Feaster v. Poppell , 62 F. App'x 913 ( 2003 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAY 1 2003
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
CLIFFORD FEASTER,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 03-6078
DAYTON J. POPPELL, Warden;
DREW EDMONDSON; STATE OF
OKLAHOMA; THE OKLAHOMA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER
Before HENRY , BRISCOE and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
Clifford Feaster, a state prisoner appearing pro se through a “next friend,”
Rudy Jaquez, requests a stay or injunction pending the appeal of the denial of his
federal habeas corpus petition. Reading his pleadings liberally, Mr. Feaster seems
to request (1) a “full and fair hearing” on probated matters he challenged in
Oklahoma state court, (2) an order requiring respondents to move him to a
hospital and to give him a competency hearing, and (3) appointment of counsel
for his state probate matters. See Pet. for Stay at 1.
Mr. Feaster’s federal habeas petition was dismissed without prejudice for
lack of exhaustion and for failure to state a cognizable habeas claim. The district
court determined that (1) Mr. Feaster had not exhausted his state remedies
regarding the challenges to his convictions because permission to file a direct
appeal had been recently granted out of time in state court and the case was
remanded for appointment of counsel; (2) his claims seeking placement in a
hospital were not cognizable under the habeas statutes and would have to be
administratively exhausted before he could file a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983; and (3) his claims regarding the state-court probate proceeding also were
not proper habeas claims.
Mr. Feaster filed a notice of appeal. On April 7, 2003, the district court
denied his request for a certificate of appealability (COA). See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1) (providing that appeal may not be taken unless a COA is first
granted). The requirement that a COA be granted before we may take the appeal
is jurisdictional. See Adams v. LeMaster , 223 F.3d 1177, 1179 (10th Cir. 2000).
And, we must have jurisdiction over a matter before we may exercise our
equitable powers to grant injunctive relief. See Knopp v. Magaw , 9 F.3d 1478,
1479-80 (10th Cir. 1993) (“subject matter jurisdiction must attach before the court
may exercise its equitable powers”); Desktop Direct, Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp. ,
993 F.2d 755, 756-57 (10th Cir. 1993) (determining appellate jurisdiction before
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considering merits of petition for stay). Thus, we must first determine whether
Mr. Feaster has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), in his underlying habeas petition before we
consider the merits of the petition for injunctive relief. We conclude that he
cannot make such a showing for substantially the same reasons stated in the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation issued February 6, 2003, and
adopted by the district court in its February 26, 2003, order.
Mr. Feaster is given leave to proceed before this court in forma pauperis.
We DENY a COA, DISMISS the appeal, and DENY the petition for injunctive
relief and all other outstanding motions as moot.
Entered for the Court
PATRICK FISHER, Clerk
By:
Deputy Clerk
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