Child a Ex Rel. Gaither v. Allstate Insurance , 323 F. App'x 635 ( 2009 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
April 10, 2009
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
CHILD A and CHILD B, by and
through their parents and next friends;
JONATHAN GAITHER, individually;
NICOLE GAITHER, individually, No. 08-6125
(D.C. No. 08-CV-00145-R)
Plaintiffs - Appellants, (W.D. Okla.)
v.
ALLSTATE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, BRISCOE, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs-Appellants Jonathan and Nicole Gaither, and their two minor
children, appeal from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
Defendant-Appellee Allstate Insurance Company (“Allstate”). The Gaithers
brought claims against Allstate based upon breach of contract for uninsured
motorist coverage and bad faith breach of insurance contract, and the case was
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
removed to federal court. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
affirm.
Background
Plaintiffs-Appellants Jonathan and Nicole Gaither, their two minor
children, Child A and Child B, and an additional child stopped at a 7-Eleven store
in Moore, Oklahoma, to buy drinks prior to the children’s softball game. Aplt.
App. 375. While Mr. Gaither and two of the children entered the store, Mrs.
Gaither and her son, Child B, remained in the car. Aplt. App. 375. While in the
car, Mrs. Gaither observed an altercation in the store between two police officers
and Mr. Roger Ramirez. Aplt. App. 375-76. Noting that a family was about to
enter the store, Mrs. Gaither exited her vehicle to warn the family not to enter.
Aplt. App. 375-76. While Mrs. Gaither was still outside her vehicle, Mr. Ramirez
ran out of the store and grabbed Mrs. Gaither, forcing her into a headlock and
putting a gun to her head. Aplt. App. 376-77. Mr. Ramirez demanded that Mrs.
Gaither take him to the other side of the family’s car, and he took the car keys out
of Mrs. Gaither’s hand. Aplt. App. 376-77. Still holding a gun to Mrs. Gaither’s
head, Mr. Ramirez was unable to unlock the car door and demanded that Mrs.
Gaither unlock the vehicle. During this time, Child B was in the back seat of the
car in a car seat. Aplt. App. 377. According to Mrs. Gaither, upon her opening
the car door, Mr. Ramirez “jumped in the car” and onto her son and attempted to
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pull Mrs. Gaither into the vehicle. Aplt. App. 377. After a struggle, Mrs. Gaither
was able to free her son from the car, and he ran away from the scene. Aplt. App.
377. Mr. Ramirez then pointed the gun directly at Mrs. Gaither and threatened
that he would kill her. Aplt. App. 377-78. After loosening his grip on Mrs.
Gaither, she too was able to free herself and run away. Aplt. App. 378. Mr.
Ramirez then entered the car from the passenger door, crossed over into the
driver’s seat, and started the vehicle. Aplt. App. 378, 381. He then drove away
and eventually crashed. Aplt. App. 378.
At the time of the incident, the Gaithers were insured by Allstate under an
Auto Insurance Policy. Aplt. App. 70-89. The Gaithers filed a claim with
Allstate under their policy’s Medical Payments Coverage, Collision Coverage,
and Uninsured Motorist (“UM”) Coverage. They claimed compensation for
property damage to the vehicle, physical injuries suffered by Mrs. Gaither and
Child B resulting from the confrontation with Mr. Ramirez, and emotional
distress of all family members. Allstate paid for the property damage under the
Collision Coverage provision. Aplt. App. 68. As alleged by Allstate, Allstate
also paid medical bills totaling $15,049.80, which were submitted by the Gaithers
under the Medical Payments coverage of the policy. Aplt. App. 35-36, 101-11,
112-24. Allstate did not pay out any claims under the UM provision of the
policy, a decision that was partially based on legal advice obtained by Allstate
regarding UM coverage under Oklahoma law. Aplt. App. 125-29. Allstate sent
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the Gaithers a letter denying UM coverage on February 6, 2006. Aplt. App. 128.
The Gaithers initially filed suit against Allstate in Cleveland County,
Oklahoma, on June 20, 2006. Aplt. App. 52-54. Specifically, the Gaithers
claimed that Allstate breached its insurance contract relating to Medical Payment
coverage and UM coverage, and they also asserted a claim of bad faith. Aplt.
App. 52-54. On May 21, 2007, Allstate filed a motion for partial summary
judgment, arguing that UM coverage did not apply as a matter of Oklahoma law.
Aplt. App. 130-40. While that motion was pending, the Gaithers filed a motion to
voluntarily dismiss the action without prejudice. Aplt. App. 141. On November
28, 2007, under the guidance of new counsel, the Gaithers filed a second suit
against Allstate in Cleveland County, asserting the same claims from the prior
suit. Aplt. App. 12-14. Allstate properly removed the action to federal court on
February 8, 2008, Aplt. App. 9-11, and on April 3, 2008, Allstate filed
substantially the same motion for summary judgment as it had in the prior action,
Aplt. App. 24-51.
In response, the Gaithers filed a motion for extension of time to respond to
the motion for summary judgment, seeking a 60-day extension for the purpose of
conducting discovery. Aplt. App. 142-46. On April 24, 2008, the district court
denied the request for a sixty day discovery extension, but granted a twenty day
extension for the Gaithers to file a response to the summary judgment motion.
Aplt. App. 253-54. The next day, the Gaithers filed a motion to amend, seeking
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leave to add Mr. Ramirez as a defendant. Aplt. App. 255-64. On May 6, 2008,
the district court denied the motion, concluding that Plaintiffs were dilatory in
seeking joinder. Aplt. App. 312-15. After the Gaithers filed a response to
Allstate’s motion for summary judgment, the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of Allstate. Gaither v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. CIV-08-145-R,
2008 WL 2116935, at *2-3 (W.D. Okla. May 19, 2008). First, the district court
concluded that the injuries suffered by the Gaithers regarding the incident with
Mr. Ramirez did not “arise out of the . . . use of an uninsured auto,” thus falling
outside the scope of UM coverage. Id. at *2. The court further granted summary
judgment in favor of Allstate on the Gaithers’ bad faith claim. Id. at *3. The
court then concluded that Plaintiffs failed to raise any genuine issue of material
fact relating to the Medical Payments coverage. Although the Gaithers had
submitted bills that allegedly remained unpaid, the court found that they failed to
demonstrate how the bills related to treatment regarding the injuries incurred on
September 18, 2005. Id. at *2. The Gaithers subsequently appealed the denial of
their motions to amend and for an extension of time, and the district court’s grant
of summary judgment in favor of Allstate. Aplt. App. 468-72. 1
1
Although the Gaithers appealed all decisions by the district court,
including the Medical Payments coverage claim, they have not briefed that issue
on appeal, thus the argument is waived. See Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d
1194, 1202 n.4 (10th Cir. 2003).
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Discussion
The Gaithers raise four issues on appeal. First, they argue that the district
court abused its discretion in denying their motion to amend seeking leave to add
Mr. Ramirez as a defendant. Second, they argue that they are entitled to UM
coverage and that the district court improperly granted summary judgment in
favor of Allstate regarding the denial of UM coverage for their injuries. Third,
they argue that the district court improperly denied the motion for an extension of
time for the purpose of conducting discovery. Fourth, the Gaithers contend that
the district court improperly granted summary judgment on their bad faith claim.
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the district court on all issues.
A. The Denial of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend
We review a denial of a motion to amend for an abuse of discretion. See
Anderson v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 521 F.3d 1278, 1288
(10th Cir. 2008); Anderson v. Suiters, 499 F.3d 1228, 1238 (10th Cir. 2007).
Under this standard, we will not reverse the district court’s determination absent
“‘a definite and firm conviction that the lower court made a clear error of
judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances.’”
Moothart v. Bell, 21 F.3d 1499, 1504 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting McEwen v. City
of Norman, 926 F.2d 1539, 1553-54 (10th Cir. 1991)). Under Rule 15(a)(2) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to amend a complaint shall be freely
given when justice so requires. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “Refusing leave to
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amend is generally only justified upon a showing of undue delay, undue prejudice
to the opposing party, bad faith or dilatory motive, failure to cure deficiencies by
amendments previously allowed, or futility of amendment.” Frank v. U.S. West,
Inc., 3 F.3d 1357, 1365 (10th Cir. 1993); see Duncan v. Manager, Dep’t of Safety,
City & County of Denver, 397 F.3d 1300, 1315 (10th Cir. 2005).
The Gaithers filed a motion to amend their complaint seeking leave to add
an additional party defendant, Mr. Ramirez, who they claim was responsible for
the injuries entitling them to UM coverage. Aplt. App. 255-64. The Gaithers
claimed that they only sought to add Mr. Ramirez after they discovered that he
was not judgment-proof. Aplt. App. 257, 270. In its response to the Gaithers’
motion, Allstate claimed the Gaithers’ intent in adding Mr. Ramirez was to
destroy diversity, was dilatory, would prejudice Allstate, and would be futile.
Aplt. App. 297-311.
The district court noted that permitting Mr. Ramirez to join the suit would
defeat diversity jurisdiction, as Mr. Ramirez was a citizen of Oklahoma. Given
that the motion to amend came “closely on the heels” of Allstate’s motion for
summary judgment, the court indicated that such timing “raises the suspicion, to
say the least, that the motion was filed for the purpose of defeating the Court’s
subject matter jurisdiction and avoiding the effect of this Court’s Order” denying
Plaintiffs’ motion for an extension of time to conduct discovery. Aplt. App. 313.
Furthermore, the court found Plaintiffs’ claim that they only recently discovered
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Mr. Ramirez’s financial situation unpersuasive. Aplt. App. 313. Thus, the court
concluded that Plaintiffs had been dilatory in seeking joinder and therefore denied
the motion to amend. Aplt. App. 313-14. The court additionally noted that the
amendment would largely be futile because the statute of limitations had run on
nearly all claims that could be brought by Plaintiffs against Mr. Ramirez, save the
claims of Child B, a minor, for whom the statute has not yet begun to run. Aplt.
App. 314. Although the court later recognized that its finding that most of the
claims were time-barred may have been error, it declined to change its prior
denial of the motion to amend, reasoning that Plaintiffs could still file suit against
Mr. Ramirez in state court. Gaither, 2008 WL 2116935, at *3,
On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that the district court abused its discretion in
denying the motion to amend. Plaintiffs primarily argue that they were entitled to
add Mr. Ramirez because no date for amendment had yet been set by a scheduling
order and they are entitled to have their claims heard in one action. Plaintiffs
suggest that if they had been able to proceed to a status conference, such
conference would have been the proper time and place to establish a deadline to
amend parties. Aplt. Br. 9-10. Thus, they argue, because they had not reached
that point in the litigation, they were entitled to amend their complaint freely to
add Mr. Ramirez. Furthermore, they contend that the amendment would not be
futile, asserting that the statute of limitations had not yet run on their claims
against Mr. Ramirez, and that the district court improperly denied the motion
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believing that most of their claims were time-barred. Aplt. Br. 14-15.
Plaintiffs had several opportunities to amend their complaint to add Mr.
Ramirez. They could have considered doing so in their first case brought in state
court, which was pending for more than a year. Aplt. App. 313. They could have
done so at the outset of filing their second case. Aplt. App. 313-14. Instead, they
waited until the day following the court’s denial of their motion for an extension
of time and while Allstate’s motion for summary judgment was still pending.
It was clearly within the court’s discretion to find that the motion to amend
was dilatory. See, e.g., First City Bank, N.A. v. Air Capitol Aircraft Sales, Inc.,
820 F.2d 1127, 1133 (10th Cir. 1987). Although Plaintiffs rely on Keel v. MFA
Ins. Co. to argue that they are entitled to join a tortfeasor in an action against the
insurer, Keel maintains that joinder is still within the discretion of the trial court
after determining that no prejudice will result. 553 P.2d 153, 158-59 (Okla.
1976). Here, the district court found that there was no prejudice to Plaintiffs by
not joining Mr. Ramirez. Aplt. App. 314. The resolution of issues regarding UM
coverage would require a separate inquiry from that required to determine Mr.
Ramirez’s tort liability for Plaintiff’s physical injuries. Additionally, Plaintiffs
may still file suit against Mr. Ramirez in state court, since the statute of
limitations had not run on all claims. 2 The district court also noted that Allstate
2
Even if the district court was initially incorrect in assessing the statute of
limitations on Plaintiffs claims against Mr. Ramirez, it declined to adjust the
(continued...)
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would be prejudiced if the motion to amend was granted, because of the delay to
the resolution of their motion for summary judgment (which they had now filed
twice). Aplt. App. 314. Thus, the district court, after considering all factors
relevant to the motion to amend, acted within its discretion by denying the
motion.
B. The Grant of Summary Judgment in Favor of Allstate Regarding UM
Coverage
We review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo, and apply
the same standard as the district court. T-Mobile Cent., LLC v. Unified Gov’t of
Wyandotte County, Kan., 546 F.3d 1299, 1306 (10th Cir. 2008). Summary
judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and [therefore] the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c). Thus, “we ask ourselves whether, by a preponderance of the
evidence, the moving party has established that it is entitled to a favorable
verdict.” Gross v. Hale-Halsell Co., 554 F.3d 870, 875 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). In this diversity
action, we apply the substantive law of the forum state, Oklahoma. See Erie R.R.
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
1. The Allstate Insurance Policy
2
(...continued)
ruling after recognizing the potential error. Whether Plaintiffs had a single claim
or all claims still available to them, they still would not likely be prejudiced by
having to bring a separate action in state court.
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Plaintiffs’ insurance policy with Allstate allowing for UM coverage
provides that Allstate will
pay damages which an insured person is legally entitled to recover from the
owner or operator of an uninsured auto because of: bodily injury sustained
by an insured person. The bodily injury must be caused by accident and
arise out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of an uninsured auto.
Aplt. App. 81. The district court found that it was undisputed that Plaintiffs
Nicole Gaither and Child B sustained injuries, and that such injuries were caused
by an “accident.” Gaither, 2008 WL 2116935, at *2. The district court however,
found that the Gaithers’ injuries did not “arise out of the . . . use of an uninsured
auto.” Id. Based upon this finding, the district court granted summary judgment
in favor of Allstate. Id.The facts clearly establish that Plaintiffs Nicole Gaither and Child B
sustained physical injuries. Mrs. Gaither suffered neck and shoulder sprains, as
well as bruising on her arms and legs. Aplt. App. 382. Child B suffered bruising
after Mr. Ramirez fell on him when he was sitting in the vehicle. Aplt. App. 383.
Furthermore, the injuries suffered were caused by an “accident.” Under
Oklahoma law, an accident is viewed from the standpoint of the insureds and can
include criminal acts. Mayer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 944 P.2d 288,
290 (Okla. 1997). Therefore, Mr. Ramirez’s acts do constitute an “accident”
under the policy. Thus, the primary issue we must address is whether there are
any facts sufficient to support a finding that the injuries suffered arose out of the
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use of the automobile.
2. Oklahoma Law on UM Coverage
Plaintiffs claim that the district court erred in finding that the injuries did
not arise out of the use of the automobile. Oklahoma law requires UM coverage
for injuries sustained by an insured when such injuries (1) were caused by an
accident, and (2) arose out of the “ownership, maintenance or use of a motor
vehicle.” 36 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 3636; see Mayer, 944 P.2d at 290. In Safeco
Insurance Co. of America v. Sanders, the Oklahoma Supreme Court analyzed the
meaning of the language in Section 3636, and announced a two-part test to be
applied when determining coverage under UM policies. 803 P.2d 688, 692 (Okla.
1990). Specifically, Safeco requires the following inquiry: (1) whether “the use
of an uninsured motor vehicle is related to its transportation nature,” and (2)
whether the injuries alleged are “connected to that use.” Id. at 694. When both
of these elements are present, then the use of the vehicle and the injury are said to
be causally connected, requiring UM coverage. Id. The Oklahoma Supreme
Court further discussed this test in Mayer, in which the court distinguished
between cases where the vehicle is “the mere situs of an accident” and “those rare
instances in which the automobile may be regarded to be itself the harm-dealing
instrumentality.” Mayer, 944 P.2d at 290-91 (finding no UM coverage because
the “intentional act of the perpetrator did not call for the use of transportation
during the commission of the crime” when the defendant used a truck as the
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launching site for a bomb).
3. The Transportation Use of the Automobile During the
Gaither Assault
As noted above, the injuries sustained by Nicole Gaither and Child B
resulted from an unprovoked attack by Mr. Ramirez, as he attempted to steal the
Gaithers’ vehicle. Aplt. App. 375-78. Mr. Ramirez was attempting to escape the
police when he attacked the Gaithers, and he used a gun to facilitate his theft of
the vehicle. Aplt. App. 376-78. At the time of the attack, the car was parked and
was not running. Aplt. App. 382. In fact, Mr. Ramirez did not start the car until
after Nicole and Child B had fled the scene. Aplt. App. 380-81.
The Gaithers first argue that the injuries arose out of the use of the
automobile because it was the “dangerous instrument which started the chain of
events leading to their injury.” Aplt. Br. 21. They contend that the injuries arose
directly from a series of events that all facilitated Mr. Ramirez’s escape from the
police. Aplt. Br. 19-21. 3 Citing Willard v. Kelley, they argue that the district
court incorrectly found that the injuries did not arise out of the use of the vehicle
3
Plaintiffs cite Okla. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mouse, 268 P.2d 886(Okla. 1954). Mouse introduced the chain of events test later applied in Safeco,
and found that the transportation use of a vehicle was implicated when injuries
resulted from “something physically attached to or immediately connected in
some manner with the motor vehicle or its operation.” Id. at 889. In Mouse, a
truck driver hauling a combine was injured when he attempted to free a portion of
the combine which had became lodged under a bridge. Id. at 887. Mouse has
little application to the present facts because no physical part of the Gaithers’
vehicle or any item connected thereto caused their resulting injuries.
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because the car was not in motion. Aplt. Br. 22. In Willard v. Kelley, the court
found that UM coverage may apply where a police officer was shot by a suspected
felon in an uninsured vehicle. 803 P.2d 1124, 1129-32 (Okla. 1990). There, the
officer had been chasing the suspected felon, who was eventually stopped after
colliding with two other vehicles. Immediately after the collision, while the car
was still running and in gear but not moving, the driver turned around and shot
the officer. Id. at 1131. The shooter then used the car to flee the scene. Id. The
court held that summary judgment was not proper because of factual questions
regarding whether the incident was considered an “accident” under the policy, and
whether the shooting and the use of the vehicle were “inextricably connected in
purpose” to the shooter’s ongoing getaway. Id. at 1131-32. In further support,
the Gaithers also cite Byus v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 912 P.2d 845, 847 (Okla.
1996). In Byus, the court found that there were genuine issues of material fact as
to whether a drive-by shooting, where the passenger in a moving vehicle fired a
gun and then used the car as a means of escape, constituted a transportation use of
the vehicle, and whether the act constituted an independent, intervening cause.
Id.Willard and Byus are clearly distinguishable. Even though the vehicle was
not technically in motion in Willard, it was running and in gear, and the shooter
had already been operating the vehicle as a means of escape immediately prior to
shooting the officer. Willard, 803 P.2d at 1131. Byus involved a drive-by
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shooting where the vehicle was in motion at the time of the injury; thus the
question for the jury became whether the transportation use of the vehicle caused
the injuries. Byus, 912 P.2d at 847. In both cases, the causal connection
regarding the use of the vehicle was a fact in issue, and so was the question of an
independent, intervening cause. Furthermore, Mayer, which was decided after
Willard, clearly states that the vehicle must be “in use as a motor vehicle at the
time of the injury.” 944 P.2d at 291.
Here, there are no facts to suggest that “the use of an uninsured motor
vehicle is related to its transportation nature,” as required by Safeco and Mayer.
Safeco, 803 P.2d at 694; Mayer, 944 P.2d at 290-91. Unlike in Willard and Byus,
Mr. Ramirez had not yet even occupied the Gaithers’ vehicle, except for his
jumping into the car in an effort to steal it. Aplt. App. 377-78. It is clear that
Mr. Ramirez demonstrated no control over the operation of the vehicle prior to or
during his assault on the Plaintiffs. At the point Mr. Ramirez finally did assert
control over the vehicle by starting the car, the assault had ended and both Nicole
and Child B were no longer in or near the car. Aplt. App. 380, 382. Although it
is true that Mr. Ramirez assaulted the Gaithers in his efforts to steal the car as a
means of escaping the police, the injuries here are not so “inextricably connected
in purpose” to facilitate an ongoing escape as they were in Willard. 803 P.2d at
1131. Just as the court in Mayer concluded that the injuries were not linked to
the use of the vehicle because its use had “ceased” once the car had been parked
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and set up as the launching site for the bomb, here the transportation use of the
vehicle had not yet begun at the time injuries occurred. Mayer, 944 P.2d at 291.
An Oklahoma Court of Appeals decision has reached the issue in a similar
case that supports the conclusion that the Gaithers are not entitled to UM benefits.
In Narvaez v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 989 P.2d 1051 (Okla. Ct. App.
1999), the court considered whether a plaintiff had UM coverage for injuries
sustained during an assault in a hotel parking lot prior to the assailant’s theft of
the plaintiff’s vehicle. Id. at 1052. The court concluded that, because there was
no evidence “to establish that the assailant operated the vehicle at the time of
Narvaez’s injury,” the plaintiff was not entitled to UM benefits. Id. at 1052-53.
Therefore, in light of the foregoing, we find that the district court properly
granted Allstate’s motion for summary judgment regarding the denial of UM
coverage.
C. The Denial of Plaintiffs’ Motion for an Extension of Time to
Conduct Discovery
The Gaithers claim the district court erred in denying their motion for
extension of time to respond to Allstate’s motion for summary judgment. Aplt.
App. 253-54. The district court construed Plaintiffs’ motion as a Rule 56(f)
motion. Thus, we review a district court’s ruling on a Rule 56(f) motion for an
abuse of discretion. Garcia v. U.S. Air Force, 533 F.3d 1170, 1179 (10th Cir.
2008). “‘A party seeking to defer a ruling on summary judgment under Rule
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56(f) must file an affidavit that explains why facts precluding summary judgment
cannot be presented. This includes identifying the probable facts not available
and what steps have been taken to obtain these facts.’” Id. (quoting Libertarian
Party of N.M. v. Herrera, 506 F.3d 1303, 1308 (10th Cir. 2007)) (internal brackets
and quotation marks omitted); see Trask v. Franco, 446 F.3d 1036, 1042 (10th
Cir. 2006). A party may not “simply stat[e] that discovery is incomplete,” but
must instead “‘state with specificity how the additional material will rebut the
summary judgment motion.’” Libertarian Party of N.M., 506 F.3d at 1308-09(quoting Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 987 (10th
Cir. 2000)); see also Garcia, 533 F.3d at 1179.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs’ motion
because Plaintiffs failed to “identify any specific facts which would create a
genuine issue of material fact.” Libertarian Party of N.M., 506 F.3d at 1308(emphasis added); see also Int’l Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Wyo. Coal Refining
Sys., Inc., 52 F.3d 901, 904-05 (10th Cir. 1995). Although Plaintiffs did mention
in their motion that they sought to depose several individuals to address the UM
coverage and bad faith claim, the district court concluded that the legal questions
at issue regarding UM coverage and the bad faith claim could be resolved almost
exclusively on the undisputed facts in Nicole Gaither’s statement. Aplt. App.
254. It was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to find that they did
not sufficiently indicate with specificity how the requested discovery was tailored
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to facts material to the resolution of the summary judgment motion.
D. The Grant of Summary Judgment Regarding the Bad Faith Claim
The Gaithers further argue that, because the district court did not allow
discovery, the district court erred in granting Allstate’s motion for summary
judgment on their claim of bad faith. As noted above, we review a district court’s
grant of summary judgment de novo. T-Mobile Cent., LLC, 546 F.3d at 1306.
In Oklahoma, all insurers owe their insureds an implied “duty to act fairly
and in good faith.” Willis v. Midland Risk Ins. Co., 42 F.3d 607, 611 (10th Cir.
1994) (citing Christian v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977)).
A bad faith cause of action, however, “will not lie where there is a legitimate
dispute” over the sufficiency of the insured’s claim. Manis v. Hartford Fire Ins.
Co., 681 P.2d 760, 762 (Okla. 1984). Although “a legitimate dispute as to
coverage will not act as an impenetrable shield against a valid claim of bad faith,”
Timberlake Constr. Co., v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 71 F.3d 335, 343 (10th Cir.
1995), to establish a claim of bad faith, “the insured must present evidence from
which a reasonable jury could conclude that the insurer did not have a reasonable
good faith belief for withholding payment of the insured’s claim,” Oulds v.
Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 1431, 1436 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing McCoy v.
Okla. Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 841 P.2d 568, 572 (Okla. 1992)).
There was a legitimate dispute over whether UM coverage would apply to
Plaintiffs’ claim. Moreover, upon finding that, as a matter of law, UM coverage
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is not available to Plaintiffs, no issue of fact remains that could properly be sent
to a jury. Because there was a legitimate dispute over coverage, as is confirmed
by this court’s finding that no UM coverage is available, we affirm the district
court’s grant of Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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