Gokool v. Oklahoma City University ( 2019 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT April 30, 2019
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
SUSAN R. GOKOOL,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 18-6093
(D.C. No. 5:16-CV-00807-R)
OKLAHOMA CITY UNIVERSITY; (W.D. Okla.)
OKLAHOMA CITY UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW,
Defendants - Appellees.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before PHILLIPS, McKAY, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.**
_________________________________
Susan Gokool, representing herself pro se, appeals from four orders of the
district court issued in response to motions she filed following this court’s decision
affirming the dismissal of her case for failure to state a claim. We now affirm those
orders. Nevertheless, we deny Oklahoma City University’s request that we sanction
Ms. Gokool for filing a frivolous appeal.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
I.
Ms. Gokool filed suit against the University in June 2016, making several
allegations against the University and its law school in connection with her
expulsion.1 The University removed the case to federal court and subsequently filed
a motion to dismiss Ms. Gokool’s first amended complaint for failure to state a claim.
The district court granted the motion and dismissed Ms. Gokool’s case in December
2016, and this court affirmed that ruling on appeal. See Gokool v. Okla. City Univ.,
716 F. App’x 815 (10th Cir. 2017).
After the mandate issued in Ms. Gokool’s first appeal, she filed a number of
motions in the district court between March and May 2018: (1) a motion asking the
district court judge to recuse himself on the basis that his 2016 ruling on the motion
to dismiss demonstrated partiality toward the University; (2) a motion to vacate the
district court’s dismissal for fraud on the court; (3) a motion for reconsideration filed
once the district court had denied those first two motions; (4) a second motion
regarding recusal of the district court judge, this time addressed to the chief judge
asking him to direct the recusal; (5) a motion to correct a typographical error in that
second recusal motion, filed after the district court had already issued an order in
response to it; (6) a motion for relief; and (7) a motion to suspend proceedings in the
1
Although Ms. Gokool named the University and the law school as separate
entities, the University has informed the court that the law school is operated by the
University and is not its own entity.
2
district court while Ms. Gokool filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the U.S.
Supreme Court.
The district court denied Ms. Gokool’s first two motions because this court
had already affirmed the dismissal of her case and she had “provided no basis for the
Court’s jurisdiction to consider either motion.” (Appellant’s App. at 369.) The court
responded to Ms. Gokool’s third and fourth motions by issuing an order for her to
withdraw them or to “show cause why her conduct does not violate Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11(b).” (Id. at 387.) The district court subsequently struck these
motions, plus the motion to correct a typographical error, upon finding that
Ms. Gokool had failed to show that her motions were not frivolous. The court also
stated that it would “strike any of Plaintiff’s future filings in this case, unless she
obtains a licensed attorney who certifies that the motion is non-frivolous.” (Id.
at 413.) The court struck Ms. Gokool’s last two motions in accordance with this
order. Ms. Gokool appealed.
II.
Ms. Gokool first contends that the district court erred in denying her motion
for the judge to recuse himself and her motion to vacate the dismissal of her case
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) and (d)(3). Although the
district court’s stated reason for denying the motions was a belief that it lacked
jurisdiction to consider them, the Supreme Court has held that district courts may
consider Rule 60(b) motions filed even after a ruling has been affirmed on appeal.
See Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17, 17–18 (1976).
3
Nevertheless, having reviewed Ms. Gokool’s motions, we find that the arguments
they make are substantially the same as arguments she made in her first appeal to this
court, only reframed as allegations of fraud on the court and partiality on the part of
the district court judge. Under these circumstances, we conclude there is no need to
remand these motions for further proceedings in the district court. Accordingly, in
the interest of judicial economy and efficiency, we will address the merits of Ms.
Gokool’s motions.
Rule 60(b)(3) allows a court to relieve a party from a final judgment that
resulted from fraud, and Rule 60(d)(3) recognizes the court’s power to “set aside a
judgment for fraud on the court.” Ms. Gokool’s motion invoking these provisions
raises two arguments that fraud, or fraud on the court, occurred in this case: (1) the
University’s discussion of Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002), and
(2) the University’s description of Ms. Gokool’s fraud claim.
Regarding the first point, Ms. Gokool claimed the University had misled the
district court and this court by suggesting that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Gonzaga had reversed the Washington Supreme Court’s conclusion in the underlying
case that the student had presented sufficient evidence of an implied contract, see
Doe v. Gonzaga Univ., 24 P.3d 390, 402–03 (Wash. 2001), reversed on other
grounds by Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 290–91. Ms. Gokool acknowledges that the
University made the distinction between the two Gonzaga cases because she had
cited to the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion as support for her implied contract claim
and the University wished to clarify that “‘[t]he U.S. Supreme Court did not take up
4
the issue of implied contracts in the university context as Plaintiff suggests.’”
(Appellant’s Reply Br. at 4 (quoting Appellant’s App. at 175 n.3).) She contends,
however, that this sentence should be disregarded and fraud found based on the
University’s prior statement that the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Washington
Supreme Court, because the University thus engaged in “a well-executed planned
scheme to deceive the district court into believing that the highest court decided that
there was not an implied contract between the student and the university.”
(Appellant’s Reply Br. at 4–5.)
Ms. Gokool’s claim is frivolous for numerous reasons. As an initial matter,
Ms. Gokool has now filed several pages of motions and briefs haggling over the
meaning of two sentences from a footnote in the University’s motion to dismiss.
Moreover, she has not demonstrated how any deception resulting from those
sentences affected either the district court’s dismissal of her case or this court’s
affirmance of that dismissal. The district court noted that the Washington Supreme
Court’s decision in Gonzaga had been reversed on appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court,
but went on to state that, regardless of the reversal, the Washington decision
“seem[ed] to only undermine, not bolster, Ms. Gokool’s claims.” (Appellant’s App.
at 218.) Contrary to Ms. Gokool’s contention that the district court’s observation of
the reversal indicated that it was deceived, the district court merely pointed out the
case’s subsequent history before addressing Ms. Gokool’s arguments based on it
anyway. Simply put, no fraud or fraud on the court occurred because of the Gonzaga
footnote.
5
As for Ms. Gokool’s second argument, she asserted in her Rule 60 motion that
the University had committed fraud on the court by describing her complaint’s fraud
cause of action as “merely alleg[ing] that holds were placed on [her] student account,
and, at most, [University] employees were confused or misinformed about what the
holds meant, why they were placed on the account, and how to remove them,” (id. at
183). Ms. Gokool claims that her fraud allegation was based on the employees’
intentional acts rather than any confusion or miscommunication. The University’s
point with regard to the fraud allegation, however, was that Ms. Gokool had not
plausibly alleged that the employees had acted intentionally; rather, the evidence at
most showed their confusion or misinformation. To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Moreover, to show
fraud, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant knew his statements were false or
acted with reckless disregard for their truth. See Bowman v. Presley, 212 P.3d 1210,
1218 (Okla. 2009). Thus, it was entirely appropriate for the University to contend,
both before the district court and on appeal, that Ms. Gokool had not plausibly
alleged that its employees knew any information they had given her was false.
Ms. Gokool’s motion asking the district court judge to recuse himself put
forward essentially the same arguments as her Rule 60 motion, only couched in terms
of the district court’s acceptance of the University’s arguments demonstrating
partiality toward the University. Just as the University committed no wrongdoing in
its Gonzaga and fraud arguments, neither did the district court judge act with
6
partiality toward the University, or the appearance of partiality, by finding merit in
those arguments. Cf. Frates v. Weinshienk, 882 F.2d 1502, 1504–05 (10th Cir. 1989)
(finding no appearance of partiality in bankruptcy judge’s approval of Chapter 11
plan and statements regarding the likely cash payout for unsecured creditors). Thus,
we affirm the district court’s denial of Ms. Gokool’s first two motions on the
alternative basis that the arguments raised in these motions fail on the merits.
After Ms. Gokool filed a motion for reconsideration and a second motion
calling for the district court judge’s recusal based on the same partiality and fraud
arguments, the district court issued an order directing her either to withdraw the
motions or to show cause that she was not in violation of Rule 11(b). Ms. Gokool’s
response to that order detailed the reasons she believed several documents she filed
prior to her first appeal, plus her first two post-appeal motions, did not violate
Rule 11(b), before finally addressing the merits of the two motions to which the order
pertained. Concerning the relevant motions, Ms. Gokool contended that the district
court judge knew he had jurisdiction to consider her Rule 60 motion but did not do so
because of his bias toward the University, which also committed wrongdoing as she
argued in her Rule 60 motion. Ms. Gokool’s response was thus premised on the same
partiality and fraud arguments that she had raised in her earlier motions, which we
have found to be without merit.
In accordance with its earlier order, after Ms. Gokool had responded, the
district court struck her motion for reconsideration, second motion for recusal, and
7
subsequently filed motion to correct a typographical error.2 The court observed that
after the first appeal Ms. Gokool “ha[d] repeatedly—without reliable evidence or
reason—accused Defendants and the Court of committing fraud against her as a
means of re-litigating meritless claims.” (Appellant’s App. at 412.) The court then
concluded that Ms. Gokool had failed to show that she was not in violation of
Rule 11(b) and stated that it would “strike any of [her] future filings in this case,
unless she obtains a licensed attorney who certifies that the motion is non-frivolous.”
(Id. at 412–13 (citing Evans-Carmichael v. United States, 343 F. App’x 294, 296
(10th Cir. 2009).)
“[I]njunctions restricting further filings are appropriate where the litigant’s
lengthy and abusive history is set forth; the court provides guidelines as to what the
litigant may do to obtain its permission to file an action; and the litigant receives
notice and an opportunity to oppose the court’s order before it is implemented.”
Andrews v. Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070, 1077 (10th Cir. 2007). Each of those elements
was met here. As we have already observed, Ms. Gokool’s first two post-appeal
motions only sought to rehash arguments she made in her first appeal. Furthermore,
as the district court noted in its order, Ms. Gokool’s second two post-appeal motions
again sought to rehash these same issues. The district court thus set out Ms.
Gokool’s history of filing frivolous motions and, having already given her an
2
Ms. Gokool asserts that the district court struck her response to its order to
show cause, but the record reveals that is not the case.
8
opportunity to demonstrate that she was not in violation of Rule 11(b), the court gave
her clear guidelines as to how she can obtain permission to file future motions.
Because we affirm the district court’s imposition of a filing restriction, we
likewise affirm its orders striking Ms. Gokool’s motions filed after the restriction was
put in place and without the requisite attorney certification.
The University has requested that we “enter an order awarding damages and
costs against [Ms.] Gokool for taking this frivolous appeal.” (Appellee’s Br. at 20.)
Under Rule 39(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, costs will generally
be taxed against the appellant if a judgment is affirmed. We see no reason to depart
from this general rule here, and thus the University may follow the procedures set
forth in Rule 39(d) in order to have costs taxed against Ms. Gokool. However, we
decline to award other damages against Ms. Gokool at this time. The district court’s
filing restriction should provide the University with sufficient protection against
frivolous motions going forward.
III.
Therefore, we AFFIRM the district court’s orders, HOLD that costs may be
taxed against Ms. Gokool, and DENY the University’s request for other appellate
damages.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
9
18-6093, Gokool v Oklahoma City University
O’BRIEN, J., concurring and dissenting.
I join the Order and Judgment in all respects except for the denial of the
University’s request for costs and damages. Fed. R. App. P. 38 provides such a remedy
for frivolous filings (for which this appeal appears to be a poster child and thereby
qualifies for at least double costs and probably damages as well). Remedial provisions
allowed to wither on the vine do not deter frivolous filers but do deny other parties just
remedies.
Rule 38 sanctions require a separately filed motion or notice from the court giving
the frivolous filer notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond. Since the University’s
request comes only from its brief, I would provide the required notice to Gokool and
expect her response to be filed within 20 days.