Romero v. United States , 658 F. App'x 376 ( 2016 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT August 10, 2016
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
AARON ROMERO,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 15-2185
(D.C. No. 1:14-CV-00640-MV-WPL)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; (D. N.M.)
JOHN R. CASTLEBERRY, Special
Agent - Drug Enforcement Administration,
in his individual capacity; PATRICIA G.
WHELAN, a/k/a Patricia Yazzie,
a/k/a Trish Yazzie, Special Agent - Drug
Enforcement Administration, in her
individual capacity; MATTHEW B.
MAYFIELD, Group Supervisor (GS) -
Drug Enforcement Administration, in his
individual capacity,
Defendants - Appellees,
and
RAYMOND “KEITH” BROWN, Assistant
Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) - Drug
Enforcement Administration, in his
individual capacity; JOSEPH M. ARABIT,
Special Agent in Charge (SAC) - Drug
Enforcement Administration, in his
individual capacity,
Defendants.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
(continued)
_________________________________
Before HARTZ, HOLMES, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Aaron Romero appeals the district court’s orders dismissing his claims against
the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and agents of the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Exercising jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. 1291, we affirm.
I. Background
According to the complaint, Mr. Romero, a resident of New Mexico, was
addicted to crack cocaine but had not used the drug for about five months in
November 2011. At that time he was contacted by an acquaintance known as
“Cesario” who, in the past, had provided Mr. Romero with crack cocaine as
compensation for acquiring the drug from third parties on Cesario’s behalf.
Unbeknownst to Mr. Romero, Cesario was working as an informant for the DEA.
When Cesario asked Mr. Romero to help him get some crack, Mr. Romero at first
refused, stating his intention to stay off the drug. But after Cesario’s repeated
requests, Mr. Romero accepted an offer to receive a large amount of crack for
arranging a deal. This caused a “resurrection of Mr. Romero’s crippling addiction to
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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crack cocaine.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 5. Mr. Romero participated in several more
drug deals before he was arrested and charged with various drug offenses. Those
charges were subsequently dismissed without prejudice after the government moved
to dismiss the indictment as to Mr. Romero.
Mr. Romero then brought this action, alleging that the United States caused
personal injury to him by exploiting his addiction to crack cocaine and causing him
to relapse. The complaint asserts two claims against the United States for negligence
and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the DEA agents’ distribution
of crack cocaine to him. The complaint also asserts claims against the DEA agents
involved in the investigation based on the legal theories that these defendants
violated his Fifth Amendment rights to be free from both bodily harm and
deprivation of liberty interests without due process of law.1
In response to defendants’ motions to dismiss, the district court issued the two
orders underlying this appeal. In one order, the court ruled that the claims against the
United States were barred by the wrongful-conduct rule because the “allegations
demonstrate that [Mr. Romero’s] conduct was prohibited by federal criminal statute
and was causally related to his alleged injuries, and that his conduct contributed to
his injuries in at least the same degree as did the government’s conduct.” Aplt. App.,
Vol. 2 at 373. In the other order, the court ruled that the DEA agents were entitled to
qualified immunity because Mr. Romero “failed to articulate clearly established law
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None of the other claims in Mr. Romero’s complaint are pertinent to this
appeal.
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that would have put the Individual Defendants on notice that their conduct in offering
and providing [drugs to Mr. Romero] in exchange for brokering drug transactions
violated his Fifth Amendment rights.” Id. at 417.
On appeal Mr. Romero argues the district court erred by concluding that the
wrongful-conduct rule bars his recovery and that he proximately caused his injuries.
He also argues the DEA agents committed outrageous government conduct by
providing him with crack cocaine, violating his clearly established due process rights,
and therefore they were not entitled to qualified immunity.
II. Analysis
We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Romero’s claims
against the United States for failure to state a claim. Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d
1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). We apply the same standards as the district court,
accepting as true the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and viewing
the alleged facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Romero. Id. We also review
de novo the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to the DEA agents. Weise v.
Casper, 593 F.3d 1163, 1166 (10th Cir. 2010).
A. The Wrongful-Conduct Rule
Mr. Romero argues that his complaint states a claim for negligence and
intentional infliction of emotional distress against the United States because the
allegations show the government’s actions “reignited” his addiction to crack cocaine.
Aplt. App., Vol. 1 at 59. We disagree.
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Under New Mexico law, a plaintiff cannot maintain a claim based on his own
illegal conduct.
It is a well settled rule of law that a person cannot maintain an action if,
in order to establish his cause of action, he must rely, in whole or in
part, on an illegal or immoral act or transaction to which he is a party,
or where he must base his cause of action, in whole or in part, on a
violation by himself of the criminal or penal laws.
Desmet v. Sublett, 225 P.2d 141, 142 (N.M. 1950). The principle of public policy
behind this rule is that “[n]o court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of
action upon an immoral or illegal act.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Mr. Romero cites no authority for why the wrongful-conduct rule should not
apply here. By his own admission, he agreed to resume acquiring crack cocaine for
Cesario, brokered multiple drug transactions, and consumed the cocaine he received
in exchange for his role in the transactions. All of his purported damages stem from
these illegal acts, which he chose to perform, his addiction to crack cocaine
notwithstanding. Indeed, when he first accepted Cesario’s offer, he had been off
cocaine for about five months. To the extent he argues that his will was overborne
by his addiction, he does not allege that the government caused his addiction.
Mr. Romero argues that the wrongful-conduct rule as articulated in Desmet is
an “anachronism” in light of New Mexico’s adoption of a comparative fault analysis
of tort claims. Aplt. Opening Br. at 12. Assuming for the purposes of this appeal
that he adequately presented this argument to the district court, we conclude that it
lacks merit. In Rodriguez v. Williams, 355 P.3d 25, 29 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015), the
court declined to apply the rule to preclude recovery for an intoxicated driver, who
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was injured when another driver ran a red light and crashed into his vehicle. The
court found that, “consistent with Desmet,” the injured driver’s damages were
properly limited solely to the other driver’s negligence, and his “recovery was
reduced by the portion of the damages attributed to his unlawful act.” Id. at 28.
Notably, the injured driver “did not seek to profit from any impairment to his
driving.” Id. at 29. Here, Mr. Romero’s damages undoubtedly arose when he
engaged in illegal conduct. He cannot “profit” from his own illegal conduct. And as
the Rodriguez decision makes clear, the wrongful-conduct rule is not inherently
incompatible with a comparative fault framework.
Moreover, Mr. Romero’s illegal use of crack cocaine was an integral and
essential part of his case. He cannot dispute that this conduct was a proximate cause
of his asserted injuries. See Orzel v. Scott Drug Co., 537 N.W.2d 208, 215-17 (Mich.
1995) (discussing the causation requirement under Michigan’s wrongful-conduct rule
and concluding that recovery was barred where the plaintiff’s illegal use of a
controlled substance served as a proximate cause of his asserted injuries). Under the
circumstances here, Mr. Romero’s insistence that the government’s conduct was also
a proximate cause of his injuries misses the mark – it is his own conduct, not the
government’s, which bars his recovery. We conclude the district court did not err by
relying on the wrongful-conduct rule to dismiss Mr. Romero’s claim.
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B. Qualified Immunity
Mr. Romero argues that the DEA agents were not entitled to qualified
immunity because they committed outrageous government conduct, thereby violating
his clearly established substantive due process rights. We are not persuaded.
“In resolving a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity, a court must
consider whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged make out a violation of a
constitutional right, and whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time
of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1164
(10th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff bears the burden of
demonstrating that the law was clearly established at the time of the alleged
violation. Herring v. Keenan, 218 F.3d 1171, 1175 (10th Cir. 2000). We conclude
that Mr. Romero has not met this burden.
A constitutional right is clearly established if its contours are clear enough that
a reasonable official would understand what he or she was doing violated it. Quinn
v. Young, 780 F.3d 998, 1004-05 (10th Cir. 2015). “Ordinarily, in order for the law
to be clearly established, there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on
point, or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts must have
found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.” Thomas v. Durastanti, 607 F.3d 655,
669 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). General statements of law
are insufficient to satisfy the “clearly established” prong of the qualified immunity
test. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 753 (2002). Rather, the unlawfulness of the
official action must be apparent in light of the pre-existing law. Id. at 739. In
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determining whether a right is clearly established, “it is crucial to look at precedent
applying the relevant legal rule in similar factual circumstances. Such cases give
government officials the best indication of what conduct is unlawful in a given
situation.” Id. at 753.
Outrageous government conduct during a criminal investigation may constitute
a violation of substantive due process rights. United States v. Mosley, 965 F.2d 906,
908-09 (10th Cir. 1992). Although “[n]o federal court has defined the requirements
of the outrageous conduct defense with any degree of precision[,] . . . this is an
extraordinary defense reserved for only the most egregious circumstances.”
Id. at 910. “It is not to be invoked each time the government acts deceptively or
participates in a crime that it is investigating.” Id.
In United States v. Harris, 997 F.2d 812, 817 (10th Cir. 1993), this court
suggested that government distribution of drugs to a known addict might constitute
outrageous conduct under certain circumstances. The court stated, however, that
“[a]ny definitive rule of law concerning whether a government agent’s sale of
narcotics to a known addict constitutes outrageous government conduct would
necessarily be flawed.” Id. at 818. And in light of law enforcement’s need to
conduct undercover operations in targeting drug dealers, “it would be nonsensical to
promulgate a rule holding outrageous government conduct each and every time the
government distributed narcotics to a known addict.” Id.
Although Harris was a direct criminal appeal, the underlying facts are
analogous to those here. The defendant facilitated purchases of crack cocaine for an
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undercover agent in exchange for a cut of what was sold. Id. at 814. The court
identified three relevant factors for determining whether government conduct is
outrageous: (1) excessive government involvement in the creation of the crime;
(2) significant governmental coercion to induce the crime; and (3) reliance on a
known addict to carry out multiple transactions with the primary purpose of stacking
charges against a criminal defendant, as opposed to having a legitimate investigatory
purpose. Id. at 816-19.
The court concluded that neither of the first two factors was satisfied in this
type of routine drug investigation. “[T]he government’s role in instigating the
transaction and acting as a buyer does not amount to creating the crime.” Id. at 816.
And even if the agent “enticed” the defendant to participate, “he was not coerced to
the point of outrageousness.” Id. at 818. Thus, the Harris decision would not have
put the DEA agents on notice that their conduct in the undercover investigation
violated Mr. Romero’s clearly established rights. See also Mosely, 965 F.2d
at 911-12 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that the government can suggest illegal activity,
provide supplies and expertise for the illegal activity, and act as both supplier and
buyer in sales of illegal goods without creating the crime, and that “coercion of any
type must be particularly egregious before it will sustain an outrageous conduct
defense”).
With respect to the third factor, the Harris court remanded the case for further
proceedings to determine whether the multiple transactions were conducted “with the
primary purpose of stacking charges.” 997 F.2d at 819 (“Absent a specific
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investigatory purpose, the agent could not continue to conduct these transactions
ad infinitum thereby constantly increasing the charges, which necessarily increases
the attendant mandatory sentence length.”). But this factor would not have put the
DEA agents on notice that their conduct violated Mr. Romero’s due process rights,
particularly given the allegations in this case, which presume that a legitimate
investigatory purpose motivated the agents, at least in part. The complaint alleges
that they exploited Mr. Romero’s addiction to crack cocaine “to further the
investigative goals” of their operation and “to target drug trafficking suspects” in the
area. Aplt. App., Vol. 1 at 25. Absent is any specific factual statement alleging that
the DEA agents conducted multiple transactions with the primary purpose of stacking
charges against him. See Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir.
2012) (“[I]n examining a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), we will disregard
conclusory allegations and look only to whether the remaining factual allegations
plausibly suggest the defendant is liable.”). Under these circumstances, the
complaint fails to allege any conduct that the DEA agents would have understood
violated Mr. Romero’s constitutional rights.
Therefore, the district court did not err by concluding the DEA agents were
entitled to qualified immunity.
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III. Conclusion
The district court’s orders are affirmed.
Entered for the Court
Carolyn B. McHugh
Circuit Judge
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