DCBS v. Muliro , 359 Or. 736 ( 2016 )


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  • 736	                        June 16, 2016	                        No. 39
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
    STATE OF OREGON
    In the Matter of the Compensation of
    Rebecca M. Muliro, Claimant.
    DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER
    AND BUSINESS SERVICES,
    Workers’ Compensation Division;
    and ComPro, Inc.,
    Respondents on Review,
    v.
    Rebecca M. MULIRO,
    Petitioner on Review,
    and
    LIBERTY NORTHWEST
    INSURANCE CORPORATION;
    Adams & Gray Home Care - Marquis Home Health;
    and Assured at Home,
    Respondents.
    (WCB 103496, 1102720; CA A152594; SC S062922)
    En Banc
    On review from the Court of Appeals.*
    Submitted on the record on January 12, 2016.
    R. Adian Martin, Portland, filed the brief for petitioner
    on review.
    Greg Rios, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed the
    brief for respondent on review. With him on the brief were
    Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Paul L. Smith,
    Deputy Solicitor General.
    NAKAMOTO, J.
    The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The
    order of the Workers’ Compensation Board is reversed, and
    the case is remanded to the board for further proceedings.
    ______________
    *  Review from Workers’ Compensation Board. 
    267 Or App 526
    , 341 P3d 131
    (2014).
    Cite as 
    359 Or 736
     (2016)	737
    Case Summary: The Department of Consumer and Business Services (DCBS)
    sought judicial review of the Workers’ Compensation Board’s order providing
    that, under ORS 656.210(2)(b), the employer’s preexisting knowledge of claim-
    ant’s secondary employment was imputed to the insurer. DCBS argued that,
    under the express terms of ORS 656.210(2)(b)(A), what a claimant must provide,
    and the insurer must receive, is actual notice. The Court of Appeals agreed that,
    under ORS 656.210(2)(b)(A), the insurer must receive actual notice. Held: ORS
    656.210(2)(b)(A) requires a claimant to prove that the insurer received actual
    notice of the claimant’s secondary employment within 30 days of the insurer’s
    receipt of the initial claim.
    The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The order of the board is
    reversed, and the case is remanded to the board for further proceedings.
    738	                                         DCBS v. Muliro
    NAKAMOTO, J.
    Under the Workers’ Compensation Act, an injured
    worker with more than one employer may be entitled to
    receive supplemental temporary disability benefits from the
    Workers’ Benefit Fund, in addition to the disability benefits
    the worker receives from the employer’s insurer. The injured
    worker cannot qualify “unless the insurer * * * receives,”
    within 30 days of receipt of an initial claim, “notice that the
    worker was employed in more than one job” at the time of
    injury. ORS 656.210(2)(b)(A). The question in this case is
    whether an injured worker must provide actual notice of
    the worker’s secondary employment in connection with the
    claims process or whether the employer’s preexisting knowl-
    edge of that employment may be imputed to the insurer to
    satisfy the notice requirement of ORS 656.210(2)(b)(A). We
    hold that the correct interpretation of ORS 656.210(2)(b)(A)
    requires a claimant to prove that the insurer received actual
    notice of the claimant’s secondary employment within 30
    days of the insurer’s receipt of the initial claim.
    I. BACKGROUND
    We take the historical facts, which are undisputed,
    from the findings of the Workers’ Compensation Board in its
    order on review. While claimant was employed by Adams
    & Gray Home Care-Marquis Home Health (Adams & Gray)
    as a certified nursing assistant, she sustained a workplace
    injury.
    At that time, claimant also worked for two other
    home health employers, and Adams & Gray was aware of
    that fact. Two coordinators at Adams & Gray responsible for
    scheduling claimant’s work hours, claimant’s supervisors,
    knew of her secondary employment because claimant would
    at various times let a supervisor know, when asked to han-
    dle a placement, that she was already scheduled by another
    agency.
    Claimant promptly sought workers’ compensation
    benefits for her injury. She filed a workers’ compensation
    claim, which Adams & Gray’s insurer, Liberty Northwest
    Insurance Corporation (Liberty), received less than a week
    later. As part of her claim, claimant filled out and signed
    Cite as 
    359 Or 736
     (2016)	739
    several workers’ compensation benefits forms that were
    submitted to Liberty—a Liberty claim form (Form 801) and
    a Department of Consumer and Business Services (DCBS)
    “Worker’s and Physician’s Report for Workers’ Compensation
    Claims” form (Form 827). On each form, there was a box
    above the signature line labeled either “Check here if you
    are employed w/more than one employer” or “Check here
    if you have more than one employer.” Claimant did not
    check the boxes on those forms that would have indicated
    that she had more than one employer. Form 801 contained
    Liberty’s mailing address, telephone number, and fax num-
    ber, and Form 827 provided a telephone number to call in
    case the claimant did not “know the name and address of
    the insurer.”
    Claimant gave a recorded statement to a claims
    investigator less than two weeks after she had filed her
    claim. Claimant told the investigator that Adams & Gray
    usually gave her 40 hours of work per week. The investiga-
    tor did not ask claimant whether she had other employers
    while working for Adams & Gray, and claimant did not vol-
    unteer that information. Within 30 days of filing her claim,
    neither claimant nor Adams & Gray had informed Liberty
    that claimant had secondary employment, and Liberty was
    unaware of that fact.
    Approximately nine months after her injury,
    claimant informed Liberty through counsel that she had
    had multiple employers at the time of her injury and
    requested supplemental temporary disability benefits.
    Liberty elected not to process the claim for supplemental
    disability benefits, so DCBS, through its assigned process-
    ing administrator, ComPro, Inc., did so.1 ComPro denied
    claimant’s request on the ground that claimant was inel-
    igible for those benefits because Liberty had not received
    timely notice of claimant’s secondary employment, as
    required by ORS 656.210(2)(b)(A).
    1
    If an insurer elects to transfer responsibility to process and pay supple-
    mental disability benefits, DCBS will “administer and pay the supplemental
    benefits directly or shall assign responsibility to administer and process the
    payment to a paying agent selected by the director.” ORS 656.210(5)(b); OAR
    436-060-0035(l)(a). In that event, ComPro acts as assigned administrator for
    supplemental disability benefits on behalf of DCBS.
    740	                                         DCBS v. Muliro
    Subsequently, claimant requested a hearing before
    the board’s Hearings Division. Based on Adams & Gray’s
    knowledge of claimant’s secondary employment and the
    reasoning of an earlier board decision, the administra-
    tive law judge (ALJ) concluded that Liberty had received
    timely notice of claimant’s secondary employment. The
    ALJ determined that claimant was eligible for supple-
    mental disability benefits and ordered ComPro to process
    claimant’s claim. DCBS and ComPro sought board review
    of that decision, and the board affirmed the ALJ’s order.
    The board concluded that “the ‘notice’ requirement of ORS
    656.210(2)(b)(A) has been met when the employer receives
    information regarding secondary employment.”
    The board acknowledged that the express language
    of the statute provides that notice must be received by the
    “insurer” and that an “employer (unless it is self-insured)
    has no express statutory obligation to pass information/
    knowledge to its insurer or statutory administrator, and
    no responsibilities under the Director’s rules for process-
    ing supplemental disability claims.” But, the board stated
    that it is “well settled that, with respect to the process-
    ing of claims, notice provided by a claimant to an insured
    employer may be imputed to the insurer.” According to the
    board, even if claimant had the burden to provide notice of
    secondary employment, “[c]laimant did provide the infor-
    mation, albeit to [Adams & Gray],” and the “issue of whether
    [the required] information should be imputed from [Adams
    & Gray] to [Liberty] is a matter distinct from the express
    statutory language.” (Footnote omitted; emphasis in orig-
    inal.) As support, the board cited three Court of Appeals
    cases “dealing with ‘imputation’ between an employer and
    its insurer”: Anfilofieff v. SAIF, 
    52 Or App 127
    , 627 P2d 1274
    (1981); Nix v. SAIF, 
    80 Or App 656
    , 723 P2d 366, rev den,
    
    302 Or 158
     (1986); and SAIF v. Abbott, 
    103 Or App 49
    , 796
    P2d 378 (1990), modified on recons, 
    107 Or App 53
    , 810 P2d
    878 (1991). Underlying the board’s decision was its concern
    that it should not interpret the statutory scheme in a way
    that “would allow an employer to nullify a supplemental dis-
    ability claim by simply refraining from forwarding other-
    wise timely received supplemental disability information to
    its insurer.”
    Cite as 
    359 Or 736
     (2016)	741
    DCBS, with Liberty and Adams & Gray join-
    ing, sought judicial review in the Court of Appeals.
    DCBS argued that, under the express terms of ORS
    656.210(2)(b)(A), what a claimant must provide, and
    the insurer must receive, is “actual notice.” The Court of
    Appeals agreed that ORS 656.210(2)(b)(A) identifies who
    must receive notice and makes no provision for any type of
    notice other than actual notice. DCBS v. Muliro, 
    267 Or App 526
    , 536, 341 P3d 131 (2014). The Court of Appeals
    also noted that the director of DCBS had adopted an agency
    rule to implement the provisions of ORS 656.210(2)(b) that
    was consistent with its reading of the statute. That rule,
    OAR 436-060-0035(6), is not challenged in this case and
    augments ORS 656.210(2)(b) by expressly stating that the
    injured worker must provide notice to the insurer. The
    Court of Appeals determined that Anfilofieff, Nix, and
    Abbott did not “provide helpful context for an interpretation
    of the notice requirement in ORS 656.210(2)(b)(A).” Muliro,
    267 Or App at 535. Instead, the court considered its rea-
    soning in Valencia v. GEP BTL, LLC, 
    247 Or App 115
    , 269
    P3d 65 (2011), to be instructive. Relying on that case, the
    Court of Appeals determined that “an injured worker seek-
    ing supplemental disability has the burden of satisfying the
    requirements of ORS 656.210(2)(b); when the worker does
    not provide the necessary information, the entity responsi-
    ble for processing the claim is not obligated to independently
    seek that information out.” Muliro, 267 Or App at 536. As a
    result, the Court of Appeals rejected claimant’s contention
    that Adams & Gray’s knowledge of claimant’s secondary
    employment should be imputed to Liberty.
    Claimant petitioned for review in this court, chal-
    lenging the conclusion that ORS 656.210(2)(b)(A) requires a
    claimant to provide, and the insurer to receive, actual notice
    of secondary employment. We allowed review to address the
    interpretation of ORS 656.210(2)(b)(A).
    II. ANALYSIS
    The issue presented involves statutory construc-
    tion, which we resolve by applying familiar principles set
    out in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 
    317 Or 606
    ,
    610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993), and State v. Gaines, 
    346 Or 742
    	                                           DCBS v. Muliro
    160, 171-72, 206 P3d 1042 (2009). We attempt to discern the
    meaning of the statute most likely intended by the legis-
    lature that enacted it, examining the text in context, any
    relevant legislative history, and pertinent rules of interpre-
    tation. Gaines, 346 Or at 171-72.
    Determining the intended meaning of a statute is
    a question of law. Bergerson v. Salem-Keizer School District,
    
    341 Or 401
    , 411, 144 P3d 918 (2006). But, depending on
    the nature of the statutory terms at issue, an administra-
    tive agency’s construction of a statute nevertheless may be
    entitled to a measure of deference. See generally Springfield
    Education Assn. v. School Dist., 
    290 Or 217
    , 223, 621 P2d 547
    (1980) (summarizing the categorization of statutory terms).
    Whether the agency’s construction is entitled to such defer-
    ence depends on whether the disputed term is exact, inexact,
    or delegative. 
    Id.
     Whether legislation is exact, inexact, or del-
    egative is itself a question of statutory construction, requir-
    ing us to examine the text of the statute in its context. J. R.
    Simplot Co. v. Dept. of Agriculture, 
    340 Or 188
    , 197-98, 131
    P3d 162 (2006). As explained below, this case involves inexact
    terms, and, in those types of cases, we examine the meaning
    of the statute without deference to the agency’s construction.
    A.  Supplemental Disability Benefits and the Statute
    We begin our analysis with an overview of the
    supplemental temporary disability benefits and the stat-
    ute at issue. The Workers’ Benefit Fund (the Fund) pays
    for special benefits designed to promote full employment
    and compensation to injured workers. OAR 411-031-
    0040(10)(c)(B). The Fund is created in the State Treasury,
    separate and distinct from the General Fund, and is pri-
    marily funded by employer assessments, noncomplying
    employer recoveries, and civil penalties. ORS 656.605(1);
    see ORS 656.054; ORS 656.506; ORS 656.735. Assessments
    collected for the Fund are computed yearly to meet its needs.
    ORS 656.506(4). Development of the assessment rate takes
    into consideration estimates of annual fund expenditures
    and revenues, annual hours worked per employee, the num-
    ber of employees covered by workers’ compensation insur-
    ance, and the Fund balance requirements. OAR 436-070-
    0010(2). The Fund is “appropriated continuously” to the
    Cite as 
    359 Or 736
     (2016)	743
    director of DCBS “to carry out the activities for which the
    fund may be expended.” ORS 656.605(3). And the director
    of DCBS has the authority to distribute funds, as well as to
    increase assessments or lower benefits when needed. ORS
    656.605(3) - (4); ORS 656.506.
    One of the special benefits that is paid out of the
    Fund is the replacement of lost wages for the injured work-
    er’s secondary employment—that is, multiple-employer sup-
    plementary temporary total disability benefits (also known
    as “supplemental temporary disability benefits,” “supple-
    mental disability benefits,” or “supplemental disability”).
    See ORS 656.210(5); ORS 656.605(2)(d); OAR 436-060-
    0035(1)(e); OAR 436-060-0500. The cost of administering
    those benefits is also paid out of the Fund. ORS 656.210(5);
    ORS 656.605(2)(d).
    Temporary total disability compensation is typi-
    cally based on wages from a single employer. Under ORS
    656.210(1), an injured worker can receive temporary total
    disability compensation in an amount based on the work-
    er’s wages.2 If the worker has “one job at the time of injury,”
    the amount of compensation is based on the worker’s weekly
    wage from that one job. ORS 656.210(2)(a)(A).
    But, if the worker has “more than one job at the
    time of injury,” the amount of compensation can be based
    on “all earnings the worker was receiving from all subject
    employment.” ORS 656.210(2)(a)(B). The statute in dispute,
    ORS 656.210(2)(b)(A), sets out one of the requirements for
    an injured worker to become eligible for the supplemental
    temporary disability benefits paid out of the Fund.
    An injured worker is not entitled to supplemental
    disability
    “unless the insurer, self-insured employer or assigned
    claims agent for a noncomplying employer receives:
    2
    ORS 656.210(1) provides, in part:
    “When the total disability is only temporary, the worker shall receive
    during the period of that total disability compensation equal to 66-2/3 per-
    cent of wages, but not more than 133 percent of the average weekly wage nor
    less than the amount of 90 percent of wages a week or the amount of $50 a
    week, whichever amount is less.”
    744	                                              DCBS v. Muliro
    “(A)    Within 30 days of receipt of the initial claim, notice
    that the worker was employed in more than one job with a
    subject employer at the time of injury; and
    “(B)  Within 60 days of the date of mailing a request for
    verification, verifiable documentation of wages from such
    additional employment.”
    ORS 656.210(2)(b) (emphases added). Thus, ORS 656.210(2)(b)
    provides that an injured worker is ineligible for supplemen-
    tal disability benefits unless the employer’s insurer receives
    two items, each within a required time period: (1) notice of
    the injured worker’s secondary employment within 30 days
    of the “receipt of the initial claim” under subparagraph (A)
    and (2) “verifiable documentation of wages” of that addi-
    tional employment within 60 days from when the insurer
    requests the documentation under subparagraph (B).
    Subparagraph (A) is silent as to whether the worker
    or the employer is responsible for providing notice of the
    injured worker’s secondary employment to the insurer.
    However, DCBS’s rule, OAR 436-060-0035(6)(b), states that
    an injured worker is eligible for supplemental disability ben-
    efits if “[t]he worker provides notification of a secondary job
    to the insurer within 30 days of the insurer’s receipt of the
    initial claim[.]” DCBS’s rule expressly places the burden of
    providing the notice on the worker. That rule also requires a
    worker to provide notice within a specific timeframe, namely,
    within 30 days of the insurer’s receipt of the initial claim.
    B.  Text and Context of ORS 656.210(2)(b)(A)
    On review, claimant reprises the arguments she
    made before the Court of Appeals. The gravamen of claim-
    ant’s position is that an insured employer’s knowledge of
    an injured worker’s secondary employment at the time of
    her injury—regardless of how or when that knowledge was
    acquired—is imputed to the employer’s insurer for pur-
    poses of ORS 656.210(2)(b)(A). Claimant does not dispute
    that the text of ORS 656.210(2)(b)(A) appears to require
    that the insurer receive actual notice of an injured work-
    er’s secondary employment. She instead draws our atten-
    tion to (1) “context,” which, according to claimant, includes
    the surrounding workers’ compensation statutes, common
    law principles of agency, and Oregon case law, and (2) the
    Cite as 
    359 Or 736
     (2016)	745
    legislative history of the statute. We conclude that the text
    of ORS 656.210(2)(b)(A), in context, is dispositive.
    We turn first to the text of ORS 656.210(2)(b) to
    determine the meaning of the disputed words “receive”
    and “notice.” In construing those two words, we pay care-
    ful attention to “the exact wording of the statute.” State v.
    Vasquez-Rubio, 
    323 Or 275
    , 280, 917 P2d 494 (1996). We
    do so because only that wording received the consideration
    and approval of a majority of the members of the Legislative
    Assembly. OR-OSHA v. CBI Services, Inc., 
    356 Or 577
    , 588,
    341 P3d 701 (2014). As we explained in Gaines, that formal
    adoption process produces “the best source from which to
    discern the legislature’s intent, for it is not the intent of indi-
    vidual legislators that governs, but the intent of the legisla-
    ture as formally enacted into law.” 346 Or at 171.
    As mentioned, to determine the meaning of the
    terms in the phrase “receives * * * notice” as it is used in
    ORS 656.210(2(b) and subparagraph (A), we must ascertain
    whether they are exact, inexact, or delegative in nature,
    so that we may apply the appropriate standard of review.
    In this case, we swiftly conclude that the statutory phrase
    “receives * * * notice” contains inexact terms: Neither term is
    so precise that no interpretation is necessary (as to require
    only factfinding), as is the case for exact terms. Nor does
    the phrase indicate that the legislature intended to delegate
    the determination of its meaning to an agency charged with
    implementing the statute, such as the term “good cause,” an
    open-ended phrase that necessitates further administrative
    agency policymaking. See Springfield Education Assn., 
    290 Or at 223
    ; see also Bergerson, 
    341 Or at 411
     (inexact terms
    “express a complete legislative meaning but with less pre-
    cision”). For that reason, we examine the meaning of ORS
    656.210(2)(b)(A) without deference to DCBS’s construction.
    Blachana, LLC v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 
    354 Or 676
    , 687, 318 P3d 735 (2014) (agency’s interpretation of non-
    delegative term “is not entitled to deference on review”).
    Because the statute does not define the disputed
    terms, our task is to determine the intended meaning of
    “receives * * * notice,” applying the ordinary tools of statu-
    tory construction. When the legislature has not defined a
    746	                                           DCBS v. Muliro
    word or a phrase, we assume, at least initially, that the word
    or phrase has its “plain, natural, and ordinary” meaning.
    PGE, 
    317 Or at 611
    . We frequently consult dictionary defini-
    tions of the terms, on the assumption that, if the legislature
    did not give the term a specialized definition, the dictionary
    definition reflects the meaning that the legislature would
    naturally have intended. State v. Murray, 
    340 Or 599
    , 604,
    136 P3d 10 (2006). But, when the legislature uses technical
    terminology, that is, “terms of art” that are “drawn from
    a specialized trade or field[,]” courts “look to the meaning
    and usage of those terms in the discipline from which the
    legislature borrowed them.” Comcast Corp. v. Dept. of Rev.,
    
    356 Or 282
    , 296, 337 P3d 768 (2014). When “a term is a legal
    one, we look to its ‘established legal meaning’ as revealed
    by, for starters at least, legal dictionaries.” 
    Id.
     We do not,
    however, interpret statutes solely on the basis of dictionary
    definitions. State v. Cloutier, 
    351 Or 68
    , 96, 261 P3d 1234
    (2011). Instead, we examine word usage in context to deter-
    mine which among competing definitions is the one that the
    legislature more likely intended. State v. Fries, 
    344 Or 541
    ,
    547-48, 185 P3d 453 (2008) (context determines which of
    multiple definitions is the one the legislature intended).
    We begin with the ordinary meaning of the word
    “receive.” “Receive” is defined as “to take possession or deliv-
    ery of * * * <~ a letter>.” Webster’s Third Int’l Dictionary 1894
    (unabridged ed 2002). Similarly, The American Heritage
    Dictionary of the English Language 1467 (5th ed 2011)
    defines “receive” as “1a. To take or acquire (something given
    or offered); get or be given: receive a present. b. To be the
    person who gets (something sent or transmitted): receive an
    email.” (Emphases in original.) Thus, in ordinary usage, the
    word “receive” connotes a person getting something sent or
    transmitted to him or her. The same is true in legal usage.
    See Black’s Law Dictionary 1460 (10th ed 2014) (to receive
    means “[t]o take (something offered, given, sent, etc.); to
    come into possession of or get from some outside source ”).
    The ordinary meaning of the word “notice” can vary
    from its usage as a legal term of art. Webster’s, for example,
    defines “notice” as “a communication of intelligence or of a
    claim or demand often required by statute or contract and
    Cite as 
    359 Or 736
     (2016)	747
    prescribing the manner or form of giving it[.]” Webster’s at
    1544. Similarly, The American Heritage Dictionary of the
    English Language 1206 (5th ed 2011) defines “notice” as
    “3. A written or printed announcement: a notice of sale.
    4a. A formal announcement, notification, or warning, espe-
    cially an announcement of one’s intention to withdraw from
    an agreement or leave a job: gave my employer two weeks’
    notice; raised the price without notice. b. The condition
    of being formally warned or notified: put us on notice for
    chronic lateness.”
    (Emphases in original.) Thus, in ordinary usage, “notice”
    requires or connotes some form of communication. See
    Wright v. Turner, 
    354 Or 815
    , 827, 322 P3d 476 (2014) (unde-
    fined terms are assumed to have ordinary meanings).
    “Notice,” however, can include constructive or
    imputed knowledge of a fact when used as a legal term of
    art. For example, Black’s defines “notice” as
    “1.  Legal notification required by law or agreement,
    or imparted by operation of law as a result of some fact
    (such as the recording of an instrument); definite legal cog-
    nizance, actual or constructive, of an existing right or title
    * * *. A person has notice of a fact or condition if that person
    (1) has actual knowledge of it; (2) has received information
    about it; (3) has reason to know about it; (4) knows about
    a related fact; or (5) is considered as having been able to
    ascertain it by checking an official filing or recording.
    “2.  The condition of being so notified, whether or not
    actual awareness exists[.]”
    Black’s at 1227. Thus, the ordinary meaning of “notice”
    does not necessarily apply to that word as it is used in ORS
    656.210(2)(b)(A).
    Claimant’s position is consistent with “notice” being
    used in the statute as a legal term that encompasses imputed
    notice. In our view, however, the legislature’s use of the term
    “receives” cuts against claimant’s proposed interpretation,
    which permits the knowledge of claimant’s other employ-
    ment by supervisors who scheduled her work at Adams &
    Gray to be imputed to Liberty to satisfy the requirement
    in ORS 656.210(2)(b)(A). That is because imputed notice,
    by definition, is not “received” by the party to whom it is
    748	                                        DCBS v. Muliro
    imputed. Instead, imputed notice is “[i]nformation attributed
    to a person.” Black’s at 1228 (defining “imputed notice” as
    “[i]nformation attributed to a person whose agent, having
    received actual notice of the information, has a duty to dis-
    close it to that person”) (emphasis added). If Adams & Gray’s
    preexisting knowledge of claimant’s secondary employment,
    unconnected to the claims process, is attributed to Liberty,
    Liberty would not actually be receiving, that is, taking pos-
    session or delivery of, that information.
    In several ways, the context of ORS 656.210(2)(b)(A)
    confirms that the legislature intended that an insurer
    must receive actual notice of an injured worker’s secondary
    employment. First, the larger scheme of ORS 656.210(2)(b)
    provides contextual evidence that supports that reading. See
    Force v. Dept. of Rev., 
    350 Or 179
    , 188, 252 P3d 306 (2011)
    (explaining that statutory context includes “other parts of
    the statute at issue”). The statute plainly indicates who
    must receive notice: an “insurer,” a “self-insured employer”
    or an “assigned claims agent for a noncomplying employer.”
    ORS 656.210(2)(b). An “employer,” i.e., a person or entity
    “who contracts to pay a remuneration for and secures the
    right to direct and control the services of any person,” ORS
    656.005(13)(a), such as Adams & Gray, is not listed. Instead,
    under ORS 656.210(2)(b), notice of secondary employ-
    ment must be given directly to an employer only when the
    employer is a “self-insured employer.” Unlike Adams &
    Gray, a “self-insured employer” is an employer who “directly
    assumes the responsibility for providing compensation due
    subject workers and their beneficiaries under [the workers’
    compensation statutes],” ORS 656.403(1), and must comply
    with specified statutory criteria to maintain “self-insured”
    status, ORS 656.005(25). Because the legislature has spec-
    ified that notice of a claimant’s secondary employment be
    given to the insurer, an assigned claims agent, or a self-
    insured employer, the preexisting knowledge of the claim-
    ant’s secondary employment of an employer like Adams &
    Gray does not appear to be relevant to whether the claimant
    may receive supplemental disability benefits.
    The timeframe specified for notice in the stat-
    ute lends additional support. For a claimant to be eligible
    for supplemental disability benefits, the legislature has
    Cite as 
    359 Or 736
     (2016)	749
    specified prompt notice of a claimant’s secondary employ-
    ment: notice must be given to the designated entity
    “[w]ithin 30 days of receipt of the initial claim.” ORS
    656.210(2)(b)(A). The statute plainly establishes a time-
    frame during which that information must be received by
    the designated entity for a claimant to establish a supple-
    mental disability claim, and that timeframe is tied to the
    injured worker’s initial claim. That timeframe suggests that
    the required notice to the insurer is part of the supplemen-
    tal disability benefits claims process. Put simply, to be eli-
    gible for the benefits, a claimant bears responsibility for the
    insurer’s receipt of information relating to her secondary
    employment within a 30-day window.
    Claimant’s view of ORS 656.210(2)(b), though, does
    not take into account the timing of notice and the appar-
    ent connection between notice of secondary employment and
    the claimant’s initiation of a workers’ compensation claim
    described in the statute. In this case, the fact that two
    supervisors at Adams & Gray had earlier become aware that
    claimant had secondary employment was not, as a factual
    matter, connected to claimant’s filing of her initial work-
    ers’ compensation claim. In other words, at no point within
    the 30-day window did claimant provide that information
    to Liberty, and neither did she provide the information to
    Adams & Gray in connection with her initial workers’ com-
    pensation claim. In the absence of such a connection, claim-
    ant’s contention that there was imputed notice to Liberty by
    virtue of knowledge that Adams & Gray obtained at some
    unknown earlier point disregards the timing requirement
    of the statute. Claimant’s position leads to the conclusion
    that the timing of Adams & Gray’s receipt of notice does not
    matter, which seems contrary to the timing requirement in
    the statute.
    Although claimant acknowledges that the text
    of ORS 656.210(2)(b)(A) favors the reading of it urged by
    DCBS and ComPro, she maintains that the board’s reading
    of ORS 656.210(2)(b)(A) is the better one based on a contex-
    tual argument. As context, claimant relies on an employer’s
    general duty to assist its insurer to process claims under
    the workers’ compensation statutes, case law attributing
    misconduct by an employer and imputing knowledge of an
    750	                                             DCBS v. Muliro
    employer to a workers’ compensation insurer in other con-
    texts, and principles of agency law. Claimant’s contextual
    argument, though, fails to persuasively validate the board’s
    reading of ORS 656.210(2)(b)(A).
    Claimant employs two statutory provisions, ORS
    656.017(1) and ORS 656.262(1), to argue that an employer’s
    knowledge of an injured worker’s secondary employment
    should be imputed to the employer’s insurer under ORS
    656.210(2)(b)(A) based on an employer’s duty to process
    claims. The first of those, ORS 656.017(1), provides:
    “(1)  Every employer subject to this chapter shall main-
    tain assurance with the Director of the Department of
    Consumer and Business Services that subject workers of
    the employer and their beneficiaries will receive compen-
    sation for compensable injuries as provided by this chapter
    and that the employer will perform all duties and pay other
    obligations required under this chapter, by qualifying:
    “(a)  As a carrier-insured employer; or
    “(b)  As a self-insured employer as provided by ORS
    656.407.”
    (Emphasis added.) Claimant focuses on the emphasized part
    of the provision, contending that ORS 656.017(1) imposes a
    duty on an employer to perform all duties required under the
    workers’ compensation statutes. But even if claimant’s read-
    ing of the provision is correct—and ORS 656.017(1) is not
    directed to some other purpose, such as a requirement that
    the subject employer either obtain workers’ compensation
    insurance or else provide workers’ compensation as a self-
    insured employer—the provision begs the question whether
    an employer like Adams & Gray was obliged to perform any
    duty relating to notice of secondary employment.
    In that regard, claimant notes that an employer
    has a general obligation to assist its insurer pursuant to a
    second statute, ORS 656.262(1): “All employers shall assist
    their insurers in processing claims as required in this chap-
    ter.” The statute does not define “processing.” And, because
    we assume that the legislature intended to use that word
    in its ordinary sense, we resort to dictionary definitions
    to give that word its plain, natural, and ordinary mean-
    ing. “Processing” means “to subject to rapid examination
    Cite as 
    359 Or 736
     (2016)	751
    and handling designed to dispose of routine details” or “to
    take care of, attend to, or dispose of by some largely rou-
    tine procedure .”
    Webster’s at 1808 (emphasis in original). Thus, an employer
    assists its insurers in processing claims by promptly exam-
    ining and handling claims by “some largely routine pro-
    cedure.” For purposes of ORS chapter 656, a “claim” is “a
    written request for compensation from a subject worker or
    someone on the worker’s behalf, or any compensable injury
    of which a subject employer has notice or knowledge.”3 ORS
    656.005(6). “Compensation” includes “all benefits, includ-
    ing medical services, provided for a compensable injury to
    a subject worker or the worker’s beneficiaries by an insurer
    or self-insured employer pursuant to [chapter 656].” ORS
    656.005(8) (emphasis added). Thus, by definition, a compen-
    sable injury may result in a multi-faceted initial claim, i.e.,
    the first or original work injury claim and, depending on the
    circumstances, other related claims, or sub-claims, for ben-
    efits such as the supplemental disability benefits at issue.4
    We are persuaded that an employer has a duty
    under ORS 656.262(1) to assist its insurer in processing
    claims for supplemental disability benefits. Nevertheless, in
    light of the text of ORS 656.210(2)(b)(A) and its context, as
    discussed above, we are unpersuaded that the legislature
    intended that any knowledge by the employer of a claim-
    ant’s secondary employment, no matter how unconnected
    that knowledge is to the claims process, must be imputed to
    the employer’s insurer.
    Claimant’s two other contextual arguments lack
    merit. None of the three Court of Appeals decisions on which
    claimant and the board have relied sheds light on the proper
    interpretation of ORS 656.210(2)(b)(A) given the facts
    3
    ORS 656.003 provides that, “[e]xcept where the context otherwise requires,
    the definitions given in this chapter govern its construction.”
    4
    “At one and the same time an injury can (and often does) give rise to com-
    pensation ‘claims’ for * * * temporary total disability (ORS 656.210)[.]” Ohlig
    v. FMC Marine & Rail Equipment, 
    291 Or 586
    , 599-600, 633 P2d 1279 (1981)
    (Peterson, J., dissenting). Therefore, the word “claim” as used in chapter 656,
    “illustrates the fact that although but one claim is made in the sense that but one
    request for compensation is made under ORS chapter 656, the relief requested
    may involve claims of many different kinds.” 
    Id. at 600
    .
    752	                                          DCBS v. Muliro
    presented in this case. In Anfilofieff and Nix, the reason-
    ing the Court of Appeals employed reveals a basic formula:
    unreasonable conduct by an employer designed to impede
    the claims process plus an employer’s obligation to process
    claims equals attribution of the employer’s misconduct to its
    insurer in certain circumstances. We do not decide the valid-
    ity of that formula, and we do not consider its applicability to
    this case, because claimant does not advance that argument,
    nor could she. Employer misconduct is absent from this case:
    Adams & Gray promptly forwarded to Liberty claims-related
    forms that claimant had herself completed without checking
    boxes to indicate that she had other employers at the time of
    her injury. The third case, Abbott, arose in a different con-
    text and does not assist in the resolution of the question in
    this case: whether the employer’s preexisting knowledge of
    claimant’s secondary employment was sufficient to satisfy a
    specific notice requirement in ORS 656.210(2)(b)(A).
    And, claimant’s argument based on agency law
    rests on an incorrect legal principle. Liberty, claimant
    notes, is an agent of Adams & Gray. Claimant next asserts
    that, as the result of “inverse imputation,” the knowledge
    of Adams & Gray, the principal, was imputed to Liberty,
    the agent. Claimant cites no authority for her novel the-
    ory, and we know of no court that has recognized “inverse
    imputation” as a principle of agency law. Knowledge of an
    agent is imputed to the principal, not the other way around.
    Under the common law of agency, it is presumed that an
    agent always communicates to the principal all information
    that it should communicate within the scope of the agency,
    “although the agent does not, in fact, inform his principal
    thereof.” Hogan v. Alum. Lock Shingle Corp., 
    214 Or 218
    ,
    228, 329 P2d 271 (1958). Thus, “notice to an agent is notice
    to his principal.” State Farm Fire v. Sevier, 
    272 Or 278
    , 288,
    537 P2d 88 (1975).
    In sum, the text of ORS 656.210(2)(b)(A) and
    the context of that provision indicate that the legislature
    intended an injured worker seeking supplemental disability
    benefits to bear the burden of providing notice of secondary
    employment to the employer’s insurer. An injured worker’s
    obligation can be met in multiple ways, including by the
    Cite as 
    359 Or 736
     (2016)	753
    worker providing the information (such as by delivering a
    completed claim form) directly to the insurer or to his or
    her employer, who, because of a statutory claims processing
    obligation, must transmit that information to its insurer.
    In either of those scenarios, notice will not be imputed; the
    insurer will receive actual notice.
    C.  Legislative History
    The parties also urge us to consider the legislative
    history of ORS 656.210(2)(b)(A) to support their differing
    views of the statute. We briefly address the legislative his-
    tory, bearing in mind that the purpose of resorting to leg-
    islative history is to aid the court in determining what the
    legislature as an institution intended the statute to mean.
    On that point, we echo the dissent in Errand v. Cascade
    Steel Rolling Mills, Inc., 
    320 Or 509
    , 888 P2d 544 (1995),
    identifying some of the pitfalls of relying too greatly on leg-
    islative history: “In general, an examination of legislative
    history is most useful when it is able to uncover the mani-
    fest general legislative intent behind an enactment.” 
    Id.
     at
    539 n 4 (Graber, J., dissenting) (quoted in Gaines, 346 Or at
    172-73 n 9). Other kinds of conclusions drawn from cherry-
    picked quotations of single legislators or of nonlegislator
    witnesses have to be carefully examined. See id. (Graber,
    J., dissenting) (cautioning that reliance on “the beliefs of a
    single legislator or witness” is “fraught with the potential
    for misconstruction”).
    With those principles in mind, we turn to the prof-
    fered legislative history of ORS 656.210(2)(b). We conclude
    that the testimony of the nonlegislator witnesses offered by
    the parties is consistent with, but adds little to, the textual
    analysis of the statute.
    In 2001, the legislature enacted Senate Bill (SB)
    485, which incorporated the statutory provision at issue in
    this case. Or Laws 2001, ch 865, § 3. As introduced, the bill
    proposed the creation of the supplemental disability benefit
    and the procedures for obtaining the benefit. During consid-
    eration of the bill, Jerry Keene, an appellate attorney spe-
    cializing in appellate workers’ compensation law, testified
    that
    754	                                              DCBS v. Muliro
    “there’s * * * language [in Section 3 of SB 485 that] con-
    notes a clear intent to basically set up a raise or waive situ-
    ation. The worker has the opportunity to bring the fact that
    they work two jobs to the employer within thirty days of the
    injury. * * * But they do bear the responsibility to get this
    information to the insurer in a timely manner.”
    Tape Recording, Senate Committee on Business, Labor and
    Economic Development, SB 485, Mar 14, 2001, Tape 49, Side
    A (statement of Jerry Keene) (emphases added).
    As the emphasized part of his testimony indicates,
    Keene explained to the committee that the bill placed the
    obligation on the worker to provide notice of secondary
    employment. Keene’s testimony, as well as the rest of the
    legislative history, indicates that workers “bear the respon-
    sibility” for providing all the information necessary for
    processing a supplemental disability claim. Id. Keene also
    stated that diligence is crucial because “once the thirty day
    window * * * comes and goes,” the opportunity to receive sup-
    plemental benefits “will not be there anymore * * * and that
    was fairly clear in the language [of Section 3].” Id.
    Claimant emphasizes that Keene also stated that
    the injured worker has the opportunity to bring the fact that
    he or she works two jobs to the “employer.” Id. Claimant also
    flags the testimony of a second nonlegislator witness, Jim
    Egan, who similarly testified that “all an injured worker
    would have to do would be to hand his or her pay-stub” from
    the secondary employer to his or her “employer” or “insur-
    ance carrier” for “proof enough that there was another job.”
    Tape Recording, Senate Committee on Business, Labor
    and Economic Development, SB 485, Feb 2, 2001, Tape 18,
    Side A (statement of Jim Egan) (emphasis added). Claimant
    urges us to conclude that the Keene and Egan testimony
    demonstrates that the terms employer and insurer are
    “interchangeable” for purposes of providing notice. We draw
    a different conclusion, namely, that the proffered testimony
    of Keene and Egan is consistent with our reading of ORS
    656.210(2)(b)(A), which generally requires the injured
    worker to direct information of his or her secondary employ-
    ment to the insurer but which also allows the worker to give
    the requisite information to the employer in connection with
    the worker’s initial claim. In the latter case, the employer,
    Cite as 
    359 Or 736
     (2016)	755
    because of its statutory obligation to process claims, will
    then be obliged to transmit the information to the insurer.
    Accordingly, we reject claimant’s contention that,
    when an injured worker does not communicate to the insurer
    or the employer within 30 days of the initial claim that she
    or he has multiple employers, despite having the ability to
    do so, the employer’s preexisting knowledge, unconnected to
    the claims process, must be imputed to the insurer. Because
    claimant did not communicate to Liberty or Adams & Gray
    that she had secondary employment within 30 days of
    Liberty’s receipt of her initial claim, which she could have
    accomplished by checking the box relating to secondary
    employment on either of two claims forms she filled out, and
    Liberty did not otherwise receive actual notice of her sec-
    ondary employment, the board erred in affirming the ALJ’s
    order directing DCBS, through ComPro, to pay claimant
    supplemental disability. Thus, we affirm the decision of the
    Court of Appeals and reverse and remand the board’s order.
    The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The
    order of the Workers’ Compensation Board is reversed, and
    the case is remanded to the board for further proceedings.