United States v. Santana-Gomez , 547 F. App'x 904 ( 2013 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
December 11, 2013
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 13-6033
v. W.D. Oklahoma
CESAR SANTANA-GOMEZ, (D.C. No. 5:12-CR-00175-M)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO, MURPHY, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
I. Introduction
Defendant-Appellant Cesar Santana-Gomez was charged in a one-count
indictment with possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of
methamphetamine. He moved to suppress evidence obtained from the search of
his Chevrolet Malibu, arguing the initial traffic stop was not supported by
reasonable articulable suspicion and the subsequent encounter was not
consensual. After the district court denied Santana-Gomez’s motion, he entered
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
into a conditional guilty plea with the government. The court thereafter sentenced
him to 120 months’ incarceration. Santana-Gomez now appeals the district
court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms the district court’s ruling.
II. Background
On July 2, 2012, Lieutenant Jason Glass was patrolling highway I-40 in
Canadian County, Oklahoma when he began following a white Chevrolet Malibu
with Minnesota license plates. Glass testified the vehicle caught his eye because
it had a loose rear bumper. Glass entered the license plate number into his mobile
computer to check the registration but the computer showed the registration was
“not on file.” Glass then had dispatch run the tag number but that query also
returned the response of “not on file.” Glass testified a tag could return as “not
on file” for either valid or unlawful reasons. Accordingly, he decided to initiate a
traffic stop to ascertain if there was possible violation of state law.
Glass approached the passenger side of the vehicle and made contact with
the driver, Santana-Gomez, who produced a valid Minnesota driver’s license,
proof of insurance, a copy of a title application from the Minnesota Department of
Public Safety, and a copy of an Arizona certificate of title in the name of the
previous owner. At Glass’s request, Santana-Gomez sat in the patrol car while
Glass ran a check on the vehicle’s VIN. The check on the VIN came back as “not
on file.” Although the documentation provided by Santana-Gomez was in order,
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Glass wrote a warning for improper tag display. He returned Santana-Gomez’s
documents and told him he was “good to go.”
Before Santana-Gomez could exit the patrol car, Glass asked him if there
was anything illegal in the vehicle. Santana-Gomez replied, “no,” and
specifically denied carrying drugs, money, or firearms. Glass asked if he could
search the vehicle and Santana-Gomez said, “Yeah, go ahead.” While searching
the trunk, Glass noticed after-market screws and other alterations indicating,
based on his experience and training, that there was a compartment in the vehicle.
He ran his drug dog around the exterior of the car and the dog alerted to the rear
bumper area. A subsequent search of the entire vehicle at an off-site location led
to the discovery of methamphetamine. Santana-Gomez was charged with one
count of possession with the intent to distribute 500 grams or more of
methamphetamine. He filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the
search of his vehicle. After holding a hearing at which Lieutenant Glass testified,
the district court denied the motion, concluding Glass had reasonable suspicion to
stop Santana-Gomez’s vehicle and any questioning that occurred beyond the
scope of the initial stop resulted from a consensual encounter. Accordingly, the
district court ruled the arrest of Santana-Gomez and the subsequent search of the
Malibu were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Santana-Gomez entered a
conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to
suppress. After sentencing, he brought this appeal.
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III. Discussion
When this court reviews a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress
evidence, it considers the totality of the circumstances, views the evidence in the
light most favorable to the government, and accepts the district court’s factual
findings unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Stephenson, 452 F.3d 1173,
1176 (10th Cir. 2006). The ultimate determination of reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment, however, is a question of law this court reviews de novo. Id.
Santana-Gomez’s first challenge to the district court’s ruling focuses on the
justification given by Lieutenant Glass for stopping his vehicle. See United
States v. Cline, 349 F.3d 1276, 1286 (10th Cir. 2003) (stating review of the
constitutionality of a traffic stop begins with determining “whether the officer’s
action was justified at its inception” (quotations omitted)). This court has held
that “a traffic stop will be held reasonable when, under the totality of the
circumstances, the officer bears a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may
be afoot.” United States v. Cortez-Galaviz, 495 F.3d 1203, 1205-06 (10th Cir.
2007) (quotations omitted). The district court concluded the initial stop met this
standard because Glass’s inability to obtain information on Santana-Gomez’s
vehicle after running his license plate number through his mobile computer and
through dispatch was an indication the vehicle could be stolen or was being used
in a crime. Santana-Gomez challenges this ruling by arguing Glass pulled his
vehicle over based solely on a “hunch” because even Glass acknowledged there
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could be lawful and valid reasons why his tag returned as “not on file.” Cf.
United States v. DeJear, 552 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2009) (stating that
unparticularized hunches about criminal activity are insufficient to justify an
investigative detention). This court considers Lieutenant Glass’s “conduct in
light of common sense and ordinary human experience, and we accord deference
to an officer’s ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions.”
United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1268 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotation and
citation omitted). Additionally, as the government correctly argues, “[a]
determination that reasonable suspicion exists . . . need not rule out the possibility
of innocent conduct.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002).
Our review of the totality of the circumstances shows the stop of Santana-
Gomez’s vehicle was not based solely on a hunch. The specific facts available to
Lieutenant Glass at the time he initiated the stop, none of which are challenged by
Santana-Gomez, would cause an objectively reasonable officer to believe
Santana-Gomez was possibly operating an unregistered vehicle. Driving an
unregistered vehicle violates Oklahoma law. See Okla. Stat. tit. 47, § 1125(C)
(requiring a vehicle owned by a nonresident to be properly registered in its native
state). Accordingly, the initial stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Santana-Gomez next argues his initial detention was extended without his
consent in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. This court has previously
held that a Terry stop ends and questioning must cease “once an officer returns
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the driver’s license and registration.” United States v. Villa, 589 F.3d 1334, 1339
(10th Cir. 2009). “This general rule, however, is subject to an important
exception. Additional questioning unrelated to the traffic stop is permissible if
the detention becomes a consensual encounter.” Id. (quotations omitted). A
detention is consensual if “a reasonable person would believe he was free to leave
or disregard the officer’s request for information.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Here, the district court concluded the encounter became consensual based
on the facts Glass did not raise his voice, brandish his weapon, remove his canine
from the back of the patrol car, or call for another officer. Further, when Glass
returned Santana-Gomez’s documents he told him he was “good to go.” Having
reviewed the record on appeal and considered Santana-Gomez’s arguments, we
conclude the district court’s analysis was entirely correct. This court has
previously held that a reasonable motorist would feel free to leave under
circumstances nearly identical to those present in this case:
[The officer] had returned [the defendant’s] license and registration
and told him he was free to go. [The defendant] must have believed
he was free to leave at that point because the district court found he
turned to get out of the car. . . . There was no evidence that [the only
officer present] used a commanding or threatening manner or tone of
voice, displayed a weapon, or touched [the defendant].
United States v. Hernandez, 93 F.3d 1493, 1499 (10th Cir. 1996). Santana-
Gomez argues the exchange had an “accusatory nature,” but that argument is
foreclosed by the district court’s finding that Lieutenant Glass did not raise his
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voice, brandish his weapon, or engage in another act that could be considered
coercive. Simply “asking questions which may elicit incriminating answers is
irrelevant to a determination of whether an encounter was consensual.” Id.; see
also United States v. Esparza-Mendoza, 386 F.3d 953, 959 (10th Cir. 2004)
(holding “‘the reasonable person test presupposes an innocent person’” and, thus,
questioning is not necessarily coercive even if it “might have been disconcerting
to a person who had committed a crime” (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S.
429, 441 (1991)). Santana-Gomez also relies on Lieutenant Glass’s testimony
that most people do not decline to answer additional questions after their
documents have been returned. That testimony addresses only whether an
objectively reasonable person would be willing to answer a question, not whether
that person would feel free to leave. Cf. United States v. Thompson, 546 F.3d
1223, 1226 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding a reviewing court is guided by precedent in
similar cases, not its own experience in how “reasonable people actually respond
to police investigations”). Additionally, as the government correctly asserts, the
fact that an objectively reasonable person may consent to answer additional
questions does not suggest they feel compelled to do so.
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IV. Conclusion
The judgment of the district court denying Santana-Gomez’s motion is
affirmed.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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