Big Cats of Serenity Springs v. Vilsack , 843 F.3d 853 ( 2016 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
December 12, 2016
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
BIG CATS OF SERENITY SPRINGS,
INC., doing business as Serenity
Springs Wildlife Center; NICK
SCULAC; and JULES INVESTMENT,
INC.,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
and
JULIE WALKER,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 15-1174
CINDY RHODES; and TRACY
THOMPSON,
Defendants - Appellants.
and
THOMAS J. VILSACK, in his official
capacity as Secretary of Agriculture;
and OTHER UNNAMED UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE EMPLOYEES,
Defendants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. NO. 1:13-CV-03275-REB-KLM)
Edward Himmelfarb, Appellate Staff Attorney, Civil Division (Benjamin C.
Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, John F. Walsh, United States
Attorney for the District of Colorado, and Barbara L. Herwig, Appellate Staff
Attorney, Civil Division, with him on the briefs), United States Department of
Justice, Washington, DC, for Appellants.
Duston K. Barton (Leonard H. MacPhee with him on the brief), Perkins Coie
LLP, Denver, Colorado, for Appellees.
Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, EBEL, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge.
Big Cats of Serenity Springs is a Colorado-based non-profit that provides
housing, food, and veterinary care for exotic animals. The facility is regulated by
the United States Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service (APHIS), established pursuant to the Animal Welfare Act. Three APHIS
inspectors accompanied by El Paso County sheriff’s deputies broke into the Big
Cats facility without its permission to perform an unannounced inspection of two
tiger cubs. But at the time the inspectors entered the facility, the cubs were at a
veterinarian’s office receiving treatment, just as Big Cats had promised the
APHIS inspectors the previous day.
Big Cats and its directors sued the APHIS inspectors for the unauthorized
entry pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting the entry was an illegal search under the Fourth
Amendment. The district court denied the APHIS inspectors’ motion to dismiss
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the complaint and they filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the court’s
failure to grant qualified immunity. This court has jurisdiction over the
interlocutory appeal from the district court’s order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 535 (1985). Additionally, the court has
jurisdiction over the question of whether a Bivens remedy exists because it was
sufficiently implicated by the qualified immunity defense. See Wilkie v. Robbins,
551 U.S. 537, 549 n.4 (2007).
We affirm in part and reverse in part. Big Cats’ complaint has stated a
claim for relief under Bivens. No APHIS inspector would reasonably have
believed unauthorized forcible entry of the Big Cats facility was permissible, and
therefore Big Cats and its directors may have a claim for violation of their Fourth
Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search. But we reverse on Big
Cats’ civil rights claim because the federal inspectors are not liable under § 1983
in the circumstances here.
I. Background
We start by explaining the regulatory scheme that applies to Big Cats’
business and then address the relevant factual and procedural background.
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A. The Animal Welfare Act
Big Cats is a licensed wild animal exhibitor under the Animal Welfare Act,
7 U.S.C. §§ 2131–59 (AWA). Under the AWA, a facility must meet care and
sanitation standards issued by the United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA). 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a). Among other things, the regulations require
licensees to handle animals safely, 9 C.F.R. § 2.131, provide adequate veterinary
care, id. at § 2.40, and mark animals for identification, id. at § 2.50.
To enforce these standards, the AWA authorizes the USDA to “make such
investigations or inspections as [the USDA] deems necessary.” 7 U.S.C.
§ 2146(a). It grants the USDA access to licensees’ facilities, animals, and records
“at all reasonable times.” Id. The corresponding regulations require a licensed
organization to allow inspectors “during business hours . . . to enter its place of
business . . . [and] inspect and photograph the facilities, property and animals, as
the APHIS officials consider necessary to enforce the provisions of the Act . . . .”
9 C.F.R. § 2.126.
Violations by licensees, whether by providing substandard care or refusing
inspection, are sanctioned through an administrative process. 7 U.S.C. § 2149.
Licensees are subject to license suspension, civil penalties up to $10,000, and in
some instances, imprisonment for up to one year. Id. Licensed organizations can
appeal a final order to a federal Court of Appeals to “enjoin, set aside, suspend
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(in whole or in part), or determine the validity of the Secretary’s order.” Id. at
§ 2149(c).
B. The Incident
The following allegations are from Big Cats’ complaint, and we take them
as true for purposes of our analysis. Weise v. Casper, 507 F.3d 1260, 1269–70
(10th Cir. 2007).
After a routine inspection of Big Cats’ Serenity Springs Wildlife Center in
early April 2013, APHIS inspectors determined that the care of an injured tiger
cub was substandard and issued a citation requiring Big Cats to provide veterinary
care. But when an inspector conducted a follow-up visit the next week, she found
that the injury had worsened, and issued another citation. Big Cats denied both
allegations and contested both citations, claiming they were part of a “pattern of
harassing behavior” by the inspectors. App. 51.
On May 6, APHIS inspectors conducted another follow-up inspection. The
inspectors claimed the cub’s injuries had worsened, and also noticed that a
different cub was suffering from an injured hind leg. Although Big Cats claimed
the cubs had been treated and were receiving appropriate medications, the
inspectors again cited Big Cats for failure to use “appropriate methods to prevent,
control, diagnose, and treat diseases and injuries.” 9 C.F.R. § 2.40(b)(2). The
inspectors required the cubs to be evaluated as soon as possible, but “not later
than 8:00 AM on 5/7/2013.” App. 37.
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During the inspection, Big Cats’ founder and director, Nick Sculac, asked
whether the cubs could be examined on May 8, because he had already scheduled
an in-facility visit for that day with his contract veterinarian. But the APHIS
officials would not approve a one-day delay. So even though transportation to a
clinic risked further injury according to two of Big Cats’ contract veterinarians, it
was Mr. Sculac’s only option to meet the citation’s 8:00 a.m. requirement. He
arrived, with the cubs, at the veterinary clinic at 7:00 a.m. on May 7.
Meanwhile, around 8:00 a.m., three APHIS personnel arrived at the
Serenity Springs Wildlife Center only to find the facility closed. After
unsuccessfully trying to reach Mr. Sculac on his cell phone, the inspectors
decided to forcibly enter the facility. They contacted the El Paso County
Sheriff’s Office at 8:45 a.m., requesting urgent assistance in entering the facility.
Two sheriff’s deputies arrived at the facility and were told by the inspectors that
they had a court order to seize the cubs. The deputies cut the outer gate’s chains,
and the inspectors entered the facility. They then cut the locks off an inner gate
to access the pens, where they encountered an employee. The employee was
“shocked and alarmed to suddenly see three [APHIS personnel] and two heavily
armed police officers appear inside the locked, private facility.” App. 17. After
she informed them the cubs were at the veterinary clinic, the inspectors left and
went to the clinic.
C. Procedural History
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Big Cats and its directors filed a lawsuit against the APHIS inspectors,
alleging a Fourth Amendment Bivens claim and a statutory claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. The district court denied the government’s motion to dismiss, concluding
the inspectors were not entitled to qualified immunity because their conduct—
forcible entry without permission—violated clearly established Fourth
Amendment constitutional law. The inspectors bring this interlocutory appeal
from the denial of qualified immunity.
II. Analysis
The government makes two arguments: first, it contends neither Bivens nor
§ 1983 apply to the APHIS inspectors’ unauthorized entry into Big Cats’ facility;
and, second, even if the inspectors’ conduct was unlawful, it argues that the
inspectors are still entitled to qualified immunity because the violation was not
clearly established under federal law.
Since this is the denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, our review is de novo,
accepting “all well-pleaded allegations ‘of the complaint as true and consider[ing]
them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.’” Butler v. Rio Rancho
Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 341 F.3d 1197, 1199 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Sutton v.
Utah State Sch. for the Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999)). “To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege facts that, if true, ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ A claim is facially plausible when the
allegations give rise to a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable.”
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Mayfield v. Bethards, 826 F.3d 1252, 1255 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting Wilson v.
Montano, 715 F.3d 847, 852 (10th Cir. 2013)). In the context of qualified
immunity, we may not dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim unless it
appears beyond doubt that plaintiffs cannot prove a set of facts that would entitle
them to relief. Id.
We address the Bivens and § 1983 claims in turn.
A. Bivens
The government first contends that a Bivens cause of action is not available
under the Animal Welfare Act. It argues a Bivens remedy is not available where
the AWA provides parties with an alternative remedy for misconduct. But as we
explain, the AWA does not allow forcible entry to a licensee’s facility, nor does it
provide licensees any relief from such conduct. A Bivens claim is Big Cats’ only
available relief for an unconstitutional search of its premises.
The Constitution does not ordinarily provide a private right of action for
constitutional violations by federal officials. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court in
Bivens approved a judicially-implied cause of action allowing individuals to seek
damages for unconstitutional conduct by federal officials. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
According to the Court, “[t]hat damages may be obtained for injuries consequent
upon a violation of the Fourth Amendment by federal officials should hardly seem
a surprising proposition.” Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395. “‘[I]t is well settled that
where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general
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right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to
make good the wrong done.’” Id. at 396 (alterations omitted) (quoting Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
In several cases following Bivens, the Supreme Court extended the doctrine
from the Fourth Amendment context to other types of constitutional claims. In
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), the Court held that a federal
Congressional employee could bring a Bivens action pursuant to the “equal
protection” element of the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment. See id. at
248–49. And then in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), the Court allowed the
plaintiffs to pursue a Bivens claim against federal prison officials for failure to
provide adequate medical treatment in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s cruel
and unusual punishment clause. See id. at 17–18.
Davis and Carlson represent the high-water mark in the Court’s Bivens
jurisprudence. Since those cases, the Court has steadfastly retreated from a broad
application of the doctrine, refusing to extend implied causes of action to other
constitutional provisions, and cabining the contexts in which it will allow Bivens
claims to proceed. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al., Hart & Wechsler’s The
Federal Courts and the Federal System 770–72 (7th ed. 2015); see also
Correctional Serv. Corp v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66–71 (2001) (collecting cases).
The Court recognizes that a judicially-implied cause of action risks infringing on
Congress’s power to make law, and has explained that
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any freestanding damages remedy for a claimed
constitutional violation [based on Bivens] has to represent
a judgment about the best way to implement a
constitutional guarantee; it is not an automatic entitlement
no matter what other means there may be to vindicate a
protected interest, and in most instances we have found a
Bivens remedy unjustified.
Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007). Thus, where Congress has already
constructed a “constitutionally adequate” alternative remedy for federal
misconduct, courts ought not step in by implying a Bivens cause of action. See
Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 379 n.14 (1983) (declining to find new substantive
legal liability to permit federal employee to recover damages from his supervisor
after supervisor improperly disciplined him for exercising his First Amendment
rights); see also Correctional Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (claims
against private prisons); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994) (claims against
federal agencies); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 425 (1988) (Fifth
Amendment claim against former government officials arising out of delays in
receipt of Social Security benefits); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987)
(declining to extend Bivens remedies to harms arising out of military service);
Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983) (same).
Yet Bivens still remains available in some circumstances, and our circuit
has allowed Bivens claims in a variety of factual scenarios—based on violations
of the First, Fourth, and Eighth Amendments. See Smith v. United States, 561
F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2009) (Eighth Amendment claim against prison officials);
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Oxendine v. Kaplan, 241 F.3d 1272 (10th Cir. 2001) (same); Nat’l Commodity &
Barter Ass’n v. Archer, 31 F.3d 1521 (10th Cir. 1994) (First and Fourth
Amendment claims against IRS agents).
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court requires courts evaluating Bivens causes of
action to carefully consider the facts and context. The analysis proceeds along a
two-step analytical framework. First, we examine whether an “alternative,
existing process for protecting the [plaintiff’s] interest amounts to a convincing
reason for the Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a new and freestanding
remedy in damages.” Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550. Second, in the absence of an
alternative remedy, we will consider whether “special factors” counsel hesitation
before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation. Id. In evaluating this
consideration, courts “weigh[] reasons for and against the creation of a new cause
of action, the way common law judges have always done.” Id. at 554.
Relying on these principles, the government contends the AWA provides a
comprehensive “alternative, existing process” that protects Big Cats’
constitutional interests and therefore counsels against an implied Bivens cause of
action. It argues that because Big Cats may administratively challenge an adverse
inspection report, it must therefore resolve any alleged Fourth Amendment claims
through that process. Moreover, the government contends that even if the AWA
does not provide a fully adequate remedial scheme, special factors weigh against
a Bivens claim here.
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We consider each argument in turn.
1. Alternative Remedy
The Supreme Court has explained that where an “‘alternative, existing
process’ [is] capable of protecting the constitutional interests at stake,” the courts
should refrain from augmenting the process with an implied damages remedy.
Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 623 (2012) (quoting Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550).
“The point of examining the existing process is to determine whether Congress
has explicitly or implicitly indicated ‘that the Court’s power should not be
exercised.’” De La Paz v. Coy, 786 F.3d 367, 375 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. filed, (Jan.
12, 2016) (quoting Bush, 462 U.S. at 378). Congress may explicitly “indicate its
intent[] by statutory language, by clear legislative history, or perhaps even by the
statutory remedy itself, that the Court’s power should not be exercised.” Bush,
462 U.S. at 378. But Congress may also implicitly indicate intent “by creating a
process that provides ‘an avenue for some redress’” for injured persons, and “[i]n
these instances, ‘bedrock principles of separation of powers’ show that ‘Congress
expected the Judiciary to stay its Bivens hand’ and instead apply the statutory
remedy.” Koprowski v. Baker, 822 F.3d 248, 262 (6th Cir. 2016) (Sutton, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Malesko, 534 U.S. at 69; Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 554). Thus, in
analyzing whether a Bivens claim is precluded by an alternative remedy, courts
must consider the nature and extent of the statutory scheme created by Congress,
and assess the significance of that scheme in light of the factual background of
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the case at hand. See Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 551; see also De La Paz, 786 F.3d at
375.
Several cases illustrate this analysis. For example, in Minneci the Court
considered whether prisoners could bring a Bivens claim against employees of a
privately owned federal prison. The Court found no right of action because a
claim “for physical or related emotional harm suffered as a result of [inadequate
medical care is] the kind of conduct that state tort law typically forbids.” 132 S.
Ct. at 624. Because state tort law provided “roughly similar incentives for
potential defendants to comply with the Eighth Amendment while also providing
roughly similar compensation to victims,” the plaintiff had adequate recourse
under state tort law. Id. at 625. See also Davis, 442 U.S. at 245 n.23 (no state
law remedy available). Similarly, in the Fifth Amendment context, the Court
determined that Title II of the Social Security Act is a constitutionally adequate
substitute for a Due Process challenge based on wrongful termination of disability
benefits. Even though the Act did not provide full compensatory relief, Congress
had sufficiently “addressed the problems created by state agencies’ wrongful
termination of disability benefits,” making a Bivens remedy unnecessary.
Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 429. 1
1
The Court suggested an Eighth Amendment Bivens claim would be
permitted in Malesko, 534 U.S. at 70, because a prisoner may lack “any
alternative remedy” for harms caused by a federal prison officer’s
unconstitutional conduct.
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But in the prototypical Fourth Amendment context, the Court has so far
rejected the notion that state tort law can adequately protect a citizen’s “absolute
right to be free from unreasonable searches.” Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392. According
to the Court, the Fourth Amendment proscribes a broader range of conduct than
what state law typically condemns, and, moreover, state law in some cases may be
“inconsistent or even hostile” to the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment.
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392–94; see also id. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“For people in Bivens’ shoes, it is damages or nothing.”). 2
The government does not rely on state law as an alternative source of relief
for Big Cats. Instead, it argues that we should conclude Congress has designed a
comprehensive statutory scheme that provides meaningful remedies for victims,
such that a Bivens remedy is unwarranted. It contends the regulatory scheme
need not provide “complete relief,” but should reflect Congress’s meaningful
intention to “provide[] what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for
constitutional violations that may occur in the course of [the statute’s]
administration.” Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 423. Under the AWA, a licensee may
administratively challenge an adverse inspection report under the Administrative
2
One court recently found Congress supplanted an implied Fourth
Amendment Bivens remedy. In De La Paz, 786 F.3d at 377, the Fifth Circuit
found Congress supplanted Fourth Amendment claims in the immigration context
where: (1) illegally seized evidence could be suppressed in deportation hearings;
(2) the government had a process for reviewing alleged Fourth Amendment
violations by employees; and (3) Congress has enacted an “elaborate remedial
system” of immigration laws that has been in place for decades.
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Procedure Act. 3 Thus, the government maintains that even though the AWA has
no express compensatory mechanism to remedy constitutional claims, a Fourth
Amendment claim is “capable of being addressed in the remedial process” by way
of rejection of inspection violations predicated on illegal conduct. Reply Br. at
10 (emphasis added).
This reading of the AWA seriously misconstrues its regulatory scope and is
not faithful to the Supreme Court’s case law considering alternative remedies.
The Court tells us the operative “question [is] whether any alternative, existing
process for protecting the interest amounts to a convincing reason for the Judicial
Branch to refrain from providing a new and freestanding remedy in damages.”
Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550. In other words, the appropriate consideration is whether
an alternate, existing process demonstrates Congress’s intent to exclude a
damages remedy. Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 435. Evidence of that intent would be a
scheme that provides adequate deterrence of constitutional violations and at least
some form of relief for the harm. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 70.
3
Licensees may then challenge a final agency action under the APA. 7
U.S.C. § 2149(c) (“Any dealer, exhibitor, research facility, intermediate handler,
[or] carrier . . . aggrieved by a final order of the Secretary issued pursuant to this
section may, within 60 days after entry of such an order, seek review of such
order in the appropriate United States Court of Appeals in accordance with the
provision of sections 2341, 2343 through 2350 of Title 28, and such court shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in part) or to
determine the validity of the Secretary’s order.”).
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But Big Cats’ challenge is based on a violation of the constitutional right to
be free from an unreasonable search, not the propriety of the licensing citation.
Nor does the AWA appeals process provide a mechanism for relief for misconduct
by inspection agents themselves, it only allows for a licensee to challenge the
factual basis for the citation—here Big Cats’ failure to “allow APHIS officials
access to conduct inspections.” App. 91; see also Aple. Br. 28–29 (citing United
States Dep’t of Agric., Animal Care: Appeals Process (2014) (demonstrating
grounds for appeal with no mechanism to assert constitutional violations)). In
fact, should an APHIS inspector unlawfully enter and search a business, but find
nothing to cite, that business would have no basis to challenge the inspector’s
behavior. Moreover, while it is true that judicial review under the APA may, in
some circumstances, foreclose a Bivens claim, 4 even if we accept the
4
Compare W. Radio Serv. Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 578 F.3d 1116, 1123
(9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he design of the APA raises the inference that Congress
‘expected the Judiciary to stay its Bivens hand [for process based challenges to
agency action].” (citation omitted)); and Miller v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Farm Serv.
Agency, 143 F.3d 1413, 1417 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that plaintiff’s right to
judicial review under the APA precluded him from bringing Bivens action), with
Munsell v. Dep’t of Agric., 509 F.3d 572, 591 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (suggesting a
hard-line rule that the existence of APA review precludes plaintiff from seeking
Bivens remedy “make[s] little sense” in some circumstances, such as when
defendant’s unconstitutional conduct removed plaintiff from regulated arena,
making APA review unavailable); and Navab-Safavi v. Broad. Bd. of Governors,
650 F. Supp. 2d 40, 70 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Neither the Supreme Court nor the D.C.
Circuit has ever held that the APA precludes the availability of a Bivens
remedy.”). But see Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 193 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that Bivens remedy is not precluded by availability of
APA review) (“Petitioner could have obtained pre-trial review . . . by filing suit
(continued...)
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government’s characterization of the existing AWA administrative scheme, we
fail to see the APA as an “‘alternative, existing process’ capable of protecting the
constitutional interests at stake.” Minneci, 132 S. Ct. at 623 (citation omitted).
While there is no need for congruent remedies or even money damages to deny a
Bivens remedy, there must be more than nothing. Here, the AWA and
administrative review provide no relief for the conduct alleged by Big Cats.
Even if the AWA provided some form of alternative relief, it would be hard
to square this case with circuit precedent. In Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d
1090, 1103 (10th Cir. 2009), we found Congress had not displaced a Bivens
remedy based on an Eighth Amendment claim even where a statutory scheme
substantially occupied the field of inmate injury. We concluded the Inmate
Accident Compensation Act (IACA), which provides compensation for federal
inmates who suffer work-related injuries, did not provide an adequate remedial
scheme, since the IACA operates a no-fault compensation system that provided no
“‘forum where the allegedly unconstitutional conduct would come to light.’”
Smith, 561 F.3d at 1103 (quoting Bagola v. Kindt, 131 F.3d 632, 642–43 (7th Cir.
1997)); see also Koprowski, 822 F.3d at 255 (“Under the [IACA] scheme, all that
matters is the nature of the injury, not the underlying conduct.”). In finding such
a system offers “very little deterrent effect for constitutional harms,” we held the
4
(...continued)
under the [APA], or even by filing a Bivens [] action.”) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted)).
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IACA did not provide an adequate, alternative process to protect prisoners’
Eighth Amendment rights. Smith, 561 F.3d at 1103; see also Koprowski, 822 F.3d
at 252; Bagola, 131 F.3d at 644; Vaccaro v. Dobre, 81 F.3d 854, 857 (9th Cir.
1996) (same).
If anything, the scheme in Smith offered a more meaningful remedy for
plaintiffs to redress their injuries than the AWA does in this case. See
Koprowski, 822 F.3d at 264 (Sutton, J., dissenting) (“Taken together, these
[IACA] alternatives allow an injured inmate to receive money for the injury and
order the officials to obey the Constitution, demonstrating that Congress paid
‘careful attention’ to this precise injury. . . . They also offer injured inmates
extensive review procedures, which further ‘safeguard their rights.’” (alteration
and citation omitted)). In this case, unlike the IACA, the AWA provides no
compensatory mechanism for unconstitutional conduct, whether it be damages or
dismissal of inspection violations. And even if unconstitutional searches were
exposed, the appeals process does not describe any recourse. The only recourse
the government suggests is that evidence improperly gathered would be ruled
impermissible to support a citation. But the citation for failure to provide access
is not ameliorated by inspectors’ subsequent conduct—no evidence was gathered.
Putting aside that no remedy appears in the statute, regulations, or in internal
administrative guidance, even if it did, the government does not explain how the
exclusion of evidence provides accountability, or—in other words—gives APHIS
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officials “skin in the game” to deter illegal conduct. See Koprowski, 822 F.3d at
255. In short, because nothing in the AWA provides licensees protection from
Fourth Amendment violations in the circumstances alleged here, we cannot hold
that an alternative, existing process excludes a Bivens remedy.
2. Special Factors
The Supreme Court also counsels that a Bivens action is not available
where the government demonstrates “special factors” that weigh against an
implied remedy. This requires “weighing reasons for and against the creation of a
new cause of action, the way common law judges have always done,” and whether
those reasons “counsel[] hesitation before authorizing a new kind of federal
litigation.” Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550, 554.
Wilkie again is illustrative. There, the Court found the risk of a floodgate
of spurious claims against BLM officials would undermine the functioning of the
agency, as well as the elusive nature of the proposed cause of action counseled
hesitation: “We think accordingly that any damages remedy for actions by
Government employees who push too hard for the Government’s benefit may
come better, if at all, through legislation.” Id. at 562.
The Court similarly found special factors precluded a Bivens action in
Chappell, where the Court held that “the unique disciplinary structure of the
Military Establishment and Congress’ activity in the field constitute ‘special
factors’ which dictate that it would be inappropriate to provide enlisted military
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personnel a Bivens-type remedy against their superior officers.” 462 at 304; see
also Schweiker at 414 (finding that design of the Social Security Act’s
administrative and judicial scheme was a special factor counseling against finding
a Bivens remedy). In Bush, the Court also rejected a Bivens remedy for the
plaintiff’s First Amendment violation on the basis of a special factors analysis,
because the case involved policy questions in an area that had received significant
congressional scrutiny. Id. at 423.
Here, the government argues that the animal inspection context militates
against a Bivens remedy because the AWA already provides a series of remedies.
Aplt. Br. at 26. But as we explained above, the AWA does not provide an
adequate remedy for illegal searches. Additionally, this is not the case where
“indications [of] congressional inaction” support an inference that the Bivens
action has been supplanted. Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 423. APHIS inspectors are not
subject to a comprehensive disciplinary scheme crafted by Congress or the
Executive Branch. Nor are there any concerns about a workable cause of action.
Fourth Amendment Bivens causes of action have been routinely applied to the
conduct of federal officials in a variety of contexts, including ATF agents, Groh
v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004); federal marshals and FBI agents, Harris v.
Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 1997); and IRS special agents, Nat’l
Commodity & Barter Ass’n v. Archer, 31 F.3d 1521 (10th Cir. 1994).
* * *
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If we were writing on a blank slate, we might be persuaded that Bivens is a
relic of another era, and that Congress is perfectly capable of policing federal
misconduct. But given our case law, Supreme Court precedent, and the factual
context present here, we are constrained to find that Big Cats may proceed. Big
Cats alleges a garden-variety constitutional violation (hardly a new context), the
regulatory scheme is plainly unavailable to remedy the alleged misconduct, and
no special factors place AWA inspectors outside Bivens. We therefore agree with
the district court that Big Cats’ Bivens claim may go forward unless the inspectors
are entitled to qualified immunity.
3. Qualified Immunity
Public officials enjoy “qualified immunity in civil actions that are brought
against them in their individual capacities and that arise out of the performance of
their duties.” Pahls v. Thomas, 718 F.3d 1210, 1227 (10th Cir. 2013). To
overcome qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the public official
violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and (2) these rights were clearly
established at the time of the alleged violation. Id. “This standard, by design,
‘gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken
judgments about open legal questions.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S.
Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011)). Although the purpose of a Bivens action is to deter
individual federal officers from committing constitutional violations, “the threat
of litigation and liability will adequately deter federal officers for Bivens
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purposes no matter that they may enjoy qualified immunity.” Malesko, 534 U.S.
at 70.
We first discuss the contours of a Fourth Amendment violation in the
regulatory context and then consider whether the law was clearly established so
that a reasonable APHIS inspector would have known he could not forcibly enter
the Serenity Springs Wildlife Center without authorization.
a. Constitutional Violation
The Fourth Amendment protects the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. “[S]earches conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions.” Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338
(2009) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
It is well established that the Fourth Amendment applies not only to private
homes and individuals, but also to commercial premises. New York v. Burger,
482 U.S. 691, 699 (1987). An owner or operator of a business thus has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in commercial property, see id. at 702; see also
Katz, 389 U.S. 360–62 (Harlan, J., concurring), and that expectation includes not
only traditional police searches, but also administrative inspections to enforce
regulations, Burger, 482 U.S. at 699.
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The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that an expectation of privacy
in commercial property is “different from, and indeed less than, a similar
expectation in an individual’s home.” Id. at 700. The expectation of privacy is
particularly low for the narrow class of heavily or “closely regulated” businesses
—such as those that sell firearms and liquor—because the business owner has
voluntarily decided to “subject himself to a full arsenal of governmental
regulation.” Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978). Without
elaborate enforcement schemes, the regulation of those industries would be
ineffective. Thus, for closely regulated businesses, warrantless administrative
searches of commercial premises—including surprise inspections—do not per se
violate the Fourth Amendment. See 5 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A
Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 10.2(f) (5th ed. 2012); 2 William E. Ringel,
Searches and Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 14:8 (2d ed. Nov. 2016
Update).
A closely regulated industry is still protected by the Fourth Amendment,
however, and warrantless searches of those businesses are unreasonable if
arbitrarily conducted. See Ringel, supra, § 14:8. To guard against unreasonable
administrative searches, in Burger the Supreme Court articulated several criteria
the government must meet to justify warrantless inspections: (1) the government
must prove a substantial interest that justifies warrantless inspections; (2) the
warrantless inspections must be necessary to further the regulatory scheme; and
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(3) the inspection program must be sufficiently certain and regular to provide a
constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. Burger, 482 U.S. at 702–03;
see also United States v. Mitchell, 518 F.3d 740, 751 (10th Cir. 2008) (applying
the Burger three-part test).
We assume the AWA fits within the analytical framework of Burger, an
assumption Big Cats does not challenge. The government has a substantial
interest in animal safety and welfare and surprise inspections help further those
interests. And the regulations implementing the AWA allow routine inspections
of regulated premises during “business hours” with protections for businesses to
have the inspections conducted by authorized personnel. 9 C.F.R. § 2.126(a).
But the fact that the AWA might authorize warrantless inspections is not
the end of the story. The question remains as to whether government officials
may forcibly enter commercial premises in pursuit of their regulatory duties.
The Supreme Court addressed this question in Colonnade Catering Corp. v.
United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970). In that case, the Court considered a
situation in which an IRS agent suspected a tavern of violating federal liquor
excise tax laws. After the owner denied access to a locked liquor storage room,
the agent broke the lock and entered the room, finding illicit goods. The store
owner sued, seeking to suppress the seized liquor as evidence of misconduct.
The Supreme Court held that the IRS agent violated the Fourth
Amendment. In reaching this conclusion, the Court considered the government’s
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argument that the statutory scheme allowed tax inspectors to forcibly enter
regulated premises. The relevant statute allowed inspectors to: (1) “enter during
business hours the premises (including places of storage) of any dealer for the
purpose of inspecting or examining any records or other documents required to be
kept,” 26 U.S.C. § 5146(b) (1964); and (2) “enter, in the daytime, any building or
place where any articles or objects subject to tax are made, produced, or kept, so
far as it may be necessary for the purpose of examining said articles,” id. at
§ 7606. The Court rejected the government’s contention that the statute
authorized breaking into closed facilities without a warrant, noting Congress’s
lack of explicit authorization to use force to further lawful inspections and the
statutory provision for civil penalties for businesses refusing entry. 26 U.S.C.
§ 7342 (1964).
The government argues that although the AWA is silent about warrantless
searches, rules promulgated under the AWA permit warrantless forcible entry
under Burger and Colonnade. Specifically, it points to the regulations governing
the confiscation of animals as authority. 9 C.F.R. § 2.129. Under these
regulations, where an inspector believes an animal is “suffering” due to the
exhibitor’s failure to comply with USDA regulations, an APHIS official shall
“notify the [] exhibitor . . . and request that the condition be corrected and that
adequate care be given to alleviate the animal’s suffering or distress.” 9 C.F.R.
§ 2.129(a). Then, if the exhibitor “refuses to comply with this request, the APHIS
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official may confiscate the animal(s) for care, treatment, or disposal . . . if, in the
opinion of the [APHIS] Administrator, the circumstances indicate the animals’
health is in danger.” Id. The regulations also provide APHIS officials with
guidance in the case of entry in premises where the owner is unavailable. An
inspector “shall [then] contact a local police or other law officer to accompany
him to the premises and shall provide for adequate care when necessary to
alleviate the animals’ suffering.” Id. at § 2.129(b). 5 The government argues that
“authorization for forcible entry is implicit” in these regulations considering: (1)
the local law enforcement provision; and (2) that inspectors would be unable to
5
That provision states in relevant part that, where an APHIS official finds
an animal is:
(a) suffering as a result of a failure of the . . . carrier to comply
with any provision of the regulations or the standards set forth in
this subchapter, the APHIS official shall make a reasonable effort
to notify the . . . carrier of the condition of the animal(s) and
request that the condition be corrected and that adequate care be
given to alleviate the animal’s suffering or distress . . . . In the
event that the . . . carrier refuses to comply with this request, the
APHIS official may confiscate the animal(s) for care, treatment,
or disposal as indicated in paragraph (b) of this section, if, in the
opinion of the Administrator, the circumstances indicate the
animal’s health is in danger.
(b) In the event that the APHIS official is unable to locate or
notify the dealer, exhibitor, intermediate handler, or carrier as
required in this section, the APHIS official shall contact a local
police or other law officer to accompany him to the premises and
shall provide for adequate care when necessary to alleviate the
animal’s suffering.
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discharge their responsibilities unless authorized to forcibly enter a facility. Aplt.
Br. at 40–41.
But § 2.129 does not apply here. By its plain language, the regulation
applies to circumstances where: (1) the licensee “refuses to comply” with an
official request to correct the animal’s suffering; and (2) the APHIS administrator
certifies that “the circumstances indicate the animal’s health is in danger.” 9
C.F.R. § 2.129(a). Here, the factual allegations in the complaint state that Big
Cats never refused to comply with a request for care or that the inspectors sought
and received an opinion from the APHIS Administrator that forcible entry was
necessary.
In fact, according to the complaint, the inspectors themselves did not think
they were engaged in a confiscation under this provision. In their internal report
on the incident, they characterized their visit as a “routine inspection” and that
they were denied access pursuant to the inspection regulation, App. 90–91, a
regulation that only allows APHIS officials to enter a business to inspect records,
photograph animals, and document noncompliance with the Act, 9 C.F.R.
§ 2.126(a). These regulations do not give a whiff of support for unannounced
forcible entry of a business.
In sum, the AWA regulatory scheme is similar to the scheme that the Court
found inadequate in Colonnade to protect constitutional rights. Absent statutory
authorization, the inspectors had no basis to forcibly enter the establishment
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without a warrant. Accordingly, Big Cats has adequately alleged that the APHIS
inspectors’ unauthorized entry violated their Fourth Amendment rights and that
the AWA did not authorize the warrantless search.
b. Clearly Established
Under qualified immunity, even if the inspectors violated the Fourth
Amendment, they are entitled to immunity if no clearly established law would
have informed them that a warrantless forcible search was improper. “A
Government official’s conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time
of the challenged conduct, ‘the contours of a right are sufficiently clear’ that
every ‘reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates
that right.’” al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083 (alterations omitted) (quoting Anderson
v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). But the plaintiff must show a Supreme
Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of
authority from other courts must supply the requisite notice. Columbian Fin.
Corp. v. Stork, 811 F.3d 390, 396 (10th Cir. 2016).
Colonnade is squarely on point. The inspection provisions allowed access
at reasonable times for surprise inspections but nowhere allowed or authorized
the use of force. Moreover, both inspection schemes provided penalties to
enforce compliance. For the tax statutes in Colonnade, Congress required a fine
for any person “who refuses to admit any officer or employee of the Treasury
Department” acting under the tax statute. Similarly, under the AWA, licensed
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businesses face civil penalties up to $10,000 for violating the statute or
corresponding regulations, thus obviating the need for forcible entry. 7 U.S.C. §
2149(b). Thus, the AWA’s scheme is like that in Colonnade, which for fifty
years has stood for the proposition that a warrant is required for forcible entry
into closed premises.
The government argues the AWA goes further than the scheme in
Colonnade or even Burger, making misconduct less obvious to inspectors. It
contends, moreover, the regulations provide for forcible entry in cases of
veterinary emergency to conduct a confiscation. As discussed above, where
inspectors believe an animal is suffering and the exhibitor refuses to provide
adequate care, the inspector may confiscate the animal if the APHIS
Administrator determines the animal’s health is in danger. 9 C.F.R. § 2.129(a).
But, according to the complaint, at no point did Big Cats refuse to provide
veterinary care, nor did the APHIS Administrator determine the tiger cubs were in
danger. They also knew that both of Big Cats’ contract veterinarians “believed
[a] one-day delay [in examination] was preferable to transporting the animals,”
App. 53, obviating the basis to believe care was urgent. And, in any event, the
inspectors did not rely on the confiscation regulations to justify their entry into
the premises, which they described as a “routine inspection” in the report filed
after the incident. It is also worth noting that neither the AWA regulations nor
applicable Animal Care Inspection Guide suggest that forcible entry is a
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permissible technique. See Supp. App. 2–19; Aplt. Br. at 27. In fact, the Guide
instructs agents to “not enter facilities with locked gates and/or No Trespassing
signs.” Supp. App. 2. The Guide further recommends law enforcement assistance
only to provide security for personal safety, and not to suggest they are necessary
to facilitate forcible entry. Id. And further at odds with the government’s
position, the Guide states “There may be times during a confiscation operation”
when inspectors should involve legal counsel “in the acquisition or service of a
subpoena or warrant.” United States Dep’t of Agric., Animal Welfare Inspection
Guide 8-28 (2013); see Aplt. Br. at 27. Thus, we see no factual or regulatory
basis for a reasonable inspection agent to use force to enter a licensee’s premises
absent an emergency or exigent circumstances. 6
Because we see no meaningful difference between the Colonnade
inspection scheme and the one here, reasonable APHIS inspectors should have
known they could not forcibly enter a business facility to perform an inspection,
absent a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement. Big Cats alleges
facts showing that the agents cut the locks to conduct a non-emergency inspection
where the regulations did not provide for forcible entry. The law is clearly
6
This is an appeal from a motion to dismiss. It is possible that after
discovery in this case we may see a different factual posture. Our task here is
based on the allegations in the complaint. If the landscape changes after
discovery, the government is entitled to seek summary judgment on qualified
immunity. For purposes of our analysis, the legal posture here does not support a
finding of a veterinary emergency or other exigent circumstances.
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established that inspection officials cannot enter business premises without a
warrant in those circumstances.
B. Section 1983
We turn lastly to the question of whether Big Cats can sue the APHIS
inspectors under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. Big Cats contends the inspectors
are subject to liability under § 1983 “because they acted under color of state law
when they induced deputies to cut chains and enter the premises. . . .” App. 57.
We disagree.
Section 1983 is not directed at conduct by federal officials. Instead, it
provides a remedy against state actors who violate a federal right, pursuant to
state authority. Fallon, supra, at 986; Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171–76
(1961), overruled in part on other grounds, Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658 (1978). For this reason, federal employees are rarely § 1983 defendants,
and “actions of the Federal Government and its officers are at least facially
exempt from [§ 1983] proscriptions.” District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S.
418, 424–25 (1973). But in some cases, federal officials may in fact act under
“color of state law” for § 1983 purposes.
The paradigmatic example is when federal officials conspire with state
officials to infringe a protected constitutional right. Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d
424, 441 (10th Cir. 1985) (“Federal officials ordinarily are not suable under
§ 1983, which requires action under color of state law, but they may be liable
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under § 1983 where, as here, they are charged with conspiring with state officers
or employees.”), vacated on other grounds, 800 F.2d 230 (10th Cir. 1986). 7 Most
courts agree that conspiracy with state actors is a requirement to finding that
federal actors jointly acted under color of state law. Strickland ex rel. Strickland
v. Shalala, 123 F.3d 863, 866–67 (6th Cir. 1997) (“[C]ourts finding that a federal
official has acted under color of state law have done so only when there is
evidence that federal and state officials engaged in a conspiracy or ‘symbiotic’
venture to violate a person’s rights under the Constitution or federal law.”).
Big Cats alleges the federal employees “acted jointly” with the deputies
when they represented they had a court order to seize the cubs, and that “[r]elying
on the USDA’s representations, the deputies cut the chains.” App. 54–55. These
are insufficient allegations to establish a conspiracy. “[U]nder established case
law, the fundamental characteristic of a conspiracy is a joint commitment to an
‘endeavor which, if completed, would satisfy all of the elements of the underlying
substantive criminal offense.’” Ocasio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1423, 1429
(2016) (alteration and citation omitted). The complaint must allege (1) an
agreement between two or more persons, with (2) an intent to achieve an unlawful
7
See also Steven H. Steinglass, Section 1983 Litigation in State Courts
§ 2.8 (2015) (“Federal officials, however, may be found to have acted under the
color of state law and thus subject to suit under § 1983 when they conspire with
state officials.”); William H. ReMine, Civil Suits for Civil Rights: A Primer on
§ 1983, Colo. Law., Nov. 1997, at 5, 6 (“Federal officials are not subject to suit
under § 1983, unless they act in conspiracy with state officials.”).
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act. Wayne R. LaFave, 2 Subst. Crim. L. § 12.2 (2d ed. 2003); see also United
States v. Hill, 786 F.3d 1254, 1266 (10th Cir. 2015) (citing the elements of a
conspiracy), cert denied, 136 S. Ct. 377 (2015). The allegations of the complaint
make it clear the El Paso County sheriff’s deputies were not engaged in an
agreement with the inspectors to pursue an unlawful act. Read most favorably to
Big Cats, the most that can be said is that the deputies were facilitating entry to
the Big Cats premises on the false representation and mistaken impression that the
inspectors had a court order to enter the facility. There was no agreement to
violate law; indeed, the El Paso County incident report in the record states the
deputies thought their actions were supported by a court order and a need to check
on the cubs’ welfare.
To hold federal officials subject to § 1983 liability based on joint action,
plaintiff must at least allege that federal and state actors shared a “common,
unconstitutional goal,” or point to a “substantial degree of cooperative action” or
“overt and significant state participation.” See Schaffer v. Salt Lake City Corp.,
814 F.3d 1151, 1157 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom
Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1454 (10th Cir. 1995)); see also Sigmon v.
CommunityCare HMO, Inc., 234 F.3d 1121, 1126 (10th Cir. 2000) (requiring
conspiracy such that the state and non-state actors “‘share[d] a common,
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unconstitutional goal’” (quoting Anaya v. Crossroads Managed Care Sys., 195
F.3d 584, 596 (10th Cir. 1999)). 8
The district court nonetheless concluded the “enlistment of state law
enforcement” was sufficient to hold federal officers liable under § 1983. The
court and the government rely on an unpublished district court case from
California for support, Reynoso v. City & County. of San Francisco, No. C 10-
00984 SI, 2012 WL 646232 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2012). In that case, San
Francisco police officers entered the plaintiff’s residence to search for drugs. But
the court found substantial concerted action by the state and federal officials.
“After the premises was secured, the ATF agents ‘merely substituted themselves
for the agents of the City and County of San Francisco in the break-in of
plaintiffs’ home and took up the search and seizure initiated by the City and
County of San Francisco authorities.’” Id. at *6 (citation omitted). Because the
federal defendants were significant participants in the state scheme, those federal
8
A plaintiff may well need to allege a higher level of coordination to show
federal officers, rather than private parties, acted under color of state law. This is
for several reasons. First, plaintiffs must overcome the presumption that
Congress did not intend for federal officers to be subject to § 1983 litigation.
Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424–25. Second, plaintiffs must overcome the presumption
that where federal and state actors come together, they are acting pursuant to
supreme law. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 568 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc)
(“[S]ince ‘federal officials typically act under color of federal law,’ they are
rarely deemed to have acted under color of state law.” (citation omitted)). We
need not resolve exactly what this showing looks like, however, because plaintiffs
fail to meet any existing analysis that would prove these non-state actors acted
under color of state law.
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defendants’ actions could “‘fairly be attributed to the state.’” Id. at *5–6 (quoting
Cabrera v. Martin, 973 F.2d 735, 742–43 (9th Cir. 1992)).
The circumstances here are quite different. The deputies were not actively
engaged in pursuing a common law enforcement objective. Nor were they
attempting to vindicate any state or county interest. They were only operating
under the false assumption that the entry was authorized under federal law and
pursuant to court order.
In sum, the complaint does not allege the federal and state actors shared an
unconstitutional goal. Nor do we find sufficient state cooperation, considering
the local deputies’ entire involvement consisted of complying with the requests of
the APHIS inspectors. More accurately, the federal officials are better seen as
acting under color of federal law—the AWA—when they instructed the state
officials to cut the locks.
Because the federal officials did not act under color of state law, the
district court erred in denying the government’s motion to dismiss the § 1983
claim.
III. Conclusion
Big Cats may proceed with its Bivens claim because no inspector would
have reasonably believed he could forcibly enter the business premises of a
licensee in these circumstances. We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s order
denying the government’s motion to dismiss the Bivens claim. We REVERSE the
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court’s order denying the government’s motion to dismiss the § 1983 claim,
however, because the federal officials did not act under color of state law.
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