Salazar v. Seagrave , 204 F. App'x 723 ( 2006 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
July 25, 2006
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
JOHN LESTER SALAZAR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 05-2325
(D.C. No. CIV-00-841 JP/W DS)
DR . DA NIEL SEAG RA VE, (D . N.M .)
Psychiatrist; STEVE RODR IGU EZ;
VINCE M ARQUEZ; RICK
M CG AH IE,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
W ILL B ELL; D A V ID IV ER SO N,
Defendants.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before HA RTZ, A ND ER SO N, and TYM KOVICH, Circuit Judges.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff-appellant John Salazar brought this § 1983 action against
employees of the Bernalillo County Detention Center (BCDC defendants) and
employees of the Las Vegas M edical Center (LVM C defendants) for alleged
violations of his right to be free from excessive force while a pretrial detainee.
The district court conducted a bifurcated trial, addressing first whether plaintiff
had exhausted his administrative remedies. At the conclusion of that phase of the
proceeding, the court ruled that plaintiff had failed to exhaust his remedies vis a
vis the BCDC defendants. In an order dated M arch 24, 2005, the claims against
those defendants were dismissed with prejudice.
As to the LVM C defendants, the court found that plaintiff had appropriately
exhausted his remedies, and the matter proceeded as a trial to the court on the
liability of those defendants. In an order dated September 27, 2005, the court
granted judgment for defendants and clarified that its earlier dismissal of the
BCDC defendants was without prejudice. Plaintiff appeals from this result, and
we affirm.
Appellate jurisdiction over BCDC defendants
Jurisdictional Facts
On October 7, 2005, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal in the district court
with a caption identifying “Dr. D aniel Seagrave et. al.” as defendants. The notice
states in its entirety: “Notice is hereby given that John L. Salazar, Plaintiff Pro
Se, appellant, in the above named captioned case, her[e]by appeal[s] to the United
-2-
States Court of Appeals for the 10th Tenth Circuit from a Statement of Fact and
Conclusion Of law by Judge Eginton, Stated: ‘For the foregoing reason, the court
hereby finds in favor of LV M C defendants Seagrave, M cGahie, M arquez and
R odriquez [sic] on plaintiff’s claims of excessive force.’” Opening Br. Attach. A ,
doc. 2. The certificate of service immediately following the copy of the Notice of
appeal attached to plaintiff’s opening brief indicates that it was served only on
“D iane W ebb, A ttorney for the Estate and Defendants attorney at P. O. Box AA,
Albuquerque, N.M . 87110.” There is no indication who Diane Webb is or how
she is related to this matter. Despite plaintiff’s assertion to the contrary, there is
no evidence in the record that the notice of appeal was ever served on the BCDC
defendants or their counsel.
Sometime in December 2005, however, well after the time for filing a
notice of appeal from the September 27th order had passed, plaintiff apparently
did serve counsel for the BCDC defendants with a copy of his opening brief.
Plaintiff does not dispute the BCDC defendants’ assertion that this was the first
they knew that a formal appeal had been filed. Upon receipt of the brief, the
BCDC defendants filed a motion with this court to dismiss them from the appeal
“to the extent Salazar’s appeal may apply to them.” That matter w as referred to
the panel on the merits and is now before us.
-3-
Jurisdictional Analysis
“Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure conditions federal
appellate jurisdiction on the filing of a timely notice of appeal.” Sm ith v. Barry,
502 U.S. 244, 245 (1992). Such notice must “designate the judgment, order or
part thereof being appealed.” Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B). The “appellate court
has jurisdiction to review only the judgment or part of the judgment designated in
the notice of appeal.” Averitt v. Southland M otor Inn of Okla., 720 F.2d 1178,
1180 (10th Cir. 1983).
Courts w ill liberally construe the requirements of Rule 3, occasionally
allowing some variance from the rule’s technicalities if the document filed
manages to meet the rule’s requirements. Smith, 502 U.S. at 248. “This principle
of liberal construction does not, however, excuse noncompliance with the Rule.
Rule 3’s dictates are jurisdictional in nature, and their satisfaction is a
prerequisite to appellate review . Although courts should construe Rule 3 liberally
when determining whether it has been complied with, noncompliance is fatal to an
appeal.” Smith, 502 U.S. at 248 (citations omitted).
A notice of appeal must specifically indicate the filer’s intent to obtain
appellate review in order to provide sufficient notice to other parties and the
courts. Id. “Thus, the notice afforded by a document . . . determines the
document’s sufficiency as a notice of appeal.” Id. Plaintiff’s pro se status does
-4-
not excuse him from complying with procedural rules. Ogden v. San Juan
County, 32 F.3d 452, 455 (10th Cir. 1994).
Because of the need to assess the sufficiency of notice, courts often rely on
the circumstances surrounding the putative appeal. In Cooper v. American
Automobile Insurance Co., 978 F.2d 602 (10th Cir. 1992), this court considered a
situation similar to the one at bar. There, the plaintiff had sued three entities: a
surety, the United States Department of Agriculture (USD A), and the Packers and
Stockyards Administration (PSA ). The surety filed a counterclaim seeking
indemnification. The district court granted summary judgment to the surety, then
later dismissed the USDA and the PSA on sovereign immunity grounds. As its
final ruling, the court, in an order dated February 28, 1990, granted summary
judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the surety’s counterclaim.
The plaintiff’s notice of appeal named only the February 28, 1990 judgment
as the subject of the appeal. This court was therefore required to examine the
scope of its jurisdiction on appeal, specifically whether the plaintiff had perfected
an appeal of the earlier dismissal of the claims against the United States. Holding
that he had, this court cited several factors instructive for our purposes: The
plaintiff’s notice of appeal named the United States as a defendant appellee; all
supporting papers, including the plaintiff’s docketing statement, indicated an
intent to appeal the dismissal of the claims against the United States; and,
importantly, all the documents were served on the United States. Under these
-5-
circumstances, this court held that the appeal encompassed the dismissal of the
claims against the United States. In contrast to the facts in Cooper, plaintiff here
did not specifically name the BCDC defendants in his notice of appeal and did not
serve his notice of appeal on them.
W e acknowledge the line of cases holding that naming a final judgment
generally as the matter being appealed from is sufficient to include for appellate
review all the earlier orders that have merged into the judgment. See, e.g.,
M cBride v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 281 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing
cases). Here, however, plaintiff specifically limited his appeal to that part of the
judgment finding no liability on the part of the LV M C defendants. “If a notice of
appeal is deliberately limited to part of a judgment, the appellant cannot
thereafter unilaterally expand the scope of the appeal to include the matters
originally omitted.” 16A Charles Alan W right, Arthur R. M iller & Edward H.
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3949.4 (3d ed. 1999); see also Cunico
v. Pueblo Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 431, 444 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating that plaintiff’s
clear intention to appeal only a portion of district court’s order limits this court’s
jurisdiction). 1
1
Additionally, the fact that plaintiff so specifically designated the part of the
judgment he w ished to appeal makes immaterial the fact that the district court’s
final order clarified that the BCDC defendants had been dismissed without
prejudice.
-6-
W e also recognize that, under some circumstances, a litigant may perfect an
appeal by filing a document other than a formal notice of appeal if that document
is filed within the deadline for appeal. Smith, 502 U.S. at 248-49. Contrary to
plaintiff’s situation, however, his opening brief was filed and served on the
BCDC defendants well after the time allowed for appeal and thus cannot serve as
a surrogate notice of appeal sufficient to invoke this court’s jurisdiction over
those defendants.
Plaintiff here was required to file something to indicate his intent to appeal
both the ruling in favor of the BCDC defendants and the separate and later ruling
in favor of the LVM C defendants. See Nolan v. United States Dep’t of Justice,
973 F.2d 843, 846-47 (10th Cir. 1992). Because he did not do so, his attempt to
bring the BCDC defendants into this appeal must fail.
M erits as to the LVM C defendants
As mentioned above, after a six-day bench trial of the LVM C defendants,
the district court found defendants not liable on plaintiff’s claims of excessive
force relating to incidents occurring on September 1 and September 8, 1998.
Relying on the standard set forth in Giron v. Corrections Corp. of America,
191 F.3d 1281, 1289 (10th Cir. 1999), the district court concluded that plaintiff
had failed to “demonstrate that defendants maliciously and sadistically applied
force to cause him harm on September 1, 1998.” R. Vol. XII, doc. 409 at 13.
Further, the court found that “the degree of force used under these circumstances
-7-
was necessary to control plaintiff,” and that “defendants w ere not involved in
plaintiff’s handling and transport on September 8, 1998.” Id. at 14.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that 1) the trial judge was biased against him;
2) his case against the BCDC defendants should be reopened to receive new
evidence; 3) there was insufficient evidence to find for defendants, including his
argument that the evidence established that one, if not all, of the defendants were
present during the alleged beating on September 8; 4) he exhausted his remedies
vis a vis the LV M C defendants; and 5) defendants were not entitled to qualified
immunity. W e will address these issues in the order presented.
“In an appeal from a bench trial, we review the district court’s factual
findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. . . . Thus, we will
reverse the district court’s finding only if it is without factual support in the
record or if, after review ing all the evidence, we are left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.” Keys Youth Servs., Inc. v. City of
Olathe, 248 F.3d 1267, 1274 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Plaintiff points to a remark made by the district court judge informing
plaintiff that his case would eventually end up in this court. Plaintiff view s this
remark as evidence that the judge had already decided that plaintiff would lose in
the district court even before he had the opportunity to put on evidence. Plaintiff
misconstrues the judge’s remarks. The judge made his statement about eventual
-8-
appeal in the context of the fact that he had found plaintiff had not exhausted his
remedies vis a vis the BCDC defendants. The judge was trying to explain to
plaintiff that, assuming he wanted to undo that judgment, the remedy would be an
appeal to the Tenth Circuit. W hen plaintiff asked the judge whether he should go
forward with the merits of his case, the judge encouraged him to do so. The
judge correctly advised plaintiff to present his whole case at that time, noting that
he should not “rely on the Tenth Circuit [] to do it [for you]”. R. Supp. Vol. V at
139. Far from being biased against plaintiff, the judge was extremely patient and
gentle with this pro se litigant, helping him on numerous occasions to understand
the proceeding.
Plaintiff repeats the argument made to the district court that he should be
allowed to reopen his case to prove that he exhausted his remedies with regard to
the BCDC defendants. As we have already held, however, this court has no
jurisdiction over those defendants, making this argument irrelevant.
Next, plaintiff challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing his
interpretation of the testimony and emphasizing why he should have prevailed.
As the district court correctly observed, however, this was a credibility case, and
trial judges are in the best position to evaluate such matters. W e find no error in
the judge’s conclusion that plaintiff failed to prove defendants were malicious and
sadistic in their treatment of him. There is more than adequate factual support in
the record to support the court’s decision. See Keys Youth Servs., 248 F.3d at
-9-
1275. As for plaintiff’s assertion that the evidence showed one or more
defendants w ere present during the September 8th incident, he does not point to
any evidence in the record to substantiate that claim. See SEC v. Thom as,
965 F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting that the court will not “sift through”
the record to find support for a claimant’s arguments).
Plaintiff’s last two arguments are irrelevant. He argues that he exhausted
his remedies vis a vis the LVM C defendants. The court did not hold otherw ise.
He also argues that those defendants should not have been afforded qualified
im munity. They w eren’t. H ad the district court come to either of these two
conclusions, plaintiff would not have been able to present his case on the merits
against defendants.
The motion of the BCDC defendants to dismiss this appeal is GRANTED to
the extent that they were purported appellees in this matter. The judgment of the
district court is A FFIR ME D.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
-10-