Huntley v. City of Owasso , 497 F. App'x 826 ( 2012 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT September 27, 2012
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
RONALD L. HUNTLEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 11-5145
(D.C. No. 4:10-CV-00017-JHP-FHM)
CITY OF OWASSO, a municipal (N.D. Okla.)
corporation of the State of Oklahoma;
JAROD MITCHELL, an individual; TIM
HUTTON, an individual,
Defendants–Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before MATHESON, Circuit Judge, PORFILIO, Senior Circuit Judge, and
BALDOCK, Circuit Judge.
Ronald L. Huntley appeals from the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of the defendants in his lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
Oklahoma’s Governmental Tort Claims Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 51, §§ 151-200.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the grant of summary
judgment on the § 1983 claims, but we vacate the grant of summary judgment on the
state-law claims and remand for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
On March 31, 2009, Susan Huntley called 911 and reported that her husband
Ronald had “just knocked [her] clear down . . . [r]ight in the throat.” Aplt. App.
Vol. 1 at 97. In response to the dispatcher’s questions, she said that there were
weapons in the house and that Mr. Huntley was still on the premises. The dispatcher
advised officers that “the wife is saying he knocked her across the room and there are
lots of weapons in the house. Suspect is now on the back porch.” Id. at 99.
Owasso police officers Tim Hutton and Jarod Mitchell were the first to arrive
at the Huntleys’ home. Officer Mitchell’s patrol car was equipped with an “ICOP”
video and audio recording system. Although the dashboard-mounted camera was not
pointed toward the house, the system also included a belt microphone that continued
to record audio when Officer Mitchell left the car and approached the house.
The officers first tried the back gate and found it locked. They then went to
the front entrance, a small porch with a front door protected by a storm door. The
storm door was closed, but the front door was partially open. The Huntleys were
inside, near the door. The officers heard Mr. Huntley say something to Mrs. Huntley
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along the lines of, “I don’t want you ever talking to (unintelligible).” Aplt. App.
Vol. 1 at 102 (transcript).1
The officers ordered Mr. Huntley to come outside. The parties dispute exactly
what happened next. Mr. Huntley contends that he attempted to comply with the
order, but the officers did not give him the chance. Instead, Officer Mitchell knocked
his book out of his hand, the officers grabbed him by the arms, and “they jerked
[him] out the door.” Id. at 270. As Mr. Huntley described it in his deposition,
it felt like a bolt of lightning had hit me. It went up my arm to my neck
and down my spine, and I was in a lot of pain. The next thing I knew, I
was on the outside and somehow I had been thrown on my back or my
stomach. I had been flipped somehow, but I don’t remember how it was
done.
Id. Mr. Huntley alleges that he suffered injuries to his back and neck from the
officers’ seizure and use of force.
For their part, the officers assert that Mr. Huntley started to close the front
door and retreat into the house. Fearing a possible hostage situation, Officer Mitchell
knocked the book out of Mr. Huntley’s hand, grabbed his left arm, and applied an
1
Mr. Huntley disputes that he made any such statement, but Mrs. Huntley was
still on the phone with 911 when the officers arrived, and the statement can be heard
on the 911 recording. Because the recording contradicts Mr. Huntley’s denial of
making a statement, he has not created a genuine issue of material fact regarding
whether he said something. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (“When
opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by
the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that
version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”). But
it is not clear what Mr. Huntley said beyond what can actually be heard on the
recording.
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arm bar. Officer Hutton grabbed Mr. Huntley’s right arm and together the officers
pulled him through the doorway, across the porch, and into the front yard. They
alleged that Mr. Huntley resisted by pulling backwards and struggling. Therefore,
once they reached the yard, Officer Mitchell performed a leg sweep, causing
Mr. Huntley to fall to the ground. It is undisputed that both officers kept hold of
Mr. Huntley’s arms as he fell.
Mr. Huntley was arrested. Initially he was charged with domestic abuse by
strangulation, resisting arrest, and obstruction of an officer, but the charges later were
modified to domestic assault and battery and obstructing an officer. Eventually
Mrs. Huntley’s noncooperation caused the charges to be dropped.
Mr. Huntley sued the officers and the City. His first claim, under the
Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act, alleged that (1) the officers had
negligently restrained him, (2) the City was vicariously liable for that negligence, and
(3) the City was negligent in hiring, training, and supervising the officers. His
second claim, under § 1983, alleged that (1) the officers had used excessive force in
violation of his rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments and
(2) the City had been deliberately indifferent to the need for training, supervision,
and discipline, thereby creating a policy or custom of allowing officers to violate
constitutional rights.
Early in the litigation, Mr. Huntley voluntarily dismissed with prejudice his
Eighth Amendment § 1983 claims and his negligence claims against the officers.
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The defendants moved for summary judgment on his remaining claims. The district
court concluded that there were no constitutional violations because the entry into the
Huntleys’ home was justified by exigent circumstances, the officers had probable
cause to arrest Mr. Huntley, and the officers’ use of force was objectively reasonable.
Accordingly, the district court held that the officers were entitled to qualified
immunity.
In a footnote, the court also held that the City was entitled to summary
judgment because the court had found no constitutional violation, Mr. Huntley had
not supported his § 1983 claim for municipal liability, and Mr. Huntley had not
established that the City was liable under the Governmental Tort Claims Act
“because there was no injury proximately caused by the Defendant Officers.” Aplt.
App. Vol. 2 at 588 n.1.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
“This court reviews the legal issues surrounding the grant of summary
judgment based on qualified immunity de novo, considering all evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving parties . . . .” Olsen v. Layton Hills Mall, 312 F.3d
1304, 1311 (10th Cir. 2002). But “[b]ecause of the underlying purposes of qualified
immunity, we review summary judgment orders deciding qualified immunity
questions differently from other summary judgment decisions.” Cortez v. McCauley,
478 F.3d 1108, 1114 (10th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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“Once a defendant invokes the defense of qualified immunity, the plaintiff must meet
a two-part burden to avoid summary judgment: (1) that the defendant’s actions
violated a constitutional or statutory right and (2) that the right was clearly
established at the time of the defendant’s unlawful conduct.” York v. City of Las
Cruces, 523 F.3d 1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The court may decide the appropriate order to consider these issues. See Camreta v.
Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2031-32 (2011); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236
(2009).
On appeal, Mr. Huntley focuses on his § 1983 excessive-force claim against
the officers, and on his § 1983 claims and his state-law negligence claims against the
City. Because he fails to challenge any other aspect of the district court’s decision,
including its conclusions that the officers’ entry into his home was justified by
exigent circumstances and that they had probable cause to arrest him, he has waived
appellate review of such issues. See Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904, 913 n.6 (10th Cir.
2007).
B. The Claim Against the Officers
1. The Objective Reasonableness Standard
Like the district court, we begin by considering whether Mr. Huntley has
established a violation of his constitutional rights. Claims of excessive force during
an arrest are evaluated under the “objective reasonableness” standard set forth in
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). “[T]he question is whether the officers’
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actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances
confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Id. at
397. “Our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to
make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some
degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.” Id. at 396. “The
‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id.
Relevant factors include “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses
an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. “The calculus of
reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often
forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain,
and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular
situation.” Id. at 396-97.
2. Was the Use of Force Objectively Reasonable?
Before we analyze the Graham factors, we note that the entire incident, from
the time the officers first spoke to Mr. Huntley to when they completed the leg
sweep, took less than thirty seconds, which underscores the Supreme Court’s caution
about “tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving” situations that require “split-second
judgments.” Id. at 397.
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 a. The Graham factors
The first Graham factor focuses on the severity of the crime at issue. The
officers were responding to a complaint of domestic violence. Under Oklahoma law,
domestic abuse may be a misdemeanor or a felony, depending on the circumstances.
See Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 644. At the time of the incident, the officers did not know
the severity of Mr. Huntley’s conduct. Faced with a complaint of potentially
felonious domestic violence, the officers find support from the first Graham factor.
The second Graham factor is whether the suspect posed a threat. The alleged
domestic violence perpetrator remained on the scene. The officers were aware that
the victim reported in her 911 call that there were “lots of weapons” in the house.
Aplt. App. Vol. 1 at 99. In their training, the officers had been told that “domestic
violence calls are among the most dangerous for officers to handle because of the
emotionally unstable condition of the participants and the unpredictability of their
behavior.” Id. at 88, 93. Moreover, when the officers arrived, both the victim and
the suspect were near the front door. The officers heard Mr. Huntley say something
along the lines of “I don’t want you ever talking to (unintelligible).” Id. at 102. The
front porch and entryway area presented close confines, leaving the officers
vulnerable. It was reasonable for the officers to believe that Mr. Huntley may present
an immediate threat to the safety of Mrs. Huntley and possibly the officers
themselves.
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The third Graham factor is whether the suspect resisted arrest. Mr. Huntley
argues that because he was “a compliant suspect,” “any use of force was unnecessary
and in violation of [his] clearly established Constitutional right to be free from
excessive force.” Aplt. Br. at 14. We separately consider the arm bar and the leg
sweep.
b. The Arm Bar
Mr. Huntley presented evidence that he tried to comply with the officers’
demand to come outside, and that, contrary to the officers’ account, he did not try to
close the front door or try to retreat into the house. Therefore, in viewing the facts in
the light most favorable to him, we must conclude that Mr. Huntley offered no
resistance when the officers approached the house and commanded him to come
outside.
But that does not resolve whether it was unreasonable for the officers to apply
the arm bar. In Cortez v. McCauley, the en banc court addressed a situation where
officers grabbed a suspect in his doorway. 478 F.3d at 1113, 1128. When the
officers arrived at the suspect’s house, the suspect opened the front door and asked
officers what was going on. Id. at 1113. The officers asked him to exit the house.
When he began to comply, they grabbed him, handcuffed him, and placed him in a
patrol car. Id. Even though the suspect had offered no resistance and presented no
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, the court had “little difficulty
concluding that a small amount of force, like grabbing [the suspect] and placing him
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in the patrol car, is permissible in effecting an arrest under the Fourth Amendment.”
Id. at 1128.
Mr. Huntley contends that the arm bar was no small amount of force; he
described it as feeling “like a bolt of lightning” when the officers grabbed his arms,
with pain going to his neck and to his spine. Aplt. App. Vol. 1 at 270. He further
asserts that his evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact as to the amount of
force used, precluding summary judgment. We disagree. There is no evidence that
the officers performed the arm bar in any way other than they had been trained to do,
or that they used force beyond what is commonly used for this maneuver.2
The officers’ conduct in pulling Mr. Huntley through the doorway appears
comparable to the grabbing in Cortez. Moreover, in Cortez this court found the use
of force constitutional even though the alleged crime had not just occurred and the
suspect presented no immediate threat to anyone’s safety. As discussed above, the
2
As to Mr. Huntley’s complaints of pain, he points out that he had back
surgery only a few months before the incident. “What would ordinarily be
considered reasonable force does not become excessive force when the force
aggravates (however severely) a pre-existing condition the extent of which was
unknown to the officer at the time.” Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F.3d 1341, 1353
(11th Cir. 2002); cf. Fisher v. City of Las Cruces, 584 F.3d 888, 896 (10th Cir. 2009)
(concluding that a reasonable jury could find the use of force excessive where
officers were made aware of the suspect’s injuries, but “hasten[ing] to add this might
be a very different case if the officers had no knowledge of [the suspect’s] injuries”).
There is no evidence that the officers were aware of Mr. Huntley’s recent back
surgery when they performed the arm bar or the leg sweep. Mr. Huntley’s assertion
in his opening brief that upon physical contact he “immediately . . . informed officers
that he had had back surgery just three months prior,” Aplt. Br. at 4, is not supported
by the record, particularly the ICOP recording. Therefore, Mr. Huntley has not
created a genuine issue of fact as to this matter. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 380.
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circumstances here support some use of force. We conclude that the district court did
not err in deciding it was justifiable for the officers to apply the arm bar.
c. The Leg Sweep
At first glance, the leg sweep appears to be a closer question. The evidence
suggests that once the officers had Mr. Huntley in the arm bar, they had controlled
him, indicating the leg sweep might have been unnecessary. A close examination of
the record, however, indicates that the district court did not err in concluding that the
leg sweep was objectively reasonable.
As with the arm bar, Mr. Huntley argues that there is a genuine issue of
material fact as to the amount of force used. But again, there is no evidence that
Officer Mitchell performed the leg sweep in any way other than he had been trained
to do, or that he used any amount of force beyond that which is commonly used when
performing that maneuver. In fact, Mr. Huntley admitted in his deposition that he did
not know exactly what happened regarding the leg sweep. See id. at 117 (in response
to the question “Do you remember how you got taken to the ground?,” “No, I do not.
I assume they knocked my feet out from under me, and I wound up on the ground.”);
id. at 118 (stating that he thought he landed on his back, but he was not sure); id. at
270 (“The next thing I knew, I was on the outside and somehow I had been thrown on
my back or my stomach. I had been flipped somehow, but I don’t remember how it
was done.”). Mr. Huntley also admitted that the officers kept hold of his arms as he
went to the ground. As with the arm bar, then, the question is whether the leg sweep
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was objectively reasonable in the first instance, not whether it should have been
performed with less force.
The officers testified that Mr. Huntley was struggling against their hold and
pulling backward as they moved him to the yard. Resistance satisfies the third
Graham factor, and this court has held that a forceful takedown is objectively
reasonable when a suspect struggles with police. See Gallegos v. City of Colo.
Springs, 114 F.3d 1024, 1031 (10th Cir. 1997); Hinton v. City of Elwood, Kan.,
997 F.2d 774, 781-82 (10th Cir. 1993). And even though we view the evidence in the
light most favorable to Mr. Huntley, on this issue we must accept the officers’
version of events because we have found nothing in the record to contradict the
officers’ assertions.
Mr. Huntley’s arguments about his compliance with the officers’ commands
focus on his conduct inside the house. He has not pointed us to, and we have not
found, any denial of the officers’ assertions that he resisted after they applied the arm
bar. In fact, the deposition excerpts quoted above indicate that he has no recollection
of exactly what occurred in those few seconds.
In sum, as to the arm bar, the first and second Graham factors favor the
officers’ use of force, and the third factor does not preclude it. As to the leg sweep,
all three Graham factors favor the officers’ use of force. Therefore, the district court
did not err in concluding that the officers’ use of force was objectively reasonable.
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We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment based on qualified
immunity to Officers Mitchell and Hutton.
3. The Claims Against the City
a. Section 1983 Claims
The district court granted summary judgment to the City on the § 1983 claims,
among other reasons, because the officers had committed no constitutional violations.
Inasmuch as we have affirmed that conclusion, we also affirm the district court’s
disposition of the § 1983 claims against the City. See Trigalet v. City of Tulsa, Okla.,
239 F.3d 1150, 1155-56 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[E]ven if it could be said that [the City’s]
policies, training, and supervision were unconstitutional, the City cannot be held
liable where, as here, the officers did not commit a constitutional violation.”).
b. Negligence Claims
That leaves the negligence claims. Mr. Huntley alleged that the City (1) was
vicariously liable for the officers’ negligence and (2) was liable for its own negligent
hiring, training, and supervising of the officers. These claims were brought pursuant
to the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act, which includes a limited waiver of
Oklahoma’s sovereign immunity against tort claims. With limited analysis, the
district court held that “Plaintiff has failed to establish Defendant City’s liability
under the Governmental Tort Claims Act because there was no injury proximately
caused by the Defendant Officers. See Nicholson v. Tacker, 512 P.2d 156 (Okla.
1973).” Aplt. App. Vol. 2 at 588 n.1.
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The parties understand the district court’s ruling differently. Mr. Huntley
argues that this decision was incorrect because he presented evidence that the
officers’ use of force injured his neck and back and caused psychological
impairments. He appears to read the district court’s decision as saying there was no
evidence of injury, period. By contrast, the appellees briefly assert that “the District
Court properly determined Defendant Officers breached no duty of ordinary care and
subsequently were not responsible for any injury to Mr. Huntley.” Aplee. Br. at
27-28.
The key to understanding the district court’s decision is its citation to
Nicholson, which said:
It is an established rule of law that there can be no actionable negligence
where the defendant has breached no duty owed to the plaintiff. Just
because the defendant has created a risk which harmed the plaintiff that
does not mean that, in the absence of some duty to the plaintiff, the
defendant will be held liable.
512 P.2d at 158. Accordingly, the City is correct that the determinative issue is
whether the City adequately established that there was no breach of duty.
1. Vicarious Liability
To succeed on a theory of vicarious liability against the City, Mr. Huntley
must show that the officers were negligent. See Hooper ex rel. Hooper v. Clements
Food Co., 694 P.2d 943, 945 (Okla. 1985). The Oklahoma Supreme Court has
assumed, “without deciding, that a police officer owes a negligence-based duty of
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care to an arrestee to protect the arrestee from injury.” Morales v. City of Okla. City,
230 P.3d 869, 878 (Okla. 2010). The court went on to discuss the nature of this duty:
[A] police officer has a special dispensation from the duty of ordinary
care not to endanger others. A police officer’s duty is very specific: it
is to use only such force in making an arrest as a reasonably
prudent police officer would use in light of the objective
circumstances confronting the officer at the time of the arrest. . . .
The question is whether the objective facts support the degree of force
employed.
Id. at 880. The court then identified several factors that may be relevant to the
analysis; the first three are the Graham factors, but the court also identified four
additional factors and left room for other circumstances to be considered. See id. at
880 & n.48.
Neither party has ever cited Morales, identified the record evidence regarding
the Morales factors, or otherwise argued how Morales applies to this case.
Accordingly, neither this court nor the district court has had the benefit of suitable
briefing or an adequate record to decide, under the applicable Oklahoma authority,
whether the City has shown that the officers did not breach their duty of care. We
must conclude that the grant of summary judgment on the vicarious liability claim
was premature.
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2. Negligent Hiring, Training, and Supervision
Mr. Huntley’s complaint also alleged that the City was negligent in hiring,
training, and supervising the officers.3 In contrast to vicarious liability, these
allegations focus on the City’s own conduct. See N.H. v. Presbyterian Church
(U.S.A.), 998 P.2d 592, 600 (Okla. 1999). But for two reasons, these claims also are
tied to the determination of the vicarious liability claim. First, they are “based on an
employee’s harm to a third party through employment.” Id. So if the officers were
not negligent, then the City would not be liable for negligent hiring, training, or
supervision. Second, in Oklahoma these claims are available only when vicarious
liability is not established. See id.; Jordan v. Cates, 935 P.2d 289, 293 (Okla. 1997).
So if Mr. Huntley prevails, it will be either on vicarious liability or on these other
negligence claims; it cannot be on both. All of Mr. Huntley’s negligence claims
against the City must therefore be remanded.
***
For these reasons, we must vacate the grant of summary judgment to the City
on Mr. Huntley’s negligence claims and remand for further proceedings. On remand,
the district court may consider whether its further examination of the negligence
claims is merited in light of the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness,
3
It appears that in his summary judgment briefing, Mr. Huntley focused on
negligent supervision; he barely mentioned negligent training and did not mention
negligent hiring at all. He may have abandoned his claims of negligent training and
hiring, but we will leave it to the district court to identify the negligence claims on
remand.
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and comity, or whether it would be more suitable for those claims to be addressed by
an Oklahoma court.4 See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm summary judgment in favor of the officers and the City on
Mr. Huntley’s § 1983 claims, but we vacate the grant of summary judgment in favor
of the City on Mr. Huntley’s negligence claims and remand for further proceedings.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Scott M. Matheson, Jr.
Circuit Judge
4
In Green v. Board of County Commissioners, 472 F.3d 794, 801 n.2 (10th
Cir. 2007), we were concerned that a Governmental Tort Claims Act claim might be
time-barred if it were dismissed by the federal court because the Oklahoma Court of
Appeals had held that the Oklahoma savings statute, Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 100, was
inapplicable to such claims. But after those state appeals-court decisions, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court made it clear that claims under the Governmental Tort
Claims Act are not excepted from § 100’s reach, see Cruse v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs,
910 P.2d 998, 1005 (Okla. 1995), which should have alleviated the concerns in
Green.
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