serious offense.” United States v. Martinez-Barragan, 545 F.3d
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894, 905 (10th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Algarate-Valencia, 550 F.3d
1238, 1245 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Congress has made it clear, through the Sentencing
Guidelines, that it considers the illegal re-entry of an alien who has committed a
violent crime to be far more serious than a standard trespassing offense.”); United
States v. Navarrete-Medina, 554 F.3d 1312, 1314 (10th Cir. 2009) (same). And,
Mr. Martinez-Gonzalez’s argument that his “history does not present heightened
concern that he will return to the U.S. unlawfully” is, as the government points
out, wholly inconsistent with his immigration history. Appellant’s Br. at 12.
Mr. Martinez-Gonzalez also makes a policy objection to the sixteen-level
increase to his offense level imposed by USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). We have stated
that, “[a]lthough a district court is ‘entitled’ to vary downward from the
guidelines based on a policy disagreement with the guidelines, it is also entitled
to defer to the policy judgment of the guidelines[.]” United States v. Escobar-
Aguirre, 409 Fed. Appx. 209, 212 (10th Cir. 2010) (unpublished). 1 As we have
also observed, “‘a sentence is not rendered unreasonable merely because of a
district court’s refusal to deviate from the advisory guideline range’ based on
disagreements with the policies underlying a particular Guideline provision.”
United States v. Wilken, 498 F.3d 1160, 1172 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting United
States v. McCullough, 457 F.3d 1150, 1171 (10th Cir. 2006)).
1
We note that we typically do not cite unpublished opinions. We cite this
case, however, because we agree with its statement.
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Furthermore, we are not persuaded by Mr. Martinez-Gonzalez’s argument
that the Guideline for reentry offenses is not based on empirical evidence and is
therefore not entitled to deference. We have rejected the argument that a
sentencing enhancement is invalid “because it lacks a specific explanation and
justification by the Sentencing Commission.” Alvarez-Bernabe, 626 F.3d at 1166.
Finally, we have previously rejected the argument that impermissible
double-counting occurs when the same conviction is used both to calculate the
offense level under USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) and the criminal history category
under USSG § 4A1.1(a). “[W]e have routinely upheld as reasonable the use of
prior convictions to calculate both the criminal history category and a sentence
enhancement where, as here, the Guidelines authorize it.” United States v. Ruiz-
Terrazas, 477 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir. 2007). Indeed, in Ruiz-Terrazas, we
upheld a fifty-seven-month sentence for an alien who, like Mr. Martinez-
Gonzalez, illegally reentered the United States and had an aggravated felony in
his criminal history.
In sum, we perceive nothing unreasonable in Mr. Martinez-Gonzalez’s
sentence. The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing it.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the sentence in this case.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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