Cox Retirement Properties, Inc. v. Johnson , 323 F. App'x 668 ( 2009 )


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  •                                                                       FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    April 17, 2009
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    COX RETIREMENT PROPERTIES,
    INC., d/b/a The Cottage Extended
    Care,
    Petitioner,
    v.                                                  No. 08-9523
    (Petition for Review)
    CHARLES E. JOHNSON, * Acting
    Secretary of the United States
    Department of Health and Human
    Services,
    Respondent.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT **
    Before LUCERO, PORFILIO, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    *
    Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Charles E. Johnson is substituted for
    Michael O. Leavitt as the respondent in this appeal.
    **
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
    argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
    ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
    precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
    collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
    with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    This is an appeal from a final decision of the Secretary of Health and
    Human Services (Secretary), affirming a civil money penalty against Cox
    Retirement Properties, Inc., d/b/a The Cottage Extended Care (the Cottage), for
    noncompliance with certain Medicare regulations governing skilled-nursing
    facilities. We have jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(e), and we affirm.
    The Cottage is a skilled-nursing facility in Tulsa, Oklahoma, certified to
    participate as a provider in both the Medicare and Medicaid programs. As such,
    the Cottage is required to comply with specific regulations aimed at resident
    behavior and facility practices. The Secretary, through the Centers for Medicare
    & Medicaid Services (CMS), is authorized to impose a civil money penalty
    (CMP) against any facility that fails to achieve substantial compliance with
    program requirements. 1
    In January 2006, the Oklahoma State Department of Health (OSDH), acting
    on behalf of CMS, conducted a survey at the Cottage in response to various
    complaints. CMS found that, from January 12 to February 13, 2006, the Cottage
    was out of compliance with the following requirements: to develop and
    implement written policies and procedures that prohibit neglect (
    42 C.F.R. § 483.13
    (c)); to consult with each resident’s physician when there is a significant
    1
    “Substantial compliance” is “a level of compliance with the requirements of
    participation such that any identified deficiencies pose no greater risk to resident
    health or safety than the potential for causing minimal harm.” 
    42 C.F.R. § 488.301
    .
    -2-
    change in the resident’s physical, mental, or psychosocial status (
    42 C.F.R. §483.10
    (b)(11)(B)); and to provide the necessary care and services for each
    resident to attain or maintain the highest practicable physical, mental, and
    psychosocial well-being (
    42 C.F.R. § 483.25
    ). 2 In addition to these deficiencies,
    CMS also determined that, for a twenty-four hour period, a “pattern of
    deficiencies . . . constitute[d] immediate jeopardy to resident health and safety.”
    R. Vol. V at 276. CMS imposed a CMP of “$3,300.00 per day beginning
    January 12, 2006 and continuing through January 12, 2006, the period of
    immediate jeopardy,” and also assessed a CMP “of $50.00 per day, beginning
    January 13, 2006 and continuing until facility achieves substantial compliance.”
    
    Id. at 278
    . By February 13, 2006, the Cottage was found to be in substantial
    compliance.
    After participating in informal dispute resolution which resulted in a
    lessening of the scope and severity of the deficiencies, the Cottage appealed the
    decision to the Departmental Appeals Board (DAB) and requested resolution by
    an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ sustained the finding of substantial
    noncompliance and the resultant penalties. The Cottage then sought review by
    2
    The Cottage incorrectly argues in its reply brief that, because 
    42 C.F.R. § 483.25
     was not identified in CMS’s original survey report, the Secretary
    “cannot rely upon the regulation to state the facility was not in substantial
    compliance with 42 C.F.R. 483.13(c).” Reply Br. at 2. The Cottage neglects the
    fact that under 
    42 C.F.R. § 498.56
    , the ALJ was authorized to add new issues to
    the case and, after her review of the record, informed the parties of her intent to
    do so and heard no objection from either party. R. Vol. II, tab CR 1629 at 3.
    -3-
    the Appellate Division of the DAB (Appellate Division) which upheld the ALJ’s
    decision and adopted all of her findings of fact and conclusions of law. The
    Appellate Division’s decision is the final decision of the Secretary and is directly
    appealable to this court. S. Valley Health Care Ctr. v. Health Care Fin. Admin.,
    
    223 F.3d 1221
    , 1223 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing 
    42 C.F.R. § 498.90
    (a)(1)). “Because
    the DAB affirm[ed] and adopt[ed] the ALJ’s decision, this court also reviews the
    ALJ’s decision as part of the Secretary’s final decision.” Horras v. Leavitt,
    
    495 F.3d 894
    , 899 (8th Cir. 2007).
    “On review in this court, the Secretary’s findings of fact, ‘if supported by
    substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole, shall be conclusive.’”
    S. Valley, 
    223 F.3d at 1223
     (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(e)). “Our review is
    also governed by 
    5 U.S.C. § 706
    . Under § 706(2), we may set aside agency
    conclusions if they are [among other things] . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
    discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law [.]” St. Anthony Hosp. v. U.S.
    Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 
    309 F.3d 680
    , 691 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing
    
    5 U.S.C. § 706
    (2)(A)). “When reviewing the legal propriety of a civil money
    penalty, we have the power to affirm, modify, set aside, or remand the order.”
    S. Valley, 
    223 F.3d at
    1223 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(e)). Finally, “[w]e give
    substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation and application of its own
    regulations.” Id.
    -4-
    The Cottage argues that the Secretary’s deficiency findings are not
    supported by substantial evidence; that its deficiencies did not pose “immediate
    jeopardy” to residents on January 12, 2006; and that the Secretary improperly
    assessed and calculated the CMP as a matter of law.
    Deficiency findings.
    The facts leading to the determination of the deficiencies concern the
    treatment of Resident #7 after she had a seizure on January 2, 2006, and a second
    seizure on January 4, 2006. Resident #7, a fifty-four year old woman, had been
    admitted in November 2005 with multiple diagnoses and a history that included
    end-stage diabetes mellitus, depression, stroke, congestive heart failure, renal
    insufficiency, and hypothyroidism. Resident #7 was under hospice care. Among
    other things, the Resident’s care plan directed the staff to watch carefully for
    complications due to the hypertension, including monitoring of blood pressure,
    shortness of breath, drowsiness, confusion, numbness or tingling. The Resident’s
    physician was to be notified of any signs or symptoms of hypertension crisis.
    Similar monitoring requirements, including watching for signs of changes in
    cognitive or functional levels, were in place because the Resident was also at risk
    for another stroke. Again, the staff was to report to the physician any signs or
    symptoms of repeat stroke.
    The first seizure, witnessed by staff, occurred on January 2, 2006, at
    11:30 am. In response, the staff made one phone call to the on-call physician, but
    -5-
    received no response. Nothing further was done to contact the physician. At
    12:05 pm, staff contacted hospice. Other than a visit on January 3 from hospice
    to treat the Resident’s necrotic big toe, no other action, not even routine
    monitoring apparently, was recorded as having been taken on behalf of the
    Resident for the next two days.
    On January 4, 2006, at 4:30 pm, staff observed the Resident again
    exhibiting seizure-like activity. The on-call doctor was not notified until
    7:00 pm; the Resident was sent to a hospital at 9:30 pm. In the emergency room,
    the Resident was diagnosed with a stroke and a seizure “probably secondary” to
    the stroke. R. Vol. VI at 496.
    The OSDH surveyors were at the Cottage on January 9, 11, and 12, 2006.
    They issued their statement of deficiencies on January 18, 2006. Contrary to the
    conclusions of both the ALJ and the Appellate Division, the Cottage argues that
    the finding of deficiencies was unsupported by substantial evidence. The sum of
    the Cottage’s argument, however, is the conclusory statement that no evidence
    supports either the finding of noncompliance from January 13, 2006, through
    February 13, 2006, or the finding of immediate jeopardy for January 12, 2006.
    The Cottage points to no evidence in the record to contradict that relied upon by
    the Secretary. Instead, the Cottage asserts that “[t]hese are arbitrary dates and the
    record holds no significance for those dates as to immediate jeopardy or
    noncompliance.” Opening Br. at 11.
    -6-
    Initially we note that, in analyzing the deficiency issue in general, the ALJ
    thoroughly reviewed the evidence we have summarized above, including evidence
    regarding Resident # 7’s history and diagnoses upon admission to the Cottage, her
    treatment plan, the facts surrounding the two seizures and staff’s response to
    them, and hospital records upon arrival at the emergency room. The ALJ also
    summarized the documents maintained by the Cottage relative to staff treatment
    of residents. The Appellate Division similarly meticulously reviewed the
    evidence and affirmed the ALJ’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Our
    review of the record as a whole reveals substantial evidence to support the
    Secretary’s findings regarding the existence of the cited deficiencies.
    The first regulation addressed by the ALJ, 
    42 C.F.R. § 483.13
    (c), addresses
    staff treatment of residents and requires that written policies and procedures must
    be implemented to prohibit neglect and abuse of patients. Although the Cottage
    was not charged with neglect per se in its treatment of Resident #7, after
    reviewing the evidence described above, the ALJ found that “on January 2 and 4,
    2006, the facility did not provide R[esident] 7 with services necessary to avoid
    physical harm, and therefore neglected her.” R. Vol. II, tab CR1629 at 8. The
    Cottage does not dispute this finding.
    Section 483.13(c) “addresses adopting effective anti-neglect and abuse
    policies, not targeting isolated events.” Emerald Oaks v. CMS, DAB 1800 at 10,
    
    2001 WL 1688390
     (HHS 2001). “‘[S]ufficient examples of neglect can
    -7-
    demonstrate lack of implementation of an anti-neglect policy.’” Barn Hill Care
    Ctr. v. CMS, DAB 1848 at 5, 
    2002 WL 31395322
     (HHS 2002) (quoting Emerald
    Oaks, DAB 1800 at 10).
    The ALJ reviewed what she described as a “somewhat meager set of written
    documents” submitted by the Cottage to demonstrate its compliance with
    § 483.13(c). R. Vol. II, tab CR 1629 at 7. Simply maintaining documents in a
    file, however, without also implementing the policies contained therein and
    regulating staff actions to assure compliance does not satisfy the regulation.
    Emerald Oaks, DAB No. 1800 at 10. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
    conclusion that “the absence of any facility investigation of these instances of
    neglect [of Resident # 7] establish[es] that the facility failed to implement its own
    policies to prevent neglect.” R. Vol. II, tab 1629 at 10.
    As for 
    42 C.F.R. § 483.10
    (b)(11), the notification-of-changes regulation,
    the Cottage completely failed to notify Resident #7’s physician of her first seizure
    on January 2 and delayed notifying the physician of the second seizure for several
    hours after the onset of symptoms.
    Under the quality-of-care regulation, 
    42 C.F.R. § 483.25
    , the Cottage was
    required to comply with Resident #7’s plan of care. The goals in that plan
    included recognizing all signs and symptoms of a possible stroke and that she
    avoid complications from her hypertension, goals which involved careful
    monitoring and communication with the Resident’s physician. It is clear from the
    -8-
    record that the monitoring and communication required by Resident #7’s plan
    were not done and thus the Cottage failed to maintain the Resident’s “practicable
    physical, mental, and psychosocial well-being.” 
    42 C.F.R. § 483.25
    .
    Determination of immediate jeopardy.
    “Immediate jeopardy” is defined as “a situation in which the provider’s
    noncompliance with one or more requirements of participation has caused, or is
    likely to cause, serious injury, harm, impairment, or death to a resident.”
    
    42 C.F.R. § 488.303
    . As noted above, the CMS found that, for the twenty-four
    hour period of January 12, 2006, the Cottage was in a situation of immediate
    jeopardy.
    The Cottage argues that, because the CMS surveyors were not at the
    Cottage on January 12, 2006, and because no evidence establishes that
    Resident #7 had returned to the Cottage by that date, the finding of immediate
    jeopardy is not supported by substantial evidence. This argument misapprehends
    the scope of immediate jeopardy and the deficiency with which the Cottage was
    charged. As noted above, immediate jeopardy exists when a facility’s
    noncompliance “has caused, or is likely to cause, serious injury, harm,
    impairment, or death to a resident.” 
    Id.
     (emphasis added). The fact that Resident
    #7 may not have been mistreated on January 12, 2006, is of no moment.
    First, “[e]ven in the absence of actual harm, a widespread potential for
    more than minimal harm” is enough to support a finding of immediate jeopardy.
    -9-
    Woodstock Care Ctr. v. Thompson, 
    363 F.3d 583
    , 590 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming
    imposition of eleven-day penalty running from March 4 through March 15 even
    though underlying incidents had largely occurred before the survey period of
    Feb. 27 thru March 4); see also Barn Hill Care Ctr., DAB 1848 at 5-6 (holding
    that a single incident of neglect on a single day preceding a CMS survey can be
    the basis of a finding of immediate jeopardy).
    Second, the Cottage was not charged with neglecting Resident #7 per se. It
    was charged with failure to “develop and implement written policies and
    procedures that prohibit mistreatment, neglect, and abuse of residents.” 
    42 C.F.R. § 483.13
    . We have held that sufficient evidence supported the Secretary’s finding
    that the Cottage failed to comply with that regulation. The failure to implement
    clear, written policies concerning staff treatment of residents could certainly have
    caused Resident #7 to be mistreated, neglected, or abused and could also, sooner
    or later, cause mistreatment, neglect, or abuse of other residents. That is
    sufficient to sustain a finding of immediate jeopardy. See Fairfax Nursing Home,
    Inc. v. United States Dept. of Health & Human Servs, 
    300 F.3d 835
    , 838-39
    (7th Cir. 2002) (affirming imposition of immediate jeopardy penalty for failure to
    “have in place a policy for monitoring its ventilator-dependent residents following
    an episode of respiratory distress” over a 105-day period even though no evidence
    showed actual harm on each of the 105 days).
    -10-
    Assessment and calculation of civil money penalty.
    The Cottage challenges the CMP of $3,300 imposed for the period of
    immediate jeopardy and the $50 per day penalty from January 13, 2006, through
    February 13, 2006. The ALJ, after applying the factors listed in 
    42 C.F.R. § 488.438
    (f), found that the “relatively minimal CMP” for the immediate jeopardy
    was reasonable, and the Appellate Division affirmed. 3 We have held that the
    finding of immediate jeopardy was supported by substantial evidence. We
    similarly hold that the ALJ’s finding and that of the Appellate Division affirming
    the imposition of the immediate jeopardy CMP was substantially supported.
    As for the $50 per day penalty, the Cottage did not contest the imposition
    of deficiencies based on three other regulations dealing with comprehensive care
    plans, 
    42 C.F.R. §§ 483.20
    (d), 483.20(k)(1), and 483.20(k)(3)(ii), for the period
    January 12 through February 13, 2006. CMS thus had discretion to impose a
    CMP for these deficiencies as authorized in 
    42 C.F.R. § 488.406
    , the minimum of
    which must be at least $50 per day, 
    id.
     at § 488.438(a)(1)(ii).
    Our review of the record as a whole demonstrates that the Secretary’s
    findings are supported by substantial evidence, are not arbitrary, capricious or an
    abuse of discretion, and are otherwise in accordance with the law.
    See St. Anthony Hosp., 
    309 F.3d at 690-91
    .
    3
    The mandatory minimum CMP for immediate jeopardy situations is $3050.
    
    42 C.F.R. § 488.438
    (a)(1)(i).
    -11-
    The decision of the secretary is AFFIRMED.
    Entered for the Court
    Stephen H. Anderson
    Circuit Judge
    -12-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 08-9523

Citation Numbers: 323 F. App'x 668

Judges: Anderson, Lucero, Porfilio

Filed Date: 4/17/2009

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/3/2023