Opala v. Hargrave , 454 F.3d 1154 ( 2006 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
July 21, 2006
PU BL ISH
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
UNITED STATES COURT O F APPEALS Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
M A RIA N P. O PA LA ,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JOSEPH M . W ATT; JAM ES R.
W INC HESTER; RO BERT E.
No. 05-6261
LA VEN DER; RU DOLPH
HARGRAV E; YVO NNE KAU GER;
JAM ES E. EDM ON DSO N, STEVEN
W . TAY LOR ; and TOM CO LBERT,
in their individual and administrative
capacities,
Defendants - Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the W estern District of Oklahoma
(D .C . No. CIV-04-1771-R)
W .A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney General (Neal Leader, Senior Assistant
Attorney General on the briefs), Office of the Attorney General State of
Oklahoma, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for the D efendants - Appellants.
Scott F. Brockman (Stanley M . W ard and W oodrow K. Glass, with him on the
briefs), W ard & Glass, LLP, Norman, Oklahoma for the Plaintiff - Appellee.
Before L UC ER O, EBEL, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
L UC ER O, Circuit Judge.
Article 7 section 2 of the Oklahoma Constitution provides that the Justices
of the Oklahoma Supreme Court shall choose a Chief Justice and Vice-Chief
Justice from among their members. Having failed in his desire to be chosen once
again Chief Justice of the Oklahoma Supreme Court, Justice M arian P. Opala
seeks to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts in his effort to achieve that
end. He brings to us claims that he was discriminated against on the basis of his
age in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and that his due process rights
were violated when his colleagues on the Oklahoma Supreme Court changed the
rule of rotation for elevation of a Chief Justice from one which precluded re-
election to that position for more than one consecutive term to one which lifted
that prohibition and re-elected Joseph P. W att as Chief Justice.
After Justice Opala named his judicial colleagues as defendants in federal
proceedings, they responded by asserting several defenses, including sovereign
immunity, qualified immunity, and legislative immunity. The district court
disagreed with the defendants, concluded that federal jurisdiction was properly
invoked, and denied the motion to dismiss. Defendants bring an interlocutory
appeal. W e take a quite different view of the jurisdictional issue, and for the
reasons that follow, we REV ER SE the judgment of the district court and
R EM A N D with instructions to DISM ISS the complaint with prejudice.
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I
Implementation of the Oklahoma constitutional provision for choosing a
Chief Justice and a Vice-Chief Justice is set forth in Rule 4 of the Internal
Operating Procedures of the Oklahoma Supreme Court Conference. Prior to
November 4, 2004, Rule 4 provided:
The term of office of Chief Justice shall rotate among eligible
members of the Court every two years. A Justice is eligible to
become Chief Justice when each sitting Justice at the time of the
Justice’s appointment has completed a term as Chief Justice or
waived his or her right to do so. No Justice shall succeed himself or
herself as Chief Justice, nor shall a Justice be eligible hereunder until
he or she has completed six years service as Justice of this Court.
(“Old Rule 4”). In his complaint, Justice Opala claims that this rule, and his
status as Vice-Chief Justice at the time, created a “reasonable expectation” that he
would be nominated for Chief Justice.
On November 4, 2004, all members of the Oklahoma Supreme Court, save
Justice Opala, convened a conference to vote on a proposed change to Rule 4.
Justice Opala was aware of the meeting, but chose not to attend in protest. The
defendants voted to amend the rule, which now reads:
The term of office of Chief Justice shall rotate among eligible
members of the Court every two years. The next senior Justice who
has never served as Chief Justice should be considered for election as
Chief Justice, provided that the Justice has served at least four (4)
years on this Court including service as Vice-Chief Justice. If the
next senior Justice has not served at least four (4) years on the C ourt
including service as Vice-Chief Justice, the incumbent Chief Justice
or any other Justice who has served as Chief Justice may be elected
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to another two-year term as Chief Justice. Otherwise, the Chief
Justice will serve only one term.
(“New Rule 4”). According to Justice Opala, the practical effects of this
amendment were to cause defendant-Chief Justice Joseph W att to have top
priority for being re-elected to the position of Chief Justice, and to prohibit
Justice Opala himself from being elected as Chief Justice. Specifically, Justice
Opala asserted that because of “[his] tenure as a Justice of the Court, [he] was the
only Justice eligible to be nominated for the Office of Chief Justice because each
of the other Justices that had satisfied the qualification of completing six (6) years
of service as Justice [Opala] had completed a term of Chief Justice.” The
defendant-Justices duly voted pursuant to New Rule 4, and re-elected Chief
Justice Watt. Justice James W inchester was elected to Vice-Chief Justice.
On December 29, 2004, Justice Opala filed suit in federal district court
against the other members of the Oklahoma Supreme Court challenging the
constitutionality of New Rule 4. He argued that the amendment to Old Rule 4
violated his rights to equal protection of the laws pursuant to the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments because it was motivated in part by his age (Justice
Opala was eighty-three at the time of filing). He also asserted that he was
deprived of a liberty interest in the Chief Justiceship in violation of the
procedural component of the Due Process Clause because the amendment did not
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provide for any post-deprivation hearing. The only redress he sought was a
declaration that New Rule 4 violated the Constitution.
As noted, defendants moved to dismiss invoking legislative immunity,
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, qualified immunity, and
failure to present a substantial federal question. The district court denied the
motion, finding that: (1) legislative immunity did not apply because the
amendment was an administrative and not a legislative act; (2) the suit fell within
the Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), exception to Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity because Justice Opala was seeking prospective – not
retroactive – equitable relief; (3) qualified immunity did not apply because Justice
Opala was not seeking money damages; and (4) determining whether Justice
Opala asserted a “substantial federal question” was infeasible without discovery.
Defendants’ subsequent motion for reconsideration of the denial of their motion
to dismiss was denied by the district court. It was then that the defendants sought
this interlocutory appeal.
II
W e review de novo the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Brumark Corp. v. Samson Resources Corp.,
57 F.3d 941, 944 (10th Cir. 1995). W e have jurisdiction to review the district
court’s denial of defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under the collateral order exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which
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provides for interlocutory appeal of orders denying motions to dismiss brought on
the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity as the basis for appellate jurisdiction.
Before Justice Opala filed this suit, Chief Justice W att was re-elected to his
post, and Justice Opala was succeeded as Vice-Chief Justice by Justice
W inchester. Because we are only permitted to grant prospective equitable relief
under Ex Parte Young, we cannot undo this election. M oreover, a declaration that
New Rule 4 is unconstitutional will not remedy Justice Opala’s claimed injury
that he was not able to stand for election under Old Rule 4 while serving as Vice-
Chief Justice. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s denial of defendants’
motions to dismiss, and remand with instructions that the district court dismiss
the complaint for want of jurisdiction.
As courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction, the federal courts may only
rule upon “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. “[T]he core
component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-
controversy requirement of Article III.” Lujan v. Defenders of W ildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560 (1992). Standing “is the threshold question in every federal case,
determining the power of the court to entertain the suit.” W arth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
The “irreducible constitutional minimum” of A rticle III’s case-or-
controversy requirement contains three elements. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560;
Committee to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 447 (10th Cir.1996).
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First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact” that is “concrete” rather
than “conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. Second, the plaintiff
must show that there is a “causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of.” Id. Finally, the plaintiff must show that it is “likely,” and not
merely “speculative,” that the injury complained of will be “redressed by a
favorable decision.” Id., 504 U.S. at 561. The party seeking to invoke federal
jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing all three elements of standing. Id.Because this suit is against the members of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in
their official capacities, federal jurisdiction is limited by sovereign immunity.
“[N]onconsenting States may not be sued by private individuals in federal court.”
Bd. of Trustees of U niv. of A la. v. Garrett, 531 U .S. 356, 363 (2001); see also
Alden v. M aine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (“[A]s the Constitution’s structure, and
its history, and the authoritative interpretations by this Court make clear, the
States’ immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the
States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution and which they retain
today . . . .”).
A state’s immunity from suit by private individuals in federal court is not
absolute. It may be overcome in three instances: (1) the state consents to suit;
(2) Congress expressly abrogates the states’ immunity; or (3) the citizen sues a
state official pursuant to Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See J.B. ex rel.
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Hart v. Valdez, 186 F.3d 1280, 1286 (10th Cir. 1999). This third exception to
Eleventh A mendment immunity is now before us.
In determining whether a suit falls within the Ex Parte Young exception,
this court applies a four-part test:
First, we determine whether the action is against state officials or the
state itself. Second, we look at whether the alleged conduct of the
state officials constitutes a violation of federal law. Third, we assess
whether the relief sought is permissible prospective relief or
analogous to a retroactive award of damages impacting the state
treasury. Finally, we analyze whether the suit rises to the level of
implicating ‘special sovereignty interests.’
Robinson v. Kansas, 295 F.3d 1183, 1191 (10th Cir. 2002) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
The district court found that Justice Opala’s suit satisfied all four criteria
for the Ex Parte Young exception. In order to review this determination, it is
necessary that we consider Justice Opala’s complaint in detail. Justice Opala
sought a declaratory judgment declaring that the amendment of Rule 4:
(1) constitutes a violation of Plaintiff’s right to equal protection
pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution; (2) constitutes a substantial deprivation of
Plaintiff’s property without due process of law in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution; (3)
violated due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution because it does not provide for any
adequate and immediate post-deprivation hearing on Plaintiff’s
preclusion from eligibility to be nominated for the position of Chief
Justice; and (4) constitutes a substantial deprivation of Plaintiff’s
liberty interest without due process of law in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
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The district court observed that Justice Opala is not requesting retroactive money
damages from the state; rather, the relief he is requesting is to “end an ongoing
violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights” by reinstating Old Rule 4. Opala v.
W att, 393 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1160 (W .D. Okla. 2005). The court correctly
concluded that the mere fact that Opala was seeking to “right a previous wrong”
did not disqualify the action from the Ex Parte Young exception.
However, the district court’s analysis of its jurisdiction in this matter was
incomplete: Not only must the requested relief be prospective in nature (to
satisfy Ex Parte Young), a ruling from this court must be capable of redressing
the alleged injury for Justice Opala to have standing to file his suit. Because
Justice Opala was no longer the Vice-Chief Justice of the Oklahoma Supreme
Court when he filed suit, and because the equitable powers of the federal courts
are limited to providing prospective equitable relief, we ordered supplemental
briefing on whether this court was capable of issuing a remedy that redresses
Justice Opala’s alleged injury. In their supplemental brief, appellants argue that
even were we to declare that New Rule 4 is unconstitutional, Justice Opala w ould
nevertheless have to stand for election, and his election to Chief Justice would not
be more likely. Thus, they tell us, any relief we may afford would only
speculatively redress Justice Opala’s alleged injury. Justice Opala disagrees, and
insists that if w e reinstated Old Rule 4, such action would undoubtedly redress his
injuries. He argues that “[a] ruling in Justice Opala’s favor would declare the
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amended Rule 4 invalid as violative of Justice Opala’s Constitutional rights, and
would place Justice Opala in the Constitutionally-protected position he was in
prior to the rule’s amendment.” This statement, however, mischaracterizes
Justice Opala’s injury. According to his own brief, his injury is that “the
amendment to Rule 4 removed him from his investitive track to be Chief Justice
without rational basis and did not permit him to come up for selection as Chief
Justice in the same manner that all other Vice-Chief Justices had for the past sixty
plus (60+) years.” Because declaring New Rule 4 to be unconstitutional would
not redress this injury, we must vacate the judgment below and dismiss the suit.
In Glover River Org. v. United States D ept. of Interior, 675 F.2d 251 (10th
Cir. 1982), we considered a challenge to the Secretary of Interior’s listing of the
leopard darter on an endangered species list. Plaintiffs claimed that they were
injured because the listing precluded them from promoting a flood control project
on a river in Oklahoma. Id. at 254. They sought an injunction requiring the
Secretary of the Interior to prepare an environmental impact statement together
with an order staying the listing until the statement was completed. Id. W e held
plaintiffs lacked standing because a remedy from the federal courts would not
redress their alleged injuries. Id. at 255. Specifically, we concluded that even if
preparation of an environmental impact statement led to the removal of the
leopard darter from the endangered species list, “this would not ensure the
funding or construction of the project.” Id.- 10 -
M ore recently in W yoming Sawmills, Inc. v. United States Forest Service,
383 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2004), a timber company claimed that it was denied the
right to buy timber because of an Historical Preservation Plan issued by the
United States Forest Service for the management of M edicine W heel National
Historic Landmark. The company claimed that the refusal to hold the timber sale
violated the Establishment Clause and the national Forest M anagement Act. Id. at
1244-45. The district court found that the plaintiff timber company lacked
standing to challenge the Plan “because the court could not remedy the
constitutional wrongs plaintiff had alleged.” Id. at 1246. Even if the Historic
Preservation Plan were declared unconstitutional, the district court concluded, the
Forest Service would nevertheless not be under any obligation to sell timber from
the area. Affirming the dismissal for lack of standing for want of pleading a
redressable injury, we held:
W yoming Sawmills has not shown that a timber lease would “likely”
become available on the lands w ithin the area of consultation if
plaintiff were to have the HPP set aside. As in Baca [Baca v. King,
92 F.3d 1031 (10th Cir. 1996)], the federal agency has complete
discretion as to whether to offer the opportunity sought by the
plaintiff, and accordingly the courts do not have the power to grant
the only relief that would rectify the alleged injury.
Id. at 1249.
Applying these authorities to the present litigation yields a clear result:
Any remedy the federal courts could fashion would not redress Justice Opala’s
injury. According to his complaint, Justice Opala w as injured because he had to
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face election under New Rule 4 rather than under Old Rule 4. Because he was
Vice-Chief Justice at the time, the use of Old Rule 4 would have made his
election as Chief Justice likely. As stated in his brief:
[A] ruling in his favor, which would reinstate the pre-determined
sequential order to that which existed prior to the Rule 4 amendment,
would redress in full Justice Opala’s grievance. It will place him
back in the investitive track for Chief Justice, cure the Constitutional
defects incurred by Appellee’s Rule 4 amendment, and allow Justice
Opala to stand for selection as Chief Justice where he must be the
first ‘candidate’ considered.
However, we lack the power to “reinstate the pre-determined sequential order to
that which existed prior to the Rule 4 amendment.” W e simply cannot make
Justice Opala Vice-Chief Justice again. This is precisely the type of retroactive
equitable relief prohibited under the Ex Parte Young doctrine. The relief sought
in the complaint – a declaration that New Rule 4 is unconstitutional – would not
place Justice Opala in the position he was in on November 3, 2004. There is no
prospective remedy that can unring that bell. 1 Justice Opala’s claimed injury is
1
At oral argument, counsel for Justice Opala, responding to a line of
questioning about redressability, suggested that the proper remedy was a “post-
election, post-deprivation name clearing” hearing. W e cannot understand how
such a hearing would redress Justice Opala’s claimed injury.
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simply not redressable with prospective relief. 2 Thus, the federal courts lack the
power to resolve this dispute.
III
Because no prospective equitable relief can redress Justice Opala’s alleged
injury, we REV ER SE the judgment of the district court and REM AND with
instructions that the district court DISM ISS the complaint for want of jurisdiction
with prejudice. Justice Opala’s “application to file statement regarding disputed
facts” is DENIED.
2
Justice Opala cites Regents for the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978) for the proposition that a plaintiff need not prove he will prevail in a
contest (such as the election for Chief Justice) in order to constitutionally
challenge the rules of that contest. In Bakke, the Supreme Court held that a
medical school applicant had standing to challenge the school’s quota for
minority students although he could not prove that absent the quota he would
have been admitted. Bakke’s injury did not consist in being rejected from
medical school per se. Rather, he allegedly was injured by being forced to
unconstitutionally compete for a smaller number of slots. This is not the case
before us. The only remedy that we may provide is to declare New Rule 4
unconstitutional. This would not redress Justice O pala’s claimed injury because
it w ould not restore his place in the “investitive track.”
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