United States v. Bennett , 823 F.3d 1316 ( 2016 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
May 26, 2016
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellant/
Cross-Appellee,
v. Nos. 14-1384 and 14-1402
CLIFTON BRETT BENNETT,
Defendant-Appellee/
Cross-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. NO. 1:13-CR-00395-CMA)
William A. Glaser, Appellate Section, Criminal Division (Leslie R. Caldwell,
Assistant Attorney General, and Sung-Hee Suh, Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, Appellate Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of
Justice, and John F. Walsh, United States Attorney, and Robert M. Russel, Chief,
Appellate Section, United States Attorney’s Office, Denver, Colorado, with him
on the briefs), United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for
Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Dean Sanderford, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Virginia L. Grady, Federal
Public Defender, with him on the briefs) Office of the Federal Public Defender,
Denver, Colorado, for Appellee-Cross-Appellant.
Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, BALDOCK, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge.
Clifton Bennett pleaded guilty to federal child pornography charges and the
district court sentenced him to fifty-seven months of imprisonment to be followed
by several conditions of supervised release. Bennett and the United States each
contend the district court erred at sentencing.
The government argues the court should have found Bennett had a prior
Colorado conviction relating to child pornography, which would trigger a ten-year
mandatory minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2). We agree that
Bennett’s prior Colorado misdemeanor conviction for sexual exploitation of a
child “relates to” child pornography, and he is therefore eligible for the
mandatory minimum.
Bennett also appeals, challenging the district court’s imposition of a special
condition of supervised release that requires he undergo mandatory testing for
sexual attraction to minors. But we are faced with too many speculative factors,
too far in the future, to make a decision sounding in constitutional principles, so
we dismiss Bennett’s cross-appeal without prejudice on ripeness grounds.
I. Background
The United States Postal Inspection Service searched Clifton Bennett’s
Colorado Springs apartment and discovered thousands of images of child
pornography and child erotica, featuring boys ranging from toddlers through
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young teenagers. Bennett pleaded guilty to knowingly possessing child
pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). 1
This was not Bennett’s first conviction for sex-related conduct involving
children. In 1997, he pleaded guilty to sexual exploitation of a child, a
misdemeanor under Colorado law, and was sentenced to 140 days in jail.
Based on this prior conviction, the parties disagreed whether federal law
required a ten-year mandatory minimum under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2). Looking
at the Colorado statute, the district court concluded that because the Colorado law
punished a broader range of activities than the federal crime of possession of
child pornography, the prior conviction is not a child pornography offense for
statutory purposes. The court sentenced Bennett to fifty-seven months of
imprisonment and ten years of supervised release.
1
Subsection (a)(5)(B) provides:
Any person who . . . knowingly possesses, or knowingly
accesses with intent to view, any book, magazine, periodical,
film, videotape, computer disk, or any other material that
contains an image of child pornography that has been mailed,
or shipped or transported using any means or facility of
interstate or foreign commerce of in or affecting interstate or
foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, or
that was produced using materials that have been mailed, or
shipped or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce by any means, including by computer . . . shall be
punished as provided in subsection (b).
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (emphasis added).
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At sentencing, Bennett also objected to the condition of supervised release
that required him to undergo a test for sexual attraction to minors using a device
called a penile plethysmograph. 2 The district court rejected this challenge and
concluded:
I have sufficient concern for the young men – the under-age men
in the community, that I think that in this particular case, to
effectively supervise and treat the defendant, and to protect the
community; in particular, these young boys from additional
crimes by the defendant, that both the computer internet access
limitation and the proposed sex offender evaluation treatment
condition of supervised release, which would include, if
necessary, plethysmograph examination, does comport with the
statutory requirements of 18 United States Code Section 3583(d)
and are appropriate in this case.
R., Vol. III, at 27.
II. Discussion
We first discuss whether Bennett’s prior state misdemeanor conviction
triggers the mandatory minimum enhancement. We conclude it does. We then
turn to the special condition requiring plethysmograph testing, and conclude that
the imposition of testing is too speculative at this point for us to consider
2
“Penile plethysmograph testing is a procedure that ‘involves placing a
pressure-sensitive device around a man’s penis, presenting him with an array of
sexually stimulating images, and determining his level of sexual attraction by
measuring minute changes in his erectile responses.’” United States v. Weber,
451 F.3d 552, 554 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Jason R. Odeshoo, Of Penology and
Perversity: The Use of Penile Plethsmography on Convicted Child Sex Offenders,
14 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 1, 2 (2004)).
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Bennett’s due process challenge. He can challenge the testing if and when it is
actually imposed.
A. Mandatory Minimum Enhancement
Under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2), the mandatory minimum applies if
Bennett’s prior conviction relates to a variety of state sexual abuse and child
pornography crimes:
Whoever violates . . . subsection (a)(5) shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both, but . . . if
such person has a prior conviction . . . under the laws of any
State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or
abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward, or the
production, possession, receipt, mailing, sale, distribution,
shipment, or transportation of child pornography, such person
shall be fined under this title and imprisoned for not less than 10
years nor more than 20 years.
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2) (emphasis added). 3 The district court determined
whether the prior Colorado conviction counted for enhancement purposes using
the so-called categorical approach.
1. Categorical Approach
The government argues that under the categorical approach Bennett’s 1997
Colorado conviction for sexual exploitation of a child qualifies as a prior
conviction relating to the possession of child pornography. Under this
assessment, it contends the court may only consider whether the elements of the
3
The enhancement also applies if the defendant has a prior federal
conviction under “this chapter, chapter 71, chapter 109A, or chapter 117, or under
section 920 of title 10[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2).
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Colorado statute categorically relate to the possession of child pornography.
Bennett disagrees that the categorical approach applies. He contends that our
decision United States v. McCutchen, 419 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. 2005), requires
that we must find his prior conduct actually relates to the possession of child
pornography. And because the limited record does not disclose his prior conduct,
we could not make that determination.
But a careful reading of McCutchen confirms that the proper analytical
framework begins with the categorical approach. In McCutchen, the defendant
pleaded guilty to knowing possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252(a)(2) 4 and (1)(4)(B). 419 F.3d at 1123. McCutchen had a prior
conviction—a guilty plea for sexual battery under Kansas law. The question was
whether that prior conviction related to abusive sexual conduct involving a minor.
Although sexual battery could be committed against children or adults,
McCutchen had in fact abused an eight-year-old. Id. at 1124. The district court
found that where the statutory language of the prior conviction was broad enough
to encompass crimes that would trigger the enhancement and crimes that would
not, it was allowed to look beyond the elements of the offense. United States v.
McCutchen, No. 04-10140-01, at 4 (D. Kan. Dec. 15, 2004), aff’d, 419 F.3d 1122
(10th Cir. 2005).
4
The enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) contains relevant
language identical to the language here.
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We affirmed the district court. In doing so, we “reject[ed] the narrow
categorical approach to application of § 2252(b)(2) advocated by McCutchen.”
McCutchen, 419 F.3d at 1127 (emphasis added). But we did not upset the general
presumption that the categorical approach applies. 5 Rather, we merely rejected
the notion that courts must focus “exclusively” on the elements of the prior
conviction and are confined “solely” to the elements of the statute. Id. at
1126–27. We found “no basis” to require sentencing courts to “focus exclusively
on the elements of a defendant’s prior state conviction in determining whether
such conviction triggers application of the sentence enhancement provisions.” Id.
at 1126.
Thus, in applying § 2252A(b)(2) we start with the categorical approach,
even if we do not end there. Consequently, we first ask whether the language of
the prior conviction categorically triggers the enhancement. If not, we may
proceed beyond the categorical approach if two pre-requisites are met. First, we
must have access to court documents such as those approved of in Shepard v.
United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005), that demonstrate the elements of the crime the
defendant committed. Second, the statute of prior conviction must be divisible,
5
In McCutchen, the government and the defendant both agreed that “courts
generally appl[y] a categorical approach” in determining whether a defendant’s
prior conviction triggers the mandatory minimum. McCutchen, No. 04-10140-01,
at 3. The government merely argued that the court go beyond the statute “if the
statute or conviction is ambiguous or broader than the definitions in 2252(b)(2) . .
. .” Id. (emphasis added).
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Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2282 (2013), meaning the statute
lists alternative ways it may be violated.
Other circuits apply a similar approach. For example, in applying
§ 2252(b)(2), the Ninth Circuit explained that a court may apply a modified
categorical approach if (1) the statute of prior conviction criminalizes more
conduct than the federal triggering offense, and (2) the statute of prior conviction
is divisible. United States v. Sullivan, 797 F.3d 623, 635 (9th Cir. 2015), petition
for cert. filed, (Jan. 26, 2016) (No. 15-7875)) (applying the categorical approach
in interpreting § 2252(b)(2) but clarifying that a modified categorical approach is
appropriate where the prior criminal conviction language is both broad and
divisible). Likewise, the Fourth Circuit starts with the categorical approach in
determining whether a prior conviction relates to sexual abuse or abusive sexual
conduct involving a minor. United States v. Colson, 683 F.3d 507, 509 (4th Cir.
2012) (applying the categorical approach in interpreting § 2252A(b)(1) because
no Shepard documents were available). While the Fourth Circuit allows the
sentencing court to consider Shepard documents to “reveal the facts on which the
conviction necessarily rested,” if no such documents are available, the sentencing
court may look only to the statutory language of the prior conviction to determine
whether that conviction was related to the triggering offenses. 6
6
See also United States v. Davis, 751 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 2014) (applying
the categorical approach in interpreting § 2252A(b)(2) and explicitly rejecting a
(continued...)
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Similarly here, we have no facts beyond the guilty plea. As a result, we
apply the categorical approach.
2. Relating To Child Pornography
We next examine the statutory definition of Bennett’s 1997 Colorado
conviction to determine whether it categorically qualifies as an offense relating to
the possession of child pornography. The relevant Colorado statute provided:
A person commits sexual exploitation of a child if, for any
purpose, he knowingly . . . Possesses or controls any sexually
exploitative material for any purpose . . . .” 7
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6-403(3)(b.5) (1995) (footnote added). The statute thus
triggers the mandatory minimum if it is a statute “relating to . . . the production,
6
(...continued)
factual approach); United States v. Simard, 731 F.3d 156, 162 (2d Cir. 2013)
(applying the categorical approach in interpreting § 2252(b)(2) and clarifying that
the modified categorical approach would have been appropriate with a divisible
statute); United States v. Linngren, 652 F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 2011) (applying the
categorical approach in interpreting § 2252(b)(1) but using Shepard documents
because the statute of the prior conviction was broad); United States v. Galo, 239
F.3d 572 (3d Cir. 2001) (applying the categorical approach in interpreting
§ 2251(d)).
7
“Sexually exploitative material” is visual material that “depicts a child
engaged in, participating in, observing, or being used for explicit sexual conduct.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6-403(2)(j). Explicit sexual conduct can be “sexual
intercourse, erotic fondling, erotic nudity, masturbation, sadomasochism, or
sexual excitement.” § 18-6-403(2)(e). Relevant here, erotic nudity can include
“the human breasts, or the undeveloped or developing breast area of the human
child, for the purpose of real or simulated overt sexual gratification[.]” § 18-6-
403(2)(d).
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possession, receipt, mailing, sale, distribution, shipment, or transportation of
child pornography.” 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2) (emphasis added).
The Colorado child exploitation statute may punish the possession of visual
depictions that fall outside the federal definition of child pornography. 8 First, the
Colorado statute, unlike the federal law, may punish possession of an image of a
child whose breasts, but not genitals, are exposed. Second, the Colorado statute
may punish possession of an image of a child observing, but not engaged in,
sexually explicit conduct. In fact, the government concedes the statutes do not
completely overlap. Principal Br. for United States 29. But a conviction
qualifies as a predicate conviction if it relates to the possession of child
pornography.
We have held, as have the other circuits, that “relating to” has a broadening
effect on § 2252A. Colson, 683 F.3d at 511–12 (“Numerous courts of appeals
agree that Congress chose the expansive term ‘relating to’ in § 2252A(b)(1) to
ensure that individuals with a prior conviction bearing some relation to sexual
abuse, abusive conduct involving a minor, or child pornography receive enhanced
minimum and maximum sentences.” (citations omitted)); McCutchen, 419 F.3d at
8
Federal law defines “Child pornography” as any visual depiction that:
was produced using a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct, depicts a minor
engaged in sexually explicit conduct, or appears as though an identifiable minor is
engaged in sexually explicit conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8). “Sexually explicit
conduct” includes graphic sexual intercourse, graphic or lascivious simulated
masturbation, and graphic or simulated lascivious exhibition of the genitals or
pubic area. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8).
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1126–27. 9 Therefore we have applied the Supreme Court’s ordinary interpretation
of “relating to” from Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383
(1992). See, e.g., United States v. Becker, 625 F.3d 1309, 1310 (10th Cir. 2010).
Under this interpretation, “the offense need only ‘stand in some relation to,’
‘pertain to,’ or ‘have a connection’ with” the possession of child pornography.
Becker, 625 F.3d at 1312 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting McCutchen, 419 F.3d at
1127). Bennett’s Colorado conviction meets these standards, and therefore
“relates to” the possession of child pornography.
To counter, Bennett argues that the recent Supreme Court case, Mellouli v.
Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980 (2015), has undermined our precedent and that of the
other circuits. In Mellouli, the Court held that a Tunisian citizen was not
removable for his state drug paraphernalia offense because the state offense
criminalized paraphernalia for substances beyond those contained on the federal
list of controlled substances. Bennett argues Mellouli mandates the enhancement
here can only be triggered by a state child pornography statute punishing images
that meet the federal definition of child pornography. Bennett Supp. Br. at 1.
This interpretation is incorrect for several reasons.
9
See also Sullivan, 797 F.3d at 637–38; United States v. Allen, 750 F.3d
209, 213 (2d Cir. 2014); United States v. Spence, 661 F.3d 194, 200 (4th Cir.
2011); United States v. Weis, 487 F.3d 1148, 1152 (8th Cir. 2007); United States
v. Hubbard, 480 F.3d 341, 347 (5th Cir. 2007).
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First, Mellouli was decided, not on the definition of “relating to,” but on
the particular removal statute’s surrounding text and history. At issue in Mellouli
was whether an alien’s Kansas drug paraphernalia conviction triggered removal
under the immigration laws, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). The removal statute in
question provided an alien can be removed if “convicted of a violation of . . . any
law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a
controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21).” Id. (emphasis
added). The Kansas definition of controlled substances included at least nine
substances that the federal list did not. 10 Id. The Supreme Court held that
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) is limited to predicate convictions involving only those drugs
defined in 21 U.S.C. § 802. Id. at 1990–91. In doing so, the Court acknowledged
that “relating to” generally has a broadening effect. Id. at 1990. But, the Court
explained, “relating to” cannot skew a statute beyond its breaking point. Relying
on the “statute’s text and history,” it concluded that “relating to” should be read
narrowly in the removal context. Id.
Here, neither the text nor the history of the enhancement statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252A(b)(2), suggest Congress intended to reference only state child
pornography offenses that match the federal child pornography offense in the
10
The drug Mellouli was discovered with, Adderall, is a controlled
substance under both federal and Kansas law. But the criminal complaint did not
identify the substance, so the Supreme Court applied the categorical approach,
looking only to the elements of the prior conviction.
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same way Congress intended to reference only state drug offenses involving
substances defined in § 802.
First, the enhancement statute does not limit “child pornography” by
linking it to the federal definition. In fact, Mellouli explicitly noted that a broad
reading of “relating to” would have made sense if Congress did not insert a
qualification limiting its application to federal controlled substances. Mellouli,
135 S. Ct. at 1988 n.9 (“[T]he dissent shrinks to the vanishing point the words ‘as
defined in [§ 802].’ If § 1227(a)(2)(B)(I) stopped with the words ‘relating to a
controlled substance,’ the dissent would make sense. But Congress did not stop
there. It qualified ‘relating to a controlled substance’ by adding the limitation ‘as
defined in [§ 802].’”).
Additionally, a broad reading of the enhancement provision does not stretch
it “to the breaking point,” as it did to the removal statute in Mellouli. 135 S. Ct.
at 1990. The removal statute requires only that the state law relate to a controlled
substance, but mentions no actus reus. The Court took issue that a broad reading
would mean the removal statute could reach any crime “associated with the drug
trade in general.” Id. at 1988 (quoting In re Martinez Espinoza, 25 I. & N. Dec.
118 (BIA 2009)). This concern was especially present for Mellouli, where an
ordinary piece of clothing—a sock—qualified as drug paraphernalia, triggering
deportation under a broad reading. Id. at 1983. Section 2252A(b)(2), by contrast,
limits the triggering offenses through a universe of actions: “production,
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possession, receipt, mailing, sale, distribution, shipment, or transportation of
child pornography.” 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2). “Relating to” can therefore have
a broadening effect without criminalizing all acts associated with child
pornography in general.
Third, the structure of the removal statute emphasizes the need for
complete overlap between state and federal predicate offenses in a way that
§ 2252A(b)(2) does not. The removal statute groups state and federal convictions
together: “any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country
relating to a controlled substance (as defined in Section 802 of Title 21).” 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Because federal law only reaches federally-defined
substances, a narrow reading of “relating to” is required, or else “relating to”
would have two meanings at once. In contrast, § 2252A(b)(2) does not group
state and federal convictions together:
a prior conviction under this chapter, chapter 71, chapter 109A,
or chapter 117, or under section 920 of title 10 (article 120 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice), or under the laws of any State
relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive
sexual conduct involving a minor or ward, or the production,
possession, receipt, mailing, sale, distribution, shipment, or
transportation of child pornography.
A narrow reading is therefore not required for coherence. In fact, the text points
the opposite direction. If Congress had intended to reference only those state
laws that punished federally-punishable conduct, it could have said so. See, e.g.,
18 U.S.C. § 3559(e)(2) (defining “state sex offense” as one that “consists of
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conduct that would be a Federal sex offense”); 18 U.S.C. § 2426(b)(1)(B)
(defining “prior sex offense conviction” as an offense “consisting of conduct that
would have been an offense under [this chapter, chapter 109A, chapter 110, or
section 1591]”). The text of § 2252A(b)(2) does not favor a narrow reading of
“relating to.” 11
Our reading is further supported by the comparative historical backgrounds
of the statutes. Under the deportation statute, Congress and the BIA had “long
required a direct link” to an exact list of federally defined drugs. Mellouli, 135 S.
Ct. at 1990. Bennett points to no historical background in favor of a narrow
reading of § 2252A(b)(2), because none exists. We have already cited wide
agreement among the circuits that “relating to” is expansive in this context and
we see no reason to depart.
The post-Mellouli decisions align with our interpretation. The Sixth,
Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have each affirmed that “relating to” remains
11
This reading is confirmed by Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958
(2016), where the Supreme Court found that state laws pertaining to sexual abuse
satisfied the § 2252(b)(2) enhancement even if they did not involve a minor. The
Court acknowledged that Congress did not require total parity between federal
and state predicate convictions. Justice Kagan in dissent urged an interpretation
that would have resulted in great disparity between federal and state triggering
offenses under § 2252(b)(2). Id. at 975 (Kagan, J., dissenting). The dissent
pointed out that many federal triggering offenses lacked state matches. The
majority responded that even though its reading yielded greater parity, its
“construction of § 2252(b)(2)’s sexual abuse predicates [did] not rely on a
general presumption that Congress sought full parity between all the federal and
state predicates in § 2252(b)(2).” Id. at 966.
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broad in this context. See United States v. Miller, ___ F.3d ___, No. 15-13555,
2016 WL 1658671, at *3 (11th Cir. Apr. 27, 2016); United States v. Sumner, ___
F.3d ___, No. 15-1509, 2016 WL 1085751, at *3 (8th Cir. Mar. 21, 2016)
(affirming the broad interpretation of “relating to” from United States v. Weis,
487 F.3d 1148, 1152 (8th Cir. 2007)); Sullivan, 797 F.3d at 638–40 (“Because
neither context nor history tugs “in favor of a narrower reading,” we define the
phrase “relating to” in § 2251(e) and § 2252(b)(2) broadly.” (quoting Mellouli,
135 S. Ct. at 1990)); United States v. Mateen, 806 F.3d 857, 860–61 (6th Cir.
2015), cert. denied, No. 15-8467, 2016 WL 900281 (Apr. 18, 2016) (“While
enhancing a sentence for a prior federal offense under section 2252(b)(2) requires
an offender to commit a specified crime, including crimes listed in chapter 109A,
a prior state conviction requires only that the defendant have been convicted of a
state offense “relating to . . . sexual abuse.” (quoting United States v. Barker, 723
F.3d 315, 322 (2d Cir. 2013)).
Because neither the text nor the history of the enhancement statute limits
triggering offenses to those mirroring federally-defined offenses, we apply the
ordinary interpretation of “relating to.” We ask whether the statute of Bennett’s
1997 Colorado conviction stands in some relation to, pertains to, or has a
connection with the possession of child pornography. 12 See Becker, 625 F.3d at
12
Bennett more or less agrees “relating to” broadens the statute. Bennett
Supp. Br. at 9. But under his reading, the enhancement would be appropriately
(continued...)
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1312. It undeniably does. The nature of sexual exploitation of a child, under
Colorado law, is the possession of visual material depicting a child participating
in explicit sexual conduct. We have little difficulty deciding that the statute
relates to the possession of child pornography. 13
Because Bennett’s prior conviction categorically relates to the possession
of child pornography, we conclude that the district court should have applied the
ten-year mandatory minimum under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2).
B. Plethysmograph Testing
Bennett also argues the district court erred by imposing penile
plethysmograph testing as a condition of his supervised release without sufficient
findings. We must examine whether this challenge is ripe for review. Friends of
Marolt Park v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 382 F.3d 1088, 1093 (10th Cir. 2004). The
parties conceded ripeness, but “[a]s a jurisdictional prerequisite, ripeness may be
examined by this court sua sponte.” Id. (quoting Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1,
Denver, Colo., 119 F.3d 1437, 1444 (10th Cir. 1997)).
12
(...continued)
triggered by, for example, “advertising or promoting” federally-defined child
pornography. Id. There is no good reason why “relating to” would only expand
the explicit list of acts associated with child pornography.
13
This decision rests comfortably with other circuits’ interpretations. For
example, some courts have even found attempt crimes where the defendant
believed he was dealing with a minor, regardless of the age of the victim, related
to sexual abuse of a minor. See United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 845–46 (8th
Cir. 2009); United States v. Hubbard, 480 F.3d 341, 347 (5th Cir. 2007).
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The government based its concession of ripeness on United States v. Mike,
632 F.3d 686 (10th Cir. 2011). In Mike, we said “supervised release terms are
directly appealable, despite the fact that they are subject to later modification,
because they ‘are part of the sentencing court’s final orders.’” Mike, 632 F.3d at
692–93 (quoting United States v. Smith, 606 F.3d 1270, 1283 n.4 (10th Cir.
2010)). But ripeness doctrine has both constitutional and prudential components.
United States v. Vaquera-Juanes, 638 F.3d 734, 735–36 (10th Cir. 2011). So
while an appeal regarding the conditions of supervised release may satisfy the
Article III component, that appeal may nonetheless be dismissed on prudential
ripeness grounds. 14 Id. at 738 (dismissing appeal regarding conditions of
supervised release on ripeness grounds because the defendant might be deported).
We have acknowledged that plethysmograph testing presents different
considerations than other terms of supervised release. See United States v.
Dougan, 684 F.3d 1030, 1036 (10th Cir. 2012) (recognizing that plethysmograph
testing implicates significant liberty interests and requires a strong nexus to the
defendant’s history and characteristics before it can be imposed). So although
supervised release terms may generally be directly appealed, we must inquire
whether the prudential considerations here, especially related to plethysmograph
testing, counsel restraint. They do.
14
“[E]ven in a case raising only prudential concerns, the question of
ripeness may be considered on a court’s own motion.” Nat’l Park Hosp. Ass’n v.
Dept’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003).
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The Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have dismissed immediate challenges
to plethysmograph testing as unripe. United States v. Ortega, 485 F. App’x 656,
660 (5th Cir. 2012) (unpublished); United States v. Rhodes, 552 F.3d 624, 628
(7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Lee, 502 F.3d 447, 450 (6th Cir. 2007). The Lee
court, for example, while recognizing that generally, “conditions of supervised
release may be ripe for appellate review immediately following their imposition at
sentence,” still concluded the defendant’s challenge to plethysmograph testing
was not ripe because (1) the defendant would not be released for fourteen years,
(2) his treatment plan was indefinite, and (3) the court was unsure whether
plethysmograph testing would even be considered medically useful in 2021. Lee,
502 F.3d at 450. Similarly, the Seventh Circuit dismissed a challenge to
plethysmograph testing as unripe where the condition would not have been
imposed for at least eight and one-half years. Rhodes, 552 F.3d at 624. The court
gave weight to the difficulty in requiring the district court to state why
plethysmograph testing is appropriate for the particular defendant when the
question would be “full of contingency and abstraction.” Id. at 628.
The First Circuit, however, rejected a ripeness challenge when it struck
down plethysmograph testing as a potential condition of supervised release in
United States v. Medina, 779 F.3d 55, 66-67 (1st Cir. 2015). As here, the
sentencing court in Medina approved sex offender treatment “including”
plethysmograph testing. Id. at 64 n.7. The First Circuit rejected a ripeness
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challenge because the condition would be imposed within the year, unlike the
fourteen-year gap in Lee. Id. at 67; Lee, 502 F.3d at 450. Additionally, Medina
did not challenge how the testing would be imposed, but rather that
plethysmograph testing was per se unlawful on the record before the district
court. Medina, 779 F.3d at 67.
“A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon ‘contingent future
events that may not occur as anticipated or indeed may not occur at all.’” Texas
v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide
Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580–81 (1985) (internal quotations omitted)).
Our prudential ripeness doctrine requires us to balance the fitness of the issue for
judicial review with the hardship to the parties from withholding review. Awad v.
Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1124 (10th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
Turning first to whether the issue is fit for judicial review, we focus on
“whether determination of the merits turns upon strictly legal issues or requires
facts that may not yet be sufficiently developed.” Kansas Judicial Review v.
Stout, 519 F.3d 1107, 1118 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting New Mexicans for Bill
Richardson v. Gonzales, 64 F.3d 1495, 1499 (10th Cir. 1995)). Bennett is not
challenging the facial validity of penile plethysmograph testing, but rather its
application to him. He argues that the district court did not make sufficiently
particularized factual findings to impose testing. Even if we remanded, the
district court would be faced with the nearly impossible task of determining how
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effective plethysmograph testing might be for Bennett after completing his ten-
year sentence. This factor weighs against review.
We next consider whether the parties face “a direct and immediate
dilemma.” Stout, 519 F.3d at 1118. Of course, this consideration would counsel
against adjudication for most conditions of supervised release where the
defendant has a lengthy sentence. But Bennett faces additional contingencies
before plethysmograph testing would be imposed. First, the treatment provider
must evaluate him and find that testing is appropriate. Second, plethysmograph
testing must be available as a treatment option, a destiny far from certain. See
United States v. Lee, 502 F.3d 447, 450 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting circuit agreement
that penile plethysmograph testing is deeply invasive and of questionable
reliability). And Bennett can challenge the condition when he is released from
his ten-year sentence if testing is still considered an appropriate treatment option
at that time.
In sum, we find the challenge to plethysmograph testing as not yet ripe.
Bennett also raises issues of substantive due process, considering the invasive
nature of the testing, but we need not reach that issue. Because Bennett’s cross-
appeal is not yet sufficiently concrete, we dismiss without prejudice.
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III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we REMAND with instructions to the district
court to VACATE the fifty-seven-month sentence and resentence Bennett to the
ten-year mandatory minimum sentence. We DISMISS Bennett’s cross-appeal on
ripeness grounds.
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No. 14-1384, 14-1402, United States v. Bennett
HARTZ, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting:
I join the majority opinion except its holding that Bennett’s sentence could be
enhanced based on his conviction under Colorado’s child-exploitation statute. On the
application of the federal enhancement statute, I respectfully dissent because, as the
majority opinion sets forth, the definition of child pornography in the Colorado statute is
broader than the definition of the term in the federal enhancement statute. Following my
understanding of the Supreme Court’s decision in Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980
(2015), I would hold that the Colorado statute is not a law “relating to… the production,
possession, receipt, mailing, sale, distribution, shipment, or transportation of child
pornography,” 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2).1
I agree with the majority that the term related to is broad language. But its
interpretation must somehow be anchored to prevent it from drifting aimlessly. We
should try to identify some feature a statute must possess to qualify under § 2252A(b)(2).
In my view, Mellouli provides guidance on how to do that.
Mellouli considered an alien-removal (deportation) statute, which, like the
enhancement statute here, referenced state laws “relating to” dealings with specifically
defined materials. Under § 2252A(b)(2) the materials are “child pornography,” which is
defined for purposes of that section by 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8). In Mellouli the materials
were specifically defined controlled substances. The federal statute made an alien
1
I leave to another day whether we could apply the modified categorical approach to the
Colorado statute.
removable if he was “convicted of a violation of… any law or regulation of a State, the
United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in
section 802 of Title 21),” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (emphasis added). Mellouli did not
limit what activity relating to controlled substances would be covered by the removal
statute except that the activity could not relate to a substance other than a defined
controlled substance. The enhancement statute at issue on this appeal similarly can be
construed to include a great many activities relating to materials that are child
pornography; it just should not be construed to include activities relating to materials that
are not child pornography.
In Mellouli the problem was that the Kansas list of controlled substances was
slightly larger than the federal list; it included at least nine substances that did not satisfy
the definition in 21 U.S.C. § 802. The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the state
list was so similar to the federal list that the state law was one “relating to a controlled
substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21).” It said that “the Government’s
construction of the federal removal statute stretches to the breaking point, reaching state-
court convictions, like Mellouli’s in which ‘[no] controlled substance (as defined in [§
802])’ figures as an element of the offense.” Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1990. “The
Government,” it said, “offers no cogent reason why its position is limited to state drug
schedules that have a ‘substantial overlap’ with the federal schedules. A statute with any
overlap would seem to be related to federally controlled drugs.” Id. (citation omitted).
Justice Thomas’s dissent observed, fairly I think, that “[t]he majority appears to conclude
that a statute ‘relates to’ a federally controlled substance if its definition of the offense of
2
conviction necessarily includes as an element of that offense a federally controlled
substance.” Id. at 1993 (emphasis and additional internal quotation marks omitted).
The parallel to the statute before us is obvious. Under the approach taken in
Mellouli, it would not be enough that almost everything defined as child pornography
under the Colorado statute is also child pornography under the federal statute; it would be
required that the state offense on which Bennett was convicted necessarily include as an
element some material that is child pornography under the federal definition.
Unlike the majority opinion, I do not read the Court’s concern about stretching the
scope of the statute to the “breaking point” as relating to the various actions involving
controlled substances; its concern related solely to the substances involved. Also, I fail to
see how it makes any difference that in the removal statute considered in Mellouli the
relating-to provision explicitly cross-referenced a definition of controlled substance,
whereas there is no explicit cross reference to a definition of child pornography in the
enhancement statute before us. The explicit cross reference was necessary in the removal
statute because the referenced definition was in a separate title of the United States Code;
but there was no need for such a cross reference in the enhancement statute because the
definition in the nearby section of the same chapter of the same title explicitly stated that
it applied throughout the chapter. See 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (“For the purposes of this
chapter,” the listed terms are defined to have the following meanings). What was
important is that there was an explicit federal definition of the term.
In addition, I am puzzled by the majority’s argument that one ground supporting
the Mellouli interpretation of relating to is that otherwise the reference in the removal
3
statute to both federal and state law would mean that “’relating to’ would have two
meanings at once.” Maj. Op. at 14. The Supreme Court did not rely on such an
argument; and I do not think we would say that a term has two different meanings just
because its application leads to different results in different jurisdictions. There would be
nothing outrageous about more (and, perhaps, broader) state statutes “relating to”
controlled substances (whatever the definition of the term) than there are federal statutes
relating to them.
I do recognize, however, that the Supreme Court in Mellouli relied on one feature
of the removal statute that does not apply to the child-pornography enhancement. It
noted “that Congress and the BIA [Board of Immigration Appeals] have long required a
direct link between an alien’s crime of conviction and a particular federally controlled
drug.” Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1990. Perhaps this history was essential to the Court’s
holding in that case. But I am inclined to doubt that. The Court’s “stretches to the
breaking point” language was independent of the statutory history, and the vigor of the
Court’s language suggests that it alone would be a sufficient ground for decision.
Moreover, there is a reason for a strict limitation to federally defined “child
pornography” that does not apply to a federally defined “controlled substance.” Congress
may have wished to be somewhat flexible with regard to state definitions of controlled
substance because creative “chemists” continually come up with new dangerous drugs.
The Mellouli dissent pointed out that under the majority’s construction of the removal
statute, “whenever a State moves first in subjecting some newly discovered drug to
regulation, every alien convicted during the lag between state and federal regulation
4
would be immunized from the immigration consequences of his conduct.” Id. at 1994.
Apparently, two of the nine drugs that were controlled substances under Kansas law but
not under federal law at the time of Mellouli’s arrest were included in the federal
definition within a year of the arrest. See id. In contrast, Congress would have had no
doubt about alternative definitions of child pornography when it enacted its detailed
definition. For whatever reason, it chose a more restrictive definition than the one
enacted in Colorado.
Finally, I do not think that reversal in this case would create a split with decisions
after Mellouli by other circuits interpreting the enhancement provision at issue in this
case. None of the four opinions cited by the majority opinion concerned state child-
pornography statutes. All addressed whether state statutes related to “sexual abuse” or
“abusive sexual conduct,” which are not terms defined by the federal statute.
This is not an easy case. But in my view, fidelity to the approach in Mellouli
requires affirmance of the district court’s decision not to impose the enhancement.
5