Ellis v. State Farm Fire and Casualty C , 322 F. App'x 594 ( 2009 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
April 16, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
RUTH ANN ELLIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 08-7072
(D.C. No. 6:07-CV-00410-RAW)
STATE FARM FIRE AND (E.D. Okla.)
CASUALTY COMPANY,
a domesticated insurer,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO, PORFILIO, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Ruth Ann Ellis appeals the district court’s entry of summary
judgment in favor of defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. (“State Farm”).
Ms. Ellis sued in Oklahoma state court asserting that her homeowner’s insurance
policy with State Farm covered damage to the concrete foundation slab of her
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
home, and she brought additional related claims. Invoking diversity jurisdiction,
State Farm removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Oklahoma. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). There, both parties requested
summary judgment on the issue of policy coverage. The district court held that
the damage was not insured because it fell under the exception for loss caused by
“continuous or repeated seepage or leakage of water or steam.” See Aplt. App. at
321-22. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
Background
We provide only a brief statement of the underlying facts that are pertinent
to the issues presented on appeal. While doing some work at Ms. Ellis’s property
in 2002, Burl Faulk discovered that a drain pipe under the foundation of her house
had broken and water was leaking out. He repaired the break. In 2006, a crack in
the concrete foundation was discovered. Ms. Ellis made a claim on her
homeowner’s insurance policy with State Farm. After an investigation that
included inspections by Mr. Faulk and two other foundation experts, State Farm
ultimately denied the claim based on the policy’s “continuous or repeated seepage
or leakage” clause:
We do not insure for any loss to the [insured] property . . . which
consists of, or is directly and immediately caused by, one or more of
the perils listed in items a. through n. below, regardless of whether
the loss occurs suddenly or gradually, involves isolated or
widespread damage, arises from natural or external forces, or occurs
as a result of any combination of these:
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....
f. continuous or repeated seepage or leakage of water or steam from
a: . . . plumbing system, including from, within or around any shower
stall, shower bath, tub installation, or other plumbing fixture,
including their walls, ceilings or floors;
which occurs over a period of time. If loss to covered property is
caused by water or steam not otherwise excluded, we will cover the
cost of tearing out and replacing any part of the building necessary to
repair the system or appliance. We do not cover loss to the system or
appliance from which the water or steam escaped . . . .
Aplt. App. at 175-76.
After her claim was denied, Ms. Ellis sued, asserting that the policy
covered the damage to her home, and alleging that State Farm had breached its
duty to deal with her fairly and in good faith. The district court entered summary
judgment in State Farm’s favor on the ground that the damage to the concrete slab
was excluded under the “continuous or repeated seepage or leakage” clause.
Ms. Ellis appeals, arguing that the clause is not applicable and renewing her
bad-faith claim. In addition, she appeals a pretrial ruling precluding her from
presenting evidence on her claims for emotional distress and punitive damages.
Because we agree with the district court that the “continuous or repeated seepage
or leakage” clause excludes coverage for the damage to the concrete slab, we do
not address Ms. Ellis’s other appellate arguments.
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Legal Standards
We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment, viewing
the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.
Warren v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 555 F.3d 1141, 1145 (10th Cir. 2009).
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). To resist summary
judgment, the nonmovant must demonstrate specific evidence of a genuine issue
concerning a material fact, which requires a showing that a reasonable jury could
find in the nonmovant’s favor. Rice v. Office of Servicemembers’ Group Life Ins.,
260 F.3d 1240, 1249 (10th Cir. 2001). “The mere existence of a scintilla of
evidence in support of the nonmovant’s position is insufficient to create a dispute
of fact that is genuine . . . .” Id. (quotation omitted).
Oklahoma substantive law applies to this diversity action. See
Air Liquide Am. Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 217 F.3d 1272, 1275
(10th Cir. 2000). Its approach to interpreting insurance policies is
unremarkable: The foremost principle is that an insurance policy is a
contract. Parties are at liberty to contract for insurance to cover such
risks as they see fit and they are bound by terms of the contract. It
necessarily follows that courts are not at liberty to rewrite the terms
of an insurance contract. The interpretation of the policy, with its
exclusions, is a law question, unless the facts necessary to apply the
decided law question are in dispute.
When addressing a dispute concerning the language of an
insurance policy, our first step is to determine as a matter of law
whether the policy language at issue is ambiguous. If it is not
ambiguous, we accept the language in its plain, ordinary and popular
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sense. We must construe the policy to give a reasonable effect to all
of its provisions, construing liberally words of inclusion in favor of
the insured and construing strictly words of exclusion against the
insurer. Duensing v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 131 P.3d 127, 134
(Okla. Civ. App. 2005) (citations omitted) (summarizing Oklahoma
Supreme Court caselaw). “Insurance contracts are ambiguous only if
they are susceptible to two constructions.” Max True Plastering Co.
v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 912 P.2d 861, 869 (Okla. 1996). When a
contract is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence is necessary to resolve the
ambiguity. See Campbell v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 01 of Okmulgee
County, 77 P.3d 1034, 1039 (Okla. 2003). In considering ambiguous
insurance contracts, courts “examine the policy language objectively
to determine whether an insured could reasonably have expected
coverage. . . . [A]mbiguities are construed most strongly against the
insurer.” Max True, 912 P.2d at 865.
Yaffe Companies, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 1182, 1185-86 (10th Cir.
2007).
Analysis
Ms. Ellis contends that the district court erred in applying the “continuous
or repeated seepage or leakage” clause for three reasons: (1) the evidence on
summary judgment was disputed as to whether the sand fill under the foundation
was washed away by water or whether “the sand sifted into the drain pipe and was
washed out by effluent that stayed within the pipe,” Aplt. Opening Br. at 13;
(2) the policy language refers to “water or steam,” not to sewage, so the clause is
either ambiguous or simply does not apply to this situation where the sand fill was
carried away by sewage; and (3) under the doctrine of “reasonable expectations,”
Ms. Ellis is entitled to coverage because an insured would reasonably expect the
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clause to apply to “a water supply line or a steam line, both of which are under
pressure, rather than a drain line,” Id. at 14.
We decline to address the merits of Ms. Ellis’s “reasonable expectations”
argument because she has raised it for the first time on appeal. We deem this
issue waived because it was not presented to the district court. See Wilburn v.
Mid-South Health Dev., Inc., 343 F.3d 1274, 1280 (10th Cir. 2003) (“An issue is
waived if it was not raised below in the district court.”).
Turning to Ms. Ellis’s argument that the policy’s terms “water [and] steam”
do not apply to a drain or sewer line, clearly the drain or sewer line contained
water. The fact that it also contained waste matter does not alter the fact that it
was water that carried away the waste. “Sewage” is defined as “refuse liquids or
waste matter usually carried off by sewers.” Merriam-Webster’s Online
Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sewage. Moreover, the
policy excludes leakage or seepage from a “plumbing system, including from . . .
[any] plumbing fixture.” Aplt. App. at 176. A plumbing system includes a drain
or sewer line. Consequently, we agree with the district court that the policy
language is not ambiguous and that the exclusion applies to the drain or sewage
line at issue here.
Finally, we address Ms. Ellis’s argument that the evidence established a
dispute over a material issue of causation, thus precluding summary judgment.
She maintains that the district court erred in concluding that “[b]y all accounts,
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the damage to Plaintiff’s home was caused by the continuous leakage of water
from the drain line repaired by Mr. Faulk in 2002.” Aplt. App. at 322. Rather,
she asserts that Mr. Faulk’s deposition testimony showed that the sand fill under
the foundation was depleted by sand sifting into the sewer pipe, rather than by the
sand being washed away.
We have carefully reviewed the evidence provided by Mr. Faulk,
particularly his deposition testimony on which Ms. Ellis relies. See Aplt. Opening
Br. at 4 (citing Aplt. App. at 89, 91, 95, and 97). At his deposition, Mr. Faulk
testified that when he repaired the leak in 2002, he saw that the fill under the
concrete slab “was not up against the concrete like it’s supposed to be. Most of it
I’m sure was – was washed down the sewer line . . . .” Aplt. App. at 89.
Mr. Faulk opined as to the cause of the crack as follows: “I think all the water
that flowed underneath the house all that time caused the fill to wash down the
drain.” Id. at 91. He further indicated that sand compacted into the sewer line,
which was caused by pumping water into the sand. Id. at 95. He also stated that
he had cleaned out the clogged sewer pipe before the discovery of the crack and
had seen fill sand in the sewer pipe. See id. at 89, 96-97.
In addition to Mr. Faulk’s opinion, the district court had written reports by
White Engineering Associates, Inc. and Ram Jack Foundation Repair concerning
the reason the foundation slab cracked. White Engineering stated that “[t]he
water likely washed out the supporting sand and soil, thus removing the support
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of the concrete slab on grade.” Id. at 98. According to Ram Jack, “[t]he interior
elevation loss and signs of damage are consistent with the effects of a plumbing
leak.” Id. at 204; see also id. at 264 (deposition testimony of the Ram Jack
representative that the damage was consistent with a plumbing leak).
Mr. Faulk’s opinion does not differ from those of White Engineering and
Ram Jack, nor does it contradict the district court’s conclusion that the damage to
the slab was caused by the water leaking under the foundation. Even if the water
under the foundation caused the sand to wash into the drain pipe, it was the water
that caused the sand to wash away. Accordingly, no disputed issue of material
fact remains as to whether the damage to the concrete slab was caused by
continuous or repeated seepage or leakage of water. Therefore, the district court’s
entry of summary judgment was appropriate.
Conclusion
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
John C. Porfilio
Circuit Judge
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