Gillings v. Banvelos , 650 F. App'x 622 ( 2016 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT May 26, 2016
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
NIGEL GILLINGS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 15-1486
(D.C. No. 1:15-CV-00172-LTB)
LT. BANVELOS; LT. YAGAR; H. (D. Colo.)
WALKER; LT. HART,
Defendants - Appellees.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before KELLY, HOLMES, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Nigel Gillings—then a federal prisoner—brought suit under Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971),
alleging, inter alia, an Eighth Amendment violation. The district court sua sponte ordered
Gillings to show cause why the court shouldn’t dismiss the action based on Gillings’
*
After examining the brief and the appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered
submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may
be cited, however, for its persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
failure to comply with Colorado’s two-year statute of limitations.1 See Roberts v.
Barreras, 484 F.3d 1236, 1238 (10th Cir. 2007) (“A Bivens action is subject to the
limitation period . . . set by the personal injury statute in the state where the cause of
action accrues.”).
In response, Gillings asserted that the district court should equitably toll the statute
of limitations because Bureau of Prisons (BOP) employees allegedly interfered with his
efforts to exhaust his administrative remedies. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (requiring
prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit under federal law); Porter
v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002) (explaining that § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion requirement
applies to Bivens actions). The district court rejected Gillings’ equitable-tolling argument
and dismissed his action with prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1);
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1). Gillings appeals, arguing the district court abused its discretion
in determining that he isn’t entitled to equitable tolling. See Alexander v. Oklahoma, 382
F.3d 1206, 1215 (10th Cir. 2004) (“We review the district court’s refusal to apply
1
At the outset, Gillings suggests that the district court erred in sua sponte invoking
the statute-of-limitations defense. See Fratus v. DeLand, 49 F.3d 673, 675 (10th Cir.
1995) (holding that district court improperly dismissed pro se prisoner’s civil rights
complaint by sua sponte raising “statute of limitations defense that was neither patently
clear from the face of the complaint nor rooted in adequately developed facts”). But here,
the district court “issue[d] a show cause order giving [Gillings] an opportunity to explain
why the statute of limitations should be tolled.” Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091,
1097 (10th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, we reject this argument. See id. (noting district court
may sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s civil rights action on the basis of the statute of
limitations if court provides prisoner “notice and an opportunity to be heard on the
issue”).
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equitable tolling for an abuse of discretion.” (quoting Garrett v. L.E. Fleming, 362 F.3d
692, 695 (10th Cir. 2004))).
Under Colorado law, “equitable tolling of a statute of limitations is limited to
situations in which either the defendant has wrongfully impeded the plaintiff’s ability to
bring the claim or truly extraordinary circumstances prevented the plaintiff from filing his
or her claim despite diligent efforts.” Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Hartman, 911 P.2d
1094, 1099 (Colo. 1996). And “when exhaustion is a necessary condition precedent to
filing suit,” the exhaustion requirement may constitute an extraordinary circumstance that
prevents a plaintiff from timely filing his or her claim. Braxton v. Zavaras, 614 F.3d
1156, 1162 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 911 P.2d at 1097).
Nevertheless, the district court concluded that Gillings isn’t entitled to equitable tolling
because, according to the district court, Gillings “failed to diligently pursue his
opportunity to file.” R. 180 (citing Braxton, 614 F.3d at 1161-63; Rosales v. Ortiz, 325 F.
App’x 695, 699 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished)).
In Rosales, we declined to equitably toll the statute of limitations under
Colorado’s extraordinary-circumstances doctrine because “ample time for filing within
the two-year limitations period remained after the exhaustion of remedies, but . . . the
plaintiff failed to diligently pursue his opportunity to file.” 325 F. App’x at 699-700.
Likewise, in Braxton, we held that the plaintiffs weren’t entitled to equitable tolling
under Colorado’s extraordinary-circumstances doctrine because, even though they “had
over a year remaining to file their action in federal court” after they “receiv[ed] the
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responses to their final administrative appeals,” the plaintiffs “waited approximately two
years to file suit.” 614 F.3d at 1162.
Braxton and Rosales stand for the proposition that plaintiffs who fail to diligently
pursue their claims after exhausting their administrative remedies are not entitled to
equitable tolling under Colorado’s extraordinary-circumstances doctrine. See id.; Rosales,
325 F. App’x at 699-700; see also Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 911 P.2d at 1098 (“The
extraordinary circumstances basis for applying equitable tolling requires good faith
efforts on the part of the plaintiff to pursue his or her claims.”). But, as the district court
noted, Gillings never exhausted his administrative remedies.2 Thus, this isn’t a case
where Gillings’ “failure to return promptly to federal court following exhaustion of
administrative remedies” constitutes a failure to “demonstrate diligent efforts to pursue
his claims.” Rosales, 325 F. App’x at 700 (quoting Russell-El v. United States, No. 99-
1124, 1999 WL 987350, at *3 (10th Cir. Nov. 1, 1999) (unpublished)). Accordingly, the
2
To the extent Gillings may have failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, he
points out that “[w]here prison officials prevent, thwart, or hinder a prisoner’s efforts to
avail himself of an administrative remedy, they render that remedy ‘unavailable’ and a
court will excuse the prisoner’s failure to exhaust.” Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245, 1250
(10th Cir. 2010). Gillings argues he is entitled to relief under Little because BOP staff
members repeatedly assured him that his administrative claims were “under
investigation” and that he should “wait 6 months” for a response. Aplt. Br. 17. Although
Gillings raised these same allegations below, the district court failed to address them.
Accordingly, we take no position on whether these allegations—if true—are sufficient to
excuse Gillings’ failure to exhaust. See Welch v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 382 F.3d
1078, 1087-88 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting that we generally refrain from considering issues
not passed on below and remanding case to give district court an opportunity to address
issue in first instance).
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district abused its discretion in relying on Braxton and Rosales to conclude that Gillings
isn’t entitled to equitable tolling. We therefore reverse the district court’s order
dismissing this action and remand to the district court for further proceedings. We also
grant Gillings’ motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. But we remind him of his
obligation to pay the filing fee in full.
Entered for the Court,
Nancy L. Moritz
Circuit Judge
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