United States v. Amaya-Sanchez ( 1997 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
DEC 17 1997
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Case No. 97-2079
v.
(D.C. CR-96-460-SC)
MARIO AMAYA-SANCHEZ, (District of New Mexico)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON, HENRY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
Mario Amaya-Sanchez appeals directly to this court from a jury verdict
convicting him of drug importation in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960(a)(1),
and 960(b)(3) and possession with intent to distribute more than fifty kilograms of
marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). His appeal states
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally
disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may
be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
that the evidence presented against him at trial is not sufficient to prove his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. We rule that the evidence is sufficient and affirm. 1
In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the record in a
light most favorable to the government and ask whether any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
See United States v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 1107, 1108 (10th Cir. 1997). “[W]hile the
evidence supporting the conviction must be substantial and do more than raise a
mere suspicion of guilt, it need not conclusively exclude every other reasonable
hypothesis and it need not negate all possibilities except guilt.” United States v.
Johnson, 42 F.3d 1312, 1319 (10th Cir. 1994) (internal quotations omitted). We
do not function as a jury. Instead, we are required to accept the jury’s resolution
of conflicting evidence and its assessment of the witnesses’ credibility. See
United States v. Pappert, 112 F.3d 1073, 1077 (10th Cir. 1997). Applying this
standard, we set forth the following facts which were presented to the jury.
Mr. Amaya-Sanchez stopped the truck he was driving at the Colombus,
New Mexico Port of Entry from Palomas, Republic of Mexico. The roads in
Palomas are in poor condition. United States Immigration Inspector James
1
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered
submitted without oral argument.
2
Varnes asked Mr. Amaya-Sanchez his citizenship, and Mr. Amaya-Sanchez
handed the Inspector his resident alien card. Mr. Amaya-Sanchez’s hands were
shaking, and he did not make eye contact with Inspector Varnes, leading the
Inspector to conclude that he was nervous. Inspector Varnes had experienced
instances when drivers were nervous but no contraband was found in their
vehicles and instances when drivers were not nervous but their vehicles did
contain contraband.
Inspector Varnes directed Mr. Amaya-Sanchez to an area at the port of
entry where other agents trained a drug-sniffing dog on the truck. The agents
themselves smelled no marijuana, but the dog alerted to the presence of drugs in
the truck’s fender. An agent drilled a hole in the fender and discovered
marijuana. The agents removed over seventy-eight pounds of the drug from the
fender wells and arrested Mr. Amaya-Sanchez.
Three days later, as an officer was driving the truck away from the port of
entry, he noticed that the truck shook badly when he drove between thirty-five
and sixty miles per hour. He pulled over, let some air out of the tires, and
smelled marijuana. There were 118.2 pounds of the drug hidden in specially built
containers in the tires.
A customs agent interviewed Mr. Amaya-Sanchez who denied that the truck
was his. Mr. Amaya-Sanchez stated that he had gone to Mexico to have his truck
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repainted in Palomas, but he could not or would not identify where or to whom he
took his truck to have it painted. He said he borrowed the truck he was driving
back across the border from Maria Vasquez, a friend of his who worked in
Palomas for Dr. Anaya. However, when the interviewing agent contacted Dr.
Anaya’s office, he found that no person named Maria Vasquez worked for Dr.
Anaya.
The truck’s glove box contained a certificate of title showing the owner as
Maria Trinidad Vasquez. However, the address listed for Ms. Vasquez on the
title did not exist and there was no Maria Vasquez or Maria Trinidad listed in the
Palomas phone book. Even so, not all residents of Palomas are listed in the phone
book and some small towns in Mexico do not have street addresses for some
houses. Finally, the truck had New Mexico plates, and the office where the title
was issued did not require proof of identification when issuing title documents.
I. POSSESSION WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE
To support a conviction of possession with intent to distribute in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
(1) that Mr. Amaya-Sanchez knowingly possessed the marijuana and (2) that Mr.
Amaya-Sanchez possessed the marijuana with the specific intent to distribute it.
See United States v. Reece, 86 F.3d 994, 996 (10th Cir. 1996).
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The government relies on the following evidence to prove that Mr. Amaya-
Sanchez knowingly possessed the marijuana with the intent to distribute it. He
was the driver and sole occupant of the truck which contained the drugs and
appeared nervous when he was stopped at the port of entry. Although Mr.
Amaya-Sanchez claimed the truck was not his, the friend he named as owner did
not work where he claimed she did and was not listed in the Palomas phone book.
Additionally, despite the fact that her name was on the title to the truck, the
address listed on the title did not exist. Also, Mr. Amaya-Sanchez lacked
credibility because he could not tell the police where he had taken his truck
earlier that day to be painted. Finally, no person would hide over $100,000 worth
of marijuana in her truck and then loan it to a friend who did not know about the
marijuana; an innocent Mr. Amaya-Sanchez would have noticed the same shaking
that the officer driving the truck away from the border would have and, not
knowing of the marijuana, would have likely taken it to a mechanic or some place
where it would have been discovered. Thus, the government’s theory of the case
was that Mr. Amaya-Sanchez knew the truck contained marijuana and lied about
his friend.
Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the government, we
accept the government’s theory of the case and hold that a reasonable juror could
have found Mr. Amaya-Sanchez guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In United
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States v. Hooks, 780 F.2d 1526 (10th Cir. 1986), we considered the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting a conviction for possession with intent to distribute when
the defendant was driving a borrowed vehicle containing PCP. We noted that
possession under § 841(a)(1) may be actual or constructive and may be proved by
circumstantial evidence. See id. at 1531. “[C]onstructive possession may be
established by proof that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the
vehicle in which the controlled substance was concealed.” Id. However, “proof
of dominion or control, without the requisite showing of knowledge, is
insufficient to sustain a conviction . . . .” Id. We ruled that the requisite showing
of knowledge was found in the totality of the circumstantial evidence and the
reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence. See id. at 1532. The
circumstantial evidence was that the defendant gave the police a false name, was
carrying baking soda which can be used to purify PCP, seemed to be under the
influence of a narcotic, approached the officer instead of waiting for the officer to
come near the truck where he could smell the PCP, and was driving a truck which
contained $10,000 worth of PCP. See id. As to this last bit of evidence, we noted
that “it is unlikely that the owner of the truck, or anyone else, would have left
such a valuable substance in the truck . . . .” while loaning it to a friend who was
unaware of its presence. Id.
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As in Hooks, we find the totality of the circumstantial evidence and the
reasonable inferences from that evidence support Mr. Amaya-Sanchez’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt as to the issue of his knowing possession of the drug.
Mr. Amaya-Sanchez appeared nervous at the border crossing, suggesting fear that
he would be caught. He told the customs agent that he took his truck to have it
painted earlier that day in Palomas, but could not remember what the name of the
shop was or where it was, leading to the inference that his story was a lie and
suggesting guilty knowledge. Additionally, his story about his friend who loaned
him the truck proved false at least as to where the friend worked, and the fact that
the friend’s address did not exist cast Mr. Amaya-Sanchez’s story into further
doubt. Finally, the fact that he was driving a car with almost 200 pounds of
marijuana in it also leads to the inference that he knew he was transporting drugs;
it strains credulity to think that the owner of such a large amount of marijuana,
worth over $100,000, would hide it in a truck and then loan that truck to an
innocent Mr. Amaya-Sanchez, who would have at the least jeopardized the
shipment once the truck encountered problems across the border.
As for the second element of the charge, that Mr. Amaya-Sanchez had the
intent to distribute the marijuana, the large quantity of marijuana in the truck is
sufficient to support a judgment that Mr. Amaya-Sanchez intended to distribute
the marijuana. See id. Therefore, we affirm his conviction on this charge.
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II. DRUG IMPORTATION
To support a conviction of drug importation in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1), the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Amaya-
Sanchez knowingly brought marijuana into the United States. See United States
v. Flinckinger, 573 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1978), overruled on other grounds by
United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir. 1984). The evidence
presented above is equally applicable to whether Mr. Amaya-Sanchez had the
requisite knowledge that he was bringing marijuana into the United States.
We determine that there is sufficient evidence to find Mr. Amaya-Sanchez
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on the drug importation charge as well. In
United States v. Ortiz-Ortiz, 57 F.3d 892 (10th Cir. 1995), the defendant was a
passenger in a car which he claimed was loaned to him by two unknown people so
he and his friend could travel across the border to buy new parts for his friend’s
car. See id. at 894. The car was titled in the name of a person the defendant
claimed he knew, but the police could not find the person. See id. The car
smelled of perfume, which is commonly used to mask the odor of drugs, and when
the border police looked, they discovered at least $28,000 worth of marijuana
concealed under a loose back seat. See id. at 895. We held that a jury was
entitled to disregard the defendant’s claims that the car belonged to a friend or
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was given to him by strangers and instead to conclude that he knowingly imported
the marijuana. See id.While the truck in the case at bar did not smell of perfume, the evidence in
our case is more compelling than in Ortiz-Ortiz because of Mr. Amaya-Sanchez’s
nervousness, because his friend could not be located, because he could not or
would not tell the border police where he had left his truck to have it painted,
and, especially, because of the vast quantity of drugs involved which make it
much less likely that a friend would have simply loaned him the car. We hold
that there was sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find
Mr. Amaya-Sanchez guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on the importation claim.
Mr. Amaya-Sanchez’s conviction is affirmed. The mandate shall issue
forthwith.
Entered for the Court,
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
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