United States v. Batara-Molina ( 2023 )

Appellate Case: 21-8079 Document: 010110816219 Date Filed: 02/22/2023 Page: 1
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
PUBLISH Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS February 22, 2023
Christopher M. Wolpert
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
_________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 21-8079
IAN ARBEE BATARA-MOLINA,
Defendant - Appellant.
_________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Wyoming
(D.C. No. 1:20-CR-00179-ABJ)
_________________________________
Josh Lee, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Virginia L. Grady, Federal Public
Defender, with him on the briefs), Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.
Jonathan C. Coppom, Assistant United States Attorney (L. Robert Murray, United States
Attorney, with him on the briefs), Cheyenne, Wyoming, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
_________________________________
Before HOLMES, Chief Circuit Judge, EBEL, and EID, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
EBEL, Circuit Judge.
_________________________________
Defendant-Appellant Ian Batara-Molina appeals the denial of his motion to
suppress methamphetamine found in a car he was driving. This methamphetamine
was discovered after Mr. Molina was stopped for speeding on his way to Sioux Falls,
South Dakota. During this traffic stop, two deputies deployed a drug-sniffing dog
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around the perimeter of the car and were alerted to the presence of contraband. The
car was searched, and methamphetamine was found in the trunk. Mr. Molina moved
to suppress this methamphetamine on the basis that his traffic stop was delayed for
the dog sniff and that the deputies lacked reasonable suspicion for this delay. After
the district court denied this motion, Mr. Molina pled guilty to one count of
possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A).
On appeal, Mr. Molina continues to argue that his traffic stop was delayed for
the dog sniff and that the deputies lacked reasonable suspicion for this delay.
Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we find that the traffic stop was
justified by reasonable suspicion, and so we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of
Mr. Molina’s motion to suppress.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
While driving through Wyoming with a female passenger, Mr. Molina was
pulled over by Deputy Eric Coxbill for going 49 mph in a 45-mph zone. Deputy
Coxbill approached the car from the passenger-side of the vehicle and noticed a
strong odor coming from the interior—which he would later describe as either fruity,
perfumy, or like a new car smell. Speaking to Mr. Molina through the passenger
window, Deputy Coxbill requested Mr. Molina’s license, registration, and insurance
information. Mr. Molina provided his license, but explained that the car was a rental,
and proceeded to look for the rental agreement on his phone.
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While Mr. Molina was searching for the agreement, Deputy Coxbill asked
where he and his female companion were headed. Mr. Molina said they were going
to South Dakota for vacation but was unable to properly pronounce the name of their
destination city. After hearing Mr. Molina say what sounded like “See Ox falls,”
Deputy Coxbill asked Mr. Molina whether he meant to say “Sioux Falls.” ROA at
58. Mr. Molina confirmed that this was indeed what he meant to say.
Mr. Molina then found the rental agreement and passed his phone to Deputy
Coxbill. After reviewing the agreement, Deputy Coxbill asked Mr. Molina how long
he and his companion planned to stay in South Dakota, since he had noticed that the
rental car was scheduled to be returned to California in two days (September 28).
Mr. Molina said that they intended to head back on Tuesday (September 29) and
would be extending the car rental accordingly.
Deputy Coxbill then returned to his patrol car to write Mr. Molina a warning.
On his way to the car, he passed Deputy Kyle Rhoades (who had arrived at the scene
while Deputy Coxbill was talking to Mr. Molina). On his way by, Deputy Coxbill
mentioned to Deputy Rhoades that he had smelled a cover odor in the car. Deputy
Rhoades then followed Deputy Coxbill back to the patrol car and stood outside the
car while Deputy Coxbill wrote the warning for Mr. Molina. While writing, Deputy
Coxbill filled Deputy Rhoades in on some of his observations from the stop,
including Mr. Molina’s fast travel plans and the fact that Deputy Coxbill had noticed
a vape in the car. When he reached the address section of the warning, Deputy
Coxbill passed the warning off to Deputy Rhoades and asked him to both verify Mr.
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Molina’s address and have Mr. Molina roll up his car windows. Deputy Rhoades
took the warning and walked to the car while Deputy Coxbill retrieved a drug-
sniffing canine from the patrol car.
Deputy Rhoades approached the driver-side of the rental car and asked
Mr. Molina to exit the vehicle and roll up the windows. Mr. Molina rolled up the
windows and followed Deputy Rhoades out onto the street and then along the
shoulder of the road to Deputy Coxbill’s car. Once Mr. Molina and Deputy Rhoades
were away from the rental car, Deputy Coxbill approached the car with the dog.
While Deputy Coxbill and the dog circled the car, Deputy Rhoades confirmed
Mr. Molina’s address. Just before Deputy Rhoades finished writing the warning, the
dog alerted to contraband in the car. Deputy Coxbill then proceeded to search the
car, where he found roughly fourteen pounds of methamphetamine in the trunk.
B. Procedural Background
Mr. Molina was indicted on one count of possession with intent to distribute
methamphetamine. He subsequently moved to suppress the methamphetamine seized
by Deputy Coxbill on the grounds that the deputies had prolonged the traffic stop in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. According to Mr. Molina, the deputies were
required to have reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop for the dog sniff, which
they lacked. Mr. Molina thus argued that the methamphetamine must be suppressed.
The district court held a hearing on this motion, at which it heard testimony
from three Government witnesses: (1) Deputy Coxbill, (2) Deputy Rhoades, and (3)
Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation Special Agent Jason Ruby. Early in his
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testimony, Deputy Coxbill walked through the reason that he had Deputy Rhoades
confirm Mr. Molina’s address. He explained that warnings and citations for
motorists are tracked in a database called “Spillman,” and that it is important to
ensure that addresses are accurate (in case two people with the same name are pulled
over). According to Deputy Coxbill, it is very common for a driver’s license to have
an incorrect address on it, and so he confirms an address every time he issues a
warning or citation.
In addition, Deputy Coxbill testified that he always travels with the drug dog
used here, and because of this, he never needs to wait for one to arrive at the scene.
He also explained that the dog used here doubles as an apprehension dog that is
trained to bite people, and so Deputy Coxbill always has people roll up their windows
during the dog sniff to ensure passenger safety, since the dog is prone to sticking his
head in open windows. And, because the canine also functions as an apprehension
dog, Deputy Coxbill usually starts the sniff on the passenger side of the vehicle so
that Deputy Rhoades and the driver can safely get out of the way of the dog.
Deputy Coxbill then walked through his various observations during the stop
that aroused his suspicions. When he first approached the car, he noticed an
“overwhelming” cover odor coming from inside the vehicle (although he was unable
to identify the exact nature of the odor). ROA at 42. He also found it odd that Mr.
Molina pronounced “Sioux Falls” as “See Ox Falls.” Id. at 58. Moreover, he noticed
that Mr. Molina’s car was rented by a third-party. Not only that, but the rental
agreement stated that the car was due back in California in two days, making for a
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very fast trip. Although Mr. Molina explained to Deputy Coxbill that he planned to
extend the trip by one day, Deputy Coxbill was aware that this was a “long drive”
and thus still believed this was a suspiciously quick trip. Id. at 46.
Deputy Coxbill also testified that he took note of the fact that Mr. Molina was
coming from California, which he believed to be a source for many narcotics. In
addition, Deputy Coxbill noticed that Mr. Molina had a vape (although he did not
smell any marijuana) and had limited luggage in his backseat. Finally, Deputy
Coxbill thought it was unusual that Mr. Molina and his companion had spent the
previous night sleeping at a gas station rest stop.
After Deputy Coxbill’s testimony concluded, Deputy Rhoades then testified
about his role in the traffic stop. He explained that, after Deputy Coxbill had passed
him the warning, he walked to the driver’s side of the vehicle and asked Mr. Molina
to roll up his windows and exit the vehicle so that they could confirm Mr. Molina’s
address. Mr. Molina rolled up his window, and then the two men walked to the side
of the road so that Deputy Rhoades could finish filling out Mr. Molina’s warning.
Deputy Rhoades learned that he had in fact misunderstood Mr. Molina’s address from
the license, and so Mr. Molina was able to clarify the correct address. Before he was
finished writing the warning, however, Deputy Coxbill approached and told him that
the dog had detected something in the vehicle.
Special Agent Ruby was the last to testify. He explained that there are various
indications of narcotics trafficking that were relevant here, like the use of a third-
party rental, a short stay at a location, limited luggage in a vehicle, and the fact that
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an individual is traveling from the West Coast. Special Agent Ruby also testified
that Mr. Molina’s trip to South Dakota and back to California would take around fifty
hours of driving.
After holding this hearing, the district court denied Mr. Molina’s motion to
suppress. The court reasoned that the deputies had not delayed the traffic stop in any
way for the dog sniff, since the only delay involved Deputy Rhoades and Mr. Molina
walking away from the vehicle to the side of the road. According to the court, this
was only done so that Deputy Rhoades could avoid standing in traffic, and Deputy
Rhoades immediately finished writing the warning once they were out of the road.
Even if the stop had been delayed for the dog sniff, though, the court concluded that
any delay would be supported by reasonable suspicion. To support this suspicion, the
district court pointed to the cover odor, the incorrect pronunciation of Sioux Falls,
the third-party rental agreement, the imminent expiration of the rental agreement, the
night spent at the gas station, the fact that Mr. Molina was traveling from California,
the vape pen, and the lack of luggage in the backseat.
II. DISCUSSION
“A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that
violation.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015). An officer’s
authority to seize a vehicle’s occupants ends, however, when “tasks tied to the traffic
infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.” Id. Even so, it is
permissible for an officer to “conduct certain unrelated inquiries during the stop,” but
these inquiries may not delay the traffic stop unless the officer has “reasonable
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suspicion ordinarily required to detain an individual.” United States v. Frazier, 30
F.4th 1165, 1173 (10th Cir. 2022) (citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355).1 “Even de
minimis delays caused by unrelated inquiries violate the Fourth Amendment in the
absence of reasonable suspicion.” Id.
Here we may assume, without deciding, that Mr. Molina’s traffic stop was
unreasonably prolonged to assist the drug investigation because, even with that
assumption, the delay was justified by the officers’ reasonable suspicion that they
were confronting ongoing criminal drug activity. Whether a dog sniff is supported
by reasonable suspicion is an objective question “based on the totality of
circumstances,” which looks to whether the facts “available to the detaining officer,
at the time, warranted an officer of reasonable caution in believing the action taken
was appropriate.” United States v. Morales, 961 F.3d 1086, 1092 (10th Cir. 2020)
(cleaned up) (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996)). This “is a mixed
question of law and fact that we review de novo.” United States v. Salazar, 609 F.3d
1059, 1063 (10th Cir. 2010). Although this review is de novo, the findings of fact
which the district court found to support reasonable suspicion are reviewed for clear
error, viewing the evidence “in the light most favorable to the determination of the
district court.” United States v. Santos, 403 F.3d 1120, 1124 (10th Cir. 2005).
Moreover, we must “defer to the ‘ability of a trained law enforcement officer to
1
This moment that the stop is prolonged such that reasonable suspicion was
necessary is referred to as the “Rodriguez moment.”
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distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions.’” Id. (quoting United States v.
McRae, 81 F.3d 1528, 1534 (10th Cir.1996)).
The district court relied upon eight facts in determining that Deputy Coxbill
had reasonable suspicion: (1) the cover odor, (2) the mispronunciation of Sioux Falls,
(3) the third-party rental agreement, (4) the imminent expiration of the rental
agreement, (5) the night spent at the gas station, (6) the vape pen, (7) the lack of
luggage in the backseat, and (8) the fact that Mr. Molina was traveling from
California. We analyze each fact below and ultimately hold that the district court
properly credited the cover odor, the third-party rental agreement, and the imminent
expiration of the rental agreement as supporting reasonable suspicion. However, it
was error for the court to rely on the remaining factors to support reasonable
suspicion of ongoing criminal activity. Taking only these permissible facts into
account, this case falls very close to the line, but we nonetheless conclude that
reasonable suspicion is narrowly supported by the totality of the circumstances.
1. The cover odor.
The first fact was the cover odor, which was permissibly factored into the
suspicion analysis. It is well-established that “a strong odor may give rise to
reasonable suspicion on the part of law enforcement officials that the odor is being
used to mask the smell of drugs.” United States v. Salzano, 158 F.3d 1107, 1114
(10th Cir. 1998). Although it is common for an officer to identify the nature of the
cover odor, see, e.g., United States v. Ludwig, 641 F.3d 1243, 1248 (10th Cir. 2011)
(trooper identified the masking smell as cologne), it is unnecessary for the purposes
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of reasonable suspicion for the officer to identify the precise nature of the smell. It is
enough that Deputy Coxbill found the smell to be “overwhelming,” since a cover
odor is often an overwhelming odor which masks the smell of narcotics. ROA at 42,
47.2
2. Mr. Molina’s pronunciation of “Sioux Falls.”
The second fact was Mr. Molina’s mispronunciation of Sioux Falls as “See Ox
Falls.” We conclude that there is nothing suspicious about the mispronunciation of
that French word by a person who didn’t purport to live there.
3. The third-party rental.
The third fact was the use of a third-party rental, which was properly
considered suspicious. Although the use of a rental car alone does not contribute to
reasonable suspicion, Frazier, 30 F.4th at 1177, the fact that a rental was made by a
third-party is consistent with the behavior of drug traffickers, see United States v.
Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1270 (10th Cir. 2001) (“The officer knew from his training
and experience that drug couriers often use third-party rental cars.”). For this reason,
it was reasonable for an officer in Deputy Coxbill’s position to find the use of a third-
party rental here suspicious.
2
It is not enough, though, for an officer merely to identify a strong smell (like an
air freshener, for example). It is critical that the smell be sufficiently “overwhelming” as
to resemble a cover odor.
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4. The imminent expiration of the rental agreement.
The fourth fact was the imminent expiration of Mr. Molina’s rental agreement,
which Deputy Coxbill permissibly found to be suspicious. To make such a long
trip—only to stay at the destination for such a short amount of time—is also
consistent with the behavior of a drug courier. See United States v. Sokolow, 490
U.S. 1, 9 (1989) (“ . . . surely few residents of Honolulu travel from that city for 20
hours to spend 48 hours in Miami during the month of July.”); see also United States
v. Simpson, 609 F.3d 1140, 1151 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding it suspicious that the
defendant “chose to drive a long distance to spend a single night” at his destination).
In arguing otherwise, Mr. Molina cites to United States v. Santos, 403 F.3d
1120, 1129 (10th Cir. 2005). In Santos, the defendant was pulled over in Wyoming
while traveling from California to New York in a car due back in California in four
days. Id. We concluded that this was not suspicious because the “government
presented no evidence that extending the car rental period would entail any financial
penalty, or even any increase in the rate,” which is key because “it is not unusual for
a driver to rent a car for a certain period, and then to extend the rental without
incurring a penalty or paying a higher rate.” Id. As such, it was critical to our
decision in Santos that the officer did not discuss the rental agreement with the
defendant, and thus did not know whether the defendant planned to extend the
agreement or whether the defendant was blasé about incurring a rental extension fee.
See id. In contrast, Deputy Coxbill did discuss the rental agreement with Mr. Molina
and learned that Mr. Molina planned to extend the agreement by just one day. This
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was therefore not a case where an officer was unaware of the details of a possible
rental extension, nor one where an officer did not see the defendant’s attitude about a
rental extension. To the contrary, Deputy Coxbill was aware that, even with an
extension, Mr. Molina would have at most two days in Sioux Falls (rather than one
day before the extension). This does not undermine Deputy Coxbill’s belief that the
trip would be suspiciously short for a supposed “vacation.” Id.; see also Sokolow,
490 U.S. at 9.3 Thus, this factor also supports the district court’s conclusion that
there was reasonable suspicion of an ongoing drug trafficking crime.
5. The night at the gas station.
The fifth fact was Mr. Molina’s night at the gas station. It was erroneous for
the district court to credit this as suspicious. Courts should not deem an action
reasonably suspicious if it “describe[s] a very large category of presumably innocent
travelers.” Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980). As the Fifth Circuit has
recognized, persons of little means are often forced to engage in cost-cutting
measures when they travel long distances, to “avoid the cost of overnight stays,”
United States v. Madrigal, 626 F. App’x 448, 451 (5th Cir. 2015) (unpublished)—and
3
Special Agent Ruby testified that the exact length of the round-trip drive is
around fifty hours. Mr. Molina is correct, however, that we “consider only those facts
known” to Deputies Coxbill and Rhoades at the point they diverted from the “traffic-
based mission to arrange the dog sniff.” Frazier, 30 F.4th at 1174. Special Agent Ruby’s
testimony is thus irrelevant to reasonable suspicion. Even so, it appears that Deputy
Coxbill generally understood the length of the trip, even if he did not know the precise
number of hours it would take. See ROA at 46 (Deputy Coxbill testifying that it was a
“long drive” from California to Sioux Falls). Thus, the record indicates that Deputy
Coxbill was aware that Mr. Molina would have around two days in Sioux Falls for this
vacation, even with the rental extension.
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this includes sleeping at gas stations or rest stops. As such, courts should not treat
these cost-cutting measures as suspicious, lest they conflate poverty with crime. See
Reid, 448 U.S. at 441. It was thus erroneous for the district court to credit this fact in
the suspicion analysis.
6. Coming from California.
The sixth fact was that Mr. Molina came from California. We have held that
neither state citizenship nor the origination point of a trip can serve as “a permissible
basis upon which to justify the detention and search of out-of-state motorists[.]”
Vasquez v. Lewis, 834 F.3d 1132, 1138 (10th Cir. 2016) (state citizenship); see also
United States v. Guerrero, 472 F.3d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 2007) (origination point). At
the time that Vasquez was decided, we observed that twenty-five states had permitted
marijuana use either medically or recreationally, and so the reference to a “drug
source state” as a justification for a search would “justify the search and seizure of
the citizens of more than half of the states in our country.” Id. at 1137–38. This
rationale has only grown stronger, since even more states have legalized marijuana in
some form since Vasquez was decided.4 It was thus impermissible for the district
4
See Ala. Code §§ 20-2A-1 et seq. (2022); Ark. Const. of 1874, Amend. 98, §§ 1
et seq. (2016); Fla. Stat. §§ 381.986 et seq. (2016); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16-12-200 et seq.
(2021); La. Stat. Ann. §§ 40:1046 et seq. (2022); Mo. Const. Art. XIV, §§ 1 et seq.
(2021); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 19-24.1-01 et seq. (2021); Okla. Stat. tit. 63, §§ 2-101 et seq.
(2022); S.D. Codified Laws §§ 34-20G-1 et seq. (2021); Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-3.7 et
seq. (2021); Va. Code Ann. §§ 4.1-1100 et seq. (2021); W. Va. Code §§ 16A-1-1 et seq.
(2022).
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court to credit Deputy Coxbill’s suspicion on this basis. Vasquez, 834 F.3d at 1137–
38.
7. The vape pen.
The seventh fact was the vape pen in Mr. Molina’s car. We have previously
held that the presence of common items—like butane lighters or energy pills—“adds
no weight to the reasonable suspicion analysis as it would be likely to find such items
in the vehicle of any innocent traveler.” Simpson, 609 F.3d at 1152. The
government has described this vape pen as among the “least probative” facts and
provides no evidence that this vape pen was being used for any illegal activity.
Although we make no ruling about the possible evidential value of a vape pen under
different circumstances, here it was erroneous to factor Mr. Molina’s vape into the
suspicion analysis. See Simpson, 609 F.3d at 1152.
8. The lack of luggage in the backseat.
The eighth fact was the lack of luggage in the backseat of Mr. Molina’s
vehicle. We have previously held that this fact is worth “little or no weight” if the
vehicle has a trunk because “many, if not most, travelers store luggage” in the trunk.
United States v. Mendez, 118 F.3d 1426, 1431 (10th Cir. 1997). To this end, it is
critical that Deputy Coxbill admitted that he did not ask about luggage in the trunk
before the dog sniff. Since there was no evidence that Mr. Molina did not have much
luggage in his trunk as well, we do not afford the lack of luggage in Mr. Molina’s
backseat any weight in the suspicion analysis. See Mendez, 118 F.3d at 1431.
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9. Totality of the circumstances.
The final step of the inquiry is to look at the totality of the circumstances “to
see whether the detaining officer has a particularized and objective basis for
suspecting legal wrongdoing.” United States v. Davis, 636 F.3d 1281, 1290–91 (10th
Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)). After
eliminating the facts that should not have been considered in the analysis, we are left
with just three facts on which Officer Coxbill permissibly relied: (1) the cover odor,
(2) the third-party rental, and (3) the details of the rental agreement. The sufficiency
of these facts to establish reasonable suspicion is right on the line, but because of the
deference we give to an officer “to distinguish between innocent and suspicious
actions,” Santos, 403 F.3d at 1124, we conclude that Deputy Coxbill’s suspicion to
prolong Mr. Molina’s traffic stop for a dog sniff was just barely supported by the
totality of the circumstances.
III. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Mr. Molina’s motion to suppress.
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