Mitchell v. Rocky Mountain Cancer Centers, LLP , 315 F. App'x 725 ( 2009 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS March 4, 2009
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
PAUL A. MITCHELL, M.D.,
Plaintiff - Appellant, No. 08-1287
v. (D. Colorado)
ROCKY MOUNTAIN CANCER (D.C. No. 07-cv-01479-BNB-MJW)
CENTERS, LLP,
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, ANDERSON, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff and appellant, Paul A. Mitchell, M.D., proceeding pro se, seeks to
appeal the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant Rocky Mountain
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
Cancer Centers, LLP (“RMCC”), in his action alleging race discrimination, a
hostile work environment and retaliation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq. We remand.
BACKGROUND
RMCC hired Mitchell as a Radiation Oncologist on August 19, 2002.
Mitchell became a partner at RMCC on September 1, 2003. On February 6, 2006,
RMCC presented Mitchell with a letter confirming his separation from RMCC and
including a release of claims, in exchange for a severance pay of $137,500.00.
Mitchell then brought this action against RMCC, alleging discriminatory
discharge, a hostile work environment, retaliation based on race, and age
discrimination. Both sides consented to refer the case to a magistrate judge. See
28 U.S.C. § 636(c). After RMCC filed a motion to dismiss the age discrimination
claim, Mitchell conceded that his age discrimination claim lacked merit and
“removed age discrimination as a cause of action in this civil suit.” Pl.’s Br. and
Aff. in Opposition to Defendant’s Mot. for Summ. Judgment at 1.
Accordingly, on August 5, 2008, the magistrate judge entered an order
dismissing as withdrawn Mitchell’s age discrimination claim and granting
summary judgment to RMCC on the claims for discriminatory discharge and
hostile work environment. The magistrate judge also ordered supplemental
briefing on Mitchell’s remaining claim for retaliation.
-2-
On August 13, 2008, Mitchell filed a notice of appeal with our court,
attempting to appeal the entry of summary judgment on the claims of
discriminatory discharge and hostile work environment. On August 19, 2008, this
court issued an order stating it was considering summary dismissal of this appeal
for lack of appellate jurisdiction because all of the claims against all of the parties
had not been adjudicated. We accordingly ordered Mitchell to serve and file,
within thirty days of our order, “a copy of a district court order entering either a
final judgment or a Rule 54(b) certification.” Mitchell v. Rocky Mountain Cancer
Centers, LLP., No. 08-1287 (10 th Cir., August 19, 2008).
On August 25, 2008, Mitchell filed a motion styled as “Plaintiff’s Motion
for the Withdraw[al] of Pending Claim and Motion for District Court Order of
Final Judgment.” Mitchell stated he “knowingly and voluntarily withdraws his
pending retaliation claim against” RMCC and “now removes the remaining
obstacle for the District Court to Enter a Final Judgment Order on Mitchell v.
Rocky Mountain Cancer Centers.”
On August 26, 2008, the magistrate judge construed Mitchell’s motion as a
stipulation of dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1), and granted the
motion. The court observed that RMCC had filed a response to Mitchell’s
motion, “stipulating to the dismissal of the [retaliation] claim without prejudice.”
Order, Mitchell v. Rocky Mountain Cancer Centers, LLP., No. 07-01479
-3-
(August 26, 2008). The court accordingly dismissed the retaliation claim without
prejudice.
On August 29, 2008, this court issued an order, observing that “[a]lthough
the district court dismissed the remaining claim, because the dismissal was
without prejudice it may not be sufficient to render the earlier orders final for
purposes of appeal.” Mitchell v. Rocky Mountain Cancer Centers, LLP., No.
08-1287 (10th Cir., August 29, 2008) (citing Jackson v. Volvo Trucks, 462 F.3d
1234, 1238 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Our general rule is that a party cannot obtain
appellate jurisdiction where the district court has dismissed at least one claim
without prejudice because the case has not been fully disposed of in the lower
court.”)). We therefore directed Mitchell to serve and file, within thirty days of
our order, “a copy of a district court order entering either a final judgment or a
Rule 54(b) certification.” Id.On September 24, 2008, 1 Mitchell filed a motion styled a “Motion for the
Dismissal of Retaliation claim be With Prejudice and the Court issue an
Order of Final Judgment.” Mitchell stated that, “[t]his Court dismissed
Plaintiff’s claim of retaliation without prejudice, which effectively barred
Mitchell from seeking appeal of the summary judgment awarded in favor or
Rocky Mountain Cancer Centers. Furthermore, Plaintiff now removes the
1
Mitchell’s motion was dated September 24, 2008, although it was not file
stamped until September 26.
-4-
remaining bar for the Court to Enter a Final Judgment Order on Mitchell v.
Rocky Mountain Cancer Centers.” On September 25, 2008, the court entered
an order again denying Mitchell’s motion, explaining as follows:
The plaintiff now requests that the retaliation claim be
dismissed with prejudice. Because “[a] motion to alter or amend a
judgment must be filed no later than 10 days after the entry of the
judgment,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), I construe the Motion as one for
relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60. A litigant may seek relief from a
judgment under Rule 60 on various grounds. The plaintiff does not
identify or discuss which grounds, if any, entitle him to the relief he
seeks, and none is obvious to me.
The court therefore denied Mitchell’s motion.
Mitchell subsequently sought certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b),
which provides, in pertinent part:
When an action presents more than one claim for relief . . . or when
multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final
judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only
if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for
delay.
The district court quoted at length from our discussion of Rule 54(b) and its
history and purpose in Oklahoma Turnpike Authority v. Bruner, 259 F.3d 1236,
1241-43 (10th Cir. 2001), in support of its conclusion that a Rule 54(b)
certification of a final order was inappropriate in this case:
a certification under Rule 54(b) is only appropriate when a district
court adheres strictly to the rule’s requirement that a court make two
express determinations. First, the district court must determine that
the order it is certifying is a final order. Second, the district court
must determine that there is no just reason to delay review of the
-5-
final order until it has conclusively ruled on all claims presented by
the parties to the case.
....
To be considered “final,” an order must be final in the sense that it is
an ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of
a multiple claims action. While the exact definition of “claim” for
purposes of Rule 54(b) is unsettled, a claim is generally understood
to include all factually or legally connected elements of a case. . . .
Thus, a judgment is not final for the purposes of Rule 54(b) unless
the claims resolved are distinct and separable from the claims left
unresolved.
Id. at 1241-43; see also Jordan v. Pugh, 425 F.3d 820, 827 (10th Cir. 2005) (“The
controlling jurisdictional question is thus whether Mr. Jordan’s facial vagueness
claim is ‘distinct and separable from the claims left unresolved.’”) (quoting
Bruner, 259 F.3d at 1241). While “there is no bright-line rule to distinguish
multiple claims, which may be appealed separately, from multiple legal grounds
in a single claim, which may not,” the “distinction is based largely on practical
concerns, particularly the question whether a subsequent appeal of the claims
before the district court will require the court of appeals to revisit the same issues
decided in the first appeal.” Id.The district court went on to observe that “no barrier exists to prevent
[Mitchell] from reasserting [his retaliation claim],” which had been dismissed
without prejudice. Moreover, the court noted that Mitchell’s motion seeking
dismissal of his retaliation claim expressly stated that the motion, if successful,
would remove the remaining “obstacle” to the district court’s entry of a final
judgment permitting appeal of the discrimination and hostile work environment
-6-
issues. Such a motion, the district court stated, runs afoul of our court’s
admonition that we do “not have jurisdiction over an appeal where the plaintiff
caused a voluntary dismissal of pending claims to manufacture finality for a
joined claim that was dismissed with prejudice.” Amazon, Inc. v. Dirt Camp,
Inc., 273 F.3d 1271, 1275 n.4 (10th Cir. 2001) (further citation omitted). The
district court accordingly denied Mitchell’s motion for a Rule 54(b) certification.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
We must first determine whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal.
Sosa-Valenzuela v. Gonzales, 483 F.3d 1140, 1143 (10th Cir. 2007). We
conclude that we do not, and we must remand this case once again.
The case presents us with a conundrum. While both parties argue that we
have jurisdiction over this appeal because the district court’s grant of summary
judgment, coupled with the dismissal of the retaliation claim, even without
prejudice, amounts to a final appealable order, and both parties obviously wish to
have the merits of this case resolved, the procedural posture of the case leaves us
no choice but to remand it. If, as the district court found, Mitchell’s retaliation
claim is a viable, still “alive” claim, then the court correctly found that Rule 54(b)
certification is improper, we do not have a final order to review, and further
proceedings on the retaliation claim must occur in the district court prior to any
-7-
appeal. If, as both parties urge, it is not a viable claim, then the district court
must enter a final order from which a proper appeal may be taken. In either
event, an action is necessary in the district court before we have jurisdiction over
an appeal.
For the foregoing reasons, this case is REMANDED for further proceedings
consistent herewith.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
-8-