Bias v. Martin ( 2019 )


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  •                                                                                       FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                              Tenth Circuit
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                                July 8, 2019
    _________________________________
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    THOMAS A. BIAS,
    Petitioner - Appellant,
    v.                                                            No. 18-5105
    (D.C. No. 4:17-CV-00607-JHP-FHM)
    JIMMY MARTIN, Warden,                                         (N.D. Okla.)
    Respondent - Appellee.
    _________________________________
    ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
    _________________________________
    Before HOLMES, BACHARACH, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________
    Thomas A. Bias, an Oklahoma state prisoner proceeding pro se,1 seeks a
    certificate of appealability (COA) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) to appeal the
    district court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
    § 2241. We deny Mr. Bias’s application for a COA and dismiss this matter.
    
    This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case,
    res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
    consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    1
    Because Mr. Bias is proceeding pro se, we construe his filings liberally, but we
    do not act as his advocate. See Yang v. Archuleta, 
    525 F.3d 925
    , 927 n.1 (10th Cir.
    2008).
    I.
    In 1975, Mr. Bias was convicted in Oklahoma state court of first-degree murder
    and sentenced to death. He was 17 years old at the time of the murder, but he was
    certified to be tried as an adult. On direct appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
    Appeals (OCCA) affirmed his conviction but modified his sentence to life imprisonment
    at hard labor. See Bias v. State, 
    561 P.2d 523
    , 538 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977) (per curiam).
    Mr. Bias filed several applications for postconviction relief in state court, which were
    denied. In 1991, he filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
    § 2254 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma. The district
    court denied the application, and this court affirmed. Bias v. Cody, No. 92-5190, 
    1993 WL 152654
    (10th Cir. May 11, 1993).
    In 2012, the Supreme Court held in Miller v. Alabama, that “the Eighth
    Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility
    of parole for juvenile offenders.” 
    567 U.S. 460
    , 479 (2012). And in January 2016, the
    Supreme Court held that Miller announced a new rule of constitutional law to be applied
    retroactively on collateral review. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 
    136 S. Ct. 718
    , 734 (2016).
    In July 2016, Mr. Bias filed another application for post-conviction relief in
    Oklahoma state court, claiming that his life sentence “should have a finite term” because
    “Oklahoma courts have implied that life meant 45 years” under state statute. R. at 64. It
    appears he did not challenge the constitutionality of his life sentence under Miller and
    Montgomery. The state court denied relief, and the OCCA affirmed.
    2
    On January 12, 2017, Mr. Bias filed a § 2241 petition for a writ of habeas corpus
    in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma claiming that his life
    sentence was “in violation of Due Process and Equal Protection by not being allowed to
    seek collateral attack against continued incarceration.” R. at 98 (emphasis and internal
    quotation marks omitted). He asserted that “State Legislation, State Law and District
    Court’s rulings have established a precedent” that he had discharged his life sentence, and
    he asked the court to modify his sentence “to a determinate forty-five (45) year
    sentence.” 
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks omitted). The district court dismissed the
    petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Mr. Bias then pursued
    administrative relief.
    On November 2, 2017, Mr. Bias filed the § 2241 habeas petition underlying this
    appeal. In Ground One, citing Miller, he claimed that his life sentence violated the
    Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In Ground Two, he alleged that he was being held
    unlawfully because he had discharged his life sentence under Oklahoma state statutes and
    court decisions. The district court dismissed the § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction.
    The court concluded that Ground One, which challenged the constitutionality of
    Mr. Bias’s life sentence, was an unauthorized second or successive § 2254 habeas claim.
    The court concluded that Ground Two, which alleged a violation of state law, was not a
    cognizable federal habeas claim. Mr. Bias seeks a COA to appeal these determinations.
    II.
    “Petitions under § 2241 are used to attack the execution of a sentence, in contrast
    to § 2254 habeas . . . proceedings, which are used to collaterally attack the validity of a
    3
    conviction and sentence.” McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 
    115 F.3d 809
    , 811
    (10th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). “[A] state prisoner must obtain a COA to appeal the
    denial of a habeas petition, whether such petition was filed pursuant to § 2254 or § 2241,
    whenever ‘the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court.’”
    Montez v. McKinna, 
    208 F.3d 862
    , 867 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
    § 2253(c)(1)(A)) (alteration omitted).
    If the petition was disposed of on procedural grounds, “the applicant faces a
    double hurdle” to obtain a COA. Coppage v. McKune, 
    534 F.3d 1279
    , 1281 (10th Cir.
    2008). “Not only must the applicant make a substantial showing of the denial of a
    constitutional right, but he must also show ‘that jurist of reason would find it debatable
    whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.’” 
    Id. (quoting Slack
    v.
    McDaniel, 
    529 U.S. 473
    , 484 (2000)) (alteration omitted). “Each component of [this
    showing] is part of a threshold inquiry, and a court may find that it can dispose of the
    application in a fair and prompt manner if it proceeds first to resolve the issue whose
    answer is more apparent from the record and arguments.” 
    Slack, 529 U.S. at 485
    . The
    procedural issue is often more apparent, see 
    id., but we
    need not decide it first if “a quick
    look at the face of the [petition]” reveals that it does not “facially allege the denial of a
    constitutional right.” Paredes v. Atherton, 
    224 F.3d 1160
    , 1161 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal
    quotation marks omitted).
    Having reviewed the record on appeal, the district court’s order and Mr. Bias’s
    combined opening brief and application for a COA, we conclude Mr. Bias is not entitled
    to a COA. With regard to Ground One, Mr. Bias previously filed a § 2254 application,
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    which was adjudicated on the merits, and he did not obtain prior authorization from this
    court before filing his claim challenging the validity of his life sentence under Miller.
    See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) and (b)(3). It is not debatable that the district court correctly
    dismissed Ground One as an unauthorized second or successive § 2254 claim. See In re
    Cline, 
    531 F.3d 1249
    , 1251 (10th Cir. 2008) (“A district court does not have jurisdiction
    to address the merits of a second or successive . . . 28 U.S.C. § 2254 claim until this
    court has granted the required authorization.”). As to Ground Two, we need not reach the
    jurisdictional issue as framed by the district court because our quick look at Mr. Bias’s
    § 2241 petition confirms that he alleged only a violation of state law—that he had
    discharged his life sentence and his continued detention violated Oklahoma statues and
    court decisions. Because he did not allege the denial of a constitutional right in Ground
    Two, Mr. Bias is not entitled to a COA. See 
    Montez, 208 F.3d at 865
    (holding that state
    law violations are not cognizable in a federal habeas action).
    III.
    For the foregoing reasons, we deny Mr. Bias’s application for a COA and dismiss
    this matter.
    Entered for the Court
    Jerome A. Holmes
    Circuit Judge
    5