Amaro v. State of New Mexico ( 2018 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
June 13, 2018
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
PEDRO J. AMARO,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 17-2178
(D.C. No. 1:16-CV-00993-KG-JHR)
STATE OF NEW MEXICO; SUSANA (D. N.M.)
MARTINEZ; BILL RICHARDSON,
former Governor for the State of New
Mexico; HECTOR H. BALDERAS,
Attorney General for the State of New
Mexico; GARY R. KING, former
Attorney General for New Mexico;
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES; NEW MEXICO
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;
GREGG MARCANTEL; JOE
WILLIAMS, Secretary of Corrections;
JERRY ROARK, Director of Adult
Prisons; TIM LEMASTER, Deputy
Secretary of Operations; LARRY
PHILLIPS, NMCD
Grievance/Disciplinary Appeals;
JAMES R. BREWSTER, General
Counsel; ANGELA M. MARTINEZ,
Health Services Administrator; Y.
RIVERA, A.C.A.
Monitor/Administrator for New
Mexico; G. CHAVEZ; GEO GROUP,
INC., a corporation registered to do
business in New Mexico; JOE R.
WILLIAMS, employed by GEO
Group; FNU LNU, Wardens; FNU
LNU, Chief of Security; FNU LNU,
Grievance Lieutenants; CORIZON,
LLC, a foreign corporation registered
to do business in New Mexico; LISA
STABER, M.D.; KATHY ARMIJO,
employed by Corizons as Health
Services; FNU LNU, John/Jane Does,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before PHILLIPS, McKAY, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
This case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Pedro Amaro, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed this action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against numerous defendants, including the State of New
Mexico, several state officials, the corporation that runs the private prison in
which he is housed, the company that manages healthcare at this prison, and
various individuals affiliated with the prison. He alleged that conditions in the
prison in which he is housed, as well as other prisons operated by the same
company, violate prisoners’ Eighth Amendment rights because design flaws and
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
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structural defects related to the ventilation system, boilers, and flues have caused
several incidents of carbon-monoxide exposure and continue to place prisoners at
risk of further such incidents. He alleged that he experienced “repetitive episodes
of Carbon Monoxide exposure/poisoning,” which occurred on December 28,
2012; January 4, 2013; January 19, 2013; January 21, 2013; and February 6, 2014.
(R. at 24–25.) He further alleged that he “twice utilized the facility’s ‘Grievance’
program under NMCD Policy/Procedure in an attempt to resolve this situation but
all ‘Grievances’ were ‘Denied’ and/or remain unanswered/unresolved.” (R. at
23.) Specifically, as the materials attached to the complaint showed, Plaintiff
filed one grievance following the December 28, 2012 incident, and he pursued
this grievance up until its final denial by the director of prisons on April 8, 2013.
He allegedly filed a second grievance following the February 6, 2014 incident,
but he obtained no relief from this grievance either. He filed this federal
complaint on September 2, 2016, claiming negligence and a violation of his
Eighth Amendment rights based on both the specific past incidents of carbon-
monoxide exposure and the ongoing risk of future exposure. He also raised a due
process claim relating to the way his grievances were handled by the prison
system. In his prayer for relief, he sought declaratory relief, various forms of
injunctive relief, and damages.
The district court sua sponte dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint on several
grounds. First, the court held that, to the extent Plaintiff sought relief for alleged
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incidents at other prisons and for alleged injuries to other prisoners, his pro se
complaint failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. Second, the
court held that the allegations of the complaint were insufficient to state a
plausible § 1983 claim against any named individual defendant, since Plaintiff did
not allege individual conduct or tie the acts of any particular individual to an
alleged constitutional violation. Third, the court held that Plaintiff could not
proceed against the State of New Mexico under § 1983 and his claims against the
state officers in their official capacity were likewise barred as claims against the
state. Finally, the court held that the complaint was also subject to dismissal
because all of Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the applicable statute of
limitations. The court noted that the complaint had been filed less than three
years after the February 6, 2014 incident. However, the court held that this
incident still did not fall within the three-year statute of limitations for civil-
rights claims because the court understood the complaint to be alleging not a
separate incident of exposure on that date, but rather a flare-up of symptoms
relating to the prior exposure. The court held the complaint was subject to
immediate dismissal without leave to amend because amendment would be futile.
The court also denied Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and request for
the appointment of counsel to represent him in this case.
We first consider Plaintiff’s argument that the district court erred in
denying his request for the appointment of counsel. We review this decision only
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for an abuse of discretion. See Rachel v. Troutt, 820 F.3d 390, 397 (10th Cir.
2016). “In considering whether the court acted within its discretion, we consider
the merits of the claims, the nature of the claims, [Plaintiff’s] ability to present
the claims, and the complexity of the issues.” Id. The district court considered
these factors and concluded that Plaintiff was capable of representing himself.
After reviewing the record and Plaintiff’s filings in this court, we see no abuse of
discretion in this decision, and we thus affirm the district court’s denial of
Plaintiff’s request for the appointment of counsel.
We turn then to Plaintiff’s arguments that the district court erred in
dismissing his complaint as time-barred and as failing to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. We review both of these legal issues de novo. See Indus.
Constructors v. Bureau of Reclamation, 15 F.3d 963, 967 (10th Cir. 1994).
We begin by addressing the statute of limitations. Civil-rights claims
arising in New Mexico and brought under § 1983 are governed by a three-year
statute of limitations. Varnell v. Dora Consol. Sch. Dist., 756 F.3d 1208, 1212
(10th Cir. 2014). “A § 1983 action accrues when facts that would support a cause
of action are or should be apparent.” Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th
Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). The statute of limitations is
statutorily tolled while a New Mexico prisoner is pursuing mandatory grievance
proceedings, but this tolling lasts only as long as the grievance process
“‘continue[s] in force.’” Roberts v. Barreras, 484 F.3d 1236, 1243 (10th Cir.
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2007) (quoting N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37-1-12). “A complaint may be dismissed sua
sponte under § 1915 based on an affirmative defense—such as statute of
limitations—only when the defense is obvious from the face of the complaint and
no further factual record is required to be developed.” Fogle, 435 F.3d at 1258
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Based on the complaint and attached documents, it is clear the statute of
limitations for Plaintiff’s claims relating to the December 2012 and January 2013
incidents accrued no later than April 2013, when Plaintiff received the final
denial of his administrative grievance relating to this exposure. At that point, the
“facts that would support a cause of action [we]re or should [have been]
apparent,” id., and the statute of limitations was no longer being tolled by the
grievance proceedings. Because Plaintiff did not file his complaint until
September 2016, his claims relating to these earlier incidents are barred by the
statute of limitations. Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff’s due process claim is
based on the 2013 grievance proceeding, it is clear from the face of the complaint
that this claim likewise accrued in April 2013 and is thus time-barred. We affirm
the dismissal of these claims based on the statute of limitations.
As for the February 2014 incident, however, we agree with Plaintiff that the
district court failed to liberally construe the allegations in his complaint. See
Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1109–10 (10th Cir. 1991). It is possible to read
the complaint in the way the district court read it, as alleging only a flare-up of
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symptoms in February 2014 based on the December 2012 incident, but the more
liberal—and more natural—reading of the complaint is to allege multiple
individual incidents of carbon-monoxide exposure at the prison, including one
incident in February 2014. Moreover, the allegations of the complaint indicate
that the statute of limitations was tolled as to this claim by Plaintiff’s pursuit of
the mandatory grievance process. Since the complaint was filed in September
2016, well within the three-year statute of limitations for civil-rights claims, the
district court erred in dismissing these claims—and any related due process
claims based on the grievance proceedings—as time-barred. To the extent
Plaintiff raised claims of negligence based on this incident that may have been
governed by a two-year statute of limitations instead, the district court likewise
erred in dismissing these claims as time-barred, since Plaintiff alleged that his
grievance was pending until at least October 2014, and thus it was not “patently
clear” from the face of his complaint that a two-year statute of limitations would
bar these claims either. Fratus v. DeLand, 49 F.3d 673, 675 (10th Cir. 1995).
Finally, we note that the district court failed to consider how the statute of
limitations would apply to Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief,
which are primarily based on Plaintiff’s allegations that he is currently being
subjected to an ongoing violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from
unsafe prison conditions and that the Eighth Amendment requires the prison to
protect him against future harm. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33
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(1993) (“That the Eighth Amendment protects against future harm to inmates is
not a novel proposition. . . . It would be odd to deny an injunction to inmates who
plainly proved an unsafe, life-threatening condition in their prison on the ground
that nothing yet had happened to them.”). We decline to decide in the first
instance how the statute of limitations would apply to these claims, and we thus
will not affirm the dismissal of these claims on this basis on appeal.
We turn then to the question of whether these surviving claims—Plaintiff’s
claims relating to the February 2014 incident and the associated grievance
process, as well as his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief—should be
affirmed on the alternative basis given by the district court, for failure to state a
plausible claim for relief.
We first hold that the district court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff’s
claims that were based on other prisons and other prisoners. “A litigant may
bring his own claims to federal court without counsel, but not the claims of
others.” Fymbo v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 213 F.3d 1320, 1321 (10th Cir.
2000). Plaintiff argues that this principle simply proves that an attorney should
have been appointed to represent him and other potential class members;
however, as previously explained, we see no abuse of discretion in the district
court’s decision not to appoint counsel, and we are not persuaded that Plaintiff’s
desire to pursue a class action either required appointment of an attorney or
permitted him to litigate the claims of others. Plaintiff further argues he should
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be permitted to seek injunctive relief relating to other prisons because there is a
chance that he may be transferred to another prison that has the same unsafe
conditions as his current one. However, the abstract possibility that he may be
transferred to an unsafe prison in the future is insufficient to satisfy Article III’s
standing requirements. See Rector v. City & Cty. of Denver, 348 F.3d 935, 946
(10th Cir. 2003).
As for Plaintiff’s claims against the individual defendants based on the
alleged carbon-monoxide exposure in February 2014 and associated grievance
proceedings, we agree with the district court that the complaint was not
sufficiently specific as to how each individual defendant violated his
constitutional rights to state a valid claim for relief under § 1983. In § 1983 cases
involving a government agency and several government actors sued in their
individual capacities, “it is particularly important . . . that the complaint make
clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each
individual with fair notice as to the basis of the claims against him or her, as
distinguished from collective allegations against the state.” Robbins v.
Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1249–50 (10th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff’s complaint “fails
to isolate the allegedly unconstitutional acts of each defendant, and thereby does
not provide adequate notice as to the nature of the claims against each.” Id.
However, given that these claims are not facially time-barred and that the
complaint might be amended to include the required specificity, we conclude that
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the district court erred in dismissing these claims without granting Plaintiff leave
to amend. Thus, although the complaint as it currently stands is not sufficient to
state a valid claim for relief under § 1983 against the individual defendants, we
reverse and remand these non-time-barred claims with instructions that Plaintiff
be granted an opportunity to amend his complaint.
We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against the
State of New Mexico. “Section 1983 provides a federal forum to remedy many
deprivations of civil liberties, but it does not provide a federal forum for litigants
who seek a remedy against a State for alleged deprivations of civil liberties.”
Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989).
As for Plaintiff’s claims against state officials in their official capacities,
however, the district court erred in holding that all such claims must likewise be
barred based on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Will. In Will, the Court held that
a plaintiff could not obtain damages from a state official sued in his official
capacity because “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is
not against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office,” and, “[a]s
such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.” Id. at 61, 71.
However, the Court expressly reaffirmed the validity of the Ex parte Young rule,
which allows claims for prospective equitable relief to be brought against state
officials in their official capacities. See id. at 71 n.10; see also Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123, 158–59 (1908). Thus, Will bars claims for retroactive relief that
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are brought against state officials in their official capacities, but it does not bar
requests for prospective relief that fall under the Ex parte Young rule. See Comm.
for the First Amendment v. Campbell, 962 F.2d 1517, 1519 n.1 (10th Cir. 1992).
In determining whether Ex parte Young applies to a particular claim, we “need
only conduct a straightforward inquiry into whether the complaint alleges an
ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as
prospective.” Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645
(2002) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). If so, then the claim is
not barred by sovereign immunity or the language of § 1983. See id., see also
Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10. Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief
satisfy these criteria, and thus the court erred in dismissing them based on Will.
We accordingly reverse the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and
declaratory relief against the state officials in their official capacities.
Finally, we note that the district court did not address Plaintiff’s claims
against the private companies that manage the prison where he is incarcerated and
the healthcare system of that prison. The only reason the district court gave for
dismissing these claims was the statute of limitations. Thus, there is no
alternative ground for affirming the dismissal of these claims in this appeal. We
accordingly affirm the dismissal of the claims against these defendants that are
based on the time-barred 2012 and 2013 incidents, but we otherwise reverse the
dismissal of the claims against these defendants and remand them for further
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proceedings before the district court.
Plaintiff also cursorily argues that the district court erred in denying his
motion for summary judgment. We see no error in this decision. The defendants
have not even been served yet, and this motion is clearly premature. Although we
are reversing the dismissal of several of Plaintiff’s claims for relief, we express
no opinion as to the ultimate merit of these claims, nor do we express any opinion
as to the possible existence of other procedural grounds for dismissal.
We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motions for the
appointment of an attorney and for summary judgment. We AFFIRM the
dismissal of (1) all claims against the State of New Mexico; (2) any claims of
damages suffered by other prisoners; (3) all requests for relief at prisons where
Plaintiff was not and is not incarcerated; (4) all claims premised on the December
2012 or January 2013 incidents or the grievance process associated with those
incidents; and (5) any claims for damages against state officials in their official
capacities. We AFFIRM the district court’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s claims
against the individual state officials and prison employees for the February 2014
incident and related grievance proceeding are not currently alleged with sufficient
individual specificity to state a valid claim for relief under § 1983, but we
REVERSE these claims with instructions for the district court to provide Plaintiff
an opportunity to amend his complaint to remedy this deficiency. All other
claims are REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings in accordance
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with this opinion. We GRANT Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis
on appeal but remind him of his obligation to continue making partial payments
until the entire filing fee has been paid in full.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
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